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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Book:
The Metaphysics
Author:
ARISTOTLE
Time:
384-322 BC
Translator: HUGH
LAWSON-TANCRED
Publisher: PENGUIN
BOOKS
Place:
London, England
Date:
This translation first published 1998, reprinted with an
updated Bibliography 2004.
ISBN-13: 978-0-140-44619-7
8 Aug
2013
'ALPHA 1
…
<[981a-982a]>
<p.4-6>
[981a] …
<p.5>
"For the experienced know the 'that' but not the 'because',
whereas the skilled have a grasp of the 'because', the cause.
That is why in each field designers are thought more
prestigious and to have more knowledge than craftsmen and to be
wiser, [981b] in that
they know the causes for what is being done. The assumption is
that it is not being practical that makes them wiser but their
possession of an account and their grasp of the causes. And in
general the ability to teach is a distinguishing mark between
the knowledgeable and the ignorant man, and that is why we think
that skill is rather a form of knowledge than experience. For
the skilled can, whereas the merely experienced cannot, teach.
Furthermore, we do not think that any of the senses is
wisdom, even those that are the most important forms of
cognition at the level of particulars. They do not, though, give
the reason for anything, e.g. as why fire is hot, but
merely indicate that
it is hot. And so it would not <p.6> be surprising if the
first man to discover some skill or other, beyond the common
senses, was admired by other men not only because of the utility
of some of what he discovered but as being wise and above the
herd. For when several skills had been discovered, some having
to do with necessity and some with indulgence, it is reasonable
that the practitioners of the latter were always more admired
than those of the former because of the uselessness of their
knowledge. Hence, indeed, it was that when all such arts had
been discovered, those arts were discovered which had to do
neither with pleasure nor with necessities, and this happened
first in those places where men had leisure. That is why it was
in Egypt that the mathematical sciences were first developed,
for their leisure was available to the priestly caste. And so,
as we said above, the man of experience is thought to be wiser
than the man who has just any perception of a subject, the
craftsman wiser than the man of experience, the designer wiser
than the artisan and the theoretical sciences wiser than the
productive ones.
[982a] It is
clear, then, that wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain
principles and causes."
<self:
See the comment later, which Aristotle made about the business
of templates (p195) being not of value.>
10 May
2013
p.28-31
'ALPHA 8
…
[Aristotle:]
Of those, then, who assert that the universe is one and a single
nature, and that this is bodily and has magnitude, it is clear
that they are wrong in many respects. For it is only of bodies
that they posit the elements and not of the unbodily things. And
when they try to give the causes for generation and destruction,
and give a comprehensive physical account, they miss the cause
of movement.
…
<p.30>
Well, the so-called Pythagoreans use pretty strange principles
and elements for the study of nature (and the reason is that
they have not taken them from sensible things; for the
mathematicals are entities without change except for those
connected with astronomy), and yet they discuss and work about
nature as a whole.
…
<p.31>
For Plato says that there is another, and yet even he thinks
that these things too are numbers and the causes of these
things, but that some of them are intellectual and some of them
sensible.'
25 June
2013
BOOK
DELTA
<p.146-147>
'XXVII.
Mutilated
A
feature of quantities which must be divisible into parts as well
as being wholes.
Thus two, for instance, is not mutilated when one of
the two ones is subtracted—in no cases is the extent of the
mutilation equal to what is left—and this goes for number in
general. This is because another requirement is that the
substance be left: if a cup is mutilated, it must
still be a cup, but a number will not be the same after
mutilation.
<p.147> …
… Bald men, accordingly, have not been mutilated.'
<p.148-149>
[1024b] …
'XXIX. False
(i) Used
of a false thing. On
the one hand, either because it has not been assembled or
because it would be impossible for it to be assembled. Examples:
the claim the diagonal is commensurable or the claim that you
are seated. For of these one is always, the other sometimes, false. And it is in
this way that these things do not have being.
On the other hand, all things as do have being but are by
nature such that they appear either not to be of the sort of
which they are or to be things that do not have being. Examples:
a sketch or dreams. These certainly are something but not those
things that they induce us to imagine.
Things, then, are said in this way to be false either by
dint of their themselves having being or by dint of the fact
that the appearance induced by them is of something that does
not have being. <p.149>
(ii) A false account, qua false, is an account
of things that do not have being. Accordingly, every account is
false of something
other than that of which it is a true account. The account, for
instance, of a circle is false
of a triangle.
And in a way there is but one account of the particular,
that of the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing, whereas in another way
there are many. This is because the particular itself and the
particular as under some affection (e.g. Socrates and the
musical Socrates) are in a way the same. And a false account is not
an account of anything simpliciter.
This, in fact, is why the view of Antisthenes is simplistic. He
held that nothing is to be spoken of except under its propriety
account, there being one such for each object. The conclusion
drawn was that it was impossible to speak falsely. However, it
is possible to speak of the particular not only under its own
account but also under that of something else. Now, of course,
this can by all means be a case of falsehood, but there
is also a way in which such a statement can be true. For
instance, eight can be said to be a double number under the
account of two.
(iii)
Also, a man, if he is adept at, and prone to, such accounts, [1025a] not for some
other reason but for the falsity
itself. Also the man who is disposed to induce such accounts in
others, which is like the way in which we say that things are false if they induce
a false appearance.
Hence, indeed, the deceptiveness of the argument in the Hippias
to the effect that the same man is both false and true. This
argument makes two assumptions: (a) that the man who is able to
speak false is false (and this, of
course, is the man of knowledge and good sense) and (b) that the
man who willingly does wicked things is the better man. But this
second assumption is falsely derived by induction, for instance
from the fact that the man who willingly limps (i.e., in the
context, who imitates a limp) is better off than the man who
does so unwillingly, given that, if the man was willingly lame
(and not just pretending), he would presumably be worse off in
this way, as also would the corresponding man in the moral
case.'
17 July
2013
p.188-191
[1032a] …
'ZETA 7
…
Things
that are produced differ in that some of them are produced by
nature, some by skill and some by spontaneity. …
<p.190>
Now the other sort of productions are called makings. And all
makings are either from skill, from ability or from thinking. In
fact there can be cases of making owing to spontaneity and to
chance in a manner that pretty much mirrors similar cases in
things produced from nature. …
Now,
things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the
mind [1032b] (and by
form I mean the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing for each thing and
the primary substance). …
<p.191>
A part, then, of productive processes is called thinking and
another part is called making. That which is from the principle
and form is called thinking and that from the last stage of the
thinking process is called making. And in fact each of the
intermediate stages in the process is produced in the same way.'
'[1033a] …
<p.193-199>
ZETA 8
<p.194>
To produce a this-thing-here, after all, is to produce a
this-thing-here from, generally speaking, the substrate. What I
am driving at is that producing a bronze ball is not producing
the ball or sphere but rather another thing, which is as this
form in something else. For if there is production here, [1033b] it must ex hypothesi be
production from
something. Fir instance, a bronze sphere is produced, but this
is in such a way that this-thing-here, which is a sphere, is
produced from this-thing-here, which is bronze. If however, this
itself is the output of a production, then this production will
take place in the same way and this will clearly generate an
infinite regress. <self: i do not currently see the infinite
regress Aristotle is talking about, it probably is referred to
by Kant as noumenon thing in itself>
What all this shows is that:
(i)
the form
(shape in object of perception – call it what you will) is not
produced,
(ii)
there is
no production of it, and
(iii)
neither
does the what-it-was-to-be-that-thing (it is this that is
realized in something else, by dint of skill, nature or
ability).
However,
that there is a bronze
sphere is an output of production. The production is from
bronze and sphere – the form is imported into this stuff and the
result is a bronze sphere. But then, quite generally, if to be in sphere form is
itself the output of a production, then this will be a case of
something being produced from something. The rule cannot here be
suspended that all outputs of production can be split up, with
this component and that component, and I am saying that the one
is matter and the other form.
But this would mean that, if we take sphere to be:
<p.195>
(a) a figure
at all points equally remote from
(b) its
midpoint,
then one
of these must be the component in which the other is produced
and the other the component which is produced in the other. And
the two together will be the output of production, on a parallel
with the way the bronze sphere is such an output. But this only
goes to show still more clearly that the component that is
spoken of as form or substance is not produced, whereas the
composite entity that is named after it is an output of
production, and that matter is present in every output of
production, that such things are both a this and a that.
But then the question is this: is there some sphere over
and above over and above
the ones we see around us, or is there a house over and above its bricks?
Would that not just be to deny that anything is produced as a
this-thing-here? Surely, it is rather the case that the form
indicates a such-and-such. It is a this-sort-of-thing-here. So a
full this-thing-here, a Callias or a Socrates, is in the same
boat as the bronze sphere on the table, whereas the man and
animal are in the position of bronze sphere in general.
But this refutes the claim that the Formed cause (and we
have here in mind a certain well-known way of introducing the
Forms, in which they are definite things over and above
particulars) is in any way relevant to productions and
substances. There is no reason in all this for the Forms to be
substances in themselves. In fact there are cases in which the
producing agent, while indeed the same sort of thing as the
output of production, is quite evidently not the same as it, nor
one in number but only one in form. Patent examples are
furnished by the natural entities (remember 'man begets man'),
and the exceptions involve something non-natural occurring, as
when a horse produces a mule. (In fact there is nothing very
disturbing about such cases: the kind that is common to horse
and ass and which most nearly comprises them happens not to have
a name, [1034a] but
can safely be presumed to be both, i.e. the horse-ass or
'mule'.)
So we can do away with the business of Forms Being
Established As Templates. After all, if there were such Forms
they would surely apply <p.196> to natural entities, which
are the ones that are substances in the fullest way. Rather, all
we need is that it is the producer that does the making and, in
the matter, is the cause of the form. And the full output, this
sort of form in this very flesh and bones is Callias or is
Socrates. They differ materially (their matter is different),
but they are formally the same (indivisibility of the form).
<p.197>
ZETA 9
…
<p.198>
The foregoing also makes it clear that in a way
everything is produced either (i) form a bearer of the same
name, as in the case of things produced naturally – an example
of this among artefacts is a building, which is produced from a building to the
extent that it is produced by thought, in that the skill is the
form of the building – or (ii) from a part with the same name or
(iii) from the possessor of some such part, ruling out, that is,
mere cases of accidental production. …
Natural compositions do not differ radically from this.
For, on the one hand, the productive effect of the seed is not
different from that from skill, given that the seed possesses
the form potentially and that <p.199> that from which it
comes shares its name, in a way, [1034b] with the
product.'
Self
In ZETA
9 – ZETA 17 (p.197-230) somewhere Aristotle wrote that humans
were made out of earth and fire (partly?).
9
November 2013
Kenny quoted Aristotle as follows: " 'What comes into existence must always be
devisible, and there must be two identifiable components, one
matter and the other form. ... (Kenny's periods) it is clear
from what has been said that the part which is called form or
substance does not come into existence; what comes into
existence is the composite entity which bears its name. (Z 8.
1033b16-19)'
He
goes on to draw an anti-Platonic conclusion: if everyday
enmattered forms do not come into existence at all, there is not
need to invoke separate, Ideal, Forms to explain how forms come
into existence. (Z 8. 1033b26)"[1]
28 July
2013
p.263-265
'THETA 5
[1048a] …
<p.264>
The explanation of this is that non-rational potentialities are
all such that there is a one-to-one correlation of potentiality
and effect, whereas with the rational potentialities each
potentiality is correlated with a pair of effects. So if the
potentiality was, in the rational cases, automatically
triggered, it would yield simultaneous contrary effects, which
is clearly not possible.
And from this it follows that the triggering of such
potentialities must be under the control of something else, and
in saying this I have in mind desire or rational preference.'
Self
When i
read this it meant to me that Aristotle distinguished
non-rational as immanent cause and effect for example when a
racket hits a tennis ball at an angle, which affects the ball in
a non-rational (racket and ball) manner. The rational side
Aristotle identifies, are two ways that rational beings can
react to immanent effects on them. Aristotle thus saw desiring
as a rational decision and choosing rationally was also a
rational decision. The distinction between 'rational' preference
and desire however, kind of, excludes desiring from 'rational'
because rational is divided into rational and desire.
14
Augustus 2013
'LAMBDA
8
… [1074a] …
<p.380>
From old – and indeed extremely ancient – times [1074b] there has been
handed down to our later age intimations of a mythical character
to the effect that the stars are gods and that the divine
embraces the whole of nature. The further details were
subsequently added in the manner of myth. Their purpose was the
persuasion of the masses and general legislative and political
expediency. For instance, the myths tell us that these gods are
anthropomorphic or resemble some of the other animals and give
us other, comparable extrapolations of the basic picture. If,
then, we discard these accretions and consider the central
feature, that they held the primary substances to be gods, we
might well believe the claim to have been directly inspired. We
might also conclude that, while it is highly probable that all
possible arts and doctrines have <p.381> been many times
discovered and lost, these ancient cosmologies have been
preserved, like holy relics, right up to the present day. It is
these, and these alone, that we can know clearly of the
ancestral – indeed primordial – beliefs.'
20
August 2013
"[1074b]
… <p.382>
LAMBDA 9
…
There
are, however, certain difficulties with our account of divine
thought.
(a) On the
one hand, it is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike
of things in our experience, but there are some problems
involved in showing exactly what state it must be in to be of
this kind. Where then would be its grandeur? It is in that state
that it would be in if it were (sic) asleep. Alternatively,
suppose that it thinks, but that its doing so is under the
control of some other factor, so that what is its substance is
not, now, the activation of thought but merely the potential for
it. In <p.383> that case, its substance would fall short
of supreme excellence, since it is thinking that confers its
merit on it.
(b) … Does it
then make any difference, or none at all, whether it thinks of
the good or any arbitrary object whatever?
(c) Also, are
there not some objects about which it is absurd that it should
rationate?
… there
would clearly then be something something else of higher merit
than the thinking, to wit the object of thought.
… That is
just why it must think itself, if it is to retain supremacy, and
absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking."
KENNY, A. 2010. A new history of
Western philosophy in four parts.
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2012 paperback edition)