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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
FILM 881 –
Philosophy of religion - 2013
Quotations
and paraphrases from prescribed reading material and
comments.
Student: Mr. M.D.
Pienaar (23990163)
CONTENTS
Werkopdrag
LW: Hierdie
werkopdrag moet die week na die eerste kontakgeleentheid per
epos ingehandig word.
OPDRAG:
Begrippe en rasionaal
Skryf ʼn opstel van ongeveer 1200 woorde waarin
die volgende vrae beantwoord word:
Maak seker jou opdrag word in ʼn akademiese
formaat, waarin jy duidelike bronverwysings aantoon,
geskryf.
Write an essay of
approximately 1 200 words, which answers the following
questions.
1.
What is religion?
2.
What is philosophy
of religion?
3.
What value and
limitations do arguments about god's existence have? Explain
with reference to the arguments discussed during the class.
The prescribed
reading materials were read and quotations and paraphrases
were typed from the reading materials with own comments. A
discussion class, lead by dr. Mark Rathbone was attended on
20 July 2013. The quotations, paraphrases and comments were
edited into this document after the class. The assignment
consists only of two conclusions. The rest of the document
after the conclusions is for referencing purposes. Clouser's
non-reductionist theory of reality explains why it is
difficult, maybe impossible, to reduce the opinions and
facts, to 1 200 words, with accurate references between
read works and own writings, due to heuristics and
hermeneutics, which are interrelated.
Eshleman distinguishes Philosophy of religion,
Religious philosophy, Religious studies and Theology.
Philosophy of religion has 'belief' as the 'fundamental
aspect'.[1]
Religious philosophy refers to beliefs due to abstracts of
specific religious scripts. Theology is a type of Religious
philosophy.[2]
Religious studies refer to the study of deterministic
effects of specific religions, for example as part of
psychology.[3]
Religious studies and Philosophy of religion can support one
another because both refer to "public reason".[4]
Religious studies however does not have 'truth' as objective
and Philosophy of religion has realization of 'truth' as
objective.[5]
Eshleman defines in words, religion, as the object of
Philosophy of religion. 'Ultimate Sacred Reality' is part of
his definition of religion. He states Aristotle argued
against definitions in his Nicomachean ethics. [6]
Pojman and Rea's Philosophy of religion
investigates what parts of religion are true and what parts
are false. Even if God does not exist, the effects of the
idea are substantial enough to investigate the different
aspects of religious belief.[7]
Determinism is thus an aspect of truths, to them. Fallacies
can be objects of reality due to lies' deterministic
effects.
Griffiths explains religion as an account[8]
with 'formal' and 'phenomenal' 'properties'. Formal objects
relate to abstractions of the account and phenomena relates
to what is in the mind of the giver of the account.[9]
Phenomena are conscious, and subconscious, for example, some
humans, like 'bats', think they are Ones, something
Griffiths claims he can establish with "reasonable"
certainty.[10]
Truths are not important to accounts of religion because
truths relate to non-phenomenal issues. The Christian
account possesses truths as non-phenomenal issue. He does
not focus on the substance of religions but rather on the
practices, which are taught to adherents of religious
beliefs.[11]
Religious accounts have three phenomenal properties[12]:
comprehensiveness[13],
unsurpassability[14],
and centrality[15].
A Christian account includes a "creator"[16]
(creators), "God"[17]
and a divine agent who is other than those offering the
account.[18]
Hudson identifies the "concept of god" as
constitutive of "religious belief".[19]
He uses two examples, namely "objects"[20]
on which physical science is dependent and "moral
obligations"[21]
on which morality is dependent, to explain his view. The
dependencies are relevant, because the subjects cannot be
practiced without reference to the subject matters.[22]
Secondly, the existence of the subject matters cannot be
doubted, they are presupposed as existing.[23]
Thirdly the concepts "object" and "moral obligation" are
dependent on definitions.[24]
Fourthly the concepts of "objects" and "moral obligation"
cannot be further reduced to other concepts. An object
cannot be reduced to something in the mind, because the
images of hallucinations cannot be argued to be objects of
physical science. Moral obligation cannot be reduced to
utility because when you say moral obligation, is to do
that, which enhances utility, the statement leads to a
tautology.[25]
There is a distinct difference[26]
between a believer and "god" because god is what is
believed-in by a believer even if the belief is to become
part of God. "Transcendence" can happen in two ways: (a)
empirical transcendence, which postulate God as other than
human, and (b) logical transcendence, which use metaphors of
worldliness. Hudson states that empirical transcendence is
the dominant mode of transcendence currently.[27]
To summarize; Philosophy of religion, a subject
of (module for) study, is part[28]
of Philosophy. Philosophies of religion have religions as
objects. Religions are movements, which imply "religious
belief". Reliances on greater powers than selves are
essential part of religions, which can include reliance on
Others-than-only-selves and/or Metaphysical truths. Theology
is a type of religion. Religious studies happen when the
deterministic[29]
effects of religions, are objects of scientific
investigation, for example by psychologists.
Van Niekerk rejects
the Sociological, Freudian and Genetic theories for the
existence of God. These theories relate to the study of
deterministic factors on humans as part of religious
studies. According to Van Niekerk, God is explained by
mystical experiences, which are parts of persons' lives. Metaphysical
effects due to metaphors
like "Father; Son and Holy Spirit" and "Mother of God" and
"Son of God", on own thoughts[30]
in him and i and most other fellow humans are relevant.
The cosmological
argument is unacceptable because it presupposes the whole of
the universe.[31]
We cannot postulate the whole of the universe because our
intellect and senses cannot fathom all of it. The
cosmological argument is thus false because it claims to do
what cannot be done, i believe. The arguments however have a
purpose, but too much capital should not be used for it.
The teleological
argument is usable because it acknowledges the
responsibility of humans as part of God, to create "utopias"
for Others-than-only-selves on Earth. Human reason is thus
postulated as important via teleological arguments, to
improve our conditions. The value of
truths in the design argument is important because like
Aristotle stated, fallaciousness is recognized by the
inability for being used in a process of assembly.[32]
The fallacious postulates, which religions sometimes use,
which cause false phenomena in minds can only have as
purpose, the transfer of wealth and not creating new wealth.
Aristotle (1986: 140,
406b) stated in De Anima that what is good for one group
cannot be good for another group. Creators (gods and
goddesses), who are subjects of theodicies, are not really
part of religious groups because religious groups are
dependent on the creativities of creators and wealth of
other groups. War and extortion are therefore integral parts
of some religions because the primary method of survival is
not creating but rather the appropriation of things already
created. Creators and creativities are postulated as evil
and therefore creators should be sacrificed. Theodicies have
a double purpose. First creativities are appropriated from
creators, whilst murdering them slowly and secondly,
populations, which are watching the mimetic shows of
sacrificing gods and goddesses, are being controlled, due to
fear, of the devils, who put theodicies in practice.
Despotisms, which happen when gods and goddesses crack due
to victimizations, are also relevant. Non-pathological
criminal incapacity (NPCI) is legal term, which means that a
person who cracks due to victimizations of theodicies for
example cannot be found guilty of misdeeds due to criminal
incapacity. Such people then enter the Calvinist economic
system in their despotic forms and the system depends on the
fear they instill after having been changed into despots by
society. Societies thus then still depend on them. Where the
dependence was previously on their creativities the
dependence, after cracking is on their despotic forms. I
know this because i have been the subject of a societal
"theodicy", i became aware of since 1999. I did not crack
but i had to give a warning to victimizers, due to suicidal
and violent thoughts. The victimizers then dismissed me from
employment with a false accusation of assault. They claimed
the verbal warning was a threatening. It could not have been
a threatening because threatening raises risks, whereas
warning decreases risks, which my actions did. The
victimizers' actions continuously increased risks until my
warning of possible NPCI was made.
The ontological
argument can be important if it postulates humans as part of
God, because then it could have similar effects as
teleological arguments. It is however subjective[33]
importance, because people do not agree about their
definitions of God. Ontological arguments start with
definitions[34] of God. Everybody do
not define God the same.[35]
Studies of metaphysical truths
(mett), can only be studies and presentations of
deterministic effects on selves (heuristic experience).
Studies of mett can also be hermeneutic-heuristic but that
would be anthropological intrusive action.
Although Hudson postulates that current common
empiricisms[36],
view "god" as incorporeal, i do not agree with him because
most of the authors refer to God with small letters, which
implies anthropomorphism. As part of the word God, "God" and
"god" are used by authors. Other authors use "goddesses",
"gods" and "goddess". When the writers' opinions, under
investigation, are portrayed with pronouns for God, small
letters are the norm. The mix of small letters and capital
letters implies that God is anthropomorphic and incorporeal,
which is much easier to accept when plurality of God is
accepted. Stating that only one human is part of God is
irrational, because no empirical evidences for such a
postulate exist. Stating that many humans are part of God is
feasible, if the idea about perfection of the
anthropomorphic Part of God is not accepted. Enoch was taken
into heaven alive, which seams greater than that, which
happened with Jesus.
The analysis of
capital letters and use of singular and plural references to
God show partly what authors think. All the authors used
singular references to God. Clouser who
is another religious writer we studied, used capital letters
and small letters in his singular references when he used
the words "transcendent Creator", "transcendent creator" and
"himself" and "His".[37]
Small letters are probably
references to human parts of God although they did not write
it explicitly, because of empiricist dogma (deceit as
necessity), which can hamper careers, if references to God
are not in the singular. Psychological barriers of selves
being the only "One" and fears of being sacrificed are
relevant. Capital letters refer to the metaphysical part of
God. It could be argued that when writers use only capital
letters they postulate God as totally metaphysical with
utmost empirical dogma. Coherencies exist between the real
definitions of words and language structures in minds of
language users. It makes not sense in my mind to use the
word "god" or "goddess" without putting an "a" in front of
"god" or "goddess". The words "God", "gods" and "goddesses"
can however be used without an "a". God is a neutral[38]
word without sexuality because God has as parts, gods,
goddesses and metaphysical parts. An "a" in front of "God"
does not make sense. This difference of language structures,
i assume, relates to real meanings of words.
Languages differ and
Bible versions differ, which influenced generations with
regard to singularity, plurality and corporeality of God.
Singular references in English to the "Lord" (singular) of
the Bible and "I" (capital letter), influenced English
language users differently than Afrikaans's references to
"dames" and "Here" (plural) and "ek" (small letter). Before the
fall into sin for example in Gen. 1:26 of the Bible,
references to God are in the plural (Elohim) and sometimes
in the singular with singular pronouns. Whether pronouns are
spelled with a capital H or small h for "Him", "His", "him"
and "his", differ from Bible to Bible. The incident where
Isaac needed a lamb to take his place when Abraham wanted to
sacrifice him relates. In the English New International
version of the Bible, reference is made to God "himself" who
will supply the lamb and in the 1933 Afrikaans version
reference is made to God "Homself" who will supply the lamb.
In the 1983 Afrikaans version the words "sy eie" was used.[39]
p.3
Religion is the
object of thought, which is philosophized about. Some
religions do not have God as the object of religious concern
for example Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism and Shinto. Belief is
the 'fundamental aspect', which is scrutinized by philosophy
of religion.
p.3-4
Religions have
various forms and religion needs to be defined to include
all the variations to be able to see how religious practices
relate to religious belief.
p.4
Some say the main
purpose of religion is to identify something to rely on
during difficult times and others say religion has a social
function. Some say religion should not be defined following
Aristotle who said that theories should not ascribe
characteristics, which are not justifiable.[40]
Eshleman constructed
a definition for religion to be wide enough to include all
religions, to exclude what is clearly not religion and to
allow for ambiguous cases. His definition is: "By means of
an interwoven set of symbols, narratives, doctrines,
rituals, ethical prescriptions, and social institutions, a
religion aims to provide an appropriate way of being related
cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally (both
individually and collectively) to that which is conceived of
as Ultimate Sacred Reality."
"The functional
aspect stresses that religion aims to bring human beings
into proper alignment with that which is conceived of as
Ultimate Sacred Reality."
p.5
Philosophy of
religion focuses on the ' "cognitive" component' of
religion, that which purports to "belief".
Philosophy of
religion can be distinguished from religious philosophy.
Philosophy of religion is practiced parallel to philosophy
of science, philosophy of law etc. Religious philosophy is
viewpoints as a result of abstractions from specific
religious texts or the whole of the specific texts. Theology
is religious philosophy.
p.5-6
Philosophy of
religion can represent an opposing attitude to religious
philosophy of a culture. Although the term 'philosophy of
religion' became regularly used during the 20th
century it existed before when philosophers like Socrates
opposed the mainstream religions of their time.
p.7
Philosophy of
religion is done with "public reason" in mind and religious
philosophy with specific scripture in mind.
p.8
"Public reason" is
also relevant at other ' "religious studies" ' for
example when religions are viewed from another subject field
for example psychology or sociology. The emphasis is then
not on religious belief but such studies can enhance
understanding by philosophy of religion. In these other
religious studies truths of religions are not important but
rather the deterministic effects of the religions.
Thus philosophy of
religion is a part of philosophy as a whole, which has as
central importance "religious belief". Where religious
studies do not emphasize truths philosophers of religion do
emphasize truths.
p.9.10
Eshleman's philosophy
of religion incorporates religions from the East (China,
Japan) and the West (Germanic-Latin areas).
p.xiii-xvi
Their philosophy of religion investigates what
parts of religion are true and what parts are false. Even if
God does not exist the effects of the idea were substantial
enough to investigate the different aspects of religious
belief.
"A religion is, for those who have it (or,
better, are had by it), principally an account. To be
religious is to give an account, where giving an account of
something means to make it the object of some intentional
activity – to tell a story about it, have some beliefs about
it, direct some actions toward it, or the like."[42]
"Accounts that people offer may be distinguished one from
another by their scope, their object, and the kinds of
intentional activity they use."[43]
Intentional activity relates to interests.[44]
Defining properties of religious accounts are
both formal and phenomenal. "They are formal because they
are abstracted from the particularities of any particular
religious account, and as a result address little if any of
the substance of such an account. And they are phenomenal
because they are not properties intrinsic to the account
itself, but rather properties that explain how the account
seems or might seem to those who offer it."[45]
He expands phenomenal later to include properties, which
believers cannot identify due to their intimate knowledge of
their beliefs when he compares some humans with bats
thinking they are ones. He thus expands phenomenal
properties to properties he can postulate with "reasonable"
certainty.[46]
Truths are not important to accounts of religion because
truths relate to non-phenomenal issues. The Christian
account of religion possesses truths as non-phenomenal
issue. The benefit of his method according to him is that he
does not have to focus on whether a religious account is
true or not. He does not focus on the substance of religions
but rather on the practices, which are taught to adherents
of religious beliefs.[47]
Religious accounts have thus three phenomenal properties:
comprehensiveness, unsurpassability, and centrality. An
account, which lacks one of these three properties, is not a
religious account. Religious people therefore give an
account of these three properties.[48]
An account is religious when it includes all
other accounts. Griffiths has more than one comprehensive
account. His Christian religion is a comprehensive account
and his belief in prime numbers as representative of all
things is another comprehensive account. The two accounts
support each other.[49]
A comprehensive account about numbers has however not always
unsurpassability and centrality and is therefore not
religious.[50]
Unsurpassability means that the essential parts
of the account do not change. His account about prime
numbers representing everything is unsurpassable and
comprehensive but centrality is another property needed for
a religious account.[51]
"For an account to seem central to you it must
seem to be directly relevant to what you take to be the
central questions of your life, the questions around which
your life is oriented." It should include how you treat
others. Centrality relates to what selves should do and not
do.[52]
"That religious accounts must be central as
well as unsurpassable and comprehensive is among the things
that make it possible to be a person and yet not offer one."[53]
He then implicitly claims the "one" he refers to being
offered is the account he offers and not a person. Persons
cannot have more than one account central to their religion.[54]
Offering a religious account requires a lot of
skill and information.[55]
Offering accounts can therefore improve or become worse.[56]
It includes a divine agent who is other than
those offering the account.[57]
The account is a response to the "creator" who became
incarnate.[58]
He spells God with a capital letter.[59]
We should direct our actions away from ourselves towards God
and fellow humans.[60]
Jesus of Nazareth is our example we should follow.[61]
Actions of a Christian account include worshipping, praying
and using the Bible.[62]
"I want to put forward a certain view of the
logical foundation of religious belief. It is, in a
sentence, the view that religious belief is constituted by
the concept of god."[63]
Hudson uses two examples namely objects on
which physical science is dependent and moral obligations on
which morality is dependent to explain his view. The
dependencies are relevant because the subjects cannot be
practiced without reference to the subject matters.[64]
Secondly the existence of the subject matters cannot be
doubted, they are presupposed as existing. It can be argued
about what specifically are valid objects and what
specifically is a valid moral obligation, but objects per se
and moral obligations per se are presupposed as existing.[65]
Thirdly the concepts "object" and "moral obligation" are
dependent on definitions for physical science and ethical
studies to proceed. Wittgenstein called these definitions
' "grammatical propositions" '. [66]
Fourthly the concepts of objects and moral obligation cannot
be further reduced to other concepts. An object cannot be
reduced to something in the mind because the images of
hallucinations cannot be argued to be objects of physical
science. Moral obligation cannot be reduced to utility
because when you say moral obligation is to do what enhances
utility the statement leads to a tautology.[67]
"The concept of god constitutes religious
belief.."[69]
There is a distinct difference[70]
between a believer and "god" because god is what is
believed-in by a believer even if the belief is to become
part of god. There are three characteristics of god, which
are common to all kinds of religious belief:[71]
(1) First, god is "aware"
of the believer (2) second, god is "agency". Agency
means that god causes things to change or be affected in a
way, which is part of the belief. (3) third "transcendence" ,
which can happen in two ways: (a) empirical transcendence,
which postulate god as other than human, (b) logical
transcendence, which use metaphors of worldliness.
Hudson states that empirical transcendence is
the dominant mode of transcendence currently.[72]
The topic he raises is the claim of the
existence of "God"[73],
which he calls theism. He does not claim there is a God he
merely states what theism claims.[74]
"Theism claims that God is a personal
being—that is, in some sense a person. By a person I mean an individual
with basic powers (to act intentionally), purposes, and
beliefs."[75]
Swinburne acknowledges truths as knowledge.[76]
God according to theism is neither male nor female therefore
using "he" to refer to God is problematic but English has
not another better pronoun.[77]
Theists claim that God ("he") a person creates ex nihilo, is
omniscient and perfectly free.[78]
God cannot however cause contradictions for example, make a
circle a square whilst being a circle, or make the universe
exist and not exist at the same time.[79]
God cannot know what humans will do in the future freely
because he created humans who are free agents.[80]
According to theism he is eternal[81],
which means he is outside of time, which Swinburne states is
nonsensical to his understanding. Swinburne thus prefers
"eternal" to mean everlasting instead of outside of time.
God is supposed to be a bodiless person and can therefore be
omnipresent and "he is the creator of the universe, and .. the sustainer
of the universe"[82]
God brings things to be in a non-basic way and
sometimes in a basic way with miracles.[83]
God is supposed to be perfectly good.[84]
"Now, if there are moral truths—truths about what is morally
good and bad—an omniscient person will know what they are.
If, for example, lying is always morally wrong, God will
know that."[85]
God cannot make bad good, for example he cannot require to
torture children for fun.[86]
Theists have different opinions about whether morality
exists independent of God.[87]
Lastly God cannot be human because having
eternity is an essential property of God.[88]
p.54
Van Niekerk distinguishes between a personal
"god" and the "God" who created the universe. The God who
created the universe is also Jesus of Nazareth as the ruler
of a vast kingdom with no end. This God is the focus of
Christians. Van Niekerk searches for reasons of religious
belief in God, the One who as transcendent being is referred
to as Him. Transcendent means He is outside of experience.
p.55-57
Religions are explained with naturalistic
motivations we as humans always had. The inclination to
believe in God/gods relate to methods of survival and
ancient ("oer") tendencies. Van Niekerk does not agree with
these explanations. They are:
Emile
Durkheim and other French sociologists propagated that
religious motivations are ways that reality is explained to
influence populations to act in a specific way. <p.56>
Society is thus an entity, which is more than the individual
parts. Society is transcendent because it is not visible as
an object. Societies generate belief systems, which are not
controlled by an individual. Such a belief system may blind
a whole group of people to not realize that their actions
take place to benefit the whole of society. <Self: Saying
actions benefit society could be contradicting because he
first said the purpose is to influence. The influencing
could thus be for society as a whole or for that part of
society who does the influencing.> Society is the
transcendent entity and not God. This theory explains times
of nationalism during war and is also the functioning of
primitive societies. Religion according to this view
originates in the Latin word ligare, which means
to bind together. <p.57> This theory practiced,
implies that people are accepted into society through
rituals and also excommunicated from society with rituals.
p.57-59
Freud
devised
a psychological theory. We are subject to natures forces,
which we personify into a Super-person. We can thus react to
these influences in a way to protect ourselves against the
influence of nature. <p.58> Christianity did this by
creating the Father figure who we are subjects to. Religion
will end when humans subject nature to human reason with
scientific inventions.
<p.59> Freud explained human religious instinct
with his Oedipus complex. After Oedipus's sons killed him
they had no father figure who could give security and
therefore God is mythologized to give security. According to
Freud it is also why incest is not allowed.
p.59-61
According
to
this naturalistic theory religion is encoded in our genes to
survive optimally. The need for God thus preceded God, the
idea. The idea was then entrenched in our genes to overcome
cheating methodologies.
p.61
Van Niekerk motivates the sociological theory
false because in times of societal crisis society is clearly
separated from God when society is blamed for problems and
God is used to motivate a change of direction.
p.62
Freud's theory is not true because many
children did not have a stable father figure, which they can
project towards a Father in heaven.
The genetic theory is also unacceptable because
it refers to spirituality in general and not specifically to
God.
p.61-62
Van Niekerk's theory is that mystery is the
reason for a belief in God. We orientate ourselves to
reality but we realize that we do not know everything about
reality. God thus represents that part of reality we do not
know but has an influence in our lives. It thus relates to
our deepest fears and most exulted joys. Rudolf Otto
influenced him in constructing his theory.
p.64
Modern science has as purpose to remove the
wonder of religion whereas ancient Greek philosophy wanted
to expose the wonder of the myth.
p.64-67
Mysteries can be distinguished from problems.
Mysteries are not objective and available outside of us to
investigate in order to solve problems. We are part of
mysteries and it can only be investigated in a transcending
way that surpasses the subject-object dichotomy.
p.67
Knowledge about mysteries is not complete, but
knowledge becomes deeper without reaching the essence of
mysteries.
p.69
Knowledge of mysteries touches our own
existence because we become part of mysteries. There is thus
an existential importance in studying mysteries.
p.70
Making sense of mysteries encompass knowledge
of wholes.
p.70-71
Making sense of mysteries implies to make peace
with uncertainties, whilst trying to remove uncertainties.
p.71-75
God is the ultimate mystery of our existence
and of language. The mystery of the One God who is
pronounced with references to "Him" and "Father" is the
furthest limit and mystery of language, which can be reached
without being incomprehensible to others.
p.242
The many cosmological arguments have in common
that the argument starts from the world or something general
about the world for example change, motion or causation.
Cosmological arguments are par excellence philosophers'
arguments for theism. Other arguments for example the design
argument starts from something in the world. <self: It
seems thus the cosmological argument entails a view of the
whole of the world as presupposition.>
Lebniz's version of the argument includes an
assumption, the "principle
of sufficient reason". Nothing occurs without
sufficient reason. The argument states that everything of
the whole is contingent on something else, which caused what
is. The causes can be traced back rationally to a first
cause, which itself was its own cause.
p.243
Arguments against this proof ask how can we be
sure everything has a reason and also how can anything be
the cause of itself. Kant's critique was based on the 2nd
objection. Kant states that the cosmological argument is
dependent on the ontological argument, which postulates
existence as proof. The ontological argument was refuted
therefore the cosmological argument as well. Mackie says
Kant's reasoning is misleading because if essence and
existence are equated then first cause can be postulated
without relying on existence. <self: the most effective
argument i remember against the ontological argument is that
it is based on a definition. Everybody do not define God the
same.[89]
I stopped reading Mackies arguments on p. 243 because it
seems to me a waste of time to try and reason about things i
know not about. Kant confirmed my feeling and his authority
is enough to substantiate the feeling.>
p.259
David Hume was the most critical against the
design argument. The design argument states that the world
looks like an ordered and good whole and only an intelligent
being could have created such a state. <self: The value
of truth in the design argument is important because like
Aristotle stated fallaciousness is recognized by the
inability being used in a process of assembly.[90]>
Hambourger
reasons about a single being who is designer.
p.260
Hambourger argues that natural phenomena can be
explained as ultimate design by analogy. An eye for example
can make persons think of a perfect machine. Human artifacts
are designed and therefore a conclusion can be made that
natural things were designed. The argument fails because
principles of induction prescribe that nothing should be
induced by analogy.
Anselm's ontological argument relates to God as
perfection.[91]
His argument relates to metaphysical truths (mett), which we
cannot fathom except for the inspirational physical effects.
Anselm's rational argument relates to Plato's perfect forms,
which inspire humans. Aquinas's critique of Anselm was
influenced by Aristotle's empiricism. The argument
explicitly excludes humans as part of God because humans
cannot be perfect, but that is not how Anselm intended it.
'Perfect' is a transcendental concept to inspire. In
reference to Anselm's argument, Aquinas decided to not quote
Anselm.[92]
With reference to Anselm's argument Anselm refers to Psalm
14:1[93]
and Aquinas refers to Psalm 13:1[94].
Aquinas thus refers to David as a fool and Anselm refers to
David postulating others as fools. Existence as predicate is
an integral part of the ontological argument. When something
is existing, ontological
arguments claim it has greater[95]
importance than when not existing but "is existing" is argued by
for example Kant as not being a property and some people
love to call such arguments "queer"[96].
Why "is existing" as greater
than metaphysical, is postulated as "queer" could be related
to psychological issues. If for example two metaphysical
concepts exist; honesties and deceits, but not one on Earth
has the ability to talk, the concepts would get greater
importance when groups of talkers put the concepts in
practice. If two groups; the-honest and deceivers, compete
by putting the concepts in practice, the result will show
which group is greater and the result will put higher value
to the winning concept than when the concept exists just as
idea. This argument holds even if none of the groups are
perfect but the one group teaches the other group something
of value.
"Werkopdrag
Opsomming
Maak ʼn opsomming van al sewe bogenoemde temas.
Dit moet in ʼn opstel van ongeveer 1200 woorde gedoen word.
Dui ook aan in jou opstel watter een (of meer) van hierdie
argumente is vir jou meer oortuigend as die ander, en
hoekom."
An assignment, as
stated below, about the topics in the Table of contents
above for FILM 881 (Sistematiek II), also titled Philosophy
of religion relates. The module is prescribed by North-West
University as part of work to complete an M.Phil
(Philosophy) degree. The educators are Dr. Mark Rathbone and
Dr. Anné Verhoef.
Make a summary of the seven topics in the
Contents. Choose the most convincing argument from the seven
topics to prove the existence of God and write an essay of
1200 words in which you scrutinize the argument.
The first problem is that God is not ontologically
defined. God must be defined before God's existence can be
logically proved. The following problem is to identify the
proofs, that fit the definition of God.
God are all honest men (gods) and women
(godesses), who therefor can assemble their truths and
knowledge with integrated thoughts for good use.
Metaphysical truth (mett), gives us the courage to be honest
and to create, whilst devils go about their sacrificing
methodology of survival. This definition of God is best
explained by Van Niekerk's problem of the evils, which
relates to Paul Copan's moral argument and Christianity's
sacrificed (step)sons of a matriarchal pantheistic system of
an earlier time and Freud's revengeful sacrifice of fathers
of a patriarchal pagan system of a following time. The focus
is on Van Niekerk's argument.
The prescribed works in the List of references
were studied. Quotes, paraphrases and comments were typed in
a summary. The assignment consists of "Proving God's
existence with Van Niekerk's problem of the evils".
Practical issues are relevant with regard to the
evils of the world.[97]
If we want to live honestly, Jesus of Nazareth is a good
example of the practical issues which are relevant to honest
lives.[98]
This statement by Van Niekerk confirms that the Christian
definition of God is not correct because of the weakness of
singularity. The Christian definition thus supports a
methodology of imparting of creative ideas whilst
'sacrificing' creators whilst motivating sacrifices of
children who 'should' "grow up". This argument supports my
definition of God, because in effect, creativities are
sacrificed by Christianity, which eventually will lead to
stagnant societies. After that happened territories will be
colonized by more creative sacrificers and the previous
sacrificers will move away after being colonized, because
they will be despised and they will have the financial means
to move away, due to their sacrificing of others.
Van Niekerk identifies evil as that what causes
suffering. He asks how existence of almighty good God can be
true together with the existing evils of the world.[99]
This almighty good God, which Van Niekerk questions, is the
incorporeal God of Christianity, which, because of its
immateriality, singularity and weakness, cannot oppose evils
currently. God is not responsible for the evils, "We" ("Ons") are.[100]
"We" are the devils of my definition of God. Van Niekerk
refers to God as "He". A question is why doesn't "He" stop
the evils because Christians claim "He" can if "He" wants
to.[101]
"He" cannot stop the evils because "He" relates to
superstitious beliefs, which are not true. There is not
enough empirical evidence of a supernatural incorporeal
force, which protect creative individuals, when isolated.
That force should be realized in other gods and goddesses,
who help to uphold laws of survival by being creative.
"Moral" evils are those evils "We" are responsible for and
"amoral" evils are the results of natural disasters for
example earthquakes and tsunamis, which were not directly
caused by humans.[102]
Negative effects of "moral" evils are the results of
dishonesties, which remove abilities to be creative due to
un-integrated thoughts, which cannot be assembled due to its
fallaciousness. People then become dependent on sacrificing
others for survival. "Amoral" evils can only be overcome by
creativities, for example in Japan where some found ways to
build constructions that are not affected by earthquakes.
Real creativities could annul "amoral" evils if Paul was
right in Romans 8 [103],
when he wrote "amoral" evils are caused by immoral behavior
of some.
The word holocaust was derived from two Greek
words. Holo,
which means whole ("algeheel"), and caustos, which
means the burning ("verbranding"). Originally it referred to
burnings of sacrificial animals.[104]
Modern technology, which was used during the holocaust,
makes it an obscene event. Obscene partly because modern
technology was for example stated by Francis Bacon as tools
to be used for the good of humans.[105]
Early Christianity defended evils with the word theodicy.
The word was derived from theos (god) and dike (justice).[106]
Sacrificing of humans, whether by murder or
imparting of ideas, or revenge for murder, or imparting of
ideas, result from own lack of creativities and
non-acceptance of difficulties, for example lack of luxury.
The seven deadly sins were identified as sources of evil.
Augustine explained theodicies originated as a
result of Lucifer, who was excommunicated by God.[107]
Lucifer thus became more evil because of his isolation and
as part of his consequential evilness he tempted Eve.
Inherited sin after the fall into sin, of Adam and Eve, is
the result of people not honoring God with their lives. The
fall into sin caused immoral lifestyles whereby people make
other people suffer. [108]
Immorality and the fall into sin, according to Paul in
Romans 8 caused the instable "amoral" events, which are not
under control of humans. Theodicies result from the
disciplining actions of God. The hell was postulated as
infinite punishment to people who do not share in Christ's
redeeming action.[109]
The argument about Lucifer supports the
argument further that God cannot be singular because
singularity of Lucifer made him more evil after plural God
isolated him. Isolation is not good for anyone and therefore
isolation is evil. Persons do not isolate themselves.
Humility is an individual attribute after humiliation by
groups, but there is not a word—isolity—after isolation by
groups. Isolity does not exist. Due to the weakness of
singularity, definitions of God must return to logical
definitions for example the plural definition of God, before
the fall into sin. The isolation of Lucifer by God was a
mistake that God made, before the fall into sin. It could be
argued that the isolation of Lucifer caused the fall into
sin of Adam and Eve. My definition of, God that exists, is
therefore similar to the definition before the fall into
sin, a group of creators, however, who do not isolate
members, for the sake of imparting of ideas, nor without
trials in courts.
Older than Augustine's theory is Irenaeus's, a
church "father" of 130-202 CE.[110]
According to Irenaeus's theory, which has been given much
attention by John Hick, God made the world and everything in
it, but it was not a perfect creation. This supports the
argument that God made a mistake when Lucifer was
excommunicated because God is not perfect according to Hick.
Evils are tests, which improve human nature. This argument
is not accepted because it relates to sacrificing sons and,
history according to Freud's argument, shows, that it causes
a backlash of fathers being sacrificed. The book of
Revelation predicts such backlashes, which support the
argument against excommunication of sons. Humans, who are
intelligent "animals", are on a journey of improvement after
tests, during which mistakes are naturally made, according
to Irenaeus. The end of the journey is Humans being God that
do not create perfect worlds.[111]
Part of Irenaeus's theory is that the law limits improvement
of human nature. Also, temptations are for our own good
because its improve us.[112]
Irenaeus's theory implies that without necessary evils,
human nature cannot improve, because evils inspire us to
overcome.[113]
Irenaeus's argument motivates devilry and forming of
fallacious groups, who impart ideas, they sell to other
territories, and, who eventually have to leave territories
they betrayed. There are enough ex-amen-ations at
academic and other institutions we can voluntarily subscribe
to. Unasked for tests, which cause, unnecessary stress,
might even cause gargoyles and early death and other stress
related diseases. The tests that Irenaeus promoted can only
be overcome by becoming self a devil and part of adultery of
"adulthood" of pantheism. It is a system of vegetarianism
for more hooves and horns. If hoofed and horned animals are
not eaten they will overpopulate Earth with consequential
negative effects for humans. Paul of the Bible also implied
this. Plato's exposition of immoral evils in the Republic
relates to Irenaeus's argument. It is clear that the devils,
exposed in the Republic, are not aware of the disadvantages
caused to society, by devils' sacrificing of creativities,
probably because of devils' methodologies to attain
financial security, which means, being out of touch with
wider societies' problems.[114]
A correlation (verband) between evil and
suffering on one side and human freedom on the other can be
identified in theodicies of Augustine and Irenaeus. The
correlation implies human freedom to decide as agents self
between good and evil.[115]
Van Niekerk discusses the human conditions with reference to
all humans, being (becoming) part of the same group. He for
example writes that "we" are responsible for all [own
insert] evils.[116]
Van Niekerk's opinion is not true because all people can be
divided between honest and dishonest people. Gods and
goddesses are on one side and devils on the other side.
Van Niekerk opines that "amoral"[117]
evils and suffering is a mystery. He states that "He" who is
"One" is God.[118]
The argument for a plural definition of God,
similar to the definition before the fall into sin, but with
slight changes, is thus supported by problems mentioned by
Van Niekerk. The argument that God is singularity, which is
honest logos of one, made a contribution, by showing the
causal effects between truths, honesties and creativities.
The argument is however based on imparting of ideas and
sacrificing creators and creatresses so that they cannot
claim remuneration for their ideas, which are used by groups
for survival. The financial insecurity we are placed in,
motivates initially to create, but eventually destroys
creativities because we can see creating does not benefit
selves. Singularity of God is an argument, which cannot
sustain current large populations, because it does not
motivate creativities by all, which are needed for survival
of large populations. It will lead to being colonized
because other territories realized they need more than the
creativities of "One" to survive.
=============================================
Grünbaum,
A. 2003. Psychoanalysis and Theism. In: Taliaferro, C. &
Griffiths, P.J. (eds.) 2003. Philosophy of Religion. An
Anthology. Malden: Blackwell, 111-122.
P.111
The mere fact that a philosophy is subjective and
psychologically based does not mean that it is not scientific.
Freud claimed to be an atheist since he was a
student.
P.111-112
Freud argued that theism had a substantial
superstitious character but he also acknowledged the
psychoanalytical effects of theism.
P.112
Freud said that belief is illusions when belief
includes hoping and wishing for something. He also wrote that
unwarrannted paranoia is the result of homesexual tendencies.
P.112-113
Illusions can turn out to be true, but Freud
claimed that theism is mass delusion. According to the Oxford
Psychiatric Dictionary delusion can only be idiosyncratic and
not ascribed to masses. <self: It seems the Oxford
Psychiatric Dictionary ascribe truth values to delusions by
masses.>
P113-114
Freud claimed that childrens' beliefs in fathers'
caring, change into beliefs about providence and that "the
protector, creator and
law-giver" are in some adults' lives God.
P114
Freud studied philosophy with Franz Brentano when
he was 18 years old and was introduced to Feuerbach's
postulate that it was "man who created God in his own image".
Marx said religion is the opium of the people
during a time when opium was bought freely. Marx meant it not
pejoritavely. <self: I assume opium was expensive and that
the proletariate could not afford opium.>
P115
Theistic religion is a threatening belief and
therefore Marx's opinion that it relates to anodynical
purposes does not make sense.
P115-116
Freud ascribes the superstitious nature of
religion further to ontogenetic and phylogenetic factors.
Ontogenetic relates to the person self and phylogenetic
relates to the culture the person is part of.
P116
Superstition according to Freud is projection of
unconscious repressed ontogenies and phylogenies.
P116-117
According to Freud the Son of God thought relates
to the Oedipal complex, which is especially relevant between
ages 3 and 6 when children start to challenge their fathers.
The father becomes the Father of the Son in adulthood, though
childish. The thoughts are then made widely acceptable by
theism.
P117
A "true" father-child relationship is recognized
when polytheism is replaced by monotheism and the children
replace their fathers as sole providers and thereby overcome
the phylogenetic inclination to trust multiple fathers to
provide for them.
According to Grünbaum Freud's hypothesis about
Oedipus was not empirically proved.
Freud claimed that long ago bands of brothers
committed parricide because of limits their father placed on
incest. At the time our ancestors were cannibals and they ate
their fathers. The murders and takings of the harems caused
ontogenetic guilt about incest and parricide. The guilts lead
to incest taboos and praying to a Father figure.
p.118
The Eucharist according to Freud is a
recollection of primitive cannibalistic deeds by bands of
brothers who ate their fathers.
P119
Theism existed one millennium before Christ as
part of Jewish religion.
Conclusion
<self: Freud's postulate is partly false
because sacrificial practices of Christianity relates to
actual "sacrifices" of past and current creators as a means of
survival due to religious hatred and appropriation of
creators' ideas. It is not fathers who are being sacrificed in
Christianity, as postulated with Freud's Oedipus complex, it
is childless daughters and sons who are being sacrificed, as a
matter of fact.
Phenomena are conscious, and subconscious, for
example, some humans, like 'bats', think they are Ones,
something Griffiths claims he can establish with "reasonable"
certainty.[119]
A Christian account includes a "creator"[120]
(creators), "God"[121]
and a divine agent who is other than those offering the
account.[122]
"It is now commonplace to say that money is
information. With the exception of Krugerrands, crumpled cab
fare, and the contents of those suitcases that drug lords are
refuted to carry, most of the money in the informatized world
is in ones and zeros. The global money supply sloshes around
the Net, as fluid as weather...However, as we increasingly buy
information with money, we begin to see that buying
information with other information is simple economic exchange without
the necessity of converting the product into and out of
currency. This is somewhat challenging for those who like
clean accounting, since, information theory aside,
informational exchange rates are too squishy to quantify to
the decimal point."[123] >
Davis, C.F. 2003. Religious Experience. In:
Taliaferro, C. & Griffiths, P.J. (eds.) 2003. Philosophy
of Religion. An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 162-181.
P162-163
Davis uses "religious experience" widely. She for
example includes parts of the Baghavad Gita in her
passages. It suffice to not try and define "religious
experience" but to just stick to the two words as definition
in itself.
P164
She categorizes religious experience with six
headings. They are "interpretive, quasi-sensory, revelatory,
regenerative, numinous and mystical."
P164-165
Interpretive
Interpretive experiences result from being
religious. Experiences, although its could be perceived by
atheists in an atheist manner are perceived by persons as of
divine origin. There is no scientific correlation between a
divine being and experiences but the experiences cannot be
completely ignored as to evidence of God.
Quasi-sensory
P165-167
These experiences relate to sense experience,
which are not objectively " 'veridical' ". The
experiences are usually either very real or hallucinatory,
extremes thus. The experiences cannot be proven scientifically
and usually relates to religious content, for example
Catholics and Hindus usually see images and Protestants hear
voices, yet they cannot be discounted totally.
Revelatory
experiences
P167-169
These experiences are explained as "out of the
blue", "enlightenment" and "mystical". Its relate to instant
realizations in minds for example eureka moments, rather than
to sensory experience. Religious authorities usually distrust
these experiences as unreal unless persons experiencing have
religious authority. Davis does not opine about the veridical
value of these experiences.
Regenerative
experiences
P169-171
These experiences relate to conviction for
example reassuring feelings of redemption. Its are less
intense than revelatory experiences and occur on a more
regular basis.
Numinous
experiences
P171-174
Numinous experiences relates to the "wrath of
God". Materialist, empiricist views have predominant
influences on realizations of noumena and numen. Its are the
we-are-who-we-are, who and which numb sensations. Especially
theisms postulate numinous experiences.
Mystical
experiences
P174-179
Mystical experiences imply realizations of union
with the Outside. These experiences are the ultimate religious
experiences or in Davis's words, "a human being's summum bonum".
Copan,
P. 2007. The Moral Argument. In: Meister, C. & Copan, P.
(Eds.) 2007. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Religion. London: Routledge, 362-372.
P362
Copan explains the circumstances with regard to
the sacking of Melos during the Peloponnesian war (431-404
BCE). The Melians requested that the Athenians not attack them
because Melians never harmed Athens. Athens replied that
during war only power is relevant and justice and fairness are
not applicable. The Athenians attacked and killed the men who
could have fought and sold the women and children into
slavery. Athens argued it is a "general and necessary law of
nature" that they should besiege Melos. Athens's arguments
were the same as Thrasymachus's in Plato's The Republic and
Melos's was the same as Socrates's in The Republic.
P363
If "objective moral values" exist then it would
vouch the existence of God.
<self: Part of the problem of accounting of
ideas is that creators do not have control over their
creativities. The people who control the creativities do not
have the moral affinities to control themselves and the
creativities responsibly. There were not enough truths on
Melos to assemble a defense. Aristotle wrote:
"Used
of a false thing.
On the one hand, either because it has not been assembled or
because it would be impossible for it to be assembled."[124]>
Copan argues there are simply moral values, which
are known to exist, before any social contract comes into
existence. It is something we believe.
P365
According to G.E. Moore there is something not
natural to goodness.
<self: I argue that goodness is natural but
deceiving minds cannot comprehend the reality because they
cannot assemble the truth.>
Naturalists who are normally materialists cannot
bridge the gap between immanence and transcendence because
pragmatism is a presupposition of their arguments. <self:
Pragmatism has however not developed well enough to show the
effects of honesties and deceits in the long term.>
Copan writes "good God, in whose image or
likeness humans have been made" is central to understanding
moral values.
P366
Bertrand Russell's naturalistic philosophy cannot
embed moral values. Copan states that moral realisms of
naturalists are not convincing because its are not explained
how natural facts ontologically motivate morals. Naturalists
apparently appeal to epistemological methodology to prove
their arguments. The approach causes confusion of "knowing and being"
P367
"If [own
bold], on the other hand, a personal God exists who has made
humans – theists and non-theists alike – in his [own bold]
image, then we should not be surprised that atheists can
recognize the same objective moral values theists can. We
function properly, according to our design, when we think and
act morally.
Though naturalistic moral realists claim that the
necessity of moral truths renders God's existence irrelevant,
their necessity would still require grounding in the character
of a good, personal God: he [own bold]
necessarily exists in all possible worlds, is the source of
all necessary moral truths, and is explanatorily prior to
these moral values, which stand in asymmetrical relation to his [own bold]
necessity."
<self: "his necessity" is possibly not true
because single good persons are overpowered by evil groups,
which cause chaos and eventual colonization. Intequinism can
however prove that—our necessity—is closer to realities. A
question is how many should be included in "our".>
He quotes Carson (2000) and Audi (1993) in
writing that to date no moralist-realist theory shows
predictive coherence.
Copan argues for objective moral values but he
writes that naturalistic moral realism does not convince him
that objective moral values exist therefore he argues for
theism's "good Creator".
P368
"supremely aware Being … supremely good personal
Being .." Copan supports his theism argument by writing
naturalists wrote that objective moral values could be proof
that God exists. He quotes J.L. Mackie (1982), an atheist who
wrote that " 'a god' " could be proven by objective moral
values. Mackie wrote objective morality in naturalism is a
' "queer" ' premise.
P369
His main argument is that if good God is
postulated as beginning then good will follow and the world
will be a moral place. <self: His argument however does not
regard belief in redemption, which in some arguments actually
promote, for example deceit. I was told about the pastor who
told his assembly they have to lie to show they believe in the
mercy of God.>
He puts a lot of value on the word "person",
<self: which makes sense if it is derived from the belief
that goodness begets sons. In the beginning of the Bible
somewhere it was written how a group stopped to have sons when
they became evil.>
He quotes David Brink (1989), a naturalist, who
investigated Plato's dialogue, Euthyphro. In the
dialogue (10a) God is postulated to conform to objective
morals and God is postulated to subjectively lay down the law.
Which is reality? Brink referred to God as
' "herself" ' and Copan wrote '[sic]' next the
feminine references. Brink opined that morals are independent
of God and not dependent on the ' "will" ' of God.
<self: It seems empiricists, naturalists and atheists often
raise a sex card in defense of their arguments, or rather as
an attacking stance. See p.368 where Mackie referred to
objective moral values as a ' "queer" ' concept.>
Copan resolves the question by stating that good moral values
can be found in the "character"
of God who made us in "his" image.
P370
Theism assumes a plan and a teleological
objective. Copan paraphrases himself (2003, 2004, 2007) and
repeats in 2007 that without the humans in, which moral values
reside, there will not be moral values. He also writes about
the "good personal God" that created us.
<self: Copan visibly struggles with himself as
part of God or not in his references to "personal God" with
male singular pronouns, which could be partly himself in the
third person. Copan has not reached a phase where he realizes
the fallacy of singular God, probably because his
circumstances did not inform him of the weakness of
singularity. When i refer to the plural nature of God
with—us—i mean that the singular nature as promoted after the
fall into sin should be pluralized in order for a better world
to exist. Truth in the singular pronouns should be expanded to
plural pronouns. My argument is not an argument against truths
and moral values it is an expansion of truths and moral
values. If my arguments are against the singular conception of
God it would imply that someone could accuse me of being
anti-christian (or "the antichrist"). My stance is not
anti-christian because Christianity did well to identify the
correlation between truths and "the Creator". Christianity was
an improvement because innovation in Christian areas showed
that truths were assembled more often than before. The
correlation between truths and creativities should however be
expanded to truths and creators without sacrificing "the
creator", which the Eucharist, by implication, promotes as a
way of survival. My belief is a more reliable and easier way,
than what i knew before, of being truer to
Others-than-only-selves? Being honest is not easy in the
current environment, knowing that deceits cause colonization
of a territory. Deceiving powers improve only their own living
standards and once the area they live in gets colonized they
ally themselves with the new leadership. They do not lead
society because they mislead society (including leadership)
for their own group benefits.>
Golding,
J.L. 2007. The Wager Argument. In: Meister, C. & Copan, P.
(Eds.) 2007. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Religion. London: Routledge, 385-393.
P385
" 'Pascal's Wager' " argues that belief
in God is beneficial and it is thus a pragmatist argument for
belief in God. We cannot with our finite thinking rationally
determine whether God exists and therefore we should base our
decisions on whether it would be beneficial or not to believe
in God.
"For if God exists and we believe in him .."
<self: Golding also refers to singular male, with his
pronouns.>
p386
Pascal also included the afterlife in his
presuppositions. Pascal's statistical argument sums the
probable outcomes of all events, including infinite afterlife,
when people believe in God. The sum of believing is then
compared to the sum of the values of all probable events,
excluding infinite afterlife, when not believing. Pascal
claims the total positive value, when believing is higher and
therefore it is rational to belief.
p387
Golding criticizes Pascal's Wager because Pascal
gave existence of God and non-existence each a probability of
50% which is not scientific. Another critique is that Pascal
say we cannot fathom infiniteness but we clearly do because
otherwise the idea of the infinite would not have existed.
P388
Golding criticizes the wager because Pascal
allows only an either/or scenario, either belief or atheism.
Golding says there is an in-between state, which is neither
belief nor atheism. Golding also mentions that sometimes
attaining something requires presupposing it, for example an
invention of a new cure for a disease can be the direct result
of the presupposition that a cure exists.
P388-390
A problem with Pascal's argument is that the
decision is taken on existence of predicted values and in
reality predicted values can be wrong and/or be not realized.
An event can be unrealized in the sense of not existing in the
future. His postulate depends on the existence of the
afterlife. If the afterlife turns out to be a fallacy,
Pascal's argument fails. The afterlife is either a winning or
a losing idea. The probabilities of an afterlife are
irrelevant, because the probability is either 0% or 100%. The
in-between probabilities of the afterlife do not matter
because they do not change the outcome. 0.1%-100% = 0% for
decision making purposes. Pascal's wager cannot include all
the possibilities of other beliefs and outcomes.
P391-392
Another critique against Pascal's Wager is that
the wager implies selfishness because it does not consider
other people sufficiently.
P393
Golding suggests that Pascal's Wager can be
improved by excluding the infinite value of the afterlife and
instead of postulating belief, to postulate a pragmatic
defined God, which can be reasoned about.
Van Niekerk, A.A. 2005. Geloof sonder sekerhede.
Besinning vir eietydse gelowiges. Wellington:
LuxVerbi.BM, 113-139
P115
Practical issues are relevant with regards to the
evils of the world.
P116
If we want to live honestly Jesus of Nazareth is a
good example of the practical issues which are relevant of
honest lives.
Van Niekerk identifies evil as that what causes
suffering. He asks how existence of almighty good God can be
true together with the existing evils of the world.
P118
God is not responsible for the evils "We" ("Ons") are.
Van Niekerk refers to God as "He". A question is
why doesn't "He" stop the evils because Christians claim "He"
can if "He" wants to.
P118-119
"Moral" evils are those evils we are responsible
for and "amoral" evils are the results of natural disasters
for example earthquakes and tsunamis, which were not caused by
humans.
P119
The word holocaust was derived from two Greek
words. Holo, which
means whole ("algeheel") and caustos, which means the or a burning
("verbranding"). Originally it referred to the or a total
burning of a sacrificial animal.
P120
Modern technology, which was used during the
holocaust makes it an obscene event. Obscene partly because
modern technology was for example stated by Francis Bacon as
tools to be used for the good of humans.
P122
Early Christianity defended evils with the word
theodicy. The word was derived from theos (god) and dike
(justice).
P122
Augustine explained theodicies originated as a
result of Lucifer, who was excommunicated by God. <self:
Lucifer thus became more evil because of his isolation and as
part of his consequential evilness he tempted Eve.>
Inherited sin after the fall into sin, of Adam and Eve, is the
result of people not honoring God with their lives. The fall
into sin caused immoral lifestyles whereby people make other
people suffer.
P123
Immorality and the fall into sin, according to
Paul in Romans 8 caused the instable "amoral" events, which
are not under control of humans. Theodicies result from the
disciplining actions of God. The hell was postulated as
infinite punishment to people who do not share in Christ's
redeeming action.
P124
Older than Augustine's theory is Irenaeus's a
church "father" of 130-202 CE.
P124-125
According to Irenaeus's theory, which has been
given much attention by John Hick, God made the world and
everything in it but it was not a perfect creation. Evils are
tests, which improve human nature. Humans, who are intelligent
animals, are therefore on a journey of improvement, during
which mistakes are naturally made. The end of the journey is
Humans being God that do not create perfect worlds.
P127-128
Part of Irenaeus's theory is that the law limits
improvement of human nature. Also, temptations are for our own
good because its improve us.
P130
Irenaeus's theory implies that without necessary
evils, human nature cannot improve because evils inspire us to
overcome.
P130
P130-131
A correlation (verband) between evil and
suffering on one side and human freedom on the other can be
identified in theodicies of Augustine and Irenaeus. The
correlation implies human freedom to decide as agents self
between good and evil.
P131
Van Niekerk discusses the human conditions with
reference to all humans being part of the same group. He for
example writes that "we" are responsible for all [own insert]
evils. <self: Van Niekerk's opinion is not true according
to me because of my postulate that all people can be divided
between an honest and dishonest group.
P133-139
Van Niekerk opines that the evils and suffering
is a mystery. He states like a 'true believer' that "He" who
is "One" is God.
Melchert,
N. 2011. The Great
Conversation. Vol II. Descartes through Derrida and Quine.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 540-547
P540
Nietzsche wrote that philosophies reflect the
moral character of philosophers themselves but not necessarily
truths per se.
P541
Nietzsche wrote that philosophizing is the will
to power whereby philosophers try to recreate the world in
their images.
<self: In a sense Nietzsche contradicted him
then because whilst criticizing other philosophers for not
being truthful he also praised them for their wills to power.
The contradiction can probably be explained by Nietzsche's
honesty. Although he acclaimed a Dionysian drive, which
according to my current understanding includes deceiving, he
did not actually deceive to accomplish his ideals. It could be
false that he acclaimed Dionysius's deceit, because maybe he
just acclaimed the despotic part as long as it was done
honestly. Despotism however cannot be combined with honesty
because of revolutions, which overthrow despotism. Nietzsche's
problem was that he did not rationalize "dogmatic" honesties
like most other pragmatists. Distinguishing Nietzsche from
other pragmatists are his honesties, except for his postulate
of the "Superman", which i currently without having read
Zarathustra, understand to be a singular concept similar to
"Messias". I lost interest in Nietzsche whilst reading Human, All Too Human
because of his arguments against "dogmatic" honesties, if i
remember correctly.>
p541
Nietzsche wrote that applying truths are not the
strongest methodology because we do not know what realities
really are. He for example wrote that Kant's categories do not
reflect realities as its are.
P542
Nietzsche questioned cause and effect because he
stated we do not see things continuously. There is much we do
not perceive therefore our understanding of cause and effect
is not correct. We are however dependent on our
understandings, even its not being truths.
<self: Nietzsche's truths was thus something
we cannot attain, similar to Jaspers's in-perceivable or
incommunicable reality.>
It seems Nietzsche was also against innovation
because he wrote innovation was one of the four errors of
human kind.
Nietzsche was a naturalist because he said humans
are animals and the most dependent animal in existence.
<self: It is not true that Nietzsche was a naturalist or in
other words a materialist.>
P543
Nietsche said honesties are the cause of our
problems because of our belief in truths. <self: This view
of Nietzsche is false. I understand Nietzsche to have
meant—not realizing—we cannot reflect reality, even whilst
being honest, is a problem of "truth", although maybe he did
not say it explicitly but only lived it, like Jesus did. It is
this—not realizing—that causes sacrifice of other human beings
with accusations that they think they are the "One" when they
say they are honest and they acclaim truths. A reason of
the—not realizing—is psychological barriers, which the idea of
the "One" only causes. The idea of the "One" blinds believers
in "One" and they do not realize that definitions for words of
definitions for words ad infinitum[125],
differs in minds and therefore honest descriptions cannot
reflect realities. I am currently not certain about the
methodology for life, Nietzsche promoted after realizing the
fact about endlessness of words. Did he promote methodologies,
which take us further away from realities by promoting
conscious lying or did he promote enhanced honesties? My
current understanding is that he did not promote conscious
deceit (a necessary "truth", which most Christians say
implicitly) as acceptable and that is partly why he was
sacrificed and accused of thinking he is "One". Nietzsche's
life supports my opinion because he did not live like a
naturalist or a materialist as far as i know.>
P544
Nietzsche annulled the material world in search
of a higher truth. <self: Melchert contradicts himself here
because on p. 542 he said Nietzsche was a naturalist, which is
similar to a materialist but here he says Nietzsche annulled
the material world in favor of a higher truth. There are thus
incoherencies in Melchert's critique, probably because he
wants to discredit Nietzsche as person. Melchert however does
not realize the contradictions of Nietzsche. If everything
Nietzsche wrote is opposed the oppositions will be
contradicting because Nietzsche contradicted himself.
Melchert's critique fails because he uses argumentum ad
hominem tactics, without realizing the contradictions in the
corpus he critiques.>
P545
Melchert shows with all the questions he asks
about Nietzsche's dead god that he does not understand the
parable. <self: Nietzsche's parable of the madman probably
relates to the slaying of people like Caesar, Socrates, Jesus
and many other honest people. There are striking similarities
between the story about Diogenes of Sinope who searched for an
honest man, with his lantern, during the day and Nietzsche's
parable.
p546
Nietzsche wrote honesty, an attribute of
Christianity will make the Christian God null and void, but
Melchert does not understand Nietzsche. <self: Nietsche
meant that when all Christians will be honest then the
singular "God Himself Who cannot lie" does not exist any more
because then many people are honest and God then are a plural
concept.
P547
Nietzsche chose to oppose Christianity as a
severe nihilism, because Christianity sacrificed God.
Nietzsche wrote the death of God makes it possible for
philosophers to live again in search of new truths and he
asked what happens to human kind when there is no God to give
laws. <self: There is contradiction here because Nietzsche
said on the one hand that Christianity sacrificed God and he
opposes the sacrifices but on the other hand he praised the
sacrifices because after all honest people have been
sacrificed God will be exterminated and it will be possible to
be honest without being sacrificed.>
Westphal, M. 2008. Postmodernism and Religious
Reflection. In: Eshleman,
A. (Ed). 2008. Readings
in Philosophy of Religion. East meets West. Malden:
Blackwell Publishing, 426-433.
P426-427
Postmodernism is
essentially an explanation of the metaphysical subjectivity of
the definitions for words of definitions for words ad
infinitum[126], which implicitly form parts of our dialogues;
and how these subjectivities can be absolute truths to
individual believers, without forced interference from an
outside influence, for example organized religion, which
monopolizes meaning.
P428
"As the denial of Hegelian
totality postmodernism is a critique of onto-theo-logy.
This is Heidegger's term for a feature of Aristotle's
metaphysics.." <self: This means to me a denial of the
metaphysical power of "One", which is connected to only one
person or maximally three persons, being the Father, the
Mother of God and the Son. Aristotle ascribed the "doctrine of
the One"[127]
to Anaxagoras. "The infinite cannot be a single
and simple body. Reason: it cannot be, as acclaimed by some, a
thing over and above the elements (from which they produce
these), nor can it have being simpliciter. There
is no such body over and above the elements. Every-thing can
be dissolved back into that of which it is composed, and there
is no evidence of any such ultimate component beyond the
simple bodies. [1067a]
Nor can the infinite be fire or any other of the elements. For
leaving aside any one of them's (sic) being infinite, it is
not possible for the entire universe, even if it were to be
limited, either to be or to become some one of them all
(recall Heraclitus' claim that from time to time everything
becomes fire). In fact, the same reasoning applies to the
infinite as to the One introduced over and above the elements
by the philosophers of nature. After all, everything changes
from one contrary to another, from hot, say, to cold."[128]
Aristotle referred to "philosophers of nature" and Anaxagoras
as creators of the idea of 'One'. Tarnas mentioned Aristotle
to be an ancient empiricist[129]. "Empiricist" can be understood as "natural
philosopher". It seems that Aristotle did not consider himself
to be a "natural philosopher" because of his metaphysical
claims, maybe by implicitly referring together with Plato to a
'noumenon' respected metaphysical character in immanent
things. Aristotle's categories are similar to Kant's
categories but Kant praised Plato more than he praised
Aristotle. Could it be that Aristotle opposing the idea of
"One" in connection with a singular human implies that Plato
and Platonists believed in a power of "One" connected
metaphysically to one human being. (He quotes
David Brink (1989), a naturalist, who investigated Plato's
dialogue, Euthyphro.
In the dialogue (10a) God is postulated to conform to
objective morals and God is postulated to subjectively lay
down the law.)[130]
Maybe the matter do not actually relate to singularity because
no rational human believes in singularity. In the one sense
Aristotle's premises against the idea of "One" could have been
an attempt to convince himself he is not God. Plato's
postulate in Euthyphro
seems to be an argument in favor of Kings in the Egyptian
fashion where laws are given on Obelisks. Were those laws on
obelisks written during the lives or after the lives of
"Kings"? Plato postulated laws during the lives of Kings by
Kings selves (Statesman)
and did not postulate interpretations of Kings' wishes. The
Egyptian system could be interpretations on obelisks by
priests and hermeneutic investigators. Aristotle seems to have
argued in favor of democrats but he taught Alexander the
Great. Aristotle was probably one of the bourgeoisie
kingmakers because his father was physician to the Macedonian
king.>
' "To those who can read, this means:
metaphysics is onto-theo-logy." '[131]
p429
Philosophy is theology because "the deity" and
the whole are studied by philosophy rather than studying parts
of the whole.
P432
The deeper meaning of postmodernism is Hegelian
fallacy that we are not God, the deeper meaning of
postmodernism is not that God does not exist. <self: He
then contradicted the above statement.>
P427-433
Westphal's Postmodernism
and Religious Reflection is a difficult paper to follow.
My understanding is that he wrote postmodernism as a whole
opposes ethics by removing the function of humans to give
positive laws in order to have a stable world. He wrote the
God of philosophy is false and that the God of theology is
reality. He referred several times to God as "Truth" but also
used capital letters with other words.
Plantinga, A. 2003. Religious Belief as “Properly
Basic”. In: Taliaferro,
C. & Griffiths, P.J. (Eds) 2003. Philosophy of Religion.
An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 200-225.
"For present
purposes, perhaps the main epistemological question is this:
what is the source of rationality, or warrant, or positive
epistemic status, if any, enjoyed by religious belief? Is it
of the same sort as that enjoyed by belief in the teachings of
current science? Is the evidence, if any, for religious belief
of the same sort as that for scientific beliefs?" [132]
P201
Bertrand Russel said there is not enough evidence
to believe in God.
Plantinga investigates the belief that God is an
"immaterial" "person" that "exists a se", a "him", on
which the whole world depends.
P202
He referred to god as a "she" as well in the
context of having it to easy. If it is presupposed that God
exists then "she" will have it to easy.
P202-203
According to atheists it is irrational to believe
in the possibility of God, which has not been proven to exist.
Atheism only beliefs what their senses affirm but do not
believe in possibilities of God, not experienced but only
realized in thought.
P204
Telling lies after consequentialist predicting
requires lying is a "truth" of "situation ethics", which was
' ill-named "new morality." '
P207
Plantinga asks why atheists need evidence to
believe in God in the current circumstances in which we cannot
afford to believe only what we evidently experience.
P207-208
Evidentialist atheism roots arguments in
foundationalism. Foundationalism states that basic things can
be regarded true but non-basic things need to "trace back" to
basics before it should be believed. God is not a basic truth
and therefore evidence is needed to believe in God.
P208
Basic belief means something you "know"[133]
for example that i ate eggs and toast this morning for
breakfast. It relates to noetic knowledge, which are not
doubted. Foundationalism is grounded in normative noetic
structures of belief. Normative refers to requirements of
society.
P212
Foundationalism is problematic because "basic
self-evident" believes cannot be proved true.
P213-214
Plantinga asks why Reformed and Calvinist
thinkers do not accept attempts to prove the existence of God.
Herman Bavinck a Dutch theologian argued faith in
God should be the starting point of any reasoning. God should
not be a conclusion (natural theology) after other
observations.
P215
Kant also referred to "him" as God.
P216-218
The 20th century theologian Karl Barth
wrote reason should never be used with regards to arguments
about God's existence because it is a sign of self-sufficient
hubris.
P221-222
Plantinga argues belief in God is basic because
it is "circumstantial" and not "groundless" and he analogize
the belief with other basic knowledge for example when i know
i had eggs and toast for breakfast it is because i am aware my
memory has not failed before with regards to remembering what
i had for breakfast. The circumstances thus warrant basic
knowledge and it is not groundless knowledge, similar to
belief in God. The circumstances, which warrant belief in God
is "guilt, gratitude, danger, a sense of God's presence, a
sense that he speaks, perception of various parts of the
universe."[134]
God's existence is not the basic belief but rather that "God"
forgives, "God" disapproves, "God" speaks, "God" creates and
"God is to be thanked and praised." Existence of a "person" who is God is
then inferred from these basic beliefs.
Otherness or alterity
is a continental concept[135],
which was significantly first developed by Immanuel Levinas
during the 20th century.[136]
'The
poet Arthur Rimbaud may be the
earliest to express the idea: "Je est un autre" (I is
another).'[137] Karl Jaspers wrote much about the transcending
effect of consciously thinking about the subject-object
dichotomy when transcending the concept of The-other. Karl
Jaspers was a Christian Existentialist[138].
The word "alterity" in
English is not an old word. It has no synonyms in the New
Oxford American Thesaurus and was defined as "alterity
|ôlˈteritē| - noun formal - the state of being other or
different; otherness. ORIGIN mid 17th cent.: from late Latin
alteritas, from alter ‘other.’ "[139]
Other relevant words are "alter" with an e, which means to
change and "altar" with an a which relates to religious
sacrifice and informally to marriage and "alterability"[140],
which is also a noun like "alterity". Alter with an e and
altar with an a are pronounced the same according to
dictionaries[141]
("|ˈôltər|"[142]).
The Oxford dictionary
of philosophy[143]
lists "otherness", "alienation", "authenticity", relevant.
What is meant by "
'transcendence as alterity' " in philosophical discourse?[144]
"Alterity" refers to
the conditions under which creators are sacrificed with
religious justification and "transcendence as alterity" refers
to creators who manage to transcend social sacrifice,
especially with reference to existentialism and the capitalist
entrepreneurial system.
Stoker's and Van der
Merwe's book, "CULTURE AND TRANSCENDENCE.." was read once and
Verhoef's paper, "How to do philosophy of religion.." was read once. I was
influenced much by reading works of Karl Jaspers and i was
influenced by comments on Karl Jaspers's writings by Samay and
Kane, with regards to transcendence.
Stoker's and Van der
Merwe's book refers to the topic with " 'transcendence as
alterity' ", which is also the topic of Annemie Halsema's
paper "LUCE IRIGARAY'S TRANSCENDENCE AS ALTERITY"[145].
"Alterity" can be compared with "otherness" because the two
words are adjectival nouns. Adjectival nouns do not normally
identify the important difference between singularity and
plurality, which is a significant part of the discourse with
regards to alterity. When The-other is postulated without
identifying the reality of plural Others-than-only-selves,
problems with regard to alterities are emphasized through
religious superstition.
Some gods and goddesses
of mythology are represented with radical alterabilities of
animal and anthropomorphic character. Eventually the images of
gods and goddesses changed into an incorporeal metaphysical
entity currently.
In current discourse
however the anthropomorphic character of God has not
disappeared completely because of metaphors like Mother,
Father and Son of God, which are equated with humans, being
honest according to the Bible and Thomas Aquinas.
How
do the circumstances mentioned above affect "transcendence as
alterity"?
First, "transcendence
as alterity" does not normally affect group members directly
because they do not possess alterability in their normativity.
Alterity relates to trauma[146]
of individuals and notions about the "gift of death"[147].
Alterity escapes nihilism.[148]
Second, "transcendence
as alterity" affects honest individuals because of the
subject-object dichotomy[149].
Stoker explains this as rejection of the "opposition between
transcendence and immanence." [150]
When subjects are honest and their object of study or belief
is postulated with authentic characteristics for example
honest God, then naturally, authentic subjects will have
difficulty to distinguish between themselves as subjects and
their object of thought, being God. The source of
"transcendence as alterity" thus relates to identifying an
object of thought, we have attributes of, separate from us,
whilst the object is thought of. Phenomena for example are
accepted and written about as objects in our minds only. Kant
identified realities of objects, being noumena outside of our
minds, in the objects themselves, in opposition to his
phenomena.[151]
Nietzsche's book, Beyond good and evil, shows part of society
does not rationalize the necessity of "dogmatic" truths.[152]
Honest people are accused of thinking they are ones, like
"bats". Creators or in Griffiths mind bats, and agents plus
God complete Christian accounts.[153]
No wonder "transcendence as alterity" exists.
Third then,
"transcendence as alterity" has its origins in difficulties
due to marginalization. A metaphor about old God (devilish
elders) and Lucifers (the marginalized) are relevant. The
Socrates who criticized music and the musical Socrates is an
example.[154]
' "Hence since the musical Socrates is another
determination from the wise Socrates, Socrates was separated
from himself." '[155]
There are other types of alterabilities, which could cause
transcendence to a higher power because of difficulties
experienced for example, enhanced authenticities in traditions
of creators[156].
When "tracing transcendence"[157] and "messianism"[158]
"God’s
transcending
towards us resembles the structure of transcendence as
alterity in the thought of philosophers such as Levinas and
even Irigaray."[159]
"Radical transcendence as alterity"[160]
is a countercultural movement relating
to authenticities due to notions attached to "ulterior"
motives, identified in authenticities and The-authentic,
according to Charles Taylor, who is studied as part of our
work. "Gratitude springs from enjoying and
finding beneficial the creatures and creations around you."[161]
The weakness of singularity is often
disregarded because of superstitions about supernatural
alterabilities when creators are sacrificed with utilitarian
motivations.
Transcendence can be
divided between transcendence from a weak position and
transcendence from a strong position. Transcendence from a
weak position can be equated with "alterity" and "otherness"
because usually, the powerful in the form of numbers of people
or technology, identifies alterities. Identifying alterities
and marginalizing alterabilities identified, is an opposite
type of transcendence and survival than "transcendence as
alterity".
Cynocephali[162]
refers to beings with dog heads. It occurred in Egyptian
mythology and Saint Christopher[163]
was also depicted with a dog head. Socrates swore in the name
of the dog[164] and not in Zeus's name and was partly because of
that, sentenced to suicide. Identifying causes of reverse
evolution, for example stress, is therefor and important task,
which relates to "transcendence as alterity".
Alterity
or otherness is identified when individuals are different from
the majority and also when groups differ culturally or differ
in some other manner.
Weak positions, partly then, causes outreach to
something metaphysical outside of selves, as help, to deal
with the difficulties of marginalization. "Transcendence as
alterity" then happens.
Creators sometimes
enter careers for example music and writing, which benefit
themselves and the powerful with performance and publication
rights. Ideas, gathered during 'tracing of transcendence' are
used in the entrepreneurial system, whilst creators are
subjected to reverse and forward evolution.
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Religion is again
becoming more prominent in contemporary society, especially
with regard to transcendence. Transcendence has several
meanings and does not only refer to the beyond for example in
Husserl's phenomenology, which relates to consciousness.[165]
Stoker divides
transcendence into four types to give a "heuristic" model in
which transcendence can be better understood. The heuristic
was given form by authors and artists since the Romantic era,
which originated[166]
in the late 18th century.[167]
Two of the types have their origin in Christianity and two in
"humanist-spiritual" culture.[168]
The first type is "
'immanent transcendence' ". Humans were "alienated" from God
or the "absolute", which is similar to humans, but humans are
aware of the other absolute reality through everyday
experience. Schleiermacher, Hegel and Tillich are examples.[169]
The second type is "
'radical transcendence' ". God is radically different from the
believer and whereas the first type is recognized by a
transparent approach to God this second type relates more to a
jealous God. Kierkegaard, Barth and Marion are examples. At
radical transcendence "being" is understood more as a noun
than a present participle verb.[170]
Creation from nothing is a prominent concept in this
tradition.[171]
The third type is "
'radical immanence' ", where the beyond is reduced to
immanence in for example Nietzsche, Heidegger and Altizer.[172]
Kenosis, the 2nd coming and a "Kingdom" is
prominent here.[173]
In Altizer, Spirit is antithesis of Jesus of Nazareth due to a
dialectical development of Spirit from being peaceful to
having wills to immanent power. The "death of God" implies
death of God of the beyond to become ones again, immanent in
this world.[174]
The fourth type, "
'transcendence as alterity' " builds on the 2nd,
radical transcendence but the beyond becomes more immanent.
The "opposition" relevant at radical transcendence is not
emphasized. Derrida, Levinas, Irigaray and Taylor (part of)
are examples.[175]
The types are important
because normativity in own cultures and critique towards own
cultures are differently identified in each of the types.[176]
Each of the 4 types is
a form of religious experience, which needs to be further
specified with content.[177]
Authors or artists add the content and the form is added by
the culture they are part of.[178]
Derrida acknowledges
differences, which can be abstracted from a text. By
abstracting the differences, contradictions can be identified
in a text, being studied. Language cannot precisely reflect
realities. By abstracting the differences movements can be
"traced". The development, which can be traced, signifies
becomings of human beings. All of us have responsibilities to
live ethically and we have to consider that utilities used
could have been available for use by someone else if we did
not use its.[179]
Derrida's view of the
wholly other can be compared with apophatic language because
negative theology does not define God ontologically. By saying
what God is not, the wholly others are indescribable.[180]
Without going into
detail of Tillich's theology i undertood Schüßler explanation
of Tillich's view to show that the tradition of immanent
transcendence explains a God of "depth". The oneness of this
God, which is referred to with singular pronouns "Him" and
"him" causes the subject-object dichotomy, which Karl Jaspers
wrote about. Plato's metaphysics was also emphasized, which i
thought was a mentioning of only part of Plato's philosophy.[181]
In The statesman Plato made a clear distinction between good
and bad leaders, which should be understood in conjunction
with Plato's metaphysics. Plato can then be interpreted to
mean today that God has a metaphysical part, which gives
humans the courage to be parts of God in immanence. Tillich is
a good example of someone who has been blinded by singular
explanations of God.
Vosloo identifies a
renewed interest in religion. The "death of God" of Nietzsche
and Freud happened in conjunction with the death of
secularism, which caused the ' "death of the death of
God" '[182].[183]
"It is Bonhoeffer’s
reasoning that nineteen hundred years of preaching and
theology have been built on the ‘religious a priori’ in human
beings."[184]
Bonhoeffer emphasized
the question about the post-metaphysical conception of God.[185]
Tillich focused on a transcendent nature of God, which can be
metaphorically talked about. Bonhoeffer wants to leave
Tillich's kind of discussion out of his own because he wants
to discuss God being present in the world doing the good,
which is necessary.[186]
Bonhoeffer does not distance himself from the anthropomorphic
nature of God. [187]
Tillich distanced him from the anthropomorphic side of God.
The unresolved subject-object dichotomy, which is present in
their (Tillich's and Bonhoeffer) writings place them with
immanent transcendence.
It seems Tillich's and
Bonhoeffer's language about God mentioned immanence and
transcendence. With Tillich's emphasis on the beyond he
distances himself from the anthropomorphic nature of God. The
uses of pronounce "him" and "Him" to refer to God are because
the beyond cannot be written about without using metaphors.
Bonhoeffer although he mentions the beyond refers more to
"Jesus Christ" and thus the anthropomorphic nature of God. The
singularity of God with no parts, they belief in, makes it
impossible to use language, which signifies the beyond and the
immanent in identifiable ways. The singular male connotations
they have with God blinded them to realize the reality of what
God are in fact.
Barth views the
presence of Jesus Christ of Nazareth as an historical event,
which shows the utter weakness of humanity. God transcends
from the beyond and when people are touched by the
transcendence it leads to disaster. Humans have no influence
on God and we live totally at the mercy of God. God is thus
the totally other, which brings alterity into the picture. His
conceives of alterity in the sense of what is in the beyond,
totally apart from us, and can therefore not be fathomed at
all.[188]
"It is well-known how
Max Weber links the rise of capitalism to the Calvinistic
work-ethic (Weber 2002)[189]
and Hans Blumenberg has argued that modernity cannot be
understood except in relation to developments in later
medieval theology, more specifically, the rise of nominalism
and voluntarism (Blumenberg 1966)[190].
It becomes increasingly clear that certain aspects of
modernity are linked to aspects or forms of thought of
Christianity."[191]
"Voluntarism – Generally a position seeing reason and
intellect as subservient to the will: any position
sympathizing with Hume's dictum that reason is and ought to be
the slave of the passions. … The theological position that all
values are traits that become elevated through being chosen by
God is also known by the name."[192]
".. theological moral voluntarism: that God's arbitrary will
determines what is morally good and bad. This view is also
known as the Divine Command Theory; another name for it is
theological moral positivism. … The theory that the law of the
state is the will of the sovereign legislator and derives
whatever binding force it has from this fact. This view is
also known as the will-theory;
another name for it is legal positivism."[193]
Gauchet built on these
views of Weber and Blumenberg when he wrote that modernity was
a result of Christianity and that the current irreligious time
resulted from Christianity's logic.[194]
<self: Whether Gauchet referred to the voluntary
(deceiving) side or the reasoning (honest) side of
Christianity is not clear currently. Can the two sides be
separated?> 'Thence, Gauchet’s provocative expression that
Christianity is “the religion for departing from religion”
(1997: 101).[195]
The notion of
‘departing from religion’ (Gauchet’s sortie de la religion) is
indeed central to Gauchet’s thinking and in his understanding
of modern and post-modern ways of thinking.'[196]
Gauchet's departure from religion refers to a societal
departure because he said that on a personal level religion
does not depart.[197]
<self: It seems thus Gauchet was writing from the
"voluntary" societal viewpoint of Rousseau and Calvinism,
which according to my current understanding excommunicate
creators and accept them back into society after they have
gone crazy and been imprisoned. These writers did not realize
that the truth that modernity was built on existed because of
courage from faiths to be honest. The departure from religion
causes societal nihilism. The necessity of honesty is then not
realized by society and the courage to be honest does not
exist and evil then overtakes the world because the resistance
against evil by society, which religion does not encourage, do
not exist any more. The courage to be honest is only promoted
by religion in individual creators, who eventually snaps and
then become lawgivers or are imprisoned.>
"This is also to say that the sortie de la
religion is not “proclaiming yet again the death of the
gods and the disappearance of their devotees” (Gauchet 1997:
4)[198]."[199]
<self: The issue mentioned here about the "devotees" of
"gods" is a sensitive issue, which like the singularity of God
causes blindness (irrationality). The devotion that is
ascribed to God is too much for a human and even for humans in
the plural. Reality also implies that praising in religion is
not healthy for humans being praised in religious manner.
Sayings like "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely" resulted from the praise of people and powers
given to them. It can however happen that an artist or artists
have a mesmerizing effect on devotees but the abilities of an
artist is not necessarily equated with religious creativities.
In Bentley's study he showed there is an inverse relation
between memory and logic. Singing for example requires a very
good memory because the words have to be remembered and the
notes. Creating (doing/developing) art is not the same as
creating through logos of religion. Was Jesus not an artist
nor a writer? There is a difference between a music writer and
a singer. They are dependent on one another but their
abilities are varied. The creativities of creators in religion
are social political type of creativities, which benefit other
people in a social way. The relationship between a singer and
a songwriter proves the interdependence between equity and
intequity. Singers have equity and songwriters have intequity.
I do not mean authors who steal their ideas (John Perry
Barlow?). In a sense singers develop ideas of songwriters by
implementing songwriters' ideas. There are individuals who
have long memories and good logic but they are very rare.[200]
Socrates had intequity when he philosophized and it seems he
had to near death, before he became musical Socrates with
equity.>
"In order to understand modernity – indeed, in
order to understand Christianity – one has to go back, far
back: way before modernity and even before Christianity; back
into the origins of religion and of mankind as such."[201]
Gauchet removes God in the Jewish tradition to
the beyond and therefore radical transcendence is required to
keep God in the world. The Messiah could incarnate God in this
world as the 2nd coming of Christ. Jesus of
Nazareth was the opposite of the Messiah because Jesus of
Nazareth's message referred not to an Earthly Kingdom but
rather a kingdom in each Christian and in heaven.[202]
'Deleuze
rejects any form of transcendence, connecting it with the
poisonous “logic of representation” (Deleuze 2004: 155)[203],
a way of thinking in which thought and language represent
being(s).'[204]
Representationalism is
compared to syntactic understanding of a computer, in contrast
to semantic understanding by humans.[205]
Representationism opposes metaphoric use of words. Deleuze
acknowledges the necessity of transcendence to be honest
whilst altering the status quo by being honest, but he opposes
changes and creativities caused by honesty and correspondence
to reality. Justaert asks, "What
does the logic of representation have to do with
transcendence?"[206]
The question does not
realize the danger, which is implied by representation. The
dualism[207]
in representation she identifies does not imply danger to the
question and therefore the question's answer shows the
correlation between representation and "transcendence as
alterity". Justaert wrote for Deleuze[208]
creativities do not exist in the logic of representation.
Seems Deleuze is like Rousseau, Charles Taylor and some other
Calvinists and some Jewish believers against creativities
because only their utilitarian God may create and all other
creators should be sacrificed.
"Throughout
the history of philosophy, there have always been thinkers who
tried to install a plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari
1991)[209],
realizing that thinking within a transcendent scheme only
leads to death, thus leaving no room for creativity at all."[210]
"After that, the battle for an immanence-in-itself was
irrevocably lost against Christian philosophy, which could
only bear immanence in homeopathic doses. The plane of
immanence was thus sharply controlled by the transcendent
Creator. And this wasn’t just a theoretical problem. The lives
of thinkers such as Meister Eckhart or Giordano Bruno were
seriously endangered when they tried to defend immanence too
passionately."[211]
Deleuze like Spinoza
promoted an immanence-in-itself, which discards the reference
of immanence to objects, which implies transcendence. They
were thus searching for the noumena of immanence as
immanence-in-itself and this noumena of immanence was called
"plane of immanence". Sartre re-affirmed the rights of
transcendence and therefore the meaning of immanence to refer
to a concept called immanent, which is inherent in objects.[212]
"Immanence: a life…"[213] "Firstly,
it
is striking that Deleuze explicitly writes ‘a’ life and not
‘the’ life. Life, for Deleuze, is impersonal. Life is Being
itself; it is a power that runs through every being. In a
being, life is temporarily expressed and crystallized. To
personalize life would mean to try to stop its dynamics and
its creativity. Secondly, this life is the absolute immanent
because it is not divided into categories or hierarchies: a
life of a human being is literally equal to a life of a rock
(Pearson 2001)[214].
Finally, ‘beatitude’ is the state of mind of an immanent life:
the mind is filled with joy when the realization dawns that it
is not we who think, but God (Being) who thinks
through us. Again, this is a movement of depersonalisation."[215]
"In fact, both a spiritual and a political ‘programme’ are
discernable in this plea for radical immanence, showing how
practically oriented Deleuze’s philosophy really is."[216]
"For
Deleuze and Guattari, the creative is inextricably
interconnected with the social and the political, even to the
extent that they state that “politics precedes Being” (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987: 225)[217]."[218]
" On the level of the collective, the social implications of
an immanent ethics are translated into the vision of the
‘people to come’, the formation of assemblages, collective
bodies that fight ‘the State’ (a concept that symbolizes any
organization of hierarchies and repression)."[219]
" The radically immanent can be understood as transcending our
lives, because the whole interpretation of the plane of
immanence as a goal to strive for, away from the world of
representation, pictures this form of immanence as quasi
unattainable. To reach it, we have to transcend our own ego,
give up our personality. With his plane of immanence, Deleuze
creates a place where all egos are left behind, thus stressing
the contingency of Being. So transcendence does have a meaning
in Deleuze’s philosophy, but it is the dynamic meaning of
transcending as an act of human beings or of beings in
general. Their static form transcends towards a more dynamic
constellation in which they can be creative, in which they can
produce again. … The act of transcending has nothing to do
with verticality: on the contrary, it is meant to annul any
kind of hierarchical position."[220]
"In a letter to a friend, Deleuze writes:
I
believe that a worthwhile book can be represented in three
quick ways. A worthy book is written only if (1) you think
that the books on the same or a related subject fall into a
sort of general error (polemical function of a book); (2) you
think that something essential about the subject has been
forgotten (inventive function); (3) you consider that you are
capable of creating a new concept (creative function) (Dosse
2010: 112)[221]."[222]
Justaert concludes by writing that Deleuze's
writing is "spiritual" because it promotes i.e. creativities.
Deleuze opposed transcendence because it represents i.e.
dualism.[223]
<self: I do not understand how Deleuze can promote
creativities and oppose dualism because some people oppose
creativities. People who oppose creativities oppose thus
Deleuze's promotion of creativities. This implies that Deleuze
had complete peace in mind about the group who opposes
creativities, probably because they did not oppose development
of his creativities by himself, which could imply he was in
the same group of people who opposes creativities. He maybe
had a license to create, ones could say. Another possibility
is that Deleuze's "transcendence as alterity" made him, in a
way, independent from utilitarians, because his creativities
was of such nature that he could create without entering a
downward spiral of self-destruction. When reading this file on
29 October 2013 it seemed that Deleuze identified a danger in
honesties, which he equated with cannibals who use people as
homeopathic medicine. The identification was also done
elsewhere by another author. Deleuze's creativity is thus not
immanent at all although he is classified under radical
immanence. The radical immanence of Deleuze seems to be
totally in concepts through words, which is not related to
reality, or maybe only related to reality through some sort of
metaphoric meaning, which he thinks removes him from the
dangers he identified with regard to honesties.>
Du Preez understands
radical immanence in the sense of putting oneself in dangerous
positions for example with extreme sports. She opines it is
not acceptable behavior for her.[224]
"In
the context of her interest in spirituality and religion,
Irigaray often refers to the notion of ‘horizontal
transcendence’, her alternative to the transcendence of God as
an object entity. It includes a relationship to the alterity
of the other. It is an ethical notion that refers to the
possibilities for self and other to develop fully in
themselves and to relate to each other in respect of
difference. I will claim that it is a central notion in
Irigaray’s humanism. As a notion of transcendence, it is close
to Stoker’s “transcendence as alterity” in which transcendence
and immanence are no longer considered as opposition."[225]
<It seems there are
relations between immanent transcendence and transcendence as
alterity because immanent transcendence viewed immanence and
transcendence as a whole.>
"She
especially finds a connection between immanence and
transcendence in the practice of yoga, between what “emanates
from the here and now (immanent) and what is situated in the
beyond (transcendent)” (1996a, p. 216, my transl.)[226]."[227]
<self: This explanation of Irigaray, kind of
explains Kant's noumena in a Neo-Platonist tradition of
emmanation. Because noumena cannot be explained it is relates
to metaphysical truth (mett) and emmanating.>
"She
[Irigaray] strongly disapproves of the teleological direction
that is characteristic of Plato’s thought and of religious
tradition – namely, the orientation towards the One presented
as the sun, Ideas or God."[228]
"Plato tends to use 'gods' (plural) or 'god' (singular)
indifferently. When he speaks of 'god' we must not interpret
him in terms of simple monotheism. He thought that the myths
of Greek polytheism were crude and misleading, .. He does seem
to have believed (like most Greeks) in a supreme god, but he
would not have regarded that belief as precluding the
existence of a multiplicity
of spiritual powers of whom many could rank as (subordinate)
gods. This is the sort of theology we meet in the Timaeus and Laws."[229]
"Women
in a masculine tradition are deprived of opportunities to
develop identities as women, because the dominant
representations of the feminine are masculine and women have
not developed representations of the feminine themselves."[230]
"The
masculinity of the God-figure (God as father) is also related
to his transcendence by Ricoeur in the last chapter of his
essay on Freud, De l’interprétation (1965)[231].
Ricoeur reflects upon why, when imagining God, the figure of
the father is more privileged than that of the mother. Without
doubt, he writes, it has to do with the richer, symbolic
virtuality of the father-figure. The father does not appear as
generator, as does the mother, but as giver of the name, of
the law. As such, he himself escapes from name giving. As
institution of the name, he cannot be named, he is irreal: as
the Hebrews have already understood, because he gives the
name, he is the problem of the name (Ricoeur 1965) [232]."[233]
<self: The name and the
law, which Halsema equates do not make sense to me because
according to my understanding of reality, Hebrews do not give
the law. In the West currently, and Middle East around the
time of Jesus of Nazareth, Westerners (currently Christians)
gave the law and the Hebrews and Jewish people lived under and
above the law, except maybe currently in Israel.>
"Irigaray’s
aim is to secure a religion that is continuous with the body,
the mother, nature, and that functions as an ideal for the
spiritual becoming of women. Such a God is radically immanent
or intermingles transcendence and immanence."[234]
Irigaray opposes the '
"Wholly Other" ' of Christianity and promotes horizontal
transcendence between humans.[235]
'It
is
“communion in pleasure”. Transcendence of the other becomes “extase
instante
in me and with him – or her” (Irigaray 1991a: 180).[236]
' [237]
"Irigaray’s humanism
In
the philosophical and religious tradition, transcendence
generally signifies a reality that is beyond, ‘on the other
side’ of humanity. Irigaray, however, rejects a notion of
transcendence that is not embodied and does not support human
becoming."[238]
'The
trauma discourse tends to define the wholly other in terms of
pain extreme enough to annihilate both language and the self,
with the paradoxical result that the boundary between self and
other collapses and pain itself becomes sanctified. … As I
hope to show in my analysis, the trauma could be understood as
a secular metaphor for transcendence – “a massive
transposition of transcendence into a naturalistic key”
(Weiskel 1976: 4)[239].
'[240]
<self: Trauma is not a
metaphor because being ostracized as alterity is
traumatic.>
"The
wholly Other/other can become visible by a reading of the
signs or the symptoms indicating his or her presence. But this
might require a series of deconstructions in morality,
politics, religion or literature, an undoing of the texts that
we tend to take for granted and a search for irresolvable
contradiction or aporia, (literally, the point that cannot be
passed). As the traumatic experience is, by definition,
inaccessible to reason, language is used here in a
contradictory way: the attempt to transcend towards an Other,
to a ‘place’ or mystery beyond the linguistic, involves the
discarding of content, the erasing of words, in search of a
more authentic tongue. In the following, I will show how this
applies to the notion of psychological trauma."[241]
<self: Other/other can
be divided between Others who/which help and others who cause
marginalization as start of events. Another part of
Other/other is the phenomena, the traumatic experiences, in
the minds of each person. Intimidation is identified; the
first cause because intimidation is the first illegal act in a
series of possible asocial events. Others, with a capital "O"
is the Metaphysical part, plus Others-than-only-selves, plus
the phenomena in minds, which/who is transcended to or from.
The world can be better understood by identifying parts, which
have different roles. Conflating parts, which could have
opposing roles, negates understanding.> "Culbertson
emphasizes that what we call memories are social fabrications,
subject to conventions that define what can (not) be believed:
there is a divide between what is bodily known and what can be
told. The most famous description of this is Delbo’s
distinction between deep sense memory on the one hand, and
external or intellectual memory on the other hand: … (Delbo 1990: 3-4)[242]."[243]
"Rendering
the
experience in words helps to re-establish the boundaries of a
self that is able to speak in socially appropriate terms and
thus to function in a community." [244]
"Acknowledging
trauma thus helps us all to embrace alterity. The trauma
discourse could then be seen as an example of agape, as
“acting intentionally, in response to God and others, to
promote overall well-being in response to that which produces
ill-being” (Oord 2010: 56)[245]."
[246]
<self: Love would be
enhanced if marginalizations, which cause alterities are
ended. This however would be a total change for some because
such a change implies a new way of surviving. Such changes are
doubtful and maybe different evolutionary tracts are an
unchangeable reality.>
"A
complicating factor is that the trauma is assumed to be
inaccessible, as it has never been stored in linguistic
memory. In this sense, trauma discourse is an example of
transcendence as alterity, by emphasizing the inaccessible,
inexpressible Other in every other. On the other hand, the
notion of trauma seems itself to have become a symbol within a
particular kind of secular transcendence.
…
When the trauma is aestheticized by discussing it in terms of
the transcendent, the metaphor runs the risk of effacing the
difference between victims, perpetrators and bystanders.
Rather than allowing the wholly other to appear, this process
threatens to annihilate alterity and to erase moral
responsibility. Discussing trauma in terms of the transcendent
means at least to run the risk of revering a pathology." [247]
<self: Jesus of Nazareth
is an example of a symbol with regard to transcendence as
alterity.>
' " singularly exposed in our
absolute and absolutely naked uniqueness, that is to say
disarmed, delivered to the other, incapable even of sheltering
ourselves behind what could still protect the interiority of a
secret (Derrida 1993: 12)[248].' "[249]
<This quote of Derrida
makes me wonder whether Derrida maybe also did not distinguish
between God (gods and goddesses) and devils.>
30 August 2013
<self:
The
hierarchy of transcendence refers to the 'cannibals' [250]
at the top and their dependents below them. Below and in the
group of cannibals are the people who make a living out of
alterities. Psychologists, psychiatrists, doctors, judges,
prison officials, givers of laws, music producers and managers
i.e. Almost all except creators are dependent on alterities.
Creators are dependent on creating. What would the world be
like if all people were creators (honest)? Boring according to
some. An approaching of a perfect world according to me.>
Westphal
prefers
to distinguish between two types, transcendence and immanence
instead of the four types identified by Stoker. "I
see deep similarities between Tillich and Altizer on the one
hand and Kierkegaard and Derrida on the other." [251]
Theism acknowledges "God as creator". God can
exist without the world but the world cannot exist without
God. Pantheism and atheism, which are basically the same,
postulate interdependence. God cannot exist without the world
and vice versa. Atheism and pantheism do not recognize "God,
as personal, purposive creator".[252]
"A
second dimension of theistic transcendence is epistemic. If
God is the Alpha and Omega ontologically, by virtue of
creation and providence, we are never able to occupy such
positions epistemically. Our knowledge (not only of God, but
of other things as well) will not be able to possess a pure,
presuppositionless, tradition-free, absolute foundation. Nor
will it be able to achieve a holistic, totalizing synthesis in
which everything, including God, fits into the niche assigned
by our system. In other words, the Cartesian and Hegelian
forms of modernity are precluded, since we would have to
become God to realize these aspirations, promises and claims."[253]
<self: This quotation
supports Vollenhofen's thesis that any discourse about God
should state as presupposition, definitions of God.>
"Sin,
the opposite of trusting obedience, is the desire for
autonomy, not merely as being responsible for my own actions,
but also as being the one who defines my identity and sets my
own agenda. The same is true when the ‘I’ is expanded to the
‘We’, the self to society." [254]
<self:
I agree partly with Westphal because without Metaphysical
truth (Mett) present, the words "gods" and "goddesses" cannot
be combined in the word God with a capital G. The same applies
to "we" and "i", which could not be capitalized because "we"
and "i" can never include Mett; "we" and "i" can only refer,
at most, to gods and goddesses or to a god or a goddess. When
Westphal capitalizes his i to form an I, i believe he is
making a mistake because even if he was a god, he could not
capitalize i because only the word "God" includes Mett, gods
(honest men) and goddesses (honest women). The words "God",
"gods" and "goddesses" can logically not be separated because
of the similar structures of the words. If someone claims that
"God" is totally incorporeal, it does not make sense because
of the existence and common awareness of the words "gods" and
"goddesses". The definitions of the words "gods" and
"goddesses" are a point of contention because my definitions
are honest men and women whereas another understanding could
be men and women of supernatural abilities or very beautiful
women and very strong men. The reference however to beauty and
strength relates to "theos", which were falsely translated to
"gods" and "goddesses". The words "gods" and "goddesses" can
be seen, just by looking at the letters in the words, to have
a different origin than the word "theos". The only letter out
of 5 letters that are the same is "o", which places the words
in my understanding in different categories. I previously
capitalized "we" to "We" and "WE" by mistake before i realized
that "i" and "we" should not be capitalized and that only
"God" can include the capital first letter, meaning Mett, gods
and goddesses together, probably not as one entity.>
"But
I like the interpretation of the 23rd
Psalm,
according
to which the goodness and mercy that will follow me all the
days of my life are the Good Shepherd’s sheep dogs. They nip
at my heels, with a ‘No’ I do not always welcome, but which
serves to keep me safe from what is really dangerous. So I do
not find compelling the portrait of Prince Myshkin who “does
not live with a distant God whose judgment he fears; rather,
for him the transcendent God is immanent in the world,
lovingly present in the form of Jesus Christ . . .” (Stoker’s
essay, Culture and transcendence: A typology, in this
volume)." [255]
"It
is fairly clear that the religion of radical transcendence as
alterity will be a countercultural religion. Neither the ‘I’
nor the ‘We’ can be the highest norm for me, my society or my
culture. There will always be a voice, neither my nor our own,
that calls me and us to responsibility and to judgment. Where
any culture, even a professedly religious culture, claims
autonomy, finality and self-sufficiency for itself,
transcendence will call for a prophetic protest against the
idolatry involved. Religion will have the form of “Christ
against culture” (Niebuhr 1951)[256]."
[257]
<self: The singularity
of
Westphal's "creator" blinded him and
probably is singular form, because Westphal and his group,
being plural, claim power over the singular form. Why does he
presuppose that "the 'We'" and "the 'I'" exclude an external
"voice", and implies a position against him? Gods and
goddesses who are honest are honest because of an outside
"voice", because honesties work as limitations in favor of
societies. Using the words gods and goddesses is necessary
because of the linguistic similarity between "God", "god",
"gods", "goddess" and "goddesses". The forms of these words
cannot be changed and have natural coherence. The "theos" of
ancient Greece are not the same as "gods and goddesses" and
should therefore not be equated with meanings about "gods" and
"goddesses" because the people who were "theos" are not
necessarily the same as the people who were part of God. "God"
and "theos" have different characteristics in time and space
and are different concepts.>
"For
the secularism that can be called ‘modern’ (pantheistic or
naturalistic, if there is any difference), immanence is real
and transcendence illusory. For the postmodern atheisms of
Derrida and Levinas (neither is a theist), transcendence is
real and full immanence illusory, a futile and self-defeating
project. That is why both speak often of ‘God’ and present
themselves as religious." [258]
According to Westphal, Derrida and Levinas are
irreligious because they postulate God as totally other.
According to Westphal they wrote immanence is impossible and
put emphasis on transcendence.[259]
What did i mean here by "totally other"? Westphal regards God
as totally non-anthropomorphic it seems, but here it seems he
judges Derrida and Levinas for postulating themselves not part
of God. Westphal it seems thus contradict himself because if
he judges Derrida and Levinas for not taking responsibility of
being good, then it implies he must himself postulate himself
as anthropomorphic part of God, but earlier he wrote societies
should not be seen as part of God not singularity. The only
conclusion i can make now is that Westphal regard only his own
society as possibly part of God.
"We
should stop thinking about God as someone, over there, way up
there, transcendent . . . It is perhaps necessary . . . to
think of God and the name of God without such idolatrous
stereotyping or representation. Then we might say: God is the
name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is
visible from the interior but not the exterior (Derrida 1995:
108)[260]."
[261]
<self: Although Westphal
writes Derrida is not a theist, the above quote of Derrida
implies for me a more honest theism than Westphal's
theism.>
<self: Westphal, i feel today (28 Aug 2013)
should be ignored because his writing contains too many
contradictions. "God, as personal, purposive creator"[262]
and the above paragraph can only be reconciled according to me
today, if deceit is accepted and thus false reconciliations
are applicable. His words for meanings cannot be recognized in
my framework and understanding. Why, i don't know, possibly
because of different frameworks of reference. His references
to and capitalization of his I's are immanent to his writing,
which has implications for translations from languages in
which i is not capitalized to English where i is capitalized.
His identification of Derrida as alterity shows the different
frameworks they operate in. According to my understanding of
Derrida, Westphal's writing can be deconstructed. It seems
Westphal has inner conflictions between the "personal,
purposive creator" he refers to, and his emphasis on initial
cosmology. Cosmological wholes cannot be perceived, at least
by me, i realized, and it seams Westphal realized it as well,
because he writes "The initial, most abstract
mode of divine transcendence, I call cosmological" [263].
Westphal's "creator" could be his least lucid realization,
which could, in reality, primarily, mean to him ' “Christ
against culture” (Niebuhr 1951)[264].'
[265] My metaphysical truth (mett), which gives
courages to be honest, approaches a conception of cosmological
nature, but i cannot call it cosmological because the cosmos
(whole) cannot be perceived by me.>
"
The initial, most abstract mode of divine transcendence, I
call cosmological. It is what distinguishes theism (the
Abrahamic monotheisms) from pantheism and, a fortiori, from
atheism. Here, God and the world stand in an asymmetrical
relationship. The world could not exist without God, but there
could be God without the world. For the theist, creation is a
free choice on the part of God, not an ontological necessity."
[266]
<self: This means to me
today that creativities are not seen as necessity of survival,
which could be the major difference between Westphal and i
because according to my current understanding, lacks of
creativities lead to colonization. When Westphal writes "creation is a free choice on the part of God, not
an ontological necessity"[267] he removes the choice to make a living by
creating from creators. He thus appropriates creativities to
common property (singular) and do not motivate creativities,
although he could motivate utilitarian development. His
conception relates to his realism, similarly to realists who
think they can fathom totality. I now think he definitely
suffers from Caiaphas syndrome and regard himself like
Rousseau as possibly the "king of the human race", whilst lying about "I" and "We".>
Westphal's
perception
of just two concepts, immanence and transcendence, initially
made sense, because it removes the conflated (two words for
one concept) descriptions of types, which introduced new
ideas, which requires new understanding, which requires
effort. Westphal's inclusion of alterity in his framework of
understanding was included in the sense of altarity and
sacrifices of ' “Christ against culture”
(Niebuhr 1951)[268]
' [269]
(singular), and
excluded
the concept of creators (plural) in favor of societies. Both
realities exist. It could be argued that immanence and
transcendence should not be conflated because each word on its
own is complicated and we could get closer to understanding
realities by understanding each word as separate concept. That
would now be my preferred, because the two concepts are not
well understood on their own. I can identify something
immanent in an object, which would be similar to Clouser's
"centrality". I could transcend dichotomous subject and object
by forming a new synthesis in my understanding. Something can
be immanent to/of transcendence because "immanent's" meaning
is similar to "inherent's" meaning. Naming of concepts use
names and meanings are found in discourses, rather than names.
The initial names make contributions to understanding by being
important introductions to concepts and remembering of
concepts. Maybe the naming of the concepts should not have
conflated immanence and transcendence.
Chaplin also, like
others stated that religion is experiencing a heightened
importance during postmodern times. Parts of motivations for
the return of religions are "suffocating" relations between
dogmatism, industrial development and "bourgeois" morality.
"Non-objective" abstract art was used as a means of
transcendence during modern times. Religious influences were
usually described spiritually during modernity but not
religiously, but parts of the mystical phenomena have during
postmodern times become material with regard to religious
rites, festivals and religious group activities.[270]
The materiality of the mystical was for example depicted by
Warhol's paintings, when he represented Jesus and his
disciples as a group of artists in his "The Last Supper".[271]
<self: Warhols representations might not be far of the mark
because apparently Luce was a doctor and a painter.>
Before anything can be
postulated to have been transcended that, which is transcended
should be identified. That, which is transcended is
" 'immanence' ".[272]
However when "immanence" is identified we also realize that
immanence can be immanent in one respect and transcendent in
another respect.[273]
"In
other words, it is important to distinguish between different
kinds of transcendence – ontological, cosmological,
epistemological, ethical, temporal, spatial, experiential and
so on."[274]
"Contemporary
art’s fascination with religious symbols and observances might
thus well suggest a longing for enduring, recognisable points
of orientation for the meaningful ordering of lives –
liturgical punctuations in an otherwise fluid existence.
Story-based rites and rituals, as non-identical repetitions,
can give contemporary life a meaningful narrative amidst the
incessant flow of ever new information and visual stimulation.
Religious symbols can be felt to provide a eucharistic rhythm
and structure to otherwise rootless lives. This quest for a
meaningful narrative does not imply a search for a religious
transcendence in terms of an ‘absolute’ or ‘beyond’. Religion
in these works is less about religious convictions and
spiritual beliefs, and more about visible practices and
tangible phenomena."[275]
<self:
Pieter Vermaak, an Afrikaans artist told me that abstract art
is a depiction of the hardships of reality. Making abstract
art, for an artist, thus sometimes, happen because ugly
reality is not depicted. That implies the objective character
of current art could be a result of material success, which
artists experience in current times. Hardship experienced by
artists during modernity is not as evident during
postmodernity because investors buy much art because of loss
of trust in other investments.>
James Romain, an art
historian wrote: " '
Works like Last Supper (Dove) bring together brand
name products from the supermarket and the sacramental imagery
of the church, asserting that modern life and faith are
neither separate nor contradictory.' " [276]
<self:
Could this be a reference to "accounting of ideas" in its
current occurrence i.e. the explanations of Barlow and
Griffiths. It could imply that Luce of the Bible for example
was not a creator in the sense of originating ideas but that
he copied ideas, which were conceived by Jesus. Barlow, I
somewhere read composed lyrics for the band The Grateful Dead
in the USA. The information he wrote about, which are being
traded could be the sources of his lyrics and The Grateful
Dead could be a reference to the people who originate the
ideas, being used in his lyrics. In this instance also a
distinction can be made between artists being creators and
artists being copiers of ideas.>
Transcendence can be
seen as nihilistic or in opposition to nihilism. Several
traditional conceptions of transcendence were equated with
nihilism. Nietzsche's writings make us more aware of matters
with regard to transcendence and nihilism.[277]
"Nihilism
is commonly associated with the teaching that Nietzsche
ascribes to ‘the madman’: that is, his message of the death of
God."[278]
<self: This statement by
Van Tongeren can be argued against on first impressions
because "the madman" ascribed nihilism to the people at the
market. Although the madman referred to "us" his rhetorical
questions imply he was preaching to the people at the market
that nihilism is a problem, which could lead to disaster.>
"Human
culture tries to understand the world, needs orientation and
is compelled to value. Therefore, we need God; we need
transcendence in order to understand the world, to value what
we do and what we see others do.
This
concept of ‘transcendence’ presupposes a distinction between
two kinds or two realms of reality, one of which (the
transcendent) is prior to the other, with the second being
dependent on the first. This priority is ontological and
epistemological, as well as ethical, if not also
chronological. Nihilism is the negation of this transcendent
reality. This death, decline or disappearance of transcendent
reality, ‘the death of God’, is therefore terrifying, because
it inevitably leads to perdition, annihilation."[279]
<self: Note the
difference between Chaplin[280] who emphasizes Aristotelian "immanence" first
and Van Tongeren who emphasizes Platonic transcendence first.
According to Plato true realizations of the immanent was
dependent on the transcendental courage to be honest and
according to Aristotle immanent deceits were to be used for
realization of the transcendental truth.>
Nietzsche identified four phases of nihilism. The
first phase is "fundamental" nihilism; pessimism and the
thought that living in this world is the worst that can happen
to a person. To be born means you will be sacrificed.
Philosophy and religion sometimes conceal this first phase and
when we become aware of it in our own lives we are faced with
a huge problem. It seems then that, according to Nietzsche
this first phase, which van Tongeren calls a second phase,
causes misrepresentations of realities. The second according
to my current understanding or first phase according to van
Tongeren was the construction of God of Christianity. This God
is dependent on nihilistic opposition, which does not value
identifications of realities.[281]
The third phase according to van Tongeren is
represented by utilitarianism, materialism and positivism,
which replaces dead God. The third phase is also represented
by destruction (terrorism) and apathy, which van Tongeren
calls "complete nihilism". The fourth stage of nihilism is an
overcoming of the problems of nihilism.[282]
Van Tongeren wrote that Nietzsche postulated two
realities, with the transcendent reality prior to immanent
reality. The duality apparently causes nihilism.[283]
According to Van Tongeren the four types of transcendence of
Stoker presuppose the duality even at radical immanence
because the transcendent is part of the radical. If Nietzsche
was right, Van Tongeren claims Stoker's conception of four
types implies four types of nihilism.[284]
Apparently Nietzsche claimed to have moved to a position
beyond, what Van Tongeren calls complete nihilism (terrorism),
because through acceptance of the evil world, without
attempting to change it by destructive means, he (Nietzsche),
reached a point of nihilism in itself, according to Nietzsche.
That is being in an inescapable reality of nihilism, and
accepting nihilism because nihilism was an inescapable reality
for Nietzsche.[285]
Van Tongeren discussed under a heading, "tragic
transcendence"[286]
the conceptions of Stoker and other contemporary authors, with
reference to Nietzsche's, Levinas's and Derridas's
transcendence as alterity. References were made to the ideal
"messiah", who Derrida wrote could be a "monster", perhaps in
a Hobbesian, Machiavellian despotic type of understanding. I
did not follow the discussion of Van Tongeren well because my
knowledge of the authors' work was not good enough, a thought
i previously had however reoccurred whilst reading. The
thought related to the alterity of Jesus of Nazareth and
Socrates and the way they died. Socrates was sentenced to
suicide and took his own life. Jesus of Nazareth was crucified
logically by the "other"/"others". A question could be asked
about the transcendences, which would have been relevant on
the side of Socrates and his judges, if Socrates refused to
commit suicide. These transcendences could have been relevant
at Jesus of Nazareth's crucifixion.
According to Stoker,
Westphal postulates the existence of transcendence before
transcendence is defined but he (Stoker) postulates the
definition of transcendence and existence of transcendence
"entertwined".[287]
<self: I do not agree with one of them. Maybe i would agree
with them if i knew their work better. Transcendence and
immanence existed before the discourse about transcendence and
immanence started. The discourse has a purpose to fix our
understandings of what these concepts are. Whilst the
definitions and discourse make the concepts clearer to
understand it also fixes the phenomena through a dialogical
process.>
Stoker, like Dengerink
Chaplin's[288],
according to Stoker, makes transcendence dependent on what is
transcended, namely, "immanence".[289]
<self: Stoker is thus Aristotelian in his reasoning and not
Platonic, or it could be argued Stoker realizes that to know
immanence, courage to be honest through faiths are necessity.
Following realizations due to honesties people transcend
further in the spirit of Kant's philosophy.> Stoker
identifies differences between Tillich and Altizer and
differences between Kierkegaard and Altizer, which are more
prominent, according to Stoker than the similarities, which
Westphal identifies and therefore four types are identified as
result of difference.[290]
Stoker writes his model
is a descriptive heuristic and not a normative heuristic,
which can be used to understand divinity better whilst
evaluating art. Dengerink, according to Stoker, does not
evaluate art according to the relationship between immanence
and transcendence but more on the mood the evaluated art
invokes.[291]
Stoker finds Van
Tongeren's postulate of dualistic transcendence interesting
and also Van Tongeren's concept of non-nihilistic
transcendence, which Stoker equates with transcendence as
alterity or an undefined 5th type.[292]
<This could imply that Stoker does realize transcendence in
faiths cause realizations of immanence, like Van Tongeren
does.>
Burms uses the word
transcendence to refer to the "evocative" power of language
and not to refer to a "metaphysical reality". He presents a
similarity to transcendence as alterity.[293]
Transcendence becomes relevant when we feel and see "nature or
reality" as not sensitive to our "eminently" experienced
problems.[294]
On the other hand we are told of metaphysical events, which
console and occur parallel to eminently experienced problems.[295]
Presentations of these metaphysical events are poetic and
therefore beliefs relate to the power of words.[296]
Cosmologies that
reflect fairness are not based on reality, but rather on
poetry, which consoles.[297]
"It
is true that an involuntary rhyme is a disturbance in ordinary
speech. If two successive sentences of a public lecture
produce an involuntary rhyme, it is experienced by lecturer
and audience as an infelicity – the audience will smile or
politely ignore the little accident."[298]
<self: Aristotelian
deceit as methodology must have convinced Burms. Rhyming
significance, for example, between "altar" and "alter" should
not be ignored. If rhyming of the two words appears in a
lecture a truth is emphasized because the words have
historical relations, which are helpful to understand reality.
Why can Burms not realize this or am i unaware of something or
does he realize it but he does not want to acknowledge it
because of fearing academic despots? It seems the Aristotelian
methodology is not widely accepted as being in existence but
this statement of Burms, which he contradicts later, proves
that Aristotelian deceit exists in academic research.>
"But
what happens in poetry is that the isolated disturbances (for
example, the isolated instances of unintentional rhyme) form a
pattern: linguistic matter is reflected in poetic form. This
makes the reader aware of two things at the same time: it is
as if language has moved closer to the infinite chaos of what
is not said, while, at the same time, it is protected from
being swallowed by such chaos. That is also what happens when
the meaningful connections discussed in the first part of this
essay provide consolation: these connections are indirect,
poetic approaches to that which is beyond meaning."[299]
Van der Braak
investigated the transcendence/immanence Western dualism with
reference of work by Japanese Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990)
because in the East, according to Van der Braak the dualism
does not exist. The transcendent is there acknowledged as
immanent. He described Nishitani's realization as " 'ecstatic
trans-descendence' " and compared it to transcendence as
alterity.[300]
Van der Braak regards
Stoker's four types of transcendence to include the first two
types, which enhance transcendence and the last two types,
which ignore transcendence in favor of immanence.[301]
<self: I disagree with Van der Braak because i experienced
that transcendence as alterity, implies a high level of
transcendence because the courage to face the ugly realities
of the world can according to me only be realized by
transcending immanence.>
"We could say that the four types of
transcendence that Stoker describes in his heuristic model are
four ways of working out the possibilities projected in the
fundamental understanding of transcendence as the relationship
between ‘here’ and ‘beyond’:
(1)
the
‘beyond’ is also ‘here’
(2)
the ‘beyond’ is radically remote from ‘here’
(3)
there is no ‘beyond’, but only ‘here’
(4)
‘beyond’ and ‘here’ are not opposites."[302]
<self: The above interpretation of Van der
Braak can place (1) and (4) in the same category and (3) and
(4) in the same category where he previously placed (1) and
(2) together and (3) and (4) together. Religious progression
can be from (1) to (4).>
The Chinese prefer to not speak about the duality
because they argue the word "immanence" implies
"transcendence" and vice versa. According to them it is one
reality.[303]
Cooperative thought between Nishitani of the
Kyoto School's Buddhist background and post-Kantian European
philosophy, especially Heidegger's thought, exist as
acknowledged by Altizer. The purpose is religious convergence
between Buddhist philosophy and Christian philosophy, with
emphasis on kenosis. Where Western philosophy sometimes
emphasizes Being, the Kyoto School focuses on Nothingness.[304]
<self: Christianity questions 'notions' of kenosis
(nothingness), which according to apocalyptic beliefs,
precedes immanence. These ideas could be a sign of the best
society in the sense that other societies actually murder
creators but the Germans and Japanese just destroy the
creative spirit but not the person the spirit inhabits. The
process of kenosis is in the psyche of the German and Japanese
applicable, seen as a prerequisite for immanence. Why first
sacrifice and then lift up? Why not allow all people to be
creators in order to reach the best human condition?>
Nothingness is emphasized by Eastern philosophy through the
realization of weakness of singularity. That individuals can
only be part of process and part of a bigger picture and that
an individual can never be The-god/-dess, at least during
his/her own lifetime.[305]
Nishitani wrote that Nietzsche's nihilism is
overcome by experiencing transcendence, an eminent part of
reality. The process follows "aboriginal" disregard of
influence and wealth to "absolute
nothingness
of the field of śūnyatā (Davis,
2004,
p. 106)[306]."[307]
"Masao
Abe, for example, has put forward an interpretation of śūnyatā as
kenosis."[308]
" 'Whoever loses his life for my sake, will find it'
(Mt 10:39)"[309]
The
typology
given in the book should not stop readers from identifying
different "kinds" (ethics, politics, economics) of analysanda
(plural of "analysandum"), used to explain the "concepts"
'transcendence' and 'immanence', which may appear at each
type. Also important are the different senses (ontological,
epistemological, cultural etc.). [310] "The reference to
transcendence is first and foremost ethical."[311]
Inhoud
Hierdie leereenheid sal deels gebruik word (in die
kontakgeleentheid) om die vraag oor transendensie verder te
bespreek. Transendensie as term binne die godsdiensfilosofie
is natuurlik baie ruimer as net die term “god”. Tog bly die
vraag of daar (veral na aanleiding van die probleme soos
uitgelig in leereenheid 2) ʼn toekoms is (of kan wees) vir
godsdiensfilosofie.
Hierdie vraag word aan die hand van Trakakis se boek The end of philosophy of
religion bespreek. Die vraag is dus in hierdie laaste
leereenheid oor of en hoe daar dan godsdiensfilosofie nog
gedoen kan word. Hierdie soort vraag laat die kompleksiteit
van die godsvraag (die argumente oor god se bestaan) duidelik
na vore kom.
Studiemateriaal/Leeswerk
Trakakis, N. 2008. The end of philosophy of
religion. London: Continuum, 1-124.
Werkopdrag
Maak ʼn
opsomming van die argument van Trakakis oor die toekoms van
godsdiensfilosofie. Lewer kritiek daarop en verduidelik hoe jy
dink godsdiensfilosofie steeds gedoen kan word.
Die
opdrag in ʼn opstel van ongeveer 1200 woorde en in akademiese
formaat gedoen word.
NB: This pdf read, did not have the notes
attached, therefore the references, which Trakakis made
could not be copied. A reference to Trakakis may include
another reference not visible.
"gruesome shadow of God" implies that Trakakis
has a negative view of God and that he does not equate God
with goodness. His "God" can actually be devils. [312]
" 'analytic tradition' ... personal and
political dangers involved" implies that theodicies are more
relevant at analytical philosophy than continental philosophy.
This does not make sense because it contradicts my current
understanding of the gods of continental philosophy, who were
subjects of theodicies. [313]
Trakakis made it clear that he thinks that
"Continental philosophy" is the future of Philosophy of
religion.[314]
This quote is again a negative view of God, in
the sense that the most powerful is in fact evil.[315]
It seems the negative view of who is the most
powerful, stems from theodicycal philosophy and that is why
Trakakis does not agree with the tradition of analytical
philosophy, which includes theodicies. His reason is that
theodicies cannot divulge the truths about evil.[316]
Trakakis identifies the emphasis on realism by
analytical philosophy as presupposition.[319]
<self: False postulates of the cosmos as datum are a
presupposition of analytical philosophy. False, because the
cosmos cannot be perceived, especially not, together with the
unreal phenomena in minds of analytical philosophers because
of their Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle promoted deceit as
a methodology and sign of a "knowledgeable man". Tarnas called
Aristotle the first empiricist.>
The main critique by analytical philosophers
against continental philosophy is against continental
philosophy's perspectivism and anti-realism.[320]
<self: It seems the analytical approach is again to deceive
the naive with words like "anti-realism" because the
continental philosophers' presuppositions namely nominalism
and perspectivism is closer to reality than realism because
the starting point is observations different people can agree
on, without postulating much theoretical knowledge, not based
in true observations.>
<self: Maybe only
theodicies can make people realize that they should be part of
God, otherwise they will not go forward in the long run. This
statement cannot be made with the knowledge i have gained so
far from theodicies because the sacrificed never won, except
if winning is envisaged as Job's riches and life after his
problems changed. Job is however the only example i can think
of now and i cannot now think of a direct reason for the
change of his circumstances.>
The utilitarian nature
of theodicies is identified with - "this
is usually understood in quantitative terms, so that the
positive value of the good state of affairs must outweigh the
disvalue of the evil state of affairs".
Trakakis however goes on to explain usually the goods should
be ascribed to the sufferer.[323]
It seems the "freedoms"
in theodicycal thinking is more applicable to the theodicists
than the victims. The statement supports my thoughts that
theodicies are constructed to benefit the people who cause the
suffering or allow the suffering.[325]
This statement accords
with the belief that God is incorporeal and humans are evil.[326]
It seems Trakakis
doubts here the truth of the definition of the analytical God,
but he does not want to revert to reductionist thought or
pre-scientific thought.[328]
Theology and
Continental philosophy took stances against theodicies but
analytical Philosophy of religion is in favor of theodicies.[329]
The incorporeal God of
analytical philosophy is normally perfect and here Trakakis
highlights a contradiction because if theodicies are ascribed
to "God himself", who allows theodicies, then perfection of
God is nullified and therefore God is not incorporeal.[331]
Seeking truth is
obviously not the same as being honest because being honest
means putting true knowledge into the world. Swinburne equated
a non-corrupt mind with seeking of truth.[335]
The above quote of
Kenneth Surin identifies the difference between seeking truths
and telling truths.[336]
Utilitarianism
softened.[337]
The contrast between
Kantian philosophy and theodicies are mentioned. Kantian
philosophy states people should not be used as means to ends.[338]
Sometimes theodicies
are regarded as bureaucratic necessity.[339]
Theodicists are complicit in the evils they explain, according
to Surin.[340]
O'Connor defends theodicists; he writes they would be
complicit only if they give advice about how to overcome evil,
in other words if they earn a living by giving advice about
methods to overcome evil.[341]
O'Connor argues that theodicies motivate transcendental
theories of religion and therefore religion cannot do without
theodicycal justifications.[342]
Surin argues the activities through which theologians' and
philosophers' theoretical explanations of theodicies take
place, have social dimensions, which justifies, in effect,
evil.[343]
Levinas explains that viewing someone else's pain is useless
as aid with regard to belief.[344]
<self: With regard to the earlier statement about
bureaucratic necessity and viewing and being aware of evil as
part of religion, obviously keep populations in a state of
nihilistic fear. The Eucharist enforces the idea of
sacrificing creators, who are the most likely victims of the
evils explained by theodicies and further, the people who
accept theodicies are probably aware of the benefits they
acquire through the imparting of creators' ideas.>
Kant and theodicies
Trakakis refers to the character Ivan's thought
in "Dostoyesvsky's" (sic) book The Brothers Karamazov:
'There is a strong contrast in
Ivan's thinking between deserved and undeserved suffering:
children do not usually deserve the suffering they experience,
whereas adults who "have eaten the apple" may well deserve to
suffer.'[345]
'It is not worth one single small tear of even one tortured
little child that beat its breast with its little fist and
prayed in its foul-smelling dog-hole with its unredeemed tears
addressed to "dear Father God"!'[346]
<self:
I think this reference is not to actual children but to adult
creators in their "foul-smelling dog-holes". It refers for
example to Diogenes the most notable cynic philosopher of
Greece who lived in a wine jar in Athens.> Gen. 4:6-7
states: 'Then the LORD said to Cain, "Why are you angry? Why
is your face downcast? If you do what is right, sin is
crouching at your door; it desires to have you, but you must
master it." ' In verse 8 Cain kills his brother Abel. The
incident where Isaac needed a lamb to take his place when
Abraham wanted to sacrifice him relates. In the English New
International version of the Bible, reference is made to God
"himself" who will supply the lamb and in the 1933 Afrikaans
version reference is made to God "Homself" who will supply the
lamb. In the 1983 Afrikaans version the words "sy eie" was
used.[347]
In a lecture about Kant and his work, La Religión it was
stated that important factors with regard to theodicies, are
miracles and suffering.[348]
There was a practice in the Old Testament whereby creators
were offered to "God" and belief exists that if "God" through
a miracle or something else does not save such a person then
the person did not have "God's" blessing. The Mother of God
and Father of God thoughts are relevant in certain cases. I
postulate however that the practice was and is a way of
motivating religious sacrifice and getting rid of creators who
are not children of the perpetrators. The creators
("children") change the status quo with their creativities and
therefore are sacrificed by the powerful according to Toynbee[349].
The main problem is the idea of sacrifice of the
"Other/other", which is inherent to the Eucharist. According
to the idea of religious sacrifice other humans can be
sacrificed if it benefits the group. This idea of sacrifice is
against the idea that we as humans can create together, to
benefit different groups at once, according to Kantian
philosophy. Aristotle's philosophy conjoins with that of the
Old Testament. The belief is that what is good for one group
cannot be good for another group.
"There is a parallel with the way
that what is good in itself cannot be so because of anything
else and what is good for its own sake cannot be so for the
sake of anything else."[350]
Religious sacrifice of creators relates to belief
that only incorporeal God creates and that creativities are a
sign of childishness and homosexuality. The Caiaphas syndrome
has been relevant from the fall into sin to current. What does
it say about men when they call another man a woman? The
"dog-hole" previously mentioned is relevant because possibly
together with the sacrifice of creators, poisoning takes
place, which causes a stink and isolation. Rumors are then
spread about homosexuality in conjunction with poisoning and
flowers of sulphur. Another relevant evil, which drives
sacrifices, is the false belief in a "Messiah" in conjunction
with the "2nd coming" of "Christ", because these beliefs
justify miracles, which could save creators from the grips of
sacrifice. Human vanity is prone to falsely believing the
possibility of such miracles as positive outcome, which
relates to the Father of God and Mother of God thoughts. The
said thoughts are however not most relevant at the fathers and
mothers of the creators being sacrificed, but are most
relevant at the people initiating the sacrifices of creators
who are not their own children. Their "Father" and "Mother" of
God thoughts are directly related to societal Caiaphas
syndrome, which took hold of them. How do i know these things?
They are logical conclusions because i have been sacrificed by
a hegemony since 1999 when i offered sufficient competition to
their trading interests.
"The 'entry ticket' to the heavenly
afterlife where an eternal harmony will reign is too
expensive; it is not worth the sufferings - particularly the
sufferings of children - that it demands." Ivan then
becomes not an atheist but a reformed Christian who opposes
the "God" of the Old Testament. [351]
This is probably in reference to the stoning and sacrifice of
Francis of Assisi by the hegemony, which Ivan would not have
taken part in.
Trakakis mentions there
could be something serious wrong with analytical Philosophy of
religion and he wants to investigate the possibility.[352]
The problem, which he does not identify according to my memory
of the first reading is the anti-creating implications of
analytical philosophy, which postulates the "One Creator" who
has a monopoly on creativities. This idea benefits only part
of humanity, only in the short term, because the believers in
"God himself" who is the only "Creator" will not find rest in
a homeland in the long term.
The reference to a
discussion between Continental philosophers and analytic
philosophers and the primary existence of the sun[353]
might refer to the sociology of knowledge truth, which states
that new things originate in individuals and spread from them
to society. The good things spread thus naturally from
creators to the rest of society. It is a truth accepted by
Continental philosophers according to my understanding but not
by analytic philosophers. Maybe they all belief in the
sacrifice of the "Son" and the nihilism Nietzsche alluded on
in his "death of God" statement.
Trakakis refers to the
divide[354]
between analytic and Continental philosophers in reference to
a complaint, analytic philosophers made during 1992 in a
letter to the London Times,
against an honorary degree awarded to Derrida because his work
was not clear enough for an academic degree. It seems analytic
philosophers has a subconscious block due to the Caiaphas
syndrome, which prohibits them from understanding Derrida,
because even i, who is not a qualified philosopher, feel i
understand the value of Derrida's work as having made one of
the biggest contributions to philosophy by contemporary
philosophers. The divide, which Trakakis identified, is not
due to territories according to me, because scientists were
put in exile between the European continent and the USA if i
am not mistaken, as recent as the 2nd World War. Was Einstein
not in exile to the USA? The difference is between individuals
on the European continent, which have the courage to oppose
analytic philosophy on the continent, to their own
disadvantage. I think the fact that Derrida was only given an
honorary degree is proof of this, or is it not? The question
is where do analytic and Continental philosophers get their
finance from because Trakakis states they do not attend each
others' conferences nor read each others' papers.[355]
Analytic philosophers
have not interest in questioning their metaphysical
presuppositions and Continental philosophers have not interest
in metaphysics.[356]
During the years after the Enlightenment, metaphysical chairs
at Continental universities were abolished. The question of
courage by philosophers is an important issue. Currently it
takes courage to question the metaphysics about realism in the
analytic tradition, which Trakakis showed he has. After the
Enlightenment it must have taken courage by a philosopher to
postulate realism on the European continent when metaphysics
chairs were abolished. Benjamin is perhaps a good example of a
Jewish philosopher who was sacrificed due to his realism?
(nominalism?) on the European continent when realism? was out
of fashion. In the Penguin dictionary of philosophy Benjamin
was mentioned as one of the Frankfurt School's first group;
Habermas was one of the 2nd group of the Frankfurt School.
Trakakis mentions that all of the analytic[357]
school did not appreciate his questioning of their traditions.
Analytic philosophy has
different schools for example philosophy of mind, language and
religion. Continental philosophy follows a more unified
"systematic" approach, whereby they do not limit themselves to
a specific field. They do not have a specific field for
philosophy of religion but they do philosophize about religion
in conjunction with their perspectivist approach.[358]
Alvin Plantinga
(analytical) and John Caputo (Continental) are used by
Trakakis to show the different in styles of philosophy.[359]
In a publication by Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity,
Plantinga used Anselm's ontological argument to prove the
existence of God.[360]
Trakakis gives an example of writing by Plantinga where
frequent reference is made to "God" as "his" and "him".[361]
The subject-object dichotomy is thus highly relevant in the
words of analytical philosophy. Analytical philosophers, due
to their presupposition about realism postulates a God's eye
view of the cosmos as datum. God being "him" and "his" in the
quoted piece can therefore not be removed from Plantinga
himself in the singular because Plantinga himself is the
philosopher who presuppose realism. The subject-object
dichotomy is therefore heavily at work in the writing and
probably causes transcendental thinking. Does it however put
Plantinga in a position to be sufficiently aware of realities
or does it blind him with Caiaphas syndrome and "Father" or
"Son" of God thoughts. If Plantinga referred to God as "them"
or "us" he would have realized that it is impossible to view
the cosmos as a datum and he would be more in line with a
perspectivist approach. His transcendence would then be less
based on the subject-object dichotomy (self [subject thinking]
being God [object of thought]) and more on trust in other
human beings as part of "us" or "them". Honesties then become
more important because of trust in other humans.
The next example[362]
about Plantinga is where Plantinga reasons about the nature of
the world God created. Plantinga starts with two paradoxes
because he wrote:
' "To show this latter [that it
is possible that 'God is omnipotent and it was not within his
power to create a world containing moral good but no moral
evil'], we must demonstrate the possibility that among the
worlds that God could not have actualized are all the worlds
containing moral good but no moral evil." '
The first paradox is an omnipotent God, which
cannot do anything ("it was not within his power"). The second
paradox is "moral evil" because evil is not moral. The paradox
or contradiction that Plantinga tries to prove is false in a
similar way that the presupposition of observing the cosmos as
datum is not possible. The example shows that analytic
philosophers have lost touch with reality and analytic
metaphysical work is illogical to some extent. The argument
does not make sense further because Plantinga takes one
example about bribery and want to infer from there something
about the cosmos as a whole. In the Afrikaans Bible of 1933
God stated that no "gelykenisse" should be made, which
implies, nothing can be compared because nothing is equal. The
equal sign of mathematics is just a theory, which do not exist
in reality. Plantinga nevertheless compares an incident (part
of the world) with the world as a whole and want to come to a
conclusion about a whole, based on a part, which is illogical.
Plantinga concludes:
' "It therefore follows that it
was not within God's power to actualize a world in which
Curley produces moral good but no moral evil. Every world God
could have actualized is such that if Curley is significantly
free in it, he takes at least one wrong action." '[363]
Something else that is illogical about analytical
philosophers is that they attack Kant and other rationalists
about their rationalistic arguments but the arguments they
use, like the argument above, use logical argumentation and
rationalism.
Trakakis then gives examples of John Caputo's
writing.[364]
The first example he calls: "Exhibit B1: Caputo
on the love of
[own bold] God". The example ends where Caputo asks, " 'But
what do they love? What do I love when I love my God? That is
their question. That is my question.' " This
example can be argued about logically because it asks what is
God. I can give a definition for God, someone else can give a
definition for God and we can determine if we love what is
described by the definitions. Without expanding about the
following[365]
two examples by Caputo my observation is that Caputo is honest
and rational because he gives an honest representation of
reality, his doings and thoughts. Caputo realizes that
rationality is dependent on the honesties of others and his
own honesties. He acts in favor of us all because we know what
he thinks and he does not include paradoxical illogical
postulations like those of Plantinga in his discourse.
(Somewhere else in this document Platinga was quoted where he
motivated honesties. Was his motivation pretence?)
Trakakis writes that analytical philosophy of
religion is based on "clarity
and rigour", which i dispute because of the contradictions
included in the examples by Plantinga. Plantinga's writing is
not clear at all to me, probably because my brain works honest
and rational like the brains of Continental philosophers who
also say they do not follow analytical philosophy of religion.
Why? Contradictions cannot be understood and contradictions
are not rational processing. Trakakis further writes that
objectivity is an attribute of analytical philosophy of
religion.[366]
I do not agree with Trakakis about the objective nature he
identifies because of the subjective nature of the
presuppositions of analytic philosophy. The subjective
experience of realism by each analytic philosopher and the
frequent use of "God himself" (subject-object dichotomy) who
miraculously perceives the "cosmos as cosmos"[367] are not
objective. Although Continental philosophy is more literary[368]
than analytical philosophy it is more objective because it is
more logical. Objectivity and logic goes hand in hand.
Continental philosophy's directness and objectivity can
sometimes come across as disrespectful though, for example of
female sexuality. I am thinking here of a lecture by the
European philosopher, Slavoj Źiźek.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What did Jesus mean when he said we should love
our enemies? Complying with written laws has become my
definition of Jesus's love, which includes loving enemies, in
conjunction with Clouser's philosophy of law. Today i however
thought that maybe Jesus meant "loving enemies" implied more
than complying with written laws; also with non-written laws
of devils. In the time of St. Francis of Assisi the hegemony
stoned him. In the time of Jesus of Nazareth they crucified
him. Today's actions of the hegemony, if compared to the past,
show that states of continuous improvement take place. Kant's
postulate of human improvement could be true. Maybe the word
"God" has lost its worth and maybe devils should be loved and
"God", the word, should be replaced with a new word, which
clearly distinguish gods and goddesses from devils, who are
loved, on the other side, in conjunction with John's
prediction in Revelation, which mentioned a new name for a new
status quo. Maybe the word "God" should be developed to its
full potential to refer only to gods, goddesses and mett,
excluding devils from "God", which is currently not the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 September 2013
"In line with their rejection of an
'objective' or scientific style, Continental philosophers
frequently adopt a very personal and intimate tone."[369]
This personal tone Trakakis identifies is objectivity (logic)
because of honesties in Continental philosophy. Perspective
views are more objective than "realist" views.
Continental philosophy has a distinct
interdisciplinary nature.[370]
The difference in style between analytic and Continental
philosophy is very deep and relates to metaphysics.[371]
According to me the difference is due to Kant's greatest good,
honesties, which are part of Continental philosophy but not
analytic philosophy. It relates to the Caiaphas syndrome,
which were partly overcome by Continental philosophy. Partly
because they still refer to God in the singular but not as
much as analytic philosophers with all their singular
references to "God himself", "God Himself", etc.
Analytic
meta-philosophy of religion took on the form of scientific
enquiry.[372]
A conclusion can therefore be made that the phenomena of
theodicies are partly a result of analytic anthropological
studies in which subjects are used as objects, whilst
interfering in the privacy of gods and goddesses, in a
perverse manner.
Continental philosophy
emphasizes not scientific objective data, but rather
interpretations of the "arts" and humanities" "especially
literature and literary criticism".[373]
Although referring to the "humanities" can include humans as
objects it seems in Continental philosophy it could be more in
reference to historical figures and existing literature than
living humans during anthropological studies, unless the
European continent is deeply divided between analytic and
humane philosophy and the analytic meta-philosophy is
practiced in secret on the European continent.
The difference in the
meta-philosophical approaches causes varying methodologies
especially with regard to Philosophy of religion.[374]
Analytic philosophy
started during the early 1900s as a movement against British
idealism. The nature of analytic philosophy is descriptive.[375]
Analytic philosophy is similar to Aristotle's philosophy,
which could be used as a tool for deceiving against idealistic
honesties (truths).
"Creative tension" is
part of analytic philosophy. "A
thousand philosophical flowers have bloomed." [376]
These words are descriptive of the Caiaphas syndrome and
flowers of sulphur, which could until recently be bought
without a prescription on the Continent. The republic Plato
promoted in The Laws
is called Magnesia and magnesium counters sulphur poisoning.
Analytic philosophy
tends to be ahistorical but the tension between determinism
and will is one of the main topics.[377]
A requirement of analytic philosophy is whether the doctrine
can be "demonstrated to be true"[378].
It seems this "truth" of analytic philosophy is mainly
coherence within the previous findings of a specific school.
Specific school truths contradict realism because realism
presupposes not only a school's system. This is another
contradiction of analytic philosophy because realism is a
presupposition of them. I have not seen a theory of realism,
which all analytic philosophers ascribe to. The combining
theory (methodology) of analytic philosophers could be deceit
in line with Aristotle. North-West University uses Clouser's
non-reductionist theory of reality but then a reductionist
approach is used for assignments; concluded thus that within
schools of analytic philosophy a universal view of realism
does not exist, unless i am mistaken with my view that
North-West University's School of philosophy is an analytical
school. There are philosophers there who focus more on
Continental approaches. The Calvinistic approach of NWU does
not subscribe to either rationalism (Continental) or
empiricism (analytic), everything is ascribed to "God himself"
and "God Himself". The NWU approach is dominantly, looking
towards centers, which is empirical strategy, the approach is
not looking from centers. The Continental foci at NWU are
probably on the fringes of the school.
The hypothesis, which is usually
under investigation in analytical philosophy of religion is:
'the world is created and governed by God, where 'God' is
standardly defined as a maximally great or absolutely perfect
being, that is, a being perfect in power (omnipotent), perfect
in knowledge (omniscient) and perfect in goodness, but also
possessing a suite of other essential properties, including
omnipresence, incorporeality, eternity, worship-worthiness,
and (on some accounts) simplicity, immutability, impassibility
and necessary existence. The overall aim is to determine
whether "the theistic hypothesis", as it is called is worthy
of acceptance. Typically this project begins with a test for
conceptual adequacy: Is the concept of God presupposed in the
theistic concept coherent
[own bold]?'[379]
This hypothesis cannot show God because God is
"incorporeal". The hypothesis can therefore only show what God
do on Earth and according to that can a person decide if
he/she wants to pray to God. I have nowhere read with
certainty what God does, unless Jesus's corporeality
(contradicting incorporeality) is the example. If this
definition of God (Jesus) is true and unchangeable, i will
have to find another way of describing the Entity i rely on to
justify my actions. The Entity i rely on cause the dignified
survival and procreation of honest individuals, and the Entity
prohibits the Caiaphas syndrome to cause havoc in the lives of
honest individuals. My opposition to the above definition of
God includes a hypothesis within analytic philosophy of
religion because analytic philosophy of religion includes
"non-theistic"[380]
thoughts, which i have.
Continental philosophy
has a "plethora" of schools for example, existentialism,
phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, postmodernism etc.
and "there is a distinct 'flavour' to
this kind of philosophy." According
to Neil Levy modernist art and not modern science underlies
Continental philosophy.[381]
"Continuous revolution" is the motto "to see the world anew."
"Hermeneutics, the interpretation or
reinterpretation of the world" and
therefore history as well is important.[382]
Kant interpreted this by postulating that "miracles" is a word
for moral and natural laws we do not understand. According to
Karl Ameriks Kant wrote the last classic theodicy.[383]
Continental philosophers are inventive not analytic. They act
as cultural critics and comment on issues they see as
subversive and damaging to society.[384]
" 'Liberation' " is an important concept.[385]
According to the lecture at note 382 Kant figured freedom to
be a concept similar to a miracle, therefore the concept
freedom has a definite religious undertone. Obviously Kant's
"freedom" was different than the freedom postulated in
breaking laws. Kant's freedom was rather being free of people
who are free to break laws. His philosophy was thus Christ
like.
Trakakis labels
Continental philosophy as " 'anti-scientism' " and
he refers to Continental philosophers with feminine "she" and
then Trakakis quotes David Cooper who quoted Kant, describing
scientism as " 'man's
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity ... the courage to
use your own understanding' ".[386]
Trakakis opines thus that Continental philosophy is anti-Kant,
which means he focuses on Continental philosophy, which is
similar to analytic philosophy anti-Kantian. All Continental
philosophy is not anti-Kantian, therefore Trakakis's implied
generalization is false. Trakakis for example write: "Continental
philosophers uniformly and vehemently reject the elevation of
science that is encapsulated in scientism."[387]
He then quotes Heidegger who used phenomenal philosophy, which
originated as far as i know in the "phenomena" and "noumena"
of Kant. It seems thus that Trakakis did not escape analytical
methodology of deceit to promote their opinions.
"The
Enlightenment equation of reason, emancipation and progress is
thereby undone."[388]
Habermas and Goudzwaard for example prolonged some ideas of
the Enlightenment with the word "modernization". Trakakis's
view is contradicting because he stated that Continental
philosophy joined modernist art[389]
but is anti-scientistic. Scientism and modern art were joined
in time being both based on truths. Trakakis's statement does
not make sense. Trakakis mentioned revolutionary[390]
artists of the 1940s and 50s like Pollock who suffered for
their art; a similar phenomenon than that of artists like Van
Gogh on the Continent during the late 1800s. The wills to
power Trakakis identifies in Continental philosophy as
dominant, is a result of wills to power, similar to the
Machiavellian and Protestant wills to power during the
Enlightenment. Wills to power was a result of being aware of
corresponding truths to corrupt realities in the Roman
Catholic system.
According to Westphal
Continental Philosophy of religion has a prophetic nature,
which is based on perpectivism, similar to the ways of the
prophets' of the Bible.[391]
Continental "perspectivism", similar to Nietzsche's
"anti-realist" view is not objective.[392]
I disagree with this view about objectivity because
perspectivism can be more objective than analytic philosophy.
Perspectivism acknowledges the reality that any view is a
perspectivist view of objects and therefore a view, which
states that interpretations are subjective, is as a matter of
fact a more realistic objectivism. Realizing ones' own
subjectivities is more objective than not realizing that ones
are subjective. Objections should be based on the direction of
the word subjectivity. If persons are labeled as subjective it
could mean they are objective or not objective. If they
realize they are subjective then their objectivities could be
more objective than the accusers', because maybe accusers have
not looked into themselves to be aware of their
subjectivities. Analytic philosophers who believe they are
objective because of realism maybe are not aware of their
subjective views just because they have not realized the fact
that everyone due to being human are subjective. Being subjective
themselves, as everyone are, and being aware of being subjective
themselves, can be more objective than, being subjective
oneself, as everyone are, and being unaware of being subjective, due
to beliefs in realism's methodologies. Realism's methodologies
can work both ways depending on whether people are honest or
deceiving. If they are honest realism will make them more
objective. If they are deceiving, realism will make them less
objective because then the modalities (aspects) could be used
to make up a more convincing deceit with their own subjective
interests emphasized away from an important issue.
Trakakis divides the
objections into "matters of form" relating to
language and style and "matters of content" relating to
motivating assumptions.[393]
Continental philosophy
lacks "clarity and
rigour". "But how
can the goals of truth and rationality, goals to which we
all should aspire, be furthered by means of poor standards
of reasoning and language that is vague and unclear, if not
utterly incomprehensible?"[394]
"The language of Continental philosophers often gives the
impression that this group of philosophers has renounced the
sincere pursuit of truth in favour of rhetoric, groundless
assertion, exegesis or commentary, or some form of purely
literary writing." Continental philosophers say "tu quoque".
The different styles are viewed by both as incomprehensible.[395]
Trakakis states that although Continental philosophers are
caricatured as philosophers who do not espouse truths, the
actuality is they do espouse truths but their definition of
truths are different than the definitions of truth for
analytic philosophers. Some Continental philosophers show
aversion to rationality. [396]
Continental
philosophers reject the criteria of objectivity through their
acceptance of perspectivism and anti-realism.[397]
Arguments say that perspectivism or relativism is
self-refuting because when Nietzsche for example states that
only interpretations exist he says there is not truth.[398]
Trakakis compare relativism with absolutism. Relativism states
all interpretations are perspectivist. Absolutism states there
are hypotheses, which are true in all perspectives.[399]
It seems the problem relates to "all". A statement, which
includes "all" could be doubted because all cannot be
empirically tested because it is impossible. To prove thus
that "all" is valid implies it will have to be a rational
exercise, using only reason, but good reason, according to me,
is realizing that all perspectives cannot be fathomed. This
was also probably the argument by Nietzsche, similar to
Socrates's argument that knowing is to know you don't know
everything. It seems the analytical absolutists then do not
agree that it is impossible for us to know or see all
perspectives. Nietzsche could have meant that if we try to add
our different perspectives together into a coherent whole we
will come closer to truths. Looking at the "melkpot" from
different perspectives cause different images but adding the
different images together causes a 3 dimensional image, which
can be turned so that every viewer view from another
perspective at another time (a few seconds later or earlier).
Absolutism postulates -
"There exist a proposition p such that p is true
in perspective Q and in every other perspective". Relativism has a "weaker" postulate - "From
the standpoint of perspective Q, proposition p is true in all
perspectives."[400]
Trakakis ascribes the 2nd postulate to relativism, which is
maybe not true because the 2nd postulate is self-referentially
incoherent. "From" and "all" are mutually exclusive.
Jack W. Meiland
contends that it is not true that relativism is ' "self-
refuting" '.[401]
Another argument against relativism is that it is
"dialectically impotent" because it removes the image of
philosophers being most knowledgeable due to their realist
view.[402]
"But
since all of the perspectives in question accept coherence as
a minimum standard for the acceptibility of a theory"[403]
it is implied that predictive and historical correspondence is
prior to coherence, although everybody do not acknowledge
correspondence (honesties) according to my current
understanding of realities.
Trakakis claims
Nietzscheans claim that " 'The
notion of the thing-in-itself is incoherent' " and that "within" some perspectives it is
true and "within" some perspectives not true according to
Nietscheans. "Whether the claim in question is true within the
realist and Kantian perspectives is a moot point"[404]
Trakakis ends this
section by writing that there are according to him no
non-question begging conclusions and no God's eye view.[405]
Assuming he means no God's eye view by humans, his opinion
places him in the analytic school because incorporeal
perfection of God is implied due to imperfections of humans.
It could also be argued that he claims that no realist view
exist and no God's eye view, which means he is an atheist. It
seems to claim realism is true and God is incorporeal is
incoherent, which is my main current critique against
analytical philosophers, because realism implies a God's eye
view through the mind of a human they write about as "God
himself" and "God Himself". The notions of "God himself" and
"God Himself" are not coherent with analytical beliefs in an
incorporeal God.
Analytical philosophers
are "generally loathe to accept a
non-realist account of religious language", similar to accounts of science. The "central
thesis" about the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" is that "God-talk is not fact stating." "God
is wholly other, God is not an existent or a being".[406]
Although Continental philosophers don't use fact stating
language explicitly when writing about God they tend to use
perspectivist language, which analytical philosophers hold
against them.[407]
When language games
become self-contained belief systems, " 'Wittgensteinian
fideism' " according to Kai
Nielsen is relevant.[408]
Wittgenstein was an Austrian/British philosopher of logic,
mathematics, mind and language.[409]
The analytical realist
view can be broken down into metaphysical and epistemic
theses: Metaphysically, God and physical things exist "objectively
- i.e.", no matter what we think and
say about its. Epistemically, "we
human
knowers are capable of acquiring objective knowledge of both
God and physical objects, that is, we can come to know them as
they are in themselves", without
being hindered by language and "conceptual
schemes."[410]
"John
Hick, for example, writes: 'Religious realism is the view that
the existence or non-existence of God is a fact independent of
whether you or I or anyone else believes that God exists. If
God exists, God is not simply an idea or ideal in our minds,
but an ontological reality, the ultimate creative power of the
universe.'[411]
Trakakis defends a
non-realist view of God, which rejects either the metaphysical
or epistemic thesis above but not necessarily both. Many
religious non-realists reject only the epistemic thesis above,
which states that God can be known from "evidence
and arguments, as is typically done in natural theology."[412]
Trakakis writes that
Phillips stated that references to facts means we are not
sure. Fact stating language thus refers to immanent things,
which are temporary.[413]
It implies that Trakakis means Phillips assumes most people
are dishonest when they say "It is a fact" in order to support
a claim of their's.
Phillips argues that
God is comprehended only through belief and nothing more. Not
existence of anything nor knowledge of anything pertains to
belief in God. Phillips's " 'Hebrew-Christian
conception of God is not a conception of a being among beings' ".[414]
Phillips says God more than exists, but do not exists.[415]
Phillips is a non-realist.[416]
The probability of
combining the metaphysical stances of non-realism and realism
are "dim".[417]
A synthesis between the two approaches is not feasible because
the divide is to great, especially with reference to
differences between "realist" and nominalist ("non-realist")
comprehensions of God.[418]
I did not read this
chapter a 2nd time because it was a description according to
my understanding of St. Francis who was excommunicated by the
hegemony. He eventually joined the Roman Catholic Church
against his will, because he did not want to be dependent on
the financial help of the church. The result was an extreme
austere lifestyle as priest of the Roman Catholic Church.
(Read between the lines). This chapter of St. Francis had much
meaning in conjunction with the theodicy chapter because of
the dehumanizing effects on St. Francis, which theodicists
could interpret as an enhancement. He was after all made a
Saint, which implies the Roman Catholic Church is espousing
theodicies, which implies conspiring between the hegemony and
the church, similarly to communication between God and Satan
in the book of Job.
Analytic philosophy has
forgotten about wisdom and focuses on knowledge. Albert Camus
stated in his The myth
of Sisyphus: ' "There is but one truly serious
philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether
life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy." ' Analytical
philosophy cannot comprehend such wisdom. On the other hand
philosophy is not literature and some Continental philosophy
comes to close to poetry. [419]
The end of Philosophy
of religion can be motivated by the cold approach followed by
analytic philosophy and the dominant role analytic philosophy
has in academic funded philosophy.[420]
If Philosophy of religion is to be enhanced the values of
myths need to be considered in more detail.[421]
A new immanent vision of transcending God should be propagated
through new ways of using language according to Tacey.[422]
Caputo explains how the
institutionalization of reason took place. " 'Debates
about reason are debates conducted by university professors in
journals and books, at symposia and public lectures, by men
and women who aspire to tenure, promotion, and support for
more research.' " According to Caputo reasoning in
academia is a function of power structures, cliques and
selfish interests of the people involved. Universities are
unduly influenced by the corporate world. 70% - 80% of
academics feel this way, which makes sense in the light of
power structures. [423]
<self: Power structures implies fear.> Too much emphasis
is placed on quantity of publications to the detriment of
quality.[424]
Young academics subscribe to these "values" in conjunction
with corporate and government structures. [425]
Trakakis promotes
philosophers with courage like Nietzsche, Kant, Seneca, Cicero
and Socrates.[426]
They must help to reinstitute truths instead of profits to the
elite, as priority of universities.[427]
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[1]
Eshleman, 3.
[2]
Eshleman, 5.
[3]
Eshleman, 8.
[4]
Eshleman, 7-8.
[5]
Eshleman, 8.
[6]
Eshleman, 4.
[7]
Pojman & Rea, xiii-xvi.
[8]
Griffiths, 31.
[9]
Griffiths, 31.
[10]
Griffiths, 32.
[11]
Griffiths, 31.
[12]
Griffiths, 33.
[13]
Griffiths, 34-35.
[14]
Griffiths, 35.
[15]
Griffiths, 36-37.
[16]
Griffiths, 40.
[17]
Griffiths, 41.
[18]
Griffiths, 40.
[19]
Hudson, 7.
[20]
Hudson, 8.
[21]
Hudson, 8.
[22]
Hudson, 7.
[23]
Hudson, 8.
[24]
Hudson, 8.
[25]
Hudson, 8.
[26]
Hudson, 9.
[27]
Hudson, 11.
[28]
Eshleman, 8.
[29]
Eshleman, 8.
[30]
Van Niekerk, 57-59, 62, 71-75.
[31]
Mackie, 242.
[32]
"Used of a false
thing. On the one hand, either because it has not been
assembled or because it would be impossible for it to be
assembled." (Aristotle, p. 148, 1024b-1025a.)
[33]
Aquinas, 231. Aquinas stated here that God has
different definitions. Because definitions about God are
not objective, definitions cannot be used to prove the
existence of God, according to Aquinas.
[34]
Aquinas, 230-233.
[35]
Aquinas, 231.
[36]
Hudson, 9.
[37]
Clouser, pp. 239, 241, 249.
[38]
Swinburne, 52.
[39]
Gen. 22:8.
[40]
"Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, section 3."
[41]
Griffiths, 31.
[42]
Griffiths, 31.
[43]
Griffiths, 31.
[44]
Griffiths, 31.
[45]
Griffiths, 31.
[46]
Griffiths, 32.
[47]
Griffiths, 31.
[48]
Griffiths, 33.
[49]
Griffiths, 34.
[50]
Griffiths, 35.
[51]
Griffiths, 35.
[52]
Griffiths, 36.
[53]
Griffiths, 36.
[54]
Griffiths, 37.
[55]
Griffiths, 39.
[56]
Griffiths, 40.
[57]
Griffiths, 40.
[58]
Griffiths, 40.
[59]
Griffiths, 41.
[60]
Griffiths, 41.
[61]
Griffiths, 41.
[62]
Griffiths, 41-42.
[63]
Hudson, 7.
[64]
Hudson, 7.
[65]
Hudson, 8.
[66]
Hudson, 8.
[67]
Hudson, 8.
[68]
Hudson, 9.
[69]
Hudson, 9.
[70]
Hudson, 9.
[71]
Hudson, 9.
[72]
Hudson, 11.
[73]
Swinburne, 51.
[74]
Swinburne, 51.
[75]
Swinburne, 51.
[76]
Swinburne, 52.
[77]
Swinburne, 52.
[78]
Swinburne, 52.
[79]
Swinburne, 52.
[80]
Swinburne, 53.
[81]
Swinburne, 53.
[82]
Swinburne, 53-54.
[83]
Swinburne, 54.
[84]
Swinburne, 54.
[85]
Swinburne, 55.
[86]
Swinburne, 55.
[87]
Swinburne, 55.
[88]
Swinburne, 57.
[89]
See PHIL221 (History of philosophy studyguide), p.
231 where Aquinas's Summa Theologiae was quoted.
[90]
"Used of a false
thing. On the one hand, either because it has not been
assembled or because it would be impossible for it to be
assembled." (Aristotle, p. 148, 1024b-1025a.)
[91]
Martin, 282-283.
[92]
Aquinas, 231. Maybe because he did not want to
quote a fellow Catholic priest's name, if he believed he
proved him wrong.
[93]
I wrote this comment on p. 230 of my PHIL221 study
guide but did not find the proof when i looked for it,
when writing this document.
[94]
Aquinas, 230.
[95]
Martin, 283-284.
[96]
Martin, 283.
[97]
Van Niekerk, p. 115.
[98]
Van Niekerk, p. 116.
[99]
Van Niekerk, p. 116.
[100]
Van Niekerk, p. 118.
[101]
Van Niekerk, p. 118.
[102]
Van Niekerk, pp. 118-119.
[103]
Van Niekerk, p. 123.
[104]
Van Niekerk, p. 119.
[105]
Van Niekerk, p. 120.
[106]
Van Niekerk, p. 122.
[107]
Van Niekerk, p. 122.
[108]
Van Niekerk, p. 122.
[109]
Van Niekerk, p. 123.
[110]
Van Niekerk, p. 124.
[111]
Van Niekerk, pp. 124-125.
[112]
Van Niekerk, pp. 127-128.
[113]
Van Niekerk, p. 130.
[114]
Book
II.
'4. Adeimantus and Glaucon Restate the Case for
Injustice'
'Beside our picture
of the unjust man let us set one of the just man, the man of true simplicity of character
who, as Aeschylus says, wants "to be and not to seem
good". We must, indeed, not allow him to seem good, for if
he does he will have all the rewards and honours paid to
the man who has a reputation for justice, and we shall not
be able to tell whether his motive is love of justice or
love of the rewards and honours. No, we must strip him of
everything except his justice, and our picture of him must
be drawn in a way diametrically opposite to that of the
unjust man. Our just man must have the worst of
reputations for wrongdoing
even though he has done no wrong, so that we can test his
justice and see if it weakens in the face of unpopularity
and all that goes with it; we shall give him an undeserved
and life-long reputation for wickedness, and make him
stick to his chosen course until death. In this way, when
we have pushed the life of justice and of injustice each
to its extreme, we shall [own
emphasis on shall] be able to judge which of the two is
the happier...And if the description is somewhat brutal,
remember that it's not I that am responsible for it,
Socrates, but those who praise injustice more highly than
justice. It is their account that I must now repeat.'
(Plato, p. 45, 360a)
[115]
Van Niekerk, pp. 130-131.
[116]
Van Niekerk, p. 131.
[117]
Van Niekerk, pp. 118-119.
[118]
Van Niekerk, p. 133-139.
[119]
Griffiths, 32.
[120]
Griffiths, 40.
[121]
Griffiths, 41.
[122]
Griffiths, 40.
[123]
Barlow, 1997: 364
[124]
Aristotle. Metaphysics,
p. 148, 1024b.
[125]
Pienaar, p. 105.
[126]
Pienaar, p. 105.
[127]
Aristotle, The Metaphysics, p. 358, 1069b-1070a.
[128]
Aristotle, The Metaphysics, p. 343-344,
1066b-1067b.
[129]
Tarnas. The pas, pp.
291-292.
[130]
COPAN, P. 2007. The Moral Argument, 369.
[131]
"Heidegger, OTL, 54; cf. 59 and 61. […]"(Westphal.
2008, p. 429.)
[132]
Plantinga, Alvin, "Religion and Science", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/religion-science/>.
[133]
p. 219.
[134] P.
222
[135]From: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Other
on 23 August 2013.
[136]From: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alterity on 22 August 2013 and Westphal, p.133.
[137]From: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Other
on 23 August 2013.
[138] 'From Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism'
(Leesbundel, p. 175)
[139] New Oxford American Dictionary.
[140] Collins English Dictionary – definition of
"alter".
[141] Collins English Dictionary and New Oxford
American Dictionary.
[142] New Oxford American Dictionary.
[143] Blackburn, pp. 11,12.
[144] Stoker and Van der Merwe, p. 5.
[145] Halsema, A. Luce Irigaray's Transcendence as
alterity, p, 101.
[146] Versteeg, pp. 115,123.
[147] Stoker, pp. 18. Westphal, p.133.
[148] Van Tongeren, p.159.
[149] Karl Jaspers.
[150] p. 5
[151] Aristotle, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger etc.
[152] Pp. 9,13,15,71.
[153] Griffiths, pp. 32,40,41.
[154] From: http://www.classics.upenn.edu/events/2013/spring-colloquium-topic-tba/andrea-capra-milan-state-university
on 26 August 2013.
[155] From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stilpo
on 26 August 2013.
[156] Van der Kooi, p. 61.
[157] Van der Merwe, p.187.
[158] Derrida in Stoker, p. 20.
[159] Van der Merwe, p.191.
[160] Westphal, p. 135.
[161] Wolterstorff, p. 64.
[162] From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dogheads
on 23 August 2013.
[163] From: https://www.google.co.za/search?q=st+christopher+cynocephalus&client=firefox-a&hs=TfF&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=eIIXUtftKKLQ7Aa5rIHYBQ&ved=0CFAQsAQ&biw=1280&bih=614
on 23 August 2013.
[164]
[Socrates]: " 'In the dog's name!' " (Plato. The
rep, p. 306: 567d; p. 95: 399a).
"Glaucon
swears 'By Zeus', the chief Olympian god; Socrates, who
always avoided such oaths, swears the oath traditionally
ascribed to him, 'By the dog'." (Plato. The rep, p. 390:
Part III, note 69)
The word
'cynocephaly' does not appear in the Collins English
dictionary or the New Oxford American Dictionary in which
i looked.
[165] Stoker and Van der Merwe, p. 1.
[166] New American Oxford Dictionary, definition
of "romanticism".
[167] Stoker, p. 3.
[168] Stoker, pp. 3-4.
[169] Stoker, p. 4.
[170] Stoker, p. 4.
[171] Stoker, pp. 10-12.
[172] Stoker, p. 5.
[173] Stoker, p. 13.
[174] Stoker, p. 13-14.
[175] Stoker, p. 5.
[176] Stoker, pp. 6-7.
[177] Stoker, pp. 7-8.
[178] Stoker, p. 8.
[179] Stoker, pp. 15-18.
[180] Stoker, pp. 19-20.
[181] Schüßler,
pp.
24-37
[182] "Caputo,
J.D., 2001. On religion. London, UK: Routledge,
p.59" (Vosloo, p.52)
[183] Vosloo, p. 38.
[184] Vosloo, p. 40.
[185] Vosloo, pp. 38-41.
[186] Vosloo, p. 42.
[187] Vosloo, p. 49
[188] Van der Kooi, pp. 54-63
[189] "Weber, M., 2002. The
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism.
Translated from German by S. Kalberg. Los Angeles, CA:
Roxbury." (Cloots, p. 75)
[190]
"Blumenberg, H., 1983. The legitimacy of the modern age.
Translated from German by R.M. Wallace. London, UK: MIT
Press." (Cloots, p. 75)
[191] Cloots, p. 64-65.
[192] Blackburn, p. 382 – definition of
voluntarism.
[193] Mautner, p. 649 – definition of voluntarism.
[194] Cloots, p. 65.
[195] "Gauchet, M., 1997. The disenchantment of
the world: a political history of religion. Translated
from French by Oscar Burge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press." (Cloots, p. 75) "This is the only work
of Gauchet translated into English hitherto and the
translation has a foreword by Charles Taylor. I will
always refer to the translation." (Cloots, p. 65)
[196] Cloots, p. 65.
[197] Cloots, p. 72.
[198] "Gauchet, M., 1997. The disenchantment of
the world: a political history of religion. Translated
from French by Oscar Burge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press." (Cloots, p. 75)
[199] Cloots, p. 65.
[200] I think i read this in the Time magazine
where i read also about the inverse relation between logic
and memory. I could not find the reference.
[201] Cloots, p. 66.
[202] Cloots, p. 64-75.
[203] "Deleuze, G., 2004. Difference and
repetition. Translated from French by P. Patton. New
York, NY: Continuum." (Justaert, p. 86)
[204] Justaert, p. 76.
[205] Blackburn, p. 316.
[206] Justaert, p. 76.
[207] Justaert, p. 76.
[208] Justaert, p. 76.
[209] "Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., 1991. Qu’est-ce
que la philosophie? Paris, France: Les Éditions de
Minuit." (Justaert, p. 86)
[210] Justaert, p. 78.
[211] Justaert, p. 78.
[212] Justaert, p. 78.
[213] Justaert, p. 77.
[214] Pearson, K.A., 2001. Pure reserve: Deleuze,
philosophy, and immanence. In: M. Bryden ed., Gilles
Deleuze and religion. London, UK: Routledge, pp.
141-155. (Justaert, p. 87)
[215] Justaert, p. 80.
[216] Justaert, p. 81.
[217] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., 1987. A
thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia.
(Justaert, p. 86)
London, UK: Continuum.
[218] Justaert, p. 82.
[219] Justaert, p. 83.
[220] Justaert, p. 84.
[221] "Dosse, F., 2010. Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari: intersecting lives. Translated from French
by D. Glassman. New York, NY: Columbia University Press."
(Justaert, p. 86)
[222] Justaert, p. 85.
[223] Justaert, pp. 85-86.
[224] Du Preez, pp. 88-100.
[225] Halsema, p. 101.
[226] "Irigaray, L., 1996a. Le souffle des
femmes: Luce Irigaray présente des crédos au feminine.
Spiritualité au féminin. Paris, France: L'Action
Catholique Générale Féminine (ACGF) [Women’s Catholic
Action]." (Halsema, p. 113)
[227] Halsema, p. 101.
[228] Halsema, p. 104.
[229] Plato, pp. 387-388. Comment by Desmond Lee
in his translation of The republic.
[230] Halsema, p. 104.
[231] "Ricoeur, P., 1965. De l’interprétation :
essai sur Freud. Paris, France: Seuil." (Halsema, p.
114)
[232] Ibid.
[233] Halsema, p. 106.
[234] Halsema, p. 106.
[235] Halsema, pp. 109-111.
[236] " Irigaray does not seem
to differentiate between the sexes in this formulation.
Therefore, it seems that the extase instante can
take place not only between lovers of different sexes, but
also between those of the same sex. However, on the same
page, she explicitly says that “pleasure between the same
sex does not result in that immediate ecstasy between the
other and myself. It may be more or less intense,
quantitatively or qualitatively different; it does not
produce in us that ecstasy which is our child, prior to
any child.” ('Irigaray, L. , 1991a. The Irigaray reader.
Edited by M. Whitford. Oxford, UK: Blackwell: 180' [Halsema, p. 113]). In
this text, Irigaray is explicitly heterosexual." (Halsema,
p. 111).
[237] Halsema, p. 111.
[238] Halsema, p. 112.
[239] "Weiskel, T., 1976. The romantic sublime:
studies in the structure and psychology of
transcendence. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins
University Press." (Versteeg, p. 125)
[240] Versteeg, p. 115.
[241] Versteeg, p. 117.
[242] Delbo, C., 1990. Days and memory.
Evanston, IL: Marlboro Press. (Versteeg, p. 124)
[243] Versteeg, p. 118.
[244] Versteeg, p. 119.
[245] "Oord, T., 2010. The nature of love: a
theology. St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press." (Versteeg,
p. 125)
[246] Versteeg, p. 122.
[247] Versteeg, p. 123.
[248] "Derrida, J., 1993. Aporias. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press." (Versteeg, p. 124)
[249] Versteeg, p. 124.
[250] Justaert, p. 78.
[251] Westphal. Dim, p.126.
[252] Westphal. Dim, pp. 126-127.
[253] Westphal. Dim, p. 127.
[254] Westphal. Dim, p. 128.
[255] Westphal. Dim, p. 130.
[256] Niebuhr, H.R., 1951. Christ and culture.
New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. (Westphal. Dim, p. 136.)
[257] Westphal. Dim, p. 135.
[258] Westphal. Dim, p. 134.
[259] Westphal. Dim, p. 134.
[260] "Derrida, J., 1995. The gift of death. Translated
from French by D. Wills. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press." (Westphal. Dim,
p. 134.)
[261] Westphal. Dim, p. 134.
[262] Westphal. Dim, pp. 126-127.
[263] Westphal.
Dim, p. 126.
[264] Niebuhr, H.R., 1951. Christ and culture.
New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. (Westphal. Dim, p. 136.)
[265] Westphal. Dim, p. 135.
[266] Westphal. Dim, p. 126.
[267] Westphal. Dim, p. 126.
[268] Niebuhr, H.R., 1951. Christ and culture.
New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. (Westphal. Dim, p. 136.)
[269] Westphal. Dim, p. 135.
[270] Chaplin, pp. 138-139.
[271] Chaplin, p. 140.
[272] Chaplin, p. 144.
[273] Chaplin, pp. 144-145.
[274] Chaplin, p. 145.
[275] Chaplin, p. 146.
[276] Chaplin, p. 147.
[277] Van Tongeren, p. 152.
[278] Van Tongeren, p. 152.
[279] Van Tongeren, p. 153.
[280] Chaplin, p. 144.
[281] Van Tongeren, p. 154.
[282] Van Tongeren, pp. 155-156.
[283] Van Tongeren, pp. 156-157.
[284] Van Tongeren, p. 157.
[285] Van Tongeren, p. 158.
[286] Van Tongeren, pp. 158-162.
[287] Stoker, p. 164.
[288] Chaplin, p. 144.
[289] Stoker, p. 165.
[290] Stoker, p. 165.
[291] Stoker, pp. 165-166.
[292] Stoker, pp. 166-167.
[293] Burms, p. 168.
[294] Burms, p. 169.
[295] Burms, p. 169.
[296] Burms, p. 170.
[297] Burms, p. 170.
[298] Burms, p. 174.
[299] Burms, p. 174.
[300] Van der Braak, p. 176.
[301] Van der Braak, pp. 176-177.
[302] Van der Braak, p. 177.
[303] Van der Braak, pp. 177-178.
[304] Van der Braak, p.179.
[305] Van der Braak, pp. 179-181.
[306] "Davis, B.W., 2004. Zen after Zarathustra: the
problem of the will in the confrontation between Nietzsche
and Buddhism. Journal of Nietzsche Studies,
28(Autumn), pp. 89–138." (Van der Braak, p.185.)
[307] Van der Braak, pp.181-182.
[308] Van der Braak, p.182.
[309] Justaert, p. 76.
[310] Van der Merwe, p. 188.
[311] Van der Merwe, p. 188.
[312] Trakakis, N. The, 1.
[313] Trakakis, N. The, 1.
[314] Trakakis, N. The, 2.
[315] Trakakis, N. The, 2.
[316] Trakakis, N. The, 3.
[317] Trakakis, N. The, 3.
[318] Trakakis, N. The, 4.
[319] Trakakis, N. The, 3-4.
[320] Trakakis, N. The, 4.
[321] Trakakis, N. The, 4.
[322] Trakakis, N. The, 6.
[323] Trakakis, N. The, 7-8.
[324] Trakakis, N. The, 9.
[325] Trakakis, N. The, 9-10.
[326] Trakakis, N. The, 10.
[327] Trakakis, N. The, 10.
[328] Trakakis, N. The, 11.
[329] Trakakis, N. The, 11.
[330] Trakakis, N. The, 12.
[331] Trakakis, N. The, 12-13.
[332] Trakakis, N. The, 14.
[333] Trakakis, N. The, 15.
[334] Trakakis, N. The, 16.
[335] Trakakis, N. The, 17.
[336] Trakakis, N. The, 18.
[337] Trakakis, N. The, 21.
[338] Trakakis, N. The, 24.
[339] Trakakis, N. The, 25.
[340] Trakakis, N. The, 26.
[341] Trakakis, N. The, 27-28.
[342] Trakakis, N. The, 28.
[343] Trakakis, N. The, 29.
[344] Trakakis, N. The, 30.
[345] Trakakis, N. The, 20.
[346] Trakakis, N. The, 22.
[347] Gen. 22:8.
[349] Venter, J.J. 86.
[350] Aristotle. De A, 140: 406b
[351] Trakakis, N. The, 23.
[352] Trakakis, N. The, 31.
[353] Trakakis, N. The, 31.
[354] Trakakis, N. The, 32.
[355] Trakakis, N. The, 32.
[356] Trakakis, N. The, 32.
[357] Trakakis, N. The, 5.
[358] Trakakis, N. The, 34.
[359] Trakakis, N. The, 36.
[360] Trakakis, N. The, 38.
[361] Trakakis, N. The, 38.
[362] Trakakis, N. The, 39.
[363] Trakakis, N. The, 40.
[364] Trakakis, N. The, 40.
[365] Trakakis, N. The, 41-42.
[366] Trakakis, N. The, 43.
[367] Stoker, H.G. The, 37-38.
[368] Trakakis, N. The, 43.
[369] Trakakis, N. The, 44.
[370] Trakakis, N. The, 45.
[371] Trakakis, N. The, 45.
[372] Trakakis, N. The, 46.
[373] Trakakis, N. The, 46.
[374] Trakakis, N. The, 46.
[375] Trakakis, N. The, 46.
[376] Trakakis, N. The, 47.
[377] Trakakis, N. The, 47.
[378] Trakakis, N. The, 48.
[379] Trakakis, N. The, 48-49.
[380] Trakakis, N. The, 49.
[381] Trakakis, N. The, 50.
[382] Trakakis, N. The, 51.
[383] "Kant and the End of Theodicy". Five videos
on Youtube with presenter Karl Ameriks of the University
of Notre Dame, viewed on 26 and 27 September 2013.
[384] Trakakis, N. The, 51.
[385] Trakakis, N. The, 52.
[386] Trakakis, N. The, 52.
[387] Trakakis, N. The, 52.
[388] Trakakis, N. The, 52.
[389] Trakakis, N. The, 54.
[390] Trakakis, N. The, 51.
[391] Trakakis, N. The, 52-59.
[392] Trakakis, N. The, 59.
[393] Trakakis, N. The, 66.
[394] Trakakis, N. The, 66.
[395] Trakakis, N. The, 67.
[396] Trakakis, N. The, 67.
[397] Trakakis, N. The, 70.
[398] Trakakis, N. The, 70-71.
[399] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[400] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[401] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[402] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[403] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[404] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[405] Trakakis, N. The, 72.
[406] Trakakis, N. The, 74.
[407] Trakakis, N. The, 74.
[408] Trakakis, N. The, 75.
[409]From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
on 28 September 2013.
[410] Trakakis, N. The, 75.
[411] Trakakis, N. The, 76.
[412] Trakakis, N. The, 76.
[413] Trakakis, N. The, 77.
[414] Trakakis, N. The, 77-78.
[415] Trakakis, N. The, 79.
[416] Trakakis, N. The, 81.
[417] Trakakis, N. The, 82.
[418] Trakakis, N. The, 82-83.
[419] Trakakis, N. The, 113.
[420] Trakakis, N. The, 113-114.
[421] Trakakis, N. The, 115.
[422] Trakakis, N. The, 115.
[423] Trakakis, N. The, 118.
[424] Trakakis, N. The, 118.
[425] Trakakis, N. The, 120.
[426] Trakakis, N. The, 119-121.
[427] Trakakis, N. The, 123-124.