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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Book title: The God
Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion.
Author: Richard Kearney.
Publisher: Indiana University Press.
Place: Bloomington and
Indianapolis.
Year: 2001.
Edition: Paperback.
Reader: Mr. M.D. Pienaar.
Reference:
KEARNEY; R. 2001. “The God Who May Be: A
Hermeneutics of Religion”. Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press.
Contents
“God neither is nor is
not but may be. That is my thesis in this volume. What I mean
by this is that God, who is traditionally thought of as act or
actuality, might better be rethought as possibility. To this
end I am proposing here a new hermeneutics of religion which
explores and evaluates two rival ways of interpreting the
divine—the eschatological
and the onto-theological.
The former, which I endorse privileges a God who possibilizes
our world from out of the future, from the hoped-for eschaton
which several religious traditions have promised will one day
come.
Taking four biblical
texts—the burning bush, the transfiguration on Mount Thabor,
the Shulamite’s Song, and God’s pledge in Matthew 10 to make
the impossible possible—I will endeavour to retrieve their
latent eschatological meaning”. (Kearney, 2001:1)
By not being willing to
form a kingdom by force [but rather by trying to necessitate a
“promised kingdom” out of caused chaos – author’s reading
between the lines, based on Matthew 10], the “God-who-may-be”
shows how, the “transfiguring power of transcendence” could
function to bring about a new order (Kearney, 2001:2).
“Each human person
carries within him/herself the capacity to be transfigured in
this way and to transfigure God in turn—by making divine
possibility ever more incarnate and alive. This capacity in
each of us to receive and respond to the divine invitation I
call persona. In
this sense, one might even say that it is, paradoxically, by
first recognizing our own powerlessness—vulnerability,
fragility, brokenness—that we find ourselves empowered to
respond to God’s own primordial powerlessness and to make the
potential Word flesh.” (Kearney, 2001: 2)
“The God of the
possible—which I call posse
in a liberal borrowing from Nicholas of Cusa—is one who is
passionately involved in human affairs and history. And my
basic wager is that this God is much closer than the old deity
of metaphysics and scholasticism to the God of desire and
promise who, in diverse scriptural narratives, calls out from
burning bushes, makes pledges and covenants, burns with
longing in the song of songs, cries in the wilderness,
whispers in caves, comforts those oppressed in darkness, and
prefers orphans, widows and strangers to the mighty and the
proud. This is a God who promises to bring life and to bring
it more abundantly. A God who even promises to raise the dead
on the last day, emptying deity of its purported
power-presence—understood metaphysically as ousia, hyperousia, esse,
substantia, causa sui—so that God may be the promised
kingdom” (Kearney, 2001: 2)
“.. God is not a dead
letter but a vibrant concern for our time.” (Kearney, 2001: 3)
“.. in favour of a more
eschatological notion of God as possibility to come: the posse which calls us
beyond the present toward a promised future?” (Kearney, 2001:
3)
Kearney prefers his
“God” as “the one who-will-be” rather than “I-am-who-am” of
Exodus 3:14. He prefers neither apophatic nor cataphatic
descriptions of “God”. His “God” is a possibility, not yet
realised, “the deity yet to come.” “God depends on us to be.
Without us no Word can be made flesh.” (Kearney, 2001:2-3)
Kearney’s God ordains
not everything and therefore his God is not recognized via
“theodicy”. Theodicies are banal and unjust due to its implied
trust in “esse” rather than “posse”. Kearney describes his
possible kingdom as “the kingdom of justice and love.” For
Kearney’s God, he quoted Hans Jonas’s conception of
‘ “self-forfeiture of divine integrity for the sake of
unprejudiced becoming, no other foreknowledge can be admitted
than that of possibilities.”[1] ‘
Kearney
however qualifies Jonas’s conception, which includes
metaphysical consequentialist properties, Kearney himself,
appreciates not. Does Kearney imply functioning injustice, at
a side he espouses not, might cause a possessed living icon to
become the living “God”; not a dead idol? If so, he could be
contradicting his statement about “theodicy”. (Kearney,
2001:4-5,113)
“Philosophically, I would
say that I am speaking from a phenomenological perspective,
endeavoring as far as possible to offer a descriptive account
of such phenomena as persona, transfiguration and desire,
before crossing over to hermeneutic readings. In this domain
my primary intellectual mentors are Husserl, Heidegger,
Levinas, Ricoeur and Derrida.” (Kearney, 2001:5)
Kearney seeks “love and
justice” and in that sense he believes “all genuine spiritual
movements” include “a liberating posse”. (Kearney,
2001:6)
Kearney chooses a
midway he calls “mi-lieu”,
which is a synthesis between apophatic theology and cataphatic
acknowledgement of plutocratic icons. Apophatic theology can
be regarded as “idolatry”, which he is closer to. Cataphatic
identifications use words like
‘ “monstrous” (Campbell, Zizek), “sublime”
(Lyotard), “abject” (Kristeva), or “an-khorite” (Caputo).’ At
both extremes, really, divine existence is not described, but
Kearney thinks hermeneutics can function for a mediating role.
With regard to this mediating role, Ricoeur influenced Kearney
to seek the divine from, not only, Christian writings.
(Kearney, 2001:6-7). Kearney could thus be classified as a
philosophical realist whose “posse” he found in everything he
hermeneutically and phenomenologically investigated. Here
Kearney places the apophatic (“negative theology”) idol in
opposition to cataphatic (“onto-theology”) icons. He proffers
an allegorical understanding, which includes not only
plutocratic immanence but also transcendence from logos to
humanity. He calls this midway, “onto-eschatology”, “where
divine and human desires overlap.” (Kearney, 2001:7-8)
Kearney writes his God
desires and transfigures. “Each person embodies a persona.” Persona
Kearney identifies relates to “alterity” and “spirit” and “is
beyond consciousness tout
court.” (Kearney, 2001:9-10)
“I never encounter others
without at the same time configuring them in some way. To
configure the other as a
persona [own bold] is to grasp him/her as present in
absence, as both incarnate in flesh and transcendent in time.
To accept this paradox of configuration is to allow the other
to appear as his/her unique persona. To refuse
this paradox, opting instead to regard someone as pure
presence (thing), or pure absence (nothing), is to disfigure
the other.
To be sure, this is not
an easy matter. The other always appears to us as if s/he were
actually present. And it is all too tempting to ignore this as if proviso and
presume to have others literally before us, to appropriate
them to our scheme of things, reading them off against our
familiar grids of understanding and identification… For if it
is true to say that we do somehow “see” the persona [own bold] in the
face of the person, we never get it. It always
exceeds the limits of our capturing gaze. It transcends us.”
(Kearney, 2001:10-11)
Therefore he primarily
refers to “the persona” with
“narrations” and “metaphors” (Kearney, 2001:9-10). His
distinction between “a persona” and “the persona” relates to
the difference between singularity and plurality, immanent and
transcendent, one and others, here and there, now and then,
self and God, nominalism and realism, etc.
“The eschaton, as persona [own
bold], is precisely
the other’s future possibilities which are impossible for me
(to realize, possess, grasp).” (Kearney, 2001:12).
There is thus a
progression, from literally, the characteristics of “a
persona”, which can include Kearney’s own persona, to “the
persona” to figuratively, “persona”, which “is beyond
consciousness tout
court.” (Kearney, 2001:9-12). Might-be (‘“may-be”’) of persona
tout court, relates to the future and others’ possibilities
and what we cannot know. ‘“Can-be”’ of “a
persona” relates to now and self. (Kearney, 2001:12) We, each,
realize our own weakness of singularity and we can generalize
about that weakness of singularity, by saying
weakness-of-singularity is universal to self and others;
Caiaphas syndrome could take hold of us. Kearney however seems
to say that Persona’s presence, could nullify the weakness of
singularity if they allow, singularity to prosper.
Persona relates to
weakness as explained in 1 Corinthians 1:28, (Kearney,
2001:13) and thus relates to singularity as opposed to
plurality, or what some others refer to as the numbers game.
“God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong.
He chose the lowly things of this world and the despised
things—and the things that are not—to nullify the things that
are” (1 Corinthians 1:27-28).
“The torturer”, [who
suffers from Caiaphas syndrome], suffers a loss when tortured
persons die, because, “he” is left only with the corpses. “The
tortured persona
always escapes the torturer.” (Kearney, 2001:13)
The persona is
something incarnate that signifies the uniqueness of a person.
It is therefore the fingerprint of individuality. (Kearney,
2001:14)
“The One ‘is
simultaneously the loved one and love; He is love of himself;
for He is beautiful only by and in Himself’ (Enneads VI, 8,
15). … In short, what we forfeit in the game of self-regarding
love is the alterity of the other person. … To this fusionary
sameness of the One I would oppose the eschatological
universality of the Other. This latter notion of the universal
is more ethical to the extent that it is conceived in terms of
a possible co-existence of unique personas, whose
transcendence is in each case vouchsafed.” (Kearney, 2001:15)
Why doesn’t Kearney
write about Others-than-only-selves, rather than “the Other”
he opposes to “the One” he criticizes? The “Other” and the
“One” are both in singular form.
Persona of the eschaton
transfigures Kearney and gives him power to transfigure
others. The eschatological persona defies any power, without
weapons due to mime, which convince each and every one to
choose individuality, weakness and trust in the law, whilst
rejecting group power and weapons. (Kearney, 2001:16)
“And because there is no
other to this finite other, bound to but irreducible to the
embodied person, we refer to this persona as the sign
of God. Not the other person as divine, mind you—that would be
idolatry—but the divine in and through that person. The divine
as trace, icon, visage, passage.” (Kearney, 2001:18)
Dying good should be
prioritized over living bad if a choice must be made between
the two options, due to procreation. (Kearney, 2001:19) “If
the tradition of onto-theology granted priority to being over
the good, this counter-tradition of eschatology challenges
that priority. … Natality transfigures mortality.” (Kearney,
2001:19)
In the Bible Exodus
3:14 uses two translations for ““ ‘ehyeh ‘asher ‘ehyeh.””
They are ““I AM WHO I AM”” and “I WILL BE WHAT I WILL BE”.
Kearney translates the
words as “I am who may be”. (Kearney, 2001:22)
The Greeks, Latins,
Augustine and Aquinas translated the verse with words
portraying infinite being; absolute being, that “does not
change and cannot change” and is therefore incorporeal. “For
Being says more of God than either the Good or the One.”
(Kearney, 2001:23)
This incorporeal view
of God, was since after Heidegger represented by
‘“onto-theology”: a tendency to reify God by reducing Him to a
being (Seiende)—albeit
the
highest, first, and most indeterminate of all beings.’
(Kearney, 2001:24)
According to the Greeks
“Being” is the name for “God”. (Kearney, 2001:24)
The eschatological
translations of Exodus 3:14 translates the words to portray a
“God”, that includes anthropomorphic roles and the “ethical
and dynamic character of God.” (Kearney, 2001:24)
It seems Kearney opines
that the eschatological (Jewish/Protestant) interpretations
are more anthropomorphic than the onto-theological
(Greek/Latin/Catholic) interpretations. According to my
current understanding, as opined in “Intequisms: Accounting of
ideas” the little difference between the two interpretations
makes not a difference because Incorporeality alone with the
One is as indeterminate and weak as singularity of the
functionalist posse. The consequence of both interpretations
is sublime evil rulings. The solution is thus the plurality of
Good, which can be achieved via the law. It was the intention
of Moses with God’s laws and it was the intention of Solon
with God’s laws, unless i am mistaken. It seems the crux is in
the analysis of the types of laws the two traditions inspired
and the applications thereof.
The burning bush that
was connected with “God’s” appearance to Moses changed the
ontological (“I am what I am”) nature of God to a more
functional futuristic narrative (“I will be what I will be”)
sense, if the Hebrew meaning is incorporated in translations.
“God” was referred to with “He” and feminine references to
“God” entered not the discourse yet. The problem of weakness
that relates to the apophatic “God” was still relevant but the
futuristic eschatological promissory nature became more
emphasised. Also “God” wanted not to be referred to with
idolatrous names similar to those secretive names of “gods” of
the area. The Hebrew futuristic way of referring to “God”
implied a critique of the sacrificial rites of religious
practices, inherited from Abraham. (Kearney, 2001:26-27)
Another change that
took place is that “God” became a “God” of liberation.
Previously “God” was oppressive. (Kearney, 2001:28) “God” was
now more dependent on human actions to liberate self, without
being idolatrous. “God” is seen as “I-Self for us” and
“becoming” of the Godhead replaces Being. “He” becomes with
his subjects and is dependent on people and “mortals” are
dependent on “Him” (Kearney, 2001:29-30) This was however
supported by the law, which implied more creativities, due to
support of individualism. The law protects not only groups,
but also individuals.
The “God” of Exodus
3:14 is not a “God” of “logocentric immanence”. Kearney
regards Greek ontology in opposition with morals of his “God”.
Kearney reads idolatry in close relation to onto-theology and
the phrase “God is One”. (Kearney, 2001:31) In this view of
Kearney and the translation of a promissory nature, that
states “God” will be what “He” will be, the infinite (always
truth) nature of God, which, prohibit mortals from immoral
acts, which requires deceits, could be infringed upon. Zizek
and other postmodern prophets, for example, describe this
problem by identifying Jewish religion with the monstrous and
sublime Leviathan postmodern “God”. Kearney opines, however
that the Jewish “God” need not be acknowledged, either in a
sense of “being nor non-being” but rather in a sense of
“eschatological may be”, which is not an apocalyptic
threatening. (Kearney, 2001:33-34) Kearney’s views, which
place Greek philosophy against Jewish religion, is not real,
because, each group can be divided between the honest and
deceivers. If “God” is partly, deceivers, then the creating
side of “God” is not true, because creativities are dependent
on truths.
“In sum, the danger of
God without being is that of an alterity so “other” that it
becomes impossible to distinguish it from monstrosity—mystical
or sublime.” (Kearney, 2001:34)
Kearney also regards
onto-theology and negative (apophatic) theology on opposing
sides and he seeks a middle way, he named “onto-eschatology”.
His middle way is where “a seismic shift occurs—with God
putting being into question just as being gives flesh to God.”
(Kearney, 2001:34)
God has carnal desire
and Stanislas Breton referred to the “God” who “are”.
(Kearney, 2001:34) “There’s more to God than being. Granted.
But to pass beyond
being you have to pass through
it. Without the flesh of the world, there is no birth.”
(Kearney, 2001:36) “God as Nicholas of Cusa puts it, is best
considered neither as esse,
nor as nihil, but
as possest (absolute
possibility which includes all that is actual).” According to Cusanus
and Heidegger “existence (esse)” presupposes possibility,
therefore “God as May-Be” is prior to the ontological Being of
God. This view can also be found with Derrida’s “messianic
Perhaps”. Kearney’s view was formed by “onto-eschatological
hermeneutics” or in other words a “poetics of the possible.”
Does it mean that the Word is a conditional for God? No,
because “God’s” love is infinite. “As a gift, God is unconditional giving.
Divinity is constantly waiting.” God’s existence is identified
in the existence of possibility. God’s words in Exodus 3:14
seems to mean: “I am
who may be if you continue to keep my word and struggle for
the coming of justice.” (Kearney, 2001:37) Kearney’s
“God” might be a future “kingdom of justice and love.”
(Kearney, 2001:38) Here his “God” can be compared to a fair
and just State.
On “Mount Thabor”, “the
person of Jesus is metamorphosed before the eyes of his
disciples into the persona
of Christ.” Jesus transfigured by “a change of “figure””,
whilst staying “flesh-and-blood embodiedness” and he converses
with Moses and Elijah. (Kearney, 2001:39). A voice from the
cloud said: ““This is my Son, the Chosen One. Listen to him”
(Luke 9:35).” (Kearney, 2001:41) Luke 9:35 in the Bible reads:
““This is my Son, whom I have chosen; listen to him.”” A
similarity between this incident and Moses’s and Elijah’s
meeting with God, with regard to the cloud and possibly not
eating or drinking for 40 days and 40 nights. Elijah also
fasted for 40 days and 40 nights, before he met God (1 Kings
19:7). The link between keeping the law during difficult
times, by not stealing food is central to the matter.
Kearney acknowledges
plural parts of God with the words “all humans becoming “sons
of God”—that is, by being transfigured into their own unique personas.” Kearney
also refers to Jesus, Moses and Elijah being icons (“eikon”,
“iconoclastic”). Jesus requested his disciples to not make a
“cultic” “idol” of him. (Kearney, 2001:43) The reference to
“eikon” is used by Kearney to refer to eschatological
likenesses to Jesus’s persona. The purpose of Jesus as “eikon”
is for all humans to be transfigured to his image on Mount
Thabor. The choice of “eikon” (“icon”) over eidolon relates to
innovation and truths. “The eschatological promise requires
not only grace but ethical action on our part. The advent of
the eschaton of
Creation is inseperable from human innovation.” (Kearney,
2001:45) The word “idol” (“drekgod”) relates directly to the
word “idea” and it is implied that it is wrong to equate ideas
in singular form with idols. Everyone should be allowed to
create and to form new ideas.
“The transfiguration
reminds us that when it comes to the persona of
God—marking the uniqueness thisness (haecitas) of each
person—it is a question of the old enigma: now you have him,
now you don’t.” (Kearney, 2001:42)
Kearney’s view of his
“persona”, which is unique, for each person, via the love of
God, means to me that he is too close to postmodern sublime.
It could imply each person is divine in his own uniqueness.
The extreme singularity of Jesus, Moses and Elijah on the
other hand is too perfect. This perfection removes God from
amongst us. The “persona” should have a universal character,
according to me. That characteristic is truth, which causes
creativities.
“The persona is “eternal”
in its very unicity to the extent that it remains irreducible
to the laws of a purely causal temporality. Its eschaton does
not operate according to the objective laws of cause-effect or
potency-act (though it does recognize that this [messianic
time] is the chronological time in which human persons exist)”
Kearney’s functional view of the “transfiguring Messiah” in
relation to his “God” is explained in relation to Walter
Benjamin’s opinion of an uncertain event; “if he comes, it
will be a surprise.” (Kearney, 2001:45-46)
Kearney refers to
“banality” in relation to New Age books, which portray Jesus
of Nazareth in genealogical context after immigrating to
France. (Kearney, 2001:48)
In relation to “Paschal
Testimonies” Kearney explains his view of “God” who feeds the
poor. His explanation narrates Jesus of Nazareth, the
crucified, who feeds people after his resurrection. This
narration of Jesus of Nazareth is conjoined with people who
help poor and destitute others. His portrayal however of who
“God” is, is there not very clear. (Kearney, 2001: 49-52)
“Another way of speaking
of the transfiguration of God is to speak of the desire of
God. It is through such desire that the God-who-may-be finds
voice, and does so in many different personas.” (Kearney,
2001:53)
It is not clear here
what Kearney means with “desire of God”. He asks: Is it God’s
desire for us? Or is it our desire for God? Or both? He says
the “desire” relates to secular passion and eros: “persona
becomes passion—the passion of burning love and of endless
waiting.” (Kearney, 2001:53)
With reference to Song
of Songs 3:1-4, Kearney identifies a women (“her”) who seeks her
“God” (“Him”). He
then writes: “God it seems, is the other who seeks me out
before I seek him, a desire beyond my desire, bordering at
times, in excess of its fervor, on political incorrectness! It
seems Kearney means that “God’s” desire for ones is a
passionate affair. Those who then submit by desiring God back
have “excess, gift and grace.” (Kearney, 2001:54).
“God” is opined to be
the other in a love relationship, with reference to Solomon’s
Song of Songs: ‘—“My dove, my perfect one”—’. The Shulamite
dark woman is referred to with “dove”. The eschaton Kearney
foresees relates to peace. The other’s body is compared to
nature, which was called neter (God) in ancient Egyptian. The
human form as part of God is acknowledged. (Kearney,
2001:55-56,135) The Song of Songs is acknowledged by Kearney
as culturally subversive. His “God’s” kingdom could therefore
be radically new. Eros and desire are “glorified” and cultural
uses like planned marriages are “derided”. (Kearney, 2001:57)
The implications for
racism from Kearney’s eschatological reading about the kingdom
to come, taken partly from the Song of Songs, means that his
view of “God” excludes racism. (Kearney, 2001:57) Kearney
identifies a progression from the ontological translation for
“I am what I am” in Exodus to free love in Song of Songs to a
claim in 1 John that “God is love”. (Kearney, 2001: 58,138)
Kearney’s view of eschatological “God” has direct relation
with erotic love. Solomon is king and is compared with
“Jahweh”. The sexual desire portrayed in the Song of Songs is
equated with the love of “God”. Being weary of desire and
respecting matrimonial procreation is synthesised (Kearney,
2001:58-59)
This interpretation of
Kearney could be in opposition to Jesus’s definition of love
(agape) being compliance to laws and living the prophecies, or
it combines erotic love with complying with the laws of
enemies (Greeks and Romans in Biblical Israel).
Kearney identifies two
ways of “desiring God”. The “onto-theological paradigm
construes desire as lack—that is, as a striving for fulfilment
in a plenitude of presence. Here desire expresses itself as a
drive to be and to know absolutely. … What Genesis, and later
the Talmud, referred to as the “evil drive” (yezer hara) to be God
by refashioning Yahweh in our own image.” It is further
recognized when people prefer ‘“power to weakness”’. Does
Kearney mean here power to “their God” or to themself.
(Kearney, 2001:60-61)
Caiaphaci use Kearney’s
critique of onto-theology. I have experienced Caiaphas
syndrome and i prefer a powerful God to a weak God, because of
Caiaphas syndrome. A strong God would have protected Jesus as
individual. His life until old age on Earth would have been
more of a blessing to us. Our current lives would have been
better if he had more opportunity to change the world.
The eschatological
paradigm emphasises eros and spirituality in the sense of
Augustine’s words: ‘“You shed your fragrance about me; I drew
breath and now I gasp for your sweet odour. I tasted you and
now I hunger and thirst for you. You touched me and I am
inflamed with love …” (Confessions,
bk. 6)’ Kearney opines that Augustine’s desire for “God”, the
“Creator” is a result of “God’s” “first shed fragrance” and
touching of Augustine. (Kearney, 2001:62)
Levinas, “a believing
Jew” wrote about “phenomenology of eros”, which is in contrast
to Hegel’s “phenomenology of consciousness.” (Kearney,
2001:62)
According to Kearney,
Levinas distinguished between ‘“totality”’ as “ontology”
(“history, reason, representation, horizon, and power”) and
“eschatology” related to “desire”. Totality relates to
objectivity, which was part of philosophies regarding “(a) the
archeological
obsession with First Causes (a retrospective account of desire
running from Neoplatonic metaphysics right through to Freudian
psychoanalysis)” and (b) the teleological drive toward a Final End (a
prospective account of desire proffered by the Hegelian model
of history). By contrast, Levinas defines eschatology as a
relationship of desire which breaches totality, opening up
what he terms “infinity.”” (Kearney, 2001:62) Levinas
pronounces that a “phenomenology of desire” holds the key to
infinity. And, according to Levinas the bases (‘a “trace”’)
for extrapolations to the infinite is within totality. This
trace should be followed due to “desire of the other” and
“responsibility for the other.” Levinas opines that at the
eschaton wars shall end, and the way to the eschaton is via
desiring the other (meaning his God), which is outside of
totality. (Kearney, 2001:63) Levinas’s God is “the good.” The
good cannot be imagined and the good transcends in towards
totality. Kearney then continues with an opinion of Levinas,
which contradicts his views about transcendence from infinity
into totality because he writes that the experience of the
“Most-High” is found “in
the midst of my relation to the concrete living other.”
(Kearney, 2001:64) Sexual desire relates, for Levinas,
directly to his God/dess. “Can one desire the
infinite—including infinite justice—without first loving the
finite beings in front of us? Can one desire the alterity of
goodness without loving human
others? Can an eschatology of eros ever be wholly disengaged
from an intersubjective relation of one-with-another?”
(Kearney, 2001:65). It is not clear how Levinas brings his
views about sexual desire in connection with Jesus and the
Messiah with relation to eschatology.
Levinas mixed sexual
desire for a living woman with his eschatological eros.
(Kearney, 2001:66) It seems Kearney opines that Levinas opined
that a father’s desire for the good, outside of totality, is
transposed onto his children, after he conceived children. His
children then, are involved, in his thoughts, with the
eschaton. (Kearney, 2001:67)
I think what happens
then with some people is that Caiaphas syndrome takes hold of
them. They believe they are acting in order to stop the
eschaton, by sacrificing creators. It means that first an
eschatological philosophy places it’s “God” (good) outside
totality before parenthood. After parenthood parents, who
follow eschatological religions, start to sacrifice creators,
because they believe there is an end to the world, which could
stop their “fecundity”.
Caputo opined that
Levinas’s philosophy was about the sublime and impossible.
(Kearney, 2001:69) That means to me that Levinas’s view of his
Messiah was a view of the Leviathan of Hobbes.
Derrida also commented
on Levinas’s writings that it could point to the sublime. In
connection with this Derrida foresaw “a-theism” as
‘“messianicity”’. It meant for Derrida an acceptance of an
Other not described by Jewish, Christian and Muslim religion.
Messianicity is something different from ‘“messianism”’
(“positive revelation”). (Kearney, 2001:71)
According to Derrida,
“desiring God” is a realization that the ‘“anthropotheomorphic
form of desire”’ is false. This is close to what Levinas
called “eschatological
desire”, which implies that the search for the first cause of
onto-theology, is discarded, in order to live a more
nominalist type of life. This archeological urge, for first
causes, relates to mania and confusion, which Derrida opposed.
“For deconstructionists, Levinas is still too metaphysical.”
(Kearney, 2001:72).
The words we use are
problematic because in Philosophy of religion the ontological
proof was opposed to the cosmological proof for God. In this
book of Kearney he uses the word ‘ontology’ in relation to
theology in the sense of cosmological type thinking similar to
the Aristotelian search for a first cause. The rejection of
the search for a first cause is a rejection of Aristotle, but
Kearney also brought that in conjunction with Neo-Platonism.
It seems thus that Aristotle could have influenced
Neo-Platonists, according to Kearney. It could also mean that
Levinas’s and Derrida’s philosophies relate to Platonism. But
Levinas blamed Heidegger (Wikipedia), therefore Popper’s views
that Hitler (Who Heidegger supported) and Plato is related
makes not sense.
Derrida’s messianicity
is a desire for “a God still to be invented.” Derrida’s faith
was not Judeo-Christian, it was a “leap into radical atheism.”
In On the Name
Derrida wrote: ‘“The other, that is, God or no matter who,
precisely, any singularity whatsoever, as soon as every other
is wholly other.”’ (Kearney, 2001:73) Caputo explained this
view of Derrida by writing that the singularity of God is,
according to Derrida extreme irrationality so-that the idea is
completely rejected as totally other. Kearney asks if this
view of Derrida does not imply that the anthropomorphic “God”
of love gets rejected. (Kearney, 2001:74) Kearney did not
consider the rejection of the idea of a singular god of love
for gods and goddesses for more love. Kearney mentioned “very
definite names, shapes, and actions at specific points in
time, the God of caritas
and kenosis who
heals specific cripples and tells specific parables, who comes
to life here and now and bring it more abundantly” (Kearney,
2001:74). Kearney contradicts himself when he opines that
“God’s sentinels” violated the beloved in the Song of Songs,
after she wandered into the streets in search of her lover. He
equated God with power there. (Kearney, 2001:75) Kearney thus
could have a psychological block due to indoctrination about
non-existent extreme ulterior singularity of good. Although he
accepts a “God” of history in plural (“names, shapes and
actions”) form, he is stuck on a “God” of the future in
singular form. He therefore does not realize that Derrida had
plurality of good in mind. On the other hand, Kearney’s
philosophy can be interpreted to transpose this historical
view into the future, but with a living of “God” in tact. A
beneficial characteristic is more beneficial if multiplied in
human beings simultaneously and more beneficial when
identified in a single living human being, instead of a
narration. It could imply thus that Derrida’s atheism, was a
rejection of the singular nature of “God”. Alterity to Derrida
could have meant that, which should be rejected as false. It
further implies that Derrida’s God could be plurality of a
desired good (justice) universal characteristic. Plurality
meant here in the sense, of a characteristic, to be found in
more than “One”, in order to restore God’s power.
Kearney opines that his
“God” cannot be seen because the One cannot be trusted. The
One could deceive him and therefore God is impossible. One
cannot be alive and has to be read about hermeneutically.
Kearney’s God is a contradiction who is the possible
impossible. Kearney asks if deconstruction, which makes the
other, totally other, can distinguish between “messiahs and
monsters”, because if something is totally other, how can it
be identified. (Kearney, 2001:75-76) Here Kearney refers in
the plural to “messiahs” but he shares not Derrida’s
realization that singularity and weakness cannot be God. The
idea of singular “God”, is totally other for Derrida. It is
utterly unfathomable, after realizing the fallaciousness of
the functional belief, indoctrinated into many people since
childhood. Derrida’s experience, similar to Nietzsche’s, makes
a person subject of Caiaphas syndrome. Caiaphaci have not
realized truly that the singularity of “God” is a functional
deceit. They therefore reject people who have realized the
fallaciousness, partly because they have not the experience to
reject Abrahamic religions, like Nietzsche and Derrida did.
Their financial security causes inabilities to realize the
weakness of their own singularity.
“God neither is nor is
not but may be.”
(Kearney, 2001:80) This statement by Kearney indicates a
position he is thinking from. When he writes “may be” he
writes from a position of authority, who could allow God to
exist. If he used the words “might be” the meaning would have
been more general and not from a position of authority. His
definitions would then have been more acceptable and based
more on correspondence. The “may” could indicate that he
observes not sufficiently from an independent position to have
a more independent opinion.
Gen 1:27 reads: “So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he created
him; male and female he created them.” This verse is an
argument in favour of the plurality of God in forms of male
and female.
Mark 10:18 reads: ‘“Why
do you call me good?” Jesus answered. “No one is good—except
God alone.’ This verse points to Caiaphas syndrome because it
proves that Jesus said he was not God.
“This marks the
transition from tribal to cosmopolitan affiliation, so
celebrated by Paul, the opening up of a kingdom which includes
each human being as son or daughter of the returning God. No
longer mere offspring of archaic gods and ancestors, we are
now invited to become descendants of a future still to come,
strangers reborn as neighbors in the World, adopted children
of the deus adventurus—the
God of the Possible.” (Kearney, 2001:81)
“The possibility opened
up by the eschatological I-am-who-may-be promise a new
natality in a new time: rebirth into an advent so infinite it
is never final. That is why we are called by the posse not
only to struggle for justice so that the kingdom may come, but
also to give thanks that the kingdom has already come and
continues to come. From where? From out of the future into
every moment, from beyond time, against time, into time—the
Word becoming flesh forever, sans fin, without end. That is why, as in
Blanchot’s story, if ever we meet the Messiah we will ask him,
“When will you come?”” (Kearney, 2001:82) Kearney rejects here
the idea of the “Messiah”, but he nevertheless keeps on
hammering on it, without saying outright that singularity of
God is false. He also did not understand what Derrida meant by
writing that the singularity of God is totally other in an
atheistic sense. It implies that he has not acknowledged the
concept of the singularity of God, for what it really is. That
is a functional deceit, which limits creativities. Maybe he
knows that but he does not write it. The “kingdom of God”
won’t be with us before that knowledge is common knowledge.
Kearney quotes Aquinas
to support his argument against Aquinas, that possibility
should be prioritized when God is thought of. Aquinas wrote:
‘“God is pure act without any potentiality whatsoever” (..
Summa Theologiae 1.3-4).’ (Kearney, 2001:83)
Kearney disputes the
Western tradition that God is rather esse than posse. He
argues that possibility precedes, existence, therefore
possibility should be regarded as “God”; posse should be
regarded more important than esse. His “God” implies thus a
continuous renewal of the ‘kingdom of God’, which has already
come and is coming continuously as justness increases.
(Kearney, 2001:84)
“Both our theoretical and
ethical consciousness, Husserl insists, are structured
according to the teleological possibility of an Idea which is
unconditioned and therefore surpasses any determined intuitive
fullness (or presence) we may presume to have.” (Kearney,
2001:85)
Husserl
confirms Kant’s view that “the highest goal of all human
endeavour is the ultimate Good”. Kant wrote about a ‘“possible
kingdom of ends”’. (Kearney, 2001:85) The kingdom never
arrives with finality it keeps on getting better. (Kearney,
2001:86) Just as the “kingdom of God”, gets better as time
goes on, so do our views of God get closer to reality. When
Jesus said in Mark 10:18 that he should not be called “good”
because only God can be “good”, he implied that more than one
just person is better than one just person. Jesus also implied
that singularity of God is nonsense. We are thus progressing
to a new high, similar to the high explained in Gen. 1:26,
where God was referred to with “us”. Kearney promotes the idea
that we were made in God’s image and although we were not made
exactly like God we do have the possibility of improving
ourselves to become like God. That is a group of people who
live together in peace and harmony with sufficient wealth to
allow a good living to all humans.
Sartre, in Being and Nothingness (1943)
described “the human desire to be God as our ultimate
teleological possibility”, whilst claiming it is “absurd, and
so utterly meaningless.” (Kearney, 2001:86). Did Sartre refer
to singularity? I looked quickly at the Conclusion of Being and Nothingness,
Kearney referred to in note 23 on page 86, but did not see any
references to singularity. “In-itself”, “For-itself” and
“being” was used a lot by Sartre there. It is a difficult book
and Sartre’s meaning, with regard to singularity and plurality
of a possible God cannot be identified in reasonable time for
this project.
Kearney refers to Ernst
Bloch’s, a new-Marxist dialectical thinker, “dialectical
notion of the possible”, who argues for improvement towards a
utopia (kingdom of ‘God’). Kearney also quotes Marx where Marx
wrote that there is ‘no real “rupture between past and future
but rather a realization of the projects of the past” (Marx in
a letter to Ruge, 1843).’ (Kearney, 2001:88) “In contrast to
Kant, Bloch sees possibility not as an a priori condition of
formal knowledge but as a precondition of historical
transformation. Utopian possibility is less a power-to-know
than a power-to-become-other than what is at present the
case.” (Kearney, 2001:90)
Bloch motivated the
concepts of ‘“being-according-to-the-possible”’ and
‘“being-in-the-possible”’ as the existents that change our
world for the better. (Kearney, 2001:89) Is this divine
possibility, that Kearney sketches? To be identified as partly
good theories, which describe not reality, but the
potentialities, that change reality into the ‘kingdom of
ends’? According to Popper’s philosophy the distinctions
between theories and theorizers are very relevant as well as
Kuhn’s sacrifices of theorizers and the effect on
competitiveness.
Kearney writes that a
“hermeneutics of utopia” can help to distinguish between good
and bad possibilities (theories, etc.). (Kearney, 2001:89)
In relation to
Heidegger’s “ontological notion of the possible” Kearney
refers to Heidegger’s statement in the introduction of Being and Time, that
for phenomenology ‘“possibility stands higher than
actuality”’. Heidegger also claims that the ‘“quiet power of
the possible”’ reveals itself as “Gift” from “Being ..
temporal-historical beings.” (Kearney, 2001:91)
Heidegger identified
“Being” directly related to loving possibility, which raises a
question regarding “God’s” relation to possibility. (Kearney,
2001:91-92)
Heidegger regards the
possibility of a time when all of philosophy is gathered into
a new beginning for thought. “The loving possible is for
Heidegger something that surpasses the understanding of both
metaphysics and logic. It is nothing less than the giving of
Being itself.” (Kearney, 2001:93)
According to Derrida’s
“deconstructive notion of the possible” we should not regard
possibility as a consequentialist pragmatist issue. We should
regard the ‘“perhaps”’ inclusive of the impossible to show our
reverence to God by acknowledging each, our own human
inability to predict the future with certainty. (Kearney,
2001:94)
For Derrida: “For and
event to be possible it must be both possible (of course) but
also impossible (in the sense of an interruption by something
singular and exceptional into the regime of pre-existing
possibles-powers-potencies). The event happens not just
because it is possible, qua ontological acting-out of some
inherent dunamis or potential, but also because something
impossible—hitherto unanticipated and unplanned—comes to
pass.” Basically Derrida means that we can use the word
“possible” with certainty but the word “impossible” is not
always true because we can never fathom all that is possible,
in order to realize all “impossibilities” of thought.
(Kearney, 2001:96)
According to Kearney,
Derrida regarded “impossible” as “im-possible”. It is
realizations about our own impossibilities that bring forth
more rational possibilities. The posse or “possible God” grows
out of realizations about own impossibilities. Derrida writes
the “in-of the
im-possible relates to “filiality” and the “origin of faith”.
(Kearney, 2001:96-97)
Derrida was “a
self-confessed atheist”. (Kearney, 2001:98)
Kearney’s eschatological
belief in the possibility of a singular human “God” was
confirmed to me by his statement: “Derrida, in short, is more
concerned with the everyday (every moment) incoming of events
than in the truth or otherwise of some divine advent. The
other that leaps toward us from this incoming moment may be a
“monster slouching towards Bethlehem to be born” or a lamb who
lays down its life for love of mankind. There is no way of
knowing.” (Kearney, 2001:13) A related view to Kearney’s based
on plurality of God and onto-theology might use the words
God-who-might-be, to build on Kearney’s work.
Kearney’s
“eschatological notion of the possible” doubts Husserl’s
elusive notion of “God”’ because Husserl’s Idea could “slip
back into some kind of rationalist or idealist theodicy where
the possible is predetermined from the outset.” (Kearney,
2001:99)
The onto-theological
identification, which prioritizes actuality of God over
possibility of “God”, should be reconsidered in order to
rather prioritize possibility over actuality. (Kearney,
2001:100) This view of Kearney could open new views to new
definitions for God.
“How do we describe the
infinite May-be? What metaphors or figures, what images or
intimations from our religious or philosophical heritages
might we deploy to speak of this unspeakable enigma?” Kearney
is looking for these words “in light of the paradigm of
God-play.” Aristotle’s “dunamis”
has mostly been interpreted to be “subordinate” to actuality
and Aristotle’s philosophy influenced onto-theology much.
(Kearney, 2001:101)
“Creatures need a
Creator and a Creator needs creatures.
Certain Christian and
Arab commentators, in particular Averroës, went so far as to
suggest that the human mind can, through ongoing contemplation
of truth, enter a sort of intimate mystical communion with the
divine nous poetikos.
So doing, we may eventually approximate to a condition of
beatific and blissful transfiguration, becoming more and more
like the divine Maker in whose image we are made. So fearful
was Thomas Aquinas of the powerful influence such teaching was
having on the Christian West that he made a point of
vehemently denouncing Averroës as a “depravor of philsophy””.
(Kearney, 2001:102)
Kearney speculates
about how nous poetikos
(God’s intellect) should be understood. Is it possible that
Averroës referred to a “creative-productive power of the nous poetikos as a
goal rather than a cause”? (Kearney, 2001:103)
According to Cusanus,
similar to Hegel and Leibniz, theodicies are necessary. “God”
is “Him”, the “Creator”, the “possest” who makes good and evil
work together. This is a “lapse into mystical pantheism”.
(Kearney, 2001:104). We should co-create according to Kearney.
We should realize our weakness of singularity, in order to
know God, “possibilizing” our good lives. (Kearney, 2001:108)
This means to me we should realize our weakness in order to
realize our dependence on own creativities. Creativities
through which powers are produced, greater than our own
individual powers, should be made our own, by overcoming
theodical beliefs.
The kingdom of God is a
metaphor only. There is no real king or emperor ever again and
each of us should be a king in his own home, living in the
small weak kingdoms of close proximity. By working together
the weak kingdoms can however create products to consume.
(Kearney, 2001:108-109) And weapons of defence that will cause
the fear of true revenging theodicy and the eschaton of the
others, who deserves to meet their eschaton. The others will
however join the kingdoms of close proximity, to form the
Kingdom, because they will realize that is all they can do.
There will be peace, once again. (Kearney, 2001:110)
‘—if we help God to
become God. How? By opening ourselves to the “loving
possible,” by acting each moment to make the impossible that
bit more possible.’ (Kearney, 2001:111)
[1] “Jonas; H.
1996. The Concept of God after Auschwitz: A Jewish Voice.
In: Mortality and
Morality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz,
p.134, edited by Lawrence Vogel. Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press.” (Kearney, 2001: 113,165)