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Back to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Book title: A NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY In Four Parts
Author: ANTHONY KENNY (Sir) ©2010
Publisher: CLARENDON PRESS, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Place: Oxford, UK
Date: 2012 paperback edition
Reader: Mr. M.D. Pienaar
19 October 2013
"Aristotle was the first philosopher who systematically studied, recorded, and criticized the work of previous philosophers."
Anaximander of Miletus (c.547 BC) wrote a book called On Nature.
"Miletus |mīˈlētəs; mə-|
an ancient city of the Ionian Greeks in southwestern Asia Minor. In the 7th and 6th centuries bc it was a powerful port, from which more than 60 colonies were founded on the shores of the Black Sea and in Italy and Egypt."
According to Brugsch the words "natura" in Latin and φνσις ("fnsis") in Greek share "innate conception" with "neter" ("God") in Egyptian. Different opinions exist about the original meaning of "neter". M. Maspero opines the connotation with "strong" was "derived" and not "original meaning". Brugsch opines the meaning relates to ' "active power which produces and creates" ' and ' "regular recurrence" '. Egyptologists "universally" translates "neteru" as "gods". The Coptic Bible uses the word "nouti" for the "Supreme Being". The difference between "neter" and "neteru" is best explained by passages in the pyramids of Unàs and Tetà, addressed to the dead.
Unàs: "Thou exist at the side of God."
Tetà: "He weigheth words, and, behold, God hearkeneth unto the words God hath called Tetà (in his name, etc.)."
The word "netert" was translated as "goddess". In the pyramid of Unàs it is explained how the soul (anima) of Unàs rose in the form of "a god" and ate "gods" after he killed them. These quotations are from Budge's The book of the dead, which is an abstract of the four full versions of The book of the dead. The first version "was edited by the priests of the college of Annu (the On of the Bible, and the Heliopolis of the Greeks)". The priests of Ànnu were very influential, which the passage in the pyramid of Unàs proves: ' "O God, thy Ànnu is Unàs; O God, thy Ànnu is Unàs. O Rā, Ànnu is Unàs, thy Ànnu is Unàs, O Rā. The mother of Unàs is Ànnu, the father of Unàs is Ànnu; Unàs himself is Ànnu, and was born in Ànnu." ... in Ànnu dwelt the great and oldest company of the gods, Tmu, Shu, Tefnut, Seb, Nut, Osiris, Isis, Set and Nephtys. The abode of the blessed in heaven was called Ànnu'. 
Miletus colonized Egypt and Anaximander wrote On Nature. Was On Nature translated from "neter"?
On Nature contained theories of Anaximander about evolution. One of his theories was that humans came from fish after the seas dried. Another was that life originated from mist. Many philosophers wrote about nature. Zeno (334-262 BC) of Citium and other Stoics placed the study of nature highest because nature was "identified with God."
"Against this position, the Eleatics defended the unity and stability of the universe. Their leader, Parmenides supposed that language embodies a logic of perfect immutability: "What is, is." (Fragments) Since everything is what it is and not something else, he argued in Περι Φυσις (On Nature), it can never correct to say that one and the same thing both has and does not have some feature, so the supposed change from having the feature to not having it is utterly impossible."
It is also possible that the translation "physis" relates to "fishes" partly due to Anaximander's book On Nature. It seems thus more likely that Anaximander used "physis" for "nature" and not "neter" because of his theory about human evolution from fish.
"fish 1 |fi sh |
... ORIGIN Old English fisc (as a noun denoting any animal living exclusively in water), fiscian (verb), of Germanic origin; related to Dutch vis, vissen and German Fisch, fischen."
Anaximander, who was not a vegetarian, opined we should not eat fish because fish were human ancestors.
"For classical Athens, Heraclitus was the proponent of the theory that everything was in motion, and Parmenides the proponent of the theory that nothing was in motion. Plato and Aristotle struggled, in different ways, to defend the audacious thesis that some things were in motion and some things were at rest."
Kenny wrote Aristotle gave credit to Parmenides for introducing "Love as the efficient cause of everything (Metaph. A 3. 984b27)" It seems that Kenny did not appreciate Hesiod's "Love" who "ministers" to gods. Parmenides's "Love" i suppose then was something that gods had without being preached to, and/or received from somewhere according to Hesiod.
"Now one of them said that mind was present in the universe, as in the animals, and that this was the cause of order in nature and the whole arrangement - making the earlier thinkers look absurd. We clearly know then that Anaxagoras embraced this account, but that it was Hermotimus of Clazomenae who earlier gave it as a cause. ... And one might suppose that Hesiod was the first to seek for such a thing, or anyone else who placed love and desire among the entities as their principle - as also did Parmenides. For he too in describing the creation of the universe, first says:
'And he devised Love for all the gods.',
while Hesiod says:
'Foremost of all was Chaos, and then next
'Broad Fronted Earth ... [copied]
'And Love, who ministers to every god.',
on the assumption that among entities there must be some cause which moves and combines things."
(c. 700 bc), Greek poet. One of the earliest known Greek poets, he wrote the Theogony, an epic poem on the genealogies of the gods.
(fl. 5th century bc), Greek philosopher. He founded the Eleatic school of philosophers. In his work On Nature, he maintained that the apparent motion and changing forms of the universe are in fact manifestations of an unchanging and indivisible reality.
Anaxagoras |ˌanəkˈsagərəs; ˌanak-|
(c. 500– c. 428 bc), Greek philosopher. He believed that all matter was infinitely divisible and motionless until animated by mind (nous)."
20 October 2013
I came across the following and thought it relevant to the part from Budge's The book of the dead and Annu. Thebes and Ammon is mentioned in it. It seems there was more to the judgement over Socrates because, in Phaedrus by Plato, Socrates chose the way of Ammon from Thebes and Alexander the Great destroyed Thebes in Greece. Did Alexander also destroy Thebes in Egypt? This example shows that in Christianity there could be an anti-creative culture, which do not value new creativities, if Ammon and Amen of the Bible is the same king (god).
1 the Greek name for an ancient city in Upper Egypt, the ruins of which are located on the Nile River about 420 miles (675 km) south of Cairo. The capital of ancient Egypt under the 18th dynasty (c. 1550–1290 bc), it is the site of the major temples of Luxor and Karnak.
2 a city in Greece, in Boeotia, northwest of Athens. A major military power in Greece following the defeat of the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra in 371 bc, it was destroyed by Alexander the Great in 336 bc. Greek name Thívai."
"THE INFERIORITY OF THE WRITTEN TO THE SPOKEN WORD
Socrates: Do you know the theory and practice which will best please God, as far as words are concerned?
Phaedrus: No, I do not. Do you?
Socrates: Well, I can give you a tradition handed down from men of old, but they alone know the truth. If we could find that out for ourselves, should we have any further use for human fancies?
Phaedrus: An absurd question. But tell me your tradition.
Socrates: They say that there dwelt at Naucratis in Egypt one of the old gods of that country, to whom the bird they call Ibis was sacred, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. Among his inventions were number and calculation and geometry and astronomy, not to speak of various types of draughts and dice, and, above all, writing. The king of the whole country at that time was Thamus, who lived in the great city of Upper Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; the name they gave to Thamus is Ammon. To him came Theuth and exhibited his inventions, claiming that they ought to be made known to the Egyptians in general. Thamus enquired into the use of each of them, and as Theuth went through them expressed approval or disapproval, according as he judged Theuth's claims to be well or ill founded. It would take too long to go through all that Thamus is reported to have said for and against each of Theuth's inventions. But when it came to writing, Theuth declared: 'Here is an accomplishment, my lord the king, which will improve both the wisdom and the memory of the Egyptians. I have discovered a sure receipt for memory and wisdom.' 'Theuth, my paragon of inventors,' replied the king, 'the discoverer of an art is not the best judge of the good or harm which will accrue to those who practice it. So it is in this case; you, who are the father of writing, have out of fondness for your offspring attributed to it quite the opposite of its real function. Those who acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful; they will rely on writing to bring things to their remembrance by external signs instead of on their own internal resources. What you have discovered is a receipt for recollection, not for memory. And as for wisdom, your pupils will have the reputation for it without the reality: they will receive a quantity of information without proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant. And because they are filled with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to society.' "
content and style of this piece of pseudo-historical writing
immediately call to mind Herodotus' account of Egypt in Book
II of his Histories; and I believe that that is the
intended effect. The initial choice of Egypt as a setting
might itself have been suggested by Herodotus' remark (II.
77) that 'of the Egyptians, those who live in the cultivated
part are the most careful of all men in keeping the memory
of the past, and by far the most given to chronicling (or
'the telling of tales', logiotatoi) of all those I have
questioned'. When it comes to matters relating to memory
(274 e 4 ff.), who should know better than the Egyptians?
(CF. Timaeus 20 d ff., where Egyptian records provide a
suitable pedigree for the myth of Atlantis.) True, Herodotus
does not mention a Theuth,
though he does talk about the sacred ibis (Thamus/Thamous/Ammon
calls by what he says is the Egyptian name Amoun, II.
42). But Theuth probably still has Herodotean connections of
a kind. It is Herodotus' stated view that 'nearly all the
gods' names came to Greece from Egypt' (II.50): thus behind
'Theuth' there is an original (?) Thoth (so at least the
name is transcribed later), the chance of the vowel sound
suggesting Prometheus, who is his Greek counterpart as
inventor of the arts and sciences. (Relevantly, Thoth is
also the scribe of the gods: see E.A. Wallis Budge, The
Egyptian Book of the Dead (London 1895, republished New York
1967) cxviii-cxix. For Prometheus, cf. Protagoras 320 d ff.,
and Philebus 16c ff.; the latter passage again implicitly
connects him with Theuth, who this time becomes something of
an expert in theoretical linguistics.) Amoun, Herodotus
says, is the Egyptian Zeus: a different name, in this case,
but the same god. Of course, such ideas need not necessarily
have been restricted to Herodotus, and much of the authentic
detail in the passage clearly does not come from him.
Nonetheless, that Plato is alluding to (parodying?) him is
still in my view a possible hypothesis.
The net result is a new version of an old theme, the quarrel between Zeus and Prometheus (for its original forms, see Hesiod Theogony 535 ff., Works and Days 42 ff.). Had Plato presented it directly as such, he would have had to use the form of the myth, as Protagoras does in his Great Speech in the Protagoras (reference above). But through the device of translating it to Egypt, he is now able to present it, by way of variation, as if it were history (though as c 1-3 warns us, no more to be relied upon for that): Egypt is a place where memories are long enough even to recall the actual disposition of things in the beginning . . . (That Zeus should be the real protagonist in the story will be highly appropriate. The Zeus of the Phaedrus is the patron of philosophy; Thamus' argument against the use of writing will soon be the basis of the argument for the rival medium of conversation as a condition of intellectual progress.) . . The real Theuth/Thoth seems to have had no connection with Naucratis. Naucratis was a Greek foundation, and according to Herodotus the only port of Egypt in ancient times (II. 179): is Theuth/Prometheus perhaps located there in the story because of his dual nationality (see previous note)? (I owe some of the information on which both notes are based to my colleague Earl McQueen; he is not to blame for the conclusions I have derived from it.) . . .
'Thamus they call Ammon': the MS reading τόν θεόν ('while the god they call Ammon') would give an intelligible sense, since Thamus—who must in any case be meant—is undoubtedly a god. But it seems to make the reader work unnecessarily hard, and is even marginally ambiguous, given that only Theuth has explicitly been identified as a god: Postgate's τόν Θαμουν looks altogether more convincing, and can be defended palaeographically (see de Vries)."
Ross writes about Theuth and Zeus, separated by a comma. Previously i wondered whether Theuth was Zeus.
The stipulation by Ammon to not use writing
because it will harm memories and give only appearances of
wisdom, could relate to the commandment in the Bible in
Exodus 20 about "gelykenisse". If it does, the printing of
the Bible is paradoxical because it records something, which
should not have been recorded according to Ammon.
Kenny refers to Plato's The Laws (4. 721b) in which Magnesia, his planned colony will have a marriage law, which stipulates that "procreation is the method by which human beings achieve immortality." The tenth book of The Laws deals with "worship of the gods and the elimination of heresy." In the Timaeus (48a) Plato's demiourgos creates the world from a chaotic state to a good state. Kenny refers to "God", "father, its maker, or its craftsman" (28c) with regard to Plato's demiourgos. Kenny contrasts Plato's demiourgos to the "Judaeo-Christian ... creator", who formed the world from nothing.
20 October 2013
The relationship between Plato and Aristotle was portrayed as cordial during the time of the Academy but later generations showed the relationship between Plato and Aristotle rested on important differences of thought. Aristotle did not agree that Plato's Forms existed because he argued it complicated philosophy of description. The idea of the Good for example was especially problematic to Aristotle. In the place of the idea of the Good Aristotle, like Plato, postulates "living happily" connected to "living virtuously".
The following are extracts from Plato's Republic where he explained his idea of the Good.
Book VII. '5. The Good as Ultimate Object of Knowledge'
Page 231: 507a
'Book VII. The Simile of the Sun. This simile compares the Form of the Good to the Sun, and may be set out in tabular form as follows:
Source of growth and light
Source of reality and truth,
which gives visibility to objects of sense and the power of seeing to the eye.
which gives intelligibility to objects of thought and the power of knowing to the mind.
The faculty of sight.
The faculty of knowledge.'
PART VIII. EDUCATION OF THE PHILOSOPHER
Book VII. '3. Dialectic'
Page 266: 534a
[Socrates]: " 'Then let us be content with the terms we used earlier on for the four divisions of our line – calling them, in order, pure knowledge (A), reason [B], belief [C], and illusion [D]. The last two we class together as opinion, the first two as knowledge (A + B), opinion being concerned with the world of becoming, knowledge (A + B) with the world of reality. Knowledge (A + B) stands to opinion as the world of reality does to that of becoming, and pure knowledge (A) stands to belief and reason to illusion as knowledge (A + B) stands to opinion. The relation of the realities corresponding to knowledge (A + B) and opinion and the twofold divisions into which they fall we had better omit if we're not to involve ourselves in an argument even longer than we've already had' ... So you agree in calling a man a dialectician who can take account of the essential nature of each thing; and in saying that anyone who is unable to give such an account of things either to himself or to other people has to that extent failed to understand them. ... Then doesn't the same apply to the good? If a man can't define the form of the good and distinguish it clearly in his account from everything else, and then battle his way through all objections, determined to give them refutation based on reality and not opinion, and come through with his argument unshaken, you wouldn't say he knew what the good in itself was, or indeed any other good. Any shadowy notion such a man gets hold of is the product of opinion rather than knowledge, and he's living in a dream from which he will not awake on this side of the other world, where he will finally sleep for ever (sic). ... So you will lay it down that they must devote themselves especially to this discipline [of a dialectician], which will enable them to ask and answer questions with the highest degree of understanding ... Then you agree that dialectic is the coping-stone that tops our educational system; it completes the course of studies and there is no other study that can rightly be placed above it.' "
The following was paraphrased from Venter's History of philosophy.
Plato's epistemology is situated in the following cosmos: Two regions can initially be identified. That is the sensible world and the intelligible world. The sensible world can be divided into two regions again; one pertaining to senses and the other pertaining to intellectual insight. Intellectual insight is the domain of Plato's epistemology. Intellectual insight is still part of the sensible world but it is nearing the intellectual world where the perfect Forms are situated—being true and good cause beauty. Senses and intellectual insight can again be subdivided each into two areas. Senses are divided into imaginations (for example the skewness of something under water due to light refraction that is not a real skewness) and 'beliefs' (physicality that we see with our eyes and hear with our ears). Intellectual insights make use of these sense experiences to deduce knowledge from 'beliefs' (seen and heard etc.). Intellectual insights (knowledge) are also acquired by dialectical reasoning from 'beliefs' (seen and heard etc.) towards higher realities that are stable and do not ever change. The sensible world is subject to constant change. Higher realities (Forms) or the 'really real' according to Venter's terminology are the first stable existing principles, that order dialectics and deductions of intellectual insights scientifically. These higher realities that are called higher, because of the stableness and timelessness thereof, are a priori truths that can be summarized by saying; being true and good cause beauty. In the intelligible world below being, truthfulness, and goodness Plato incorporated Pythagoras' numbers that serve as measurement units in order to make scientific measurement possible. There are thus two extreme sides with regard to belief that work together. The belief (Religion) of the intelligible world supports the 'beliefs' (positivism) of the sensible world and in between we have opinion. 'Beliefs' of the sensible world, although close to realities are still only opinion because only the realities of the intelligible world are stable enough to be called truths. Basically there are just two regions for Plato. On one side is Belief (stable) and on another side 'beliefs' (opinions).
Diagram 1: Plato's epistemology
Ought to be
Intellectual insight (knowledge)
' Belief ' =
Deduction by hypothesis
I concluded the above diagram and the following
after studying Venter's historical insights about Plato and
reading The Republic.
The philosophy of Plato we can fathom, with regard to the
cosmos, seems to be agreeable. There is a problem with
regard to his philosophy though. According to Karl Popper,
Plato wanted a stable sensible world. A stable sensible
world was not possible during his time and is not possible
currently, because of change and creativities that are the
results of truths. I call it the anomaly of Plato.
The following was extracted from Popper's The open society and its enemies. "Accordingly, no sensible things (except perhaps the most excellent ones) resemble their Forms sufficiently closely to be unchangeable. 'Absolute and eternal immutability is assigned only to the most divine of all things, and bodies do not belong to this order' " This quotation from Statesman shows that Plato excluded immanent things from divine status. Divine to Plato thus meant perfect being of his Forms. In Statesman he however clearly distinguished between good and evil statesmen. Plato did not classify all immanent things together as bad because of the divine nature of Forms.
The differences between Plato's, and Aristotle's philosophies are rooted in Plato's honesties and Aristotle's deceits. Aristotle opined that deceiving is an attribute of knowledgeable men. Taylor and Lee mentioned a thesis about inability to prove existence of misleading, because lies do not exist. The thesis appeared in three of Plato's works. Logic implies, the non-existence of what lies portray, proves lies. This statement could imply that Plato's Forms were results of lies because proof of existence of Forms is not visible. Forms however were concepts and Plato did not hide that it was a concept or idea. Lies refer to misleading, with reference to misrepresenting facts we can agree on by observation. Where Plato's Forms inspired to create, Aristotle opposed creativities with his emphasis on descriptive philosophy. Aristotle wrote: "So we can do away with the business of Forms Being Established As Templates." The quotation by Popper from Plato's Statesman, and Popper's opinion, however makes it look as if Plato was also opposed to creativities, but the anomaly of Plato shows certainty about this opinion does not exist.
The difference between Plato and Aristotle can further be seen in Aristotle's view about settlement of benefit. Creative actions can benefit more than one party, or all, but according to Aristotle, benefit can only settle with a corresponding disadvantage to another. Aristotle stated: "There is a parallel with the way that what is good in itself cannot be so because of anything else and what is good for its own sake cannot be so for the sake of anything else." Aristotle felt that theories should not be trusted until observation confirms theory.
Aristotle did not agree with "Platonic communism" because he thought property should be held privately. Plato's ideas about procreation were not acceptable to Aristotle because Aristotle preferred traditional families. Aristotle did not believe women should be involved militarily.
Whilst reading i thought with reference to the different opinions that no system can be fixed because any system depends on the actual circumstances, which differ from place to place and time to time. The word system can only refer to something temporal. The most important principle is thus to institute honesties, which show what the facts are, for human reason to adapt situations, based on realities. The institutions of honesties are dependent on faiths in God and therefore it is not possible for unreasonable people to make accusations against "pagan heathens", who only rely on human reason above God. Only honesties as results of faiths in God can cause coherence amongst different specialist subjects. No human has the life span to acquire enough knowledge to have a coherent view of the cosmos therefore something has to cause integrity of different fields to form a coherent whole. That something is correspondence with physical realities, which is caused by faiths in God. True realism can benefit communication amongst people who study different subjects. Ambivalent realism, which claims percepts of the "cosmos as cosmos" are possible through "God himself" is problematic because of totalitarianism.
"Since the Renaissance it has been traditional to regard the Academy and the Lyceum as two opposite poles of philosophy. Plato, according to this tradition, was idealistic, utopian, other-wordly; Aristotle was realistic, utilitarian, commonsensical."
Two other schools replaced the Academy and the Lyceum as most profound. They were The Garden of Epicurus and Zeno's school of Stoics. Epicurus's objective was to remove the fear of death, which was caused by superstitious religion. Superstitions should be avoided by scientific studies according to Epicurus. Epicureanism was based on Democritus's atomism.
"Epicureanism |ˌepəkyəˈrēəˌnizəm; -ˈkyoŏrēə-| noun - an ancient school of philosophy founded in Athens by Epicurus. The school rejected determinism and advocated hedonism (pleasure as the highest good), but of a restrained kind: mental pleasure was regarded more highly than physical, and the ultimate pleasure was held to be freedom from anxiety and mental pain, esp. that arising from needless fear of death and of the gods."
Whilst listening to Jack Johnson's Losing Hope i thought there is not something like a white lie. We should all tell truths whilst knowing of the possibility of death by imposition from devils. It's all understood, the next song spoke of the kind of temporality i had in mind when writing that systems has no permanence.
Chrysippus combined a lot of Stoic philosophy and he replaced Cleanthes's fire with "breath (pneuma)". The "human soul and mind" and "God" was made of "pneuma". For Stoics reason was paramount but subject to the laws of "Nature". Society was important and people had to live according to "Nature". Chrysippus who differed from other Stoics defended incest and cannibalism.
21 October 2013
Aristotle "had spoken, obscurely," of an intellect, which was responsible for forming of concepts. Alexander of Aphrodisias understood this intellect as "God" and the Arab world was influenced by this belief. Christians of the time however believed that humans form concepts self.
"We have dreams in which we think we are flying; a man may go mad and think he is a god. Surely these are cases where what seems to a person is not true?"
7 N0vember 2013
"Without a capital, the English word 'being' has, in philosophy, two uses, one corresponding to the Greek participle and one to the Greek infinitive. A being, we can say, using the participle, is an individual that is; whereas being (using the verbal noun is, as it were, what any individual being is engaged in. The totality of individual beings make up Being." <self: Kenny identifies three uses of the word; two uses for 'being' and one use for 'Being'. My current understanding is that 'being(s)' can refer to flesh and bone with souls as in--(a) 'human being(s)' who sit(s) on couche(s)--. The word 'being(s)' can also refer to the present participle verb when--human being(s) is/(are) busy being human by their actions he/she/(they) is/(are) busy with--. The word being(s) can also refer to the action(s), which Kenny called the "verbal noun". For the word "being" i distinguished thus today three meanings. The word "being" relates to immanence. The word "Being" can similarly refer to transcendental concepts and therefore is a transposition from singular to plural, but with a religious sense attached. The words "human Being" can refer to the totality of all (living?) humans' flesh, bones and souls. The present participle "Being" can refer to a single good human's actions, which when combined with other Beings (verbal noun) of other good humans make up bigger parts of God. Kenny understands "Being" as all humans' flesh, bones and soles combined. It seems thus that the words "being" and "Being" should rather be excluded from discussion because of the varied meanings, which can be ascribed to the two ("Being" and "being") forms. Kenny did not ascribe a religious connotation to "Being" because "Being" referred to all human beings. I am sure other meanings can also be found if looked for intensely.>
Parmenides's ontology ascribed value of "Being" (noun) to anything a person can think of. The word "Unbeing" in Parmenides's ontology refers to nothing because it cannot be thought. Predicates cannot be attached to "Unbeing". Kenny refers later to Plato's Parmenides and Sophist and to "false". After reading p. 161, i thought that Parmenides wrote that any thought, including a false thought had being. According to Sophist it seems Plato wrote that something false has not being. Kenny gives examples; " 'Theaetetus is sitting' " and " 'Theaetetus is flying' ". Where predicates refer to what is "false" are not references to "Unbeing" because birds fly. "False" exists not therefore "false" cannot be referred to. "False" relates to non-correspondence according to Plato in the Sophist. It is not clear what Plato wrote. It seems however that Kenny opined the anomaly of Plato, was cleared by Plato in Sophist because there he combined Heraclitus's change and Parmenides's constancy into a new synthesis. "The Sophist shows us the way to have our cake and eat it and say that Being encompasses all that is unchangeable and all that is in change (271d)." It seems Statesman by Plato was extracted from the Sophist, Kenny referred to.
From Plato's Statesman:
"[271c] and hence arises their name and the tradition about them, except those of them whom God removed to some other fate.1
Younger Socrates: Certainly that follows from what preceded. But was the life in the reign of Cronus, which you mentioned, in that previous period of revolution or in ours? For evidently the change in the course of the stars and the sun takes place in both periods.
Stranger: You have followed my account very well." "[271d] No, the life about which you ask, when all the fruits of the earth sprang up of their own accord for men, did not belong at all to the present period of revolution, but this also belonged to the previous one. For then, in the beginning, God ruled and supervised the whole revolution, and so again, in the same way, all the parts of the universe were divided by regions among gods who ruled them, and, moreover, the animals were distributed by species and flocks among inferior deities as divine shepherds, each of whom was in all respects the independent guardian of the creatures under his own care,"
<self: Plural can be implied by a capital letter in the middle of a sentence for example when "God" is used in stead of "a god" or "Being" in stead of "a being". Plural can also be explicitly stated, by using plural "s" for example "gods" and "beings". It seems there is no plural "s" for "God", unless maybe in Philosophy of religion and Christian philosophy discourse. Plural "s" can be applicable to present participle "Beings" of gods and goddesses if they are all honest but busy with different actions ("Beings"). With regard to the predicates; 'nothing is nothing' makes sense. 'Unbeing is Unbeing', makes sense but other predicates make not sense in conjunction with 'nothing' and 'unbeing'. I cannot say: 'Nothing is divine' or 'Unbeing is divine' but an atheist can say that. It seems thus that according to Kenny, Parmenides's reasoning was contradictory because atheists can attach a predicate to "Unbeing", without lying.>
Taylor and Lee mentioned a thesis about inability to prove existence of misleading, because lies exist not. Theses appeared in three of Plato's works. Logic implies non-being of that what lies portray, proves lies "false".
According to my current logic a thought [phenomenon in a mind], which is not correspondent, exist but has not being. Being is thus of higher grade than existence. That implies that belief (similar to thinking) in corresponding language and logos could be argued to exist, but to have not being. Belief in logos and 'eerlikes' has however of the highest grade of being and has therefore being and lower existence, because it is belief in correspondence and not mere thinking about "use of a false thing", which exists as a phenomena in minds. What happens when thoughts are about another's thinking about "use of a false thing"? What then determine whether phenomena in minds have being? Phenomena have being when phenomena have creating effects.
10 November 2013
"Thales, for instance, is credited with an early version of 'Do as you would be done by': asked how we could best live, he replied, 'if we do not ourselves do what we blame others for doing'."
In Protagoras by Plato an opinion was raised that a science is needed, which establishes what "good", are according to measures of pain and pleasure (356d-357b). I read up to 358d and it seems Socrates did figure some sort of consequentialism (utilitarianism?) a valid science. It is however not clear whether Socrates would have prioritized consequentialist reasoning above duties. My overall knowledge of Socrates today makes me think that he would have prioritized certain duties for example courage higher than consequentialist reasoning about pains and pleasures. He was a decorated soldier; his actions must have included possibility of pain. The problem of consequentialism is the prioritization of own reasoning above universal laws for example honesties, which is a requirement for societal competence.
Kenny opines that it is not certain whether Socrates espoused virtue with consequentialist hedonism. "Plato certainly did not."
11 November 2013
Plato regarded souls, which move things to be gods and he agreed with Thales that everything was full of gods (898e-899b). The word "θεῶν" ("gods", "theó̱n") was used by Plato in the Laws at 899b where Thales was quoted. It seems the quotation was derived by implication from Aristotle; "A dictum of Thales: Aristot. Soul 411 a 7 ff." 
"Augustine's Christianization of Plato is most explicit in the treatise De Ideis, which is the forty-sixth question in his Eighty-Three Different Questions. He offers three Latin words for Ideas: 'formae', 'species', and 'rationes'. The Ideas cannot be thought to exist anywhere but in the mind of the creator. If creation was a work of intelligence, it must have been in accord with eternal reasons. But it is blasphemous to think that God, in creating the world in accordance with Ideas, looked up to anything outside himself. Hence the unique, eternal, unchanging Ideas have their existence in the unique, eternal, unchanging Mind of God. 'Ideas are archetypal forms, stable and immutable essences of things, not created but eternally and unchangeably existent within the divine intellect' (83Q 46. 2)."
"Aquinas on Faith, Knowledge, and Science ... Doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation were known only by revelation and unprovable by unaided reason."
"Just as Augustine opposed those Christians who justified suicide to avoid rape, so he took a rigorous line against those who justified lying in a good cause (e.g. to hide the mysteries of the faith from inquisitive pagans). He wrote two treatises on lying, which he defines as 'uttering one thing by words or signs, while having another thing in one's mind' (DM 3. 3). He denies that such lying, with intention to deceive, is ever permissible. Naturally he has to deal with cases in which it seems prima facie that a good person might do well to tell a lie. Suppose there is, hidden in your house, an innocent person unjustly condemned. May you lie to protect him? Augustine agrees that you may try to throw the persecutors off the scent, but you may not tell a deliberate lie. 'Since by lying you lose an eternal life, you may not ever lie to save an earthly life' (DM 6. 9)."
1 December 2013
"The grace that enables human beings to avoid sin is allotted to some people rather than others not on the basis of any merit of theirs, whether actual or foreseen. It is awarded simply by the inscrutable good pleasure of God. No one can be saved without being predestined.
... A British ascetic named Pelagius, who came first to Rome, and then after its sack to Africa, preached a view of human freedom quite in conflict with Augustine's. The sin of Adam, he taught, had not damaged his heirs except by setting them a bad example; human beings, throughout their history, retained full freedom of the will. Death was not a punishment for sin but a natural necessity, and even pagans who lived virtuously enjoyed a happy afterlife."
Augustine secured the condemnation of Pelagius at a council at Carthage in 418 (DB 101-8) but that was not the end of the matter. Devout ascetics in monasteries in Africa and France complained that if Augustine's account of freedom was correct, then exhortation and rebuke were vain and the whole monastic discipline was pointless.
The crabbed crusader of predestination in the monastery at Hippo is very different from the youthful defender of human freedom in the gardens of Cassiciacum. It was the former, and not the latter, whose influence was powerful after his death and cast a shadow over centuries to come."
Augustine promoted honesties and was probably honest at some time according to the quotation on p. 455. According to my definition of God, Augustine was at that time he was honest, part of God. It seems though that later on in his life he became dishonest because why would a man go to such extremes to condemn another man like Pelagius, except maybe out of self-defense. Maybe Pelagius promoted dishonesty but that would still not justify condemnation?
"Montaigne piles up stories of faithful and magnanimous dogs and grateful and gentle lions, to contrast with the cruelty and treachery of human beings. Most of his examples of beasts' ingenuity are drawn from Greek and Latin texts, such as the legendary logical dog, who while following a scent reaches a crossroads, and sniffs out two routes, and on drawing a blank charges immediately down the third route without further sniffing."
Nicholas Malebranche claimed only "God" causes. His definition of "God" seems to have not included anthropomorphic parts. The impression Kenny gives is that Malebranche promoted a totalitarian system of development because humans, according to Malebranche, had no part in creativities. Malebranche was son of a secretary of Louis XIV of France. Malebranche's Treatise was placed on the Roman Catholic index of forbidden books in 1690.
"Louis XIV (1638–1715), son of Louis XIII; reigned 1643–1715; known as the Sun King. His reign represented the high point of the Bourbon dynasty and of French power in Europe. His almost constant wars of expansion united Europe against him, however, and gravely weakened France's financial position." (NEW Oxford American Dictionary)
Malebranche's metaphysics were "strongly opposed" by Leibniz. Leibniz wrote Theodicy of 1710.
"The philosophy of nature seeks an understanding of the concepts we employ in describing and accounting for natural phenomena: concepts such as 'space', 'time', 'motion', and 'change'."
Malebranche and Spinoza philosophized that God cause everything. "Leibniz took issue here Malebranche and Spinoza: in order to allow for divine and human freedom he wished to make room for contingency throughout the universe. In the Monadology Leibniz makes a distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. Truths of reason are ascertained by a logical analysis parallel to the mathematician's derivation of theorems from axioms and definitions; their ultimate basis is the principle of non-contradiction. Truths of fact are based on a different principle: the principle that nothing is the case without there being a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise (G, 6, 612-13)."
"His [Kant's] ethics of duty remains to this day the main competitor to the eudaimonistic virtue ethics of Plato and Aristotle, and to the consequentialist utilitarian ethics that became the most influential moral system of much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."
12 January 2014
"He [John Stuart Mill] began to learn Greek at the age of three and by the age of twelve had read much of Plato in the original. At that age he began studying logic from the text of Aristotle, while helping to proofread his father's History of India."
Recently i submitted a new proposal (filename ends with 9) to NWU for my MPhil to prof. M. Heyns and dr. A. Verhoef. Part of the proposal was to identify whether Plato was arguing against only 'utilitarian' changes ('progress'). Maybe that is why Popper wrote Plato wanted to "arrest all change" by mistake. Maybe Popper did not distinguish between utilitarian (mimetic) change and creative (diegetic?) change. The definition of 'diegetic' in the Penguin Dictionary of philosophy used to explain the opposition between mimetic and diegetic for Plato, could imply that the author's 'diegetic' in modern times could just as well be 'mimetic'. Diegetic was there defined as being removed from actuality, for example when viewing a film. As written before, i do not believe the statement before many fiction stories that the story was not based on actual events. If Mill read all of Plato at the age of 12 and he became the utilitarian he was, it could imply that Plato did not influence Mill sufficiently to not be a utilitarian. That could mean that Plato was a utilitarian in essence. It however does not make sense because Plato seems to have promoted a business of casting of "Forms", which Aristotle opposed. Maybe there genuinely was a serious anomaly in Plato's reasoning. It seems it could be the case if Plato promoted corresponding truths, which are necessary, according to my current understanding to design good forms and be reasonable. The necessity of corresponding truths for reasonability will perhaps be an assumption for my work because maybe others will not accept pre-knowledge, etc. and the example of Wan, Others and Others-than-only-self as enough logical proof.
"What Mill took from Comte and the Saint-Simonians was the idea of Progress. Between each organic period and the next there was, so Mill understood, a critical and disruptive period, and he believed that he was living in such a period. He now began to look forward"
I should focus only on
being a philosopher. At my age and circumstances, focus should
be to death, in order to attain the limited dignity still
possible for me. Tomorrow i have a meeting with .. of ..,
during which i planned to look for capital for the planned
business, in which i wanted to implement the capital
structure, which incorporates intequity. I realized that the
role i should fulfill is promoting and stating opinions and
not implementing opinions. Trying to implement my opinions
self in an entrepreneurial manner causes problems, not because
my ideas are not 'profitable', but because it causes change.
My opinions should first go through sifts of philosophical
discourse before its perhaps enter the South African economy.
In Mills first publication he followed Berkeley with an idealist view. Matter was only in Mind. It implies his idealism and belief in his own reason, partly lead him into false beliefs about consequentialism.
"Mill sets out five rules, or canons, of experiment to guide inductive scientific research. The use of such canons, Mill maintains, enables empirical inquiry to proceed without any appeal to a priori truths."
"Mill maintained that arithmetic and geometry, no less than physics, consist of empirical hypotheses--hypotheses that have been very handsomely confirmed in experience, but hypotheses that are none the less corrigible in the light of later experience.
This thesis--implausible as it has appeared to most subsequent philosophers--was essential to Mill's overriding aim in A System of Logic, which was to refute a notion that he regarded as 'the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions', namely the notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition independently of experience. Mill indeed saw this issue as the most important in all philosophy. 'The difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition, and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress' (A 162)."
When considering Mill's statements above together with his promotion of utilitarianism it could mean that he was not a consequentialist but yet a utilitarian; it could also mean that he just never realized his own fallibilities and therefore belief in his own consequentialist thought. Elsewhere Kenny stated Mill never addressed the utilitarian implications for sacrifice: reasonings that one could be morally sacrificed for more. What does that imply? Does it imply something about his belief? That Mill was a Caiaphas not because of Caiaphas syndrome but because of his belief. Functionalist monotheism. It could imply that Caiaphas syndrome should not be seen as a syndrome but rather as a belief system. There are differences between true monotheism and functionalist monotheism, which relate to definitions of 'God'.
17 January 2014
"Both empiricism and idealism entail that the mind has no direct knowledge of anything but its own contents. The history of both movements shows that they lead in the direction of solipsism, the doctrine 'Only I exist'. "
"No general rules can be set out that will prevent us from ever going wrong in a specific piece of concrete reasoning. Aristotle in his Ethics told us that no code of laws, or moral treatise, could map out in advance the path of individual virtue: we need a virtue of practical wisdom (phronesis) to determine what to do from moment to moment."
"If God created the world, then mechanistic explanation is underpinned by teleological explanation; the fundamental explanation of the existence and operation of any creature is the purpose of the creator. If there is no God, but the universe is due to the operation of necessary laws upon blind chance, then it is the mechanistic level of explanation that is fundamental."
"For Plato the Ideal Horse was itself a horse: only by being itself a horse could it impart horsiness to the non-ideal horses of the everyday world."
"All states of consciousness, James there says, can be called 'feelings'; and by 'feeling' he means the same as Locke meant by 'idea' and Descartes meant by 'thought'. ... ,James invites us to consider a feeling of the most basic possible kind: 'Let us suppose it attached to no matter, nor localized at any point in space, but left swinging in vacuo, as it were, by the direct creative fiat of a god. And let us also, to escape entanglement with difficulties about the physical or psychical nature of its 'object', not call it a feeling of fragrance or of any other determinate sort, but limit ourselves to assuming that it is a feeling of q. (T 3)' "
"fiat |ˈfēət; ˈfēˌät|
a formal authorization or proposition; a decree : adopting a legislative review program, rather than trying to regulate by fiat.
• an arbitrary order : the appraisal dropped the value from $75,000 to $15,000, rendering it worthless by bureaucratic fiat.
ORIGIN late Middle English : from Latin, ‘let it be done,’ from fieri ‘be done or made.’ " (New Oxford American Dictionary)
"To safeguard liberty, Mill [John Stuart] maintains, it is not sufficient to replace autocratic monarchy by responsible democracy, because within a democratic society the majority may exercise tyranny over the minority. Nor is it sufficient to place limits upon the authority of government, because society can exercise other and more subtle means of coercion.
'There needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways. (L 130) '
In order to place a just limit on coercion by physical force or public opinion we must affirm, as a fundamental principle, that the only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is accountable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence should be absolute." 
"The individual's rule of conduct should be his or her own character, not the traditions or customs of other people. If this principle is denied, 'there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress' (L 185)." 
"To value a commodity, we should look on it as a piece of crystallized labour. How is labour itself measured? By the length of time the labour lasts. A silken handkerchief is worth more than a brick because it takes longer to make than a brick does. Marx states his theory thus: 'The value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labour fixed in the one to the quantity of labour fixed in the other' (VPP 31).
Two qualifications must be made to this simple equation. A lazy or unskilful worker will take longer to produce a commodity than an energetic and skilful one: does this mean that his product is worth more? Of course not: when we speak of the quantity of labour fixed in a commodity we mean the time that is necessary for a worker of average energy and skill to produce it. Moreover, we must add into the equation the labour previously worked up into the raw material of the commodity, and into the technology employed.
'For example, the value of a certain amount of cotton yarn is the crystallization of the quantity of labour added to the cotton during the spinning process, the quantity of labour previously realised in the cotton itself, the quantity of labour realised in the coal, oil, and other auxiliary matter used, the quantity of labour fixed in the steam engine, the spindles, the factory building and so forth.' (VPP 32) "
"Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength, and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and places, that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only."
"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned (sic) to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others."
"Just as Christian thinkers throughout the ages have given fuller accounts of hell than heaven, so too Marx's description of the evils of nineteenth-century capitalism are more vivid than his predictions of the final beatific state of communism. All we are told is that communist society will 'make it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, and write criticism just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic' (GI 66)." 
Smith explains that the division of labor is a result of bartering. Bartering distinguishes humans from other animals because all humans are one race that benefits from one another's skills. Animals can look after themselves and do not benefit as much from the other members of their species.
"THIS DIVISION OF LABOUR, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion."  
"Biblical and classical literature, Kierkegaard reminds us, offers other examples of parents sacrificing their children: Agamemnon offering up Iphigenia to avert the gods' curse on the Greek expedition to Troy, Jephta giving up his daughter in fulfilment of a rash vow, Brutus condemning to death his treasonable sons. These were all sacrifices made for the greater good of a community: they were, in ethical terms, a surrender of the individual for the sake of the universal." 
According to Kierkegaard Abraham's planned sacrifice of Isaac was not for a community but for something higher and relating to a direct agreement with God.  
"In his [Kierkegaard's] Philosophical Fragments and his Concluding Unscientific Postscripts he offers a number of arguments to the effect that faith is not the outcome of any objective reasoning. The form of religious faith that he has in mind is the Christian belief that Jesus saved the human race by his death on the cross." 
"In defending his [Darwin] theory from geological objections he pleads that the imperfections of the geological record 'do not overthrow the theory of descent from a few created forms with subsequent modification' (OS 376). 'I should infer from analogy', he tells us, 'that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator' (OS 391)."
"Natural selection and intelligent design are not incompatible with each other, in the way that natural selection is incompatible with the Genesis story." 
ARISTOTLE. 1986. De anima: on the soul. (London, England: Penguin)
ARISTOTLE. 2004. The metaphysics. (London, England: Penguin)
BUDGE Wallis, E.A. 1895. The book of the dead: the papyrus of Ani. (New York: Dover, 1967)
JOHNSON, J. Losing hope. (On Brushfire fairytales)
KENNY, A. 2010. A new history of Western philosophy in four parts. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 2012 paperback edition)
Laslett, P. ed. 1989. John Locke's Two treatises of government, edited with an introduction and notes by Peter Laslett, fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Student edition)
MAUTNER, T. 2005. The Penguin dictionary of philosophy. (London, England: Penguin, 2nd edition)
NEW Oxford American Dictionary. © 2005-2009 Apple Inc. Version 2.1 (80)
PLATO. 1973. Phaedrus. (London, England: Penguin, 1995 edition)
PLATO. 1986. Phaedrus. (Wiltshire, England: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 2nd edition)
PLATO. 2007. The republic. (London, England: Penguin, 2nd edition)
POPPER, K. 2011. The open society and its enemies. (London and New York: Routledge Classics)
ROSS, S.D. 1993. Injustice and restitution: the ordinance of time. (Albany, New York: State University of New York)
Manis, J. ed. 2012. Adam Smith's An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. (Electronic Classics Series Publication, Pennsylvania State University. From: http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/Wealth-Nations.pdf on 14 November 2012)
TAYLOR, C.C.W. & LEE, M. The sophists. (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2012 edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/sophists/)
VENTER. 2012. Leesbundel. (In Geskiedenis van die filosofie studiegids - PHIL 221 PAC. Potchefstroom, South-Africa: North-West University, 2012.)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 8.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 11.
 New Oxford American Dictionary.
 Google translate on 10 October 2013. This translation is close to "physis" (nature), which the sophists contrasted with "nomos" (laws).
 Budge, W.E.A. 1895. The book of the dead, lxxxii-lxxxiii.
 Budge, W.E.A. 1895. The book of the dead, lxxxix.
 Budge's The book of the dead is not the full version because it is based on the papyrus of Ani, which compiled an important abstract of the full Book of the dead. Aristotle's book De Anima was translated as De soul.
 Budge, W.E.A. 1895. The book of the dead, lxxviii-lxxix.
Budge, W.E.A. 1895. The book of the dead,
on 18 October 2013.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 80.
 "About Physis" translated by Google Translate on 18 October 2013.
 New Oxford American Dictionary.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 12.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 20.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 21.
 Aristotle. The metaphysics, pp.15-16, 984b16-984b34.
 New Oxford American Dictionary.
 New Oxford American Dictionary.
 Plato. 1973. Phaedrus, pp. 74-76, 274c.
 Plato. 1986. Phaedrus, 208-209.
 Ross, S.D. 1993. Injustice and restitution, 245.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 54.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 55.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 59.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 69.
 Plato. 2007. The republic.
 Venter. 2012. Leesbundel, 189.
"This quotation is from the Statesman,
269d. ... Ultimately, I may perhaps refer to
general psychological considerations. On the one hand the
of innovation (illustrated by many passages in the Laws,
e.g. 758c/d) and on the other hand, the idealization of
the past ... All this indicates the view that
our unhappy and unblessed state is a consequence of the
development which makes us different from our original
nature—our Idea; and it further indicates that the
development is one from a state of goodness and
blessedness to a state where goodness and blessedness are
being lost; but this means that the development is one of
increasing corruption." (Popper. 2011: 530-531)
 Popper, K. 2011. The open society, 36.
 Aristotle. 2004. The Metaphysics, p. 149, 1025a.
 Taylor, C.C.W. & Lee, M. The. "Euthydemus 284a–c, Theaetetus 188d–189a and Sophist 236e–237e".
 Aristotle. 2004. The Metaphysics, p. 195, 1034a.
 Aristotle. 1986. De anima, p. 140, 406b.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 62.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 70.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 75.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 78-79.
 New Oxford American Dictionary.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 81.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 82.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 92.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 123-124.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 160.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 161.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 171-172.
9 November 2013.
 From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DStat.%3Asection%3D271d on 9 November 2013.
 Taylor, C.C.W. & Lee, M. 2012. The sophists. "Euthydemus 284a–c, Theaetetus 188d–189a and Sophist 236e–237e".
 "Used of a false thing. On the one hand, either because it has not been assembled or because it would be impossible for it to be assembled." (Aristotle, 2004. The metaphysics, p.148, 1024b)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 204.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 209.
 From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178%3Atext%3DProt.%3Asection%3D358d on 10 November 2013.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 233.
 Google translate
 From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0165%3Abook%3D10%3Apage%3D899 on 11 November 2013.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 377.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 383.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 455.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 471.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 472.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 512.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 545.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 544-547, 645-646.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 544.
 Mautner, T. 2005. The Penguin dictionary, 371.
 Mautner, T. 2005. The Penguin dictionary, 343.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 624.
Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 645-646.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 645-646. G = References to the Gerhardt edition of Leibniz's complete works by volume and page. (Kenny, 2010:1009)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 704.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 760.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 761.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 762.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 762.
 "A = Autobiography, ed. J. Stillinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) (Kenny, 2010:1012)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 763.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 928.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 863.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 869.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 890.
 "See above, p. 166" (Kenny, 2010:893). On p. 166 Kenny explained Plato's theory of Ideas with citations to Plato's works.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 891.
 "T = The Meaning of Truth (New York: Prometheus Books, 1997)" (Kenny, 2010:1012)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 907.
 "L = On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). (Kenny, 2010: 1012).
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 963.
 "L = On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). (Kenny, 2010: 1012).
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 964.
 "VPP = Value, Price and Profit, ed. E. M. Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1935)" (Kenny, 2010: 1012).
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 971.
Intequities with regard to honesties and group
consequential utilitarian comforts. Remember Plato's
Republic and the treatment of good people.
 Manis, J. ed. 2012. Adam Smith's An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 33-34.
 Laslett, P. ed. 1989. John Locke's Two treatises of government, par. 27:1
 "GI = The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Allen (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1920, 2004)" (Kenny, 2010: 1012).
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 973.
 I wonder what Marx wanted to fish and hunt with. If he wanted to hunt with a bow and arrow his wish could make sense. Fishing is however another matter because how do ones fish without nets or without fishing lines and rods. Nets and fishing lines imply division of labour to produce the lines and nets. Was Marx predicting a future in which men, due to mechanisation, will have freedoms to live like men of the gentry? It raises a question whether Marx had the same disrespect of creativities, which Rousseau had. If Marx predicted a future of mechanised freedoms, it could be, that he had not the disrespect of creativities, which Rousseau had.
 Manis, J. ed. 2012. Adam Smith's An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 18-21.
 Manis, J. ed. 2012. Adam Smith's An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 18.
 In contrast to Rousseau's and Marx's opinions.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 979.
 Does Kenny here write in Kierkegaard's words without making it his own or does he agree? To state that a utilitarian sacrifice is to benefit a universal is not right because the universal duties of the categorical imperative forbid such sacrifices. What would the world become if everyone or every group starts sacrificing his/her/their fellow human beings?
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 979.
 We do not know what happened There with Abraham and Isaac. Maybe Isaac was naughty and working on the nerves of Abraham and Abraham wanted to give Isaac a big scare to make him more disciplined, especially at the old age of Abraham. Maybe the plan of Abraham can be compared to giving a young child Ritalin. "Ritalin |ˈritl-in| noun trademark for methylphenidate ." "methylphenidate |ˌmeθəlˈfenəˌdāt| noun Medicine a synthetic drug that stimulates the sympathetic and central nervous systems and is used to improve mental activity in attention deficit disorder and other conditions." (New Oxford Americam Dictionary)
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 980.
 According to Intequinism Christianity makes objective sense if it is postulated that the practice to sacrifice creators should have stopped when Jesus was sacrificed. Jesus's sacrifice thus directly should have saved other creators after him, which indirectly will benefit all of humanity with more free time due to mechanization. Therefore creativities will sustain communities and prohibit conditions conducive to being colonized.
 "OS = On the Origin of Species, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)" (Kenny, 2010: 1010).
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 984.
 Kenny, A. 2010. A new history, 985.
When comparing the quotations of Darwin on p. 984,
with this statement of Kenny on p. 985, seemingly as his
own, it seems he does not understand Darwin's statement
like i do, because the quotations of Darwin is compatible
with Genesis and i think Darwin also thought so.