Notes about Plato's works.
Reader: Mr. MD Pienaar
PMC – Paper, MD Pienaar, comments for M.Phil.
PPMC – Postscript, Paper, MD Pienaar, comments for M.Phil.
PJCQ – Paper quotation of Jowett for M.Phil.
PJCP – Paper paraphrase of Jowett for M.Phil.
PJQ – Quotations from Jowett's translation of Plato's works for M.Phil paper.
20 March 2014
PJCQ: "Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. … The apology of Plato is not the report of what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy that the actual defense of Socrates was as much greater than the Platonic defense as the master was greater than the disciple."
PJCP: Schleiermacher opined that Plato's reflection in Apology was a nominalist production about the actual events because Plato would not have changed reality.
Karl Barth was in
opposition to Schleiermacher's theological enterprise,
Shleiermacher was called ' "Father
of Modern Liberal Theology" '.
Schleiermacher had a big influence on hermeneutics, which
attempt to find the intentions of authors.
This could mean that Schleiermacher's opinion about Plato's
intent was specialised knowledge.
21 March 2014
PJQ: Socrates: "I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying."
PMC (23 March 2014): The effect of the words of Chaerephon had an immense impact on Socrates. The level of impact could mean there was something that made Socrates prone to misleading. Maybe his opinion of his self, whether that was too high or too low, i do not know. Socrates states that Chaerephon was an early friend of him. Was Socrates correct with regards to the friendship? Was Chaerephon not perhaps an enemy who used functionalist language to tempt Socrates into thinking he is The best, without realizing that 'best' exists not, rationally. Socrates's definition of 'God' is relevant. Probably the word 'God' is not the correct translation in my understanding of 'God' because 'God' for Socrates refers to words of an oracle and Chaerephon. 'God' here, however refers not to my definition because it was Socrates who spoke. I don't know what Socrates's definition of The absolute was. It seems he regarded himself part of The absolute because he tried to refute 'God' by speaking to too many 'wise' people, in order to show to himself that he is not wise, according to his own belief, and to then just realise according to himself that he is wiser than them, and after all, maybe the oracle was correct. Socrates however stayed steadfast in his belief that he is not the greatest if i see the realities through Plato's books. It seems true that Socrates disrespected 'God' in Athenian terms of the time, because in The laws, writ later than Socrates's sentence, impiety, the charge against Socrates, is against the law. If the Greek word for 'God', Socrates used, was the word, which could imply impiety, Socrates could have been a scapegoat, which implies Caiaphas syndromes. I am not sure whether, impiety, was a writ offense at the time of the trial. In The republic according to Saunders Plato still thought that Statesman should be above the law and therefore, impiety, the offense, could have entered the legal system via common law judgements. New common law judgements, which introduce new offenses to a leagl system, should however according to me today, first be written down and advertised. The common law system, which implies functionalist use of scapegoats should be changed. In The laws Plato included impiety as a writ offense. According to Socrates's defence, impiety had not a fixed understanding. The non-generalisable word 'impiety' also shows in Euthyphro, where Socrates enquires from Euthyphro to explain what piety is.
PMC: The emphasis on Socrates's request above, if Jowett's translation is nominalist, not to be interrupted, could imply that Plato, very cleverly, wanted his dialogue to look like a nominalist production, or it could imply that Plato's dialogue was a nominalist production of the actual events. Socrates contradicts himself here because if he refers to God who said he is the wisest man how can he then say that he is not wise. That does not make sense. The English translation at 21a of Perseus Digital Library also has the request of Socrates to not interrupt, but it is not between emphasis marks. There are emphases marks in the Greek version of the Perseus Digital Library, similar to Jowett's translation quoted.
PPMC: It is not possible to generalize about the dialogues because parts of the dialogues could be nominalist truths and part could be ambivalent realism. The thought came up that Socrates's progress was to realize again the human part of God in his community. It was however an alien thought because the populace was indoctrinated into believing that God is pantheistic One, with corresponding Caiaphas syndrome. Caiaphas did not completely overcome the ideas about One human but he did better than the group of the populace, with their Caiaphas syndromes, who therefore sacrificed Socrates.
Socrates: "But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court!"
14 June 2014
"Plato is always concerned to advocate views that will make people what he thinks virtuous; he is hardly ever intellectually honest, because he allows himself to judge doctrines by their social consequences. Even about this, he is not honest; he pretends to follow the argument and to be judging by purely theoretical standards, when in fact he is twisting the discussion so as to lead to a virtuous result. He introduced this vice into philosophy, where it has persisted ever since." (Russel, 2004:84).
"Let us begin with Xenophon, a military man, not very liberally endowed with brains, and on the whole conventional in his outlook. Xenophon is pained that Socrates should have been accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth; he contends that, on the contrary, Socrates was eminently pious and had a thoroughly wholesome effect on those who came under his influence. His ideas, it appears, so far from being subversive, were rather dull and commonplace. This defence goes to far, since it leaves the hostility to Socrates unexplained." (Russel, 2004:89).
"There has been a tendency to think that everything Xenophon says must be true, because he had not the wits to think of anything untrue. This is a very invalid line of argument. A stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something that he can understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemy among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy." (Russel, 2004:90).
"Nevertheless, some of Xenophon's reminiscences are very convincing. He tells (as Plato also does) how Socrates was continually occupied with the problem of getting competent men into positions of power. He would ask such questions as: 'If I wanted a shoe mended, whom should I employ?' To which some ingenuous youth would answer: 'A shoemaker, O Socrates.' He would go on to carpenters, coppersmiths, etc., and finally ask some such question as 'who should mend the Ship of State?' When he fell into conflict with the Thirty Tyrants, Critias, their chief, who knew his ways from having studied under him, forbade him to continue teaching the young, and added: 'You had better be done with shoemakers, carpenters and coppersmiths. These must be pretty well trodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have given them' (Xenophon, Memorabilia, Bk. I, chap. ii)." (Russel, 2004:90).
"With Plato's account of
Socrates, the difficulty is quite a different one from what it
is in the case of Xenophon, namely, that it is very hard to
judge how far Plato means to portray the historical Socrates,
and how far he intends the person called 'Socrates' in his
dialogues to be merely the mouthpiece of his own opinions.
Plato, in addition to being a philosopher, is an imaginative
writer of great genius and charm. No one suppposes, and he
himself does not seriously pretend, that the conversations in
his dialogue took place just as he records them." (Russel, 2004:90).
Russell wrote with regard to Plato's dialogue, Apology: "He [Socrates], however, proposed a fine of thirty minae, for which some of his friends (including Plato) were willing to go surety." (Russel, 2004:90). "After the verdict, and the rejection of the alternative penalty of thirty minae (in connection with which Socrates names Plato as one among his sureties, and present in court), he makes one final speech." (Russel, 2004:94).
In Apology at 33 to 34 Socrates talks about Plato, being present at the trial. From this part of the dialogue much might be learnt about who was Socrates's real friends and real enemies (Plato, 2013:634). Was the alternative sentence, of 30 minae, Socrates suggested a sarcastic reference to "the Thirty" tyrants. The "Thirty" included Aristotle. Today i think that perhaps the younger generation, under te influence of Critias, Plato's uncle, influenced, for Socrates's trial.
20 March 2014
PMC: Socrates opined that quarrels exist partly as a result of the inability to refer to nominalist reality for example the weighing or measuring of something. Due to the unavailibility of nominalist realities, differences of opinion occur with resulting quarrels amongst "gods" and also amongst others. (Euthyphro, 8). Jowett referred to "Cf. Alcibiades"
Socrates: "For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? … But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike;" (Euthyphro, 8).
Socrates: "The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods." (Euthyphro, 10).
Socrates distinguished between "God" and "gods" because he said "holy" is an independent concept from "gods". "Holy" relates more to "God" than to "gods" because "holy" exists not because that holy is "loved" by "gods". The state of being "pious" is therefore according to Socrates independent of what interpreters of "gods" think. (Euthyphro, 10). In the dialogue with Euthyphro up to 10, there was not a clear distinction made between "gods" of Socrates and "gods" of Euthyphro. There was however common referring to Zeus, Cronos and Uranus. Zeus killed his father Cronos and Cronos killed his father Uranus because the fathers devoured their sons.
Socrates: "but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him," (Euthyphro, 11).
PJCQ: "That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy." 
"It may be observed however that Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not "the world", but the "one wise man," is still the paradox of Socrates in his last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may be fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the many can do neither good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moral evil; in his own words, "they cannot make a man wise or foolish." "
PMC: Referring to Socrates' students, including Critias, Plato's uncle, who was one of the thirty tyrants, implies that Socrates' teachings could have been regarded in a Machiavellian sense, with reference to Socrates statement in The republic that the leaders should lie for the good of The state. Those lies probably partly caused the takeover by democracy over oligarchy. Socrates could have been therefore as well regarded as an enemy of democracy, although Jowett states that Socrates was neutral during the time of flux between the oligarchy and democracy. In Euthyphro at 2, "King" Archon's porch is mentioned where Socrates awaited his trial. The democracy included therefore a king of Athens, which could have caused Caiaphas syndrome, because Socrates's reasoning during his trial implied he is wiser than the king. In Statesman the idea of the philosopher king is mentioned. Jowett refers to reason as feminine, which could imply that he espoused rationalism but that he did not regard himself as rational. The circumstances around honesties and mania is referred to by "refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest". Caiaphas syndrome, which was present at Socrates's hearing is mentioned by " "one wise man" " and "many can do neither good nor evil".
PMC after reading the dialogue: Crito suggests that Socrates escape to Thessaly where Crito has friends. Thessaly was mentioned in Apology as a place where laws are not dominant. Socrates however decides to place the Law above himself and to die although he agrees not with his sentence. Socrates thus in effect substantiates te idea that Laws are the most important concept in the city. There are many similarities between Socrates's views and Jesus of Nazareth's view because Jesus defined love as the compliance with Laws and prophecies. Socrates also believed that evil should not follow others' evil deeds, which is similar to Jesus's statement that they should not oppose there offenders who represented the city Jerusalem. The logic in it is that there is no use in opposing because of the power of plurality. Socrates decided not to choose exile in Apology, also because of the power of plurality because he knew that it will be the same problem in other territories.
22 March 2014
I read the first pages of the commentary of Phaedo until I realised that it relates too much to ambivalent realism. I also read the last part of the dialogue where Socrates drank the poison. Discussions about the soul and body and other metaphysical matters we cannot vouch with nominalist truth for this study. Jowett wrote that Plato was not present during the dialogue, which implies that the work is a literary work produced by Plato and had not a bureaucratic purpose, which normally excludes hearsay. It also implies that Plato was not a real friend of Socrates who was not there at Socrates's end. The mention of Plato by Socrates, as present, during Apology, did not show friendliness. My doubts about the intentions of Plato thus still exist. Did Plato's works contribute to Socrates's sentencing, is still my question. If so was it necessary, that is Socrates's sentence? Socrates's sentence is in today's context not right because of freedom of speech. If honesties was a law in their time Socrates's statement in The republic that leaders could lie to 'enemies' of the state would have been a transgression. In Apology it was stated that part of the populace was in exile and therefore the 'leaders' could have regarded some of the citizens of Athens as enemies of The state. It was those 'enemies', who sentenced Socrates after their return from exile if I understood Apology right. Although Socrates was neutral during the oligarchic and democratic strive, my understanding today is that he sided with the oligarchic leaders (Plato's family) and partly therefore he was sentenced. Plato's role is still a mystery.
23 March 2014
At the start of The laws (627a-628a) the Athenian, who represents Plato's thought according to, the translator, Trevor J. Saunders, posits that an important function of law is to protect good minorities against evil majorities.
25 March 2014
"CHILDREN ARE EASILY PERSUADED"
"ATHENIAN: But just suppose that the truth had been different from what the argument has now shown it to be, and that a lawgiver, even a mediocre one, had been sufficiently bold, in the interests of the young, to tell them a lie. Could he have told a more usefull lie than this, or one more effective in making everyone practise justice in everything they do, willingly and without pressure?
CLEINIAS: Truth is a fine thing, sir, and it is sure to prevail, but to persuade men of it certainly seems no easy task." (663e)
From this quote it seems Plato was a functionalist realist, arguing for white lies to influence people in the direction of his idea of good. It also seems that "truth" was not nominalist truths for Plato because nominalist truths cannot be 'supposed to be different from what an argument showed'. Nominalist truths in my understanding is plain to see. Nominalist truths relates not to concepts, but only to material (extended matter) things, which are described with words, which are commonly understood. The nominalist truths values of words, which could be included in a dictionary for example relates.
The preceding rubric was "JUSTICE AND HAPPINESS GOES TOGETHER" (660e-663d). Saunders opined that the Athenian promotes the idea that happiness and goodness goes together. My understanding of the section was that Plato meant that goodness cause eventual happiness and it should be taught to children. Plato did not mean that if a person is happy it means he did good, because short lived happiness can be deceiving. Plato had an eternal happiness in mind, which relates to old age and the after life. This eternal happiness is a result of living well and moderately in a beneficial manner to society as a whole.
In the next section called "THE THREE CORUSES" the Athenian (Plato) opines that if children are told that the good life causes happiness it is the "plain" truth, which are told (664c).
This statement by the Athenian makes Plato look like a nominalist, who regards happiness in a stoic way.
664d-665a could explain partly where Nietzsche got his appreciation for Dionysus and Apollo from. Plato divides a good play between three parts. A first chorus who praises the Muses, a second praises Apollo and a third Dionysus. The Muses are for children, Apollo for middle aged people and Dionysus for the old "good" people of Plato.
At 667e Athenian opines that abstract art should not relate to "usefulness or truth, or accuracy of representation". Abstract art gives pleasure according to Plato. "Truth" is used in a nominalist sense here by Plato because truths are the opposite of abstract art.
This opinion could relate to the earlier espousing of Egyptian laws by Athenian relating to art and Old Testament laws about makings of "gelykenisse".
Athenian opines that realistic (imitative) art should be
judged on nothing but accuracy. Pleasure and pain has no part
in appreciating imitative arts. This opinion is in favour of
At 668a-668b Athenian opines that music should be only an imitative art in the sense of representing the beautiful. If music is used for enjoyment it should be illegal. Did he mean that music for enjoyment is only meant for old Dionysian people? "These people, then, who are anxious to take part in the finest possible singing, should, apparently, look not for a music which is sweet, but one which is correct; and correctness, as we said, lies in the imitation and successful reproduction of the proportions and characteristics of the model." (668b)  Saunders opines that "These people" are the old people who take part in the Dionysian chorus. I disagree because Athenian earlier said old people are not eager to sing and take part in plays. It is thus more likely a reference to the young and beautiful who sings the second chorus of Apollo. At 665d Plato describes the Dionysian chorus with "the noblest and most useful songs", which is it seems not the "finest possible singing" of the Apollonian chorus mentioned at 668b.
At 668e Athenian refers to the characters represented in a play with "creatures".
26 March 2014
"LIFE AFTER THE FLOOD"
At 679c the Athenian said: "So these men were good, partly for that very reason, partly because of what we might call their 'naïveté'. When they heard things labelled 'good' or 'bad', they were so artless as to think it a statement of the literal truth and believe it. This lack of sophistication precluded the cynicism you find today: they accepted as the truth the doctrine they heard about gods and men, and lived their lives in accordance with it."
This statement by Plato was contradicting at first contemplation because first the Athenian says "men were good" and then he said those corporeal theon's acceptances, that statements about differences between "good" and "bad" are true, were wrong. The Athenian however refers explicitly to "literal truth" and therefore makes a clear distinction between nominalist truths and ambivalent realist "One" truïsm, which made Plato more of a nominalist than an ambivalent realist. Amibivalent realism makes not the distinction between different truths, because, for ambivalent realists the "cosmos as cosmos" is a datum. The "cosmos as cosmos", an inspiring belief, cannot be a datum, but we can get better understandings of the parts in the cosmos, which give better understandings about the cosmos. In The republic at 534a Socrates distinguished between correspondences ("opinion") and belief (faith, "pure knowledge") of an individual. Correspondences (honest uses of words) can be compared with "literal truth". Beliefs, faiths and "pure knowledge", which are truer than correspondences brought correspondences (literal truths) closer to actualities due to increased levels of honesties. Beliefs make ones honest and cause loving corresponding language uses, which bring opinions closer to reality and cause true realism. The identification by Plato of "literal truth" implies he was closer to nominalism and true realism than to ambivalent realism, because of different truths (objective correspondences and subjective coherencies) he acknowledges, which contribute to societal coherence, the first priority. According to Kant this first priority, implied by Popper to be the first principle of science, can be accomplished, if enough people build there subjective coherencies with components made of correspondences (literal truths). Figurative truths also has a role but figurative truths can only be understood after corresponding truths are known. Figurative "good" and "evil" are well understood after literal "gods", "goddesses" and "devils" are understood.
Whilst reading 682,
a realization about necessities of creativities and progress
were enforced because Noah, a creator of new shipbuilding
technology survived the great flood and after the flood, the
technology they had, managed before the flood, enhanced their
position on Earth. The circumstances imply that nature and
creativities work together to assure progress of creating
groups. Colonizations and effective defence confirm this.
"THE DORIAN LEAGUE"
At 682e-683a the Athenian says: "As if God himself were guiding us, we've come back to the very point from which we digressed: the actual foundation of Sparta." The Athenian also recalled that Sparta's and Crete's laws, which were established "on the right lines" had a family resemblance. Crito arranged Socrates escape from jail in order to flee to Crete. There's also resemblance between Crito's name and Crete's name.
"WHY DID THE LEAGUE FAIL"
"ATHENIAN: So what kind of ignorance would deserve the title 'crass'? See if you agree with my description. I suggest this kind.
ATHENIAN: The kind involved when a man thinks something is fine and good, but loathes it instead of liking it, and conversely when he likes and welcomes what he believes is wicked and unjust. I maintain that this disaccord between his feelings of pleasure and pain and his rational judgement constitutes the very lowest depth of ignorance."
This has to do with Caiaphas syndrome.
27 March 2014
The Athenian and Clenias (from Crete) refers to "God". See 688e and 692b. Cleinias for example says at 688e. "And so we shall, God willing." They did not define what they mean by the word "God". Their meanings could be either functionalist uses in the sense of accusative (accusing another that they think they are "God" or "God" are references to A force separate of their circumstances that influence them. Another possibility is also functionalist, that, they think not they each are "God", after being accused that they think they are "God" and accusing that others think they are "God". I recall not that Megillus (from Sparta) have used the word "God". Such uses of the word "God" can be grouped into meaning that their "God" was completely separate of them, not themselves. A functionalist accusation that another, mistakenly thinks he is "God" could imply two things. First that the accuser thinks he is in a sense "God" or, that, "God" is completely separate of all people (the Athenian, Megillus and Cleinias) taking part in the discussion or separate of all people in the world. Using the accusative functionalist form "God", could imply Caiaphas syndrome at the accuser. Maybe the users of the word "God" included themselves as parts of "God" without using "God" in an accusative sense.
The uncertainty of the meanings shows the importance of Vollenhoven's thesis that works should have pre-theses. Such pre-theses logically could be definitions for important words. Popper did not believe in defining his words, which is strange if ones consider that correspondences were important to him. That is a difference between Popper and i. Sometimes i also feel like Popper, but if clarity and higher levels of correspondence is an aim, Vollenhoven's idea of a pre-theses could be used to aim more accurately at correspondences. Obviously there is a limit to how many definitions can be given in pre-theses.
"THE PERSIAN MONARCHY"
"ATHENIAN: Then let's listen to the story. Under Cyrus, the life of the Persians was a judicious blend of liberty and subjection, and after gaining their own freedom they became the masters of a great number of other people. As rulers, they granted a degree of liberty to their subjects and put them on the same footing as themselves, with the result that soldiers felt more affection for their commanders and displayed greater zeal in the face of danger. The king felt no jealousy if any of his subjects was intelligent and had some advice to offer; on the contrary, he allowed free speech and valued those who could contribute to the formulation of policy; a sensible man could use his influence to help the common cause. Thanks to freedom, friendship and the practice of pooling their ideas, during that period the Persians made progress all along the line."
"ATHENIAN: But surely, in the absence of self control, justice will never spring up.
MEGILLUS: Of course not.
"ATHENIAN: So let's have done with the Persians. Our conclusion is that the empire is badly run at the moment because the people are kept in undue subjection and the rulers excessively authoritarian."
1 April 2014
The Athenian promotes aiming for the whole of virtue in stead of aiming only for a part (705d, 631a). The rationality of Plato here can be seen by him positing an aiming in stead of an attaining. Attaining the whole is not a possible state of being but is rather a state of aiming in order to always improve ones' selves.
2 April 2014
"THE NEED FOR A BENEVOLENT DICTATOR"
"That the all-controlling agent in human affairs is God" (709b) and "God will have done nearly all that he usually does when he wants to treat a state with particular favour" when the state has a single benevolent dictator who understands how laws give right order. More than one leader is not as good as a state with one leader because "difficulties are in direct proportion to the numbers."(710d).
Plato prefers one benevolent leader but like before I think he was writing about colonies, which were not independent. Plato's one leader is the point of contact of a colony with the people like himself who forms colonies. In the Statesman the same view of Plato came out.
At 711a the Athenian says the reason a single benevolent leader institutes the best government and an oligarchy the least best is because a single benevolent leader can allow the "rapid and trouble-free transition", which is needed when progress is required. At 711c the Athenian refers to a requirement of changing and developing laws. At 711e the Athenian says "Nestor" who lived during Trojan times was such a leader of "moderation" and "self-restraint". The Athenian stated clearly that he thinks such leaders are rare. Popper's view thus that Plato limited change for the good is refuted here in The laws.
From 713a to 714b the Athenian refers to "the god" of a state as an incorporeal being. Cronus appointed superior beings ("spirits") the Athenian contrasted with mortals, to rule over humans, like humans rule over domesticated animals.
3 April 2014
"LAW SHOULD BE SUPREME"
From 714b to 715d the Athenian promotes a state which has Laws above all people. His reason is that when supreme force of revolutions, Pindar posited, the origins of ruling authorities, too much flux is relevant, which disadvantages parts of a state. The Laws should be written to benefit all of a state. At 711c the Athenian talked about the importance of changing Laws in order to adjust to new circumstances.
The Athenian prefers one
ruler in the service of "a god" ("spirit") of that state. The
Athenian's view implies that one ruler should have control
over Laws. This posited one ruler should be in service of "a
god", which is a "spirit". The spirits of states were
originally during Cronus's time appointed by Cronus. Cronus
was not supreme during Plato's writing because he used the
word "God" in his translated work. The Athenian (who
represents Plato's thought)
compared Cronus with "God", but up to here "God" has not been
defined. The closest Plato has come to defining "God" is by
comparing God with Cronus
It seems thus that due to the singularity of Plato's "God",
Plato could have regarded himself to be his "God". Based on Phaedrus and The laws, up to
here, and other works of Plato read to date Plato's "God" was
in the spirit world, where his spirit will go after his death.
25-26 April 2020: From the Trevor J. Saunders (Penguin) translation 716a:
"ADDRESS TO THE NEW COLONISTS
ATHENIAN: Now then, our address should go like this: 'Men, according to the ancient story, there is a god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and middle of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature. Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side. The man who means to live in happiness latches onto her and follows her with meekness and humility. But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honours or by physical beauty when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others - there's a man whom God has deserted. And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos. Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin. Thus it is ordained. What action, then, should a sensible man take, and what should his outlook be? What must he avoid doing or thinking?'
CLEINIAS: This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those who follow in the company of God.
ATHENIAN: 'So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his wishes? There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying "like approves of like" (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due proportion). In our view it is God who is pre-eminently the "measure of all things", much more so than any "man", as they say. (Note22)"
(Note 22: Page 512: ""measure of all things"..."man", as they say: Protagoras, a philosopher of the fifth century BC, maintained that 'man is the measure of all things'.")
ATHENIAN (continued): So if you want to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate man is God's friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning applies to the other vices to. 'Let's be clear that the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines the finest and truest): If a good man sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in his prayers and offerings and every kind of worship he can give them, this will be the best and noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is his most effective way of achieving a happy life. But if the wicked man does it, the results are bound to be just the opposite... The first weapon in our armoury will be to honour the gods of the underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron gods of the state". The Athenian (Plato) continues explaining after the underworld, spirits, forefather etc and parents must be worshipped and respected.
This section explains Plato's definition for God. Socrates's definition was different. Socrates regarded God more in the sense of "the dog" in whose "name" he swore, which relates to good ideas, development, ostracism and vagrancy.
At 716c the Athenian says: 'God who is pre-eminently the "measure of all things", much more so than any "man", as they say.'
Plato seems to emphasise singularity of 'any "man" ', which could imply Caiaphas syndrome. My feeling is that Protagoras's " 'man ..' " was meant in the plural. My current conception of God that give courage to be honest, could be similar to Protagoras' plural " 'man ..' ", plus logos
"The first weapon in our armoury will be to honour the gods of the underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron gods of the state; the former should be alotted such secondary honours as the Even and the Left, while the latter should receive superior and contrasting honours like the Odd. That's the best way a man can hit his target, piety. After these gods, a sensible man will worship the spirits, and after them the heroes."
7 April 2014
"ATHENIAN: … But when, as with us now, God has given a group of people anew state to found, in which so far there is no mutual malice – well, to stir up ill-will towards each other because of the way they distribute the land and houses would be so criminally stupid that no man could bring himself to do it.… It doesn't matter whether he's founding a new state from scratch or reconstructing an old one that has gone to ruin: in either case, if he has any sense, he will never dream of altering whatever instructions may have been received from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon about the gods and temples that ought to be founded by the various groups in the state, and the gods or the spirits after whom the temples should be named."
8 April 2014
"ATHENIAN: … well, do you think there's any legislator so stupid as not to realize that his code has many inevitable deficiencies which must be put right by a successor, if the state he's founded is to enjoy a continuous improvement in its administrative arrangements, rather than suffer a decline." At 772b-772d the Athenian says that the laws should be adjusted over a period of ten years until strictly correct. After that the laws can only be changed by unanimous decision amongst "all the officials, the entire citizen body and all the oracles of the gods."
At 770d-771a the Athenian says that "Our aim in life should be goodness and the spiritual virtue appropritae to mankind." He also talked about censuring laws, which do not help us and about being law-abiding citizens.
13 April 2014
At 797d the Athenian says change is "extremely dangerous", except if "the change affects something evil". At 798c-798d the Athenian says "the biggest evil that can affect a state" takes place when the laws are changed for "praising and censuring" the "moral character" of citizens.
"MEGILLUS: What on earth are we to do, Cleinias? Are we going to let our visitor run down Sparta for us like this?
CLEINIAS: Yes, we are. We told him he could be frank, and we must give him his head until we've properly worked through every section of our legal code."
At 812d-813a the Athenian gives his opinion about what is not good music. For example the lyre may not be used to play an "independent melody" and short intervals may not be combined with large, high notes with low, and quick with slow tempos. Cleinias then says: "Here again you've spoken the truth -" and the Athenian replies: "- the whole truth and nothing but the truth! So these are the regulations the person appointed as our Director of Music must adopt and enforce: let's wish him the best of luck in his task."
From 667a to 668b a discussion about music takes place. Opinions by the Athenian are described by Cleinias as "emphatically true" and "Very true".
It starts to look now as if Plato regarded his opinions as 'the truth' and therefore he was an adherent to a type of ambivalent realism, but, it is not clear yet if his opinions were based at his old age on nominalist truths through out his life. If Plato was a deceiver it would mean according to Kant that Plato had not built the necessary correspondences with nature, in his mind, to have had, at old age, good judgement.
At 817a-817b the Athenian regards himself, Cleinias and Megillus "tragedians". It seems thus that Plato's character sided with observers, the types who copy tragedies. It does not contradict his writings of Socrates's philosophy and death. Plato regularly refers to impiety and at 799b he describes a situation that can be compared to Socrates's sentences, with regard to theon, as wrong, and his consequential sentence as right. I have however read a commentary in which the commentator wrote that Plato felt that Socrates's sentence was not fair.
At 818b-818c the Athenian regards "at least some practical and theoretical knowledge" and "synthesis" necessary for education.
"ATHENIAN: … Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught." This statement by Plato could mean that Plato had a similar opinion than Kant. That correspondences will lead to coherence at old age, even if a person is completely ignorant of a field of knowledge. It is therefore, according to Plato, it seems now, not vast studies, which cause coherent views of the world but something else. That something else could be correspondences, which would make Plato more of a nominalist than an ambivalent realist. The ambivalent realism i referred to earlier should perhaps have been bivalent realism, because what i meant was that the truth of his opinions about music can not be determined readily therefor the word "bivalent". Bivalent realism refers in my mind now to true realism, which must be tempered by universal laws against, for example, murdering and deceiving. Ambivalent realism is the type i oppose. Trivalent realism is something better than bivalent realism. Recall the descriptions in the philosophy dictionaries about bivalence.
At 819e-820e the Athenian uses arguments about commensurability and incommensurability, which supports my epistemology that the only stable background for trivalent realism are corresponding truths with nature. "Corresponding" is descriptive of a state between nature and words, which we can agree upon without too much theoretical content included in presuppositions. The only presupposition should be "correspondence per se". Instruments should be allowed too measure correspondence but only if agreed upon. The most accurate measure to judge "correspondence" is honery testing.
At 823e a negative opinion is raised against fishing and killing birds but it is allowed in Plato's laws at 824a.
13 April 2014
Whilst discussing sexual matters the Athenian said the following. "But now for something which is not a triviality at all. It's a point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God himself is really the only person to do it – supposing, that is, we could in fact somehow get explicit instructions from him. Since that's impossible, it looks as if we need some intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens, give a firm 'no' to our most compelling passions, and order his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole organization of the state. There will be no one to back him up. He'll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him. … (there's no one listening, so let's be frank)"
"HOW TO DISCOURAGE UNNATURAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE"
16 April 2014
From 895c-897b Plato elaborates on the belief that "soul" was prior to all other things, including materials.
From 897b-899d Plato elaborates on the belief that "reason" orders heavenly bodies. The Athenian says that we ought to say that "reason" "is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path." On this philosophical realist statement Cleinias answered only "True" and the Athenian then answered that if the heavenly bodies moves not in predictable order we ought to say that "the evil kind of soul is in charge of them." Elsewhere in the book it was explained that the word "planets" referred to the evil souls' moving powers because "planets" in Greek literally means "wanderers".
"ATHENIAN: … Everyone should think of adulteration as essentially the same sort of thing as lying and deceit – which in fact people commonly describe as quite respectable. But they are wrong to defend this sort conduct as 'frequently justified, on appropriate occasions', because what they mean by the 'appropriate' place and occasion they leave vague and indefinite and their dictum does nothing but harm both to themselves and to others. Now a legislator cannot afford to leave this vague: he must always lay down precise limits, however wide or narrow they may be. So let's define some limits now: a man must tell no lie, commit no deceit, and do no fraud in word or deed when he calls upon the gods, unless he wants to be thoroughly loathed by them – as anyone is who snaps his fingers at them and swears false oaths, or (though they find this less offensive) tells lies in the presence of his superior."
At 937c the death penalty is proposed against witnesses who commit perjury three times.
"ATHENIAN: … Rhadamanthus should be admired for the way in which, according to report, he decided the suits that came before him. He realized that his contemporaries were absolutely convinced of the existence of gods – and not surprisingly, as most people alive then were actually descended from them, and this is traditionally true of Rhadamanthus himself. I suppose it was because he thought that no mere man should be given the task of judging, but only gods, that he managed to make his judgements so swift and straightforward. What ever the subject of dispute, he let the litigants take an oath, a device which enabled him to get through his list of cases rapidly and without making mistakes. Nowadays, however, some people (as we remarked) don't believe in gods at all, while others believe they are not concerned about mankind; and there are others – the worst and most numerous category – who hold that in return for a miserable sacrifice here and a little flattery there, the gods will help them to steal enormous sums of money and rescue them from all sorts of heavy penalties."
After reading The laws i thought that Plato believed that "gods" and "goddesses" grouped together by him as "theon", were living corporeal honest human beings as well as the heavenly bodies, which had orderly movements, which's movements could be predicted with accuracy. Plato referred often to gods and children of gods. Inferences could be made between the things Jesus did and said and the things Plato wrote in The laws. Tarnas's opinion about early Christians being influenced by Greek philosophy is true. The seven deadly sins or some of them appeared often as topical issues in The laws. Anger was often mentioned.
23 April 2014
The Cooper and Hutchinson edition used the Thrasyllus manuscript. Thrasyllus lived during the first century of the common era.
It is fact that Plato's opinions should be understood as part of a whole similar to philosohical realism.
According to Cooper and Hutchinson the primary speaker in Plato's dialogues represents not Plato's opinion, even so with the Athenian in Laws. The reason is because dialogue forms mean that authors remove themselves from pictures they portray.
Aristotle regarded the main speaker of the dialogues to be presenting Plato's opinion except at the Socratic dialogues, in which he ascribed the opinons to the historical Socrates. The tradition in the Academy, when reading Plato's works, after Aristotle's death, for example Arcesilaus's, (2nd century BC head of the Academy) was sceptic in the sense of not attaining an absolute truth. Arcesilaus opined Plato was a sceptic like Socrates. Antiochus of Ascalon (1st century BC) argued that Plato's works did not portray a sceptic attitude. The Neoplatonists then started again to spread Plato's works with more dogmatic opinions ascribed to Plato.
Charmides and Critias in conversation with Socrates when Charmides was a teenager. The thirty tyrants, "antidemocrats" of whom Charmides and Critias were part, were appointed in 404 BC by the Spartan king after Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian War. Both died in 403 BC during the "fighting", which "restored" democracy.
Socrates refers to doctors' treatments of eyes in a philosophical realist way. He mentions treating the whole of the body instead of only a part, being a "principle". Similarly "the body" should not be treated apart from "the soul". "The whole" should be in order for parts to function well. Doctors' treatments should start at "the soul" with "charms", which are "beautiful words" according to Zalmoxis, "a god" and king of Thrace.
The family of Solon was known for their poetry. Charmides's maternal uncle Pyrilampes was "the finest and most influential man in the country" due to his political connections with the "Great King" and other countries.
Socrates opines that playing the lyre quick and lively is "admirable" and Charmides agrees.
Whilst discussing " 'sōphrosunē' " ("temperance"), Charmides opined that temperance is doing things quietly. Socrates then influenced Charmides to agree that doing things "violently", quickly and lively is more admirable than doing things slowly and quietly. Charmides then changed "quiet" behaviour to "modest" behaviour, for being temperate. Socrates then equated his opinion about violent behaviour, with "temperance" and "good". It looked to me as if Charmides, the dialogue, was an explanation, which Socrates wrote to Plato, before his trial. The dialogue up to here was understood in the context of Socrates who returned from war. His actions during the war had to be quick to survive, therefore, obviously, quickened actions would have been "good" to him. Such actions of war is the opposite of slow stately austere actions, which was characteristic of Plato's stately family. Charmides and Critias was killed, before democracy was instilled. It could be that Socrates's motivation for "violent" behaviour led to Charmides's death. Critias was however an older man, which was maybe not influenced by Socrates. It now seems to me that Socrates in philosophy can be compared with Machiavelly and Hobbes.
The argument then turned to "minding one's own business". Someone who appeared to be wise told Charmides that "minding one's own business" is temperance. Socrates disagreed because he argued that when Charmides writes he writes not only about himself. When Critias started to argue the case for "minding one's own business", creativities entered the argument. Critias opined that work is always admirable but that creativities only when it is good creativities.
Critias eventually equated temperance with being "good", not "bad". Critias quoted a verse "Pledges lead to perdition". Critias opines "that temperance is to know oneself." The argument then lead to whether science of temperance should be regarded as a science of itself and of all other sciences. Also relevant was what selves know and know not and being aware of that. I had the impression that the argument was basically the result of two men who tried to each get the upperhand over the other and that actuality was not really the issue. Socrates especially gave me that impression, probably, still being on a high after the fighting he was involved in during the battles of the Peloponnesian War, where he returned from, before the discussion.
26 April 2014
At 172a Socrates wrote or was quoted: ' "Isn't this what we mean about temperance, Critias," I said, "when we say what a good thing it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?" "This is certainly what we mean," he said.' Up to here in the dialogue the impression was formed that Socrates was busy challenging Critias, one of the royals, about their science of temperance, which Socrates thought, was not a science, which could give knowledge to interfere with other sciences, for example, medicine and contruction (building houses). Socrates said that the leaders of the state, who study the science of temperance should leave the other sciences to go about their businesses, without interference. The specialisation and little interference by leaders will then cause an ordered state according to Socrates.
At 172b Socrates opines that the science of temperance is knowledge of science per se without knowledge about a specialised science. This knowledge of science per se will give a person the ability to see all things clearer in a philosophical realist sense. Such a person will be able to act like himself (Socrates), when he questions others with his dialectical method of questioning, which according to him shows 'the truth' or truths about the specialised "subjects he himself knows in a more effective fashion".
At 172d Socrates asks whether the science of temperance adds benefit to society and he aks whether it is professional duty to do what we know and to hand over to others to do what we do not know. Critias answers in the affirmative but at 172e Socrates counters that he thinks it is not the case. Critias then replies, ' "You certainly say some queer things, Socrates" ' on which Socrates replies ' "By the dog" ', ' "they seem queer to me to, and that is why, when I became aware of this a moment ago, I said that some strange things would come to light and that I was afraid we were not conducting the examination correctly. Because truly, even if their were no doubt that  temperance is like this, it appears in no way clear to me that it does us any good." '
At 173b-d Socrates promotes specialisation in sciences to improve living conditions and he rejects "deceivers" and promotes the "mantic" science, which predicts the future most accurately. These "prophets of the future" are "the true seers" according to Socrates. Temperance will (not shall) then reign and happiness will (not shall) be promoted by science and not the absence of science. At 173e – 174b Socrates adds that the most desirable knowledge is that of the "seer" who knows the future, past and present. Socrates meant nominalist knowledge with regard to the past and present and philosophical realist knowledge with regard to the future. At 174b Critias adds or replies that the science, which most effectively cause happiness is knowledge of ' "good and evil" '. At 174c-174d Socrates agrees with Critias but he qualifies his agreement by saying that knowledge of 'good and evil' is not the same as knowledge of temperance (" 'sōphrosunē' "). Socrates opposed the Greek aristocracy by not accepting their words.
At 176 Charmides and Critias agree that the youth should hear what Socrates says and they also threatened or warned Socrates that they will use violence if Socrates opposes them.
A debate between Hermogenes and Cratylus about the meaning of names. According to Hermogenes the definitions of words are determined merely by agreement and convention. According to Cratylus words have a deeper meaning, which says something about the nature of things.
At 384c-385e Hermogenes contradicts himself because he says an individual can decide to call a "man" a "horse" and it will be right, but he also said that definitions are decided upon by "convention and agreement". He bases his argument by comparing an individual person to a nation. He says different languages use different words for the same thing, therefore it applies to individual persons as well. He however seems to refer primarily to new words with regard to individual persons. If one can decide what a word should be for description, then societal "convention and agreement" is not regarded important, unless societies agree to disagree. To agree to disagree is however unsustainable because that would allow deceits to reign, which cause regression, due to lacks of creativities. Copyrights to new words are relevant here. I started to use "intequity". Does that mean I decide what the definition should be for "intequity"? I propose the definition and societies accept or reject the thesis. Acceptance and use are dependant on societies and an individual, who proposes a new word.
At 387 Socrates and Hermogenes defines "the truth" and "a falsehood". Socrates says: "And those that say of the things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they are not are false?"
At 388b Socrates explains that names (words) are tools we use for "dividing being." At 388d Socrates explains that words should be used according to rules, which law-givers set. At 388e-389a Socrates opines that "a rule-setter" is "a name-maker", "the kind of craftsman most rarely found among human beings." At 390a Socrates refer to different numbers of syllables of different words of different languages, which depict the same thing and he compares the different syllables to different types of materials, tools are made of. He then says the tools work as long as forms of tools are correct, whilst different types of wood and metal are used. Wood for spindles and metal for hard hammers. Socrates also opines that "rule-setters" have equal purpose in different territories.
At 390b Socrates opines that lyre-players should supervise manufacturers of lyres and ship-captains should supervise shipbuilders because users of tools know best what is needed in their tools. At 390c Socrates then infers from the examples of lyres and ships that the users of words should supervise and "judge" the words and "work of a rule-setter". The practical sides of this opinion by Socrates are complicated because remunerations must be apportioned fairly between rule-setters and the users (judges) of new words and concepts.
At 390c-e Socrates opines that "a dialectician" who asks questions and can answer them should supervise rule-setters. He then agrees with Cratylus that words have natural essences, which rule-setters grasp.
At 391-393 Socrates and Hermogenes use examples from Protagoras's ' "Truth" ' to originations of different words, for the same things, Homer ascribed in his Iliad to "the gods" and "men". He then goes on to compare gods to singular men who defend cities on their own and men to women of a city.
At 397c Socrates uses " 'theoi' " is the Greek word for " 'gods' ". At 397d Socrates opines that " 'theoi' " is a suitable name for gods because they "run" "(thein)" constantly like the moon, the sun and the stars. 
At 398b-c Socrates equites "good" with "wise" and gold. "Daemon" Socrates uses to refer to the wise after they died. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary the arhaic word "daemon" changed into the current "demon". It thus supports my belief that the words "good", "gods" and "godesses" and "God" should not be mixed up with knowledge, which can be used for evil purposes. The two most prominent contenders for parts of "good" are currently truths, which implies honesties and love. Love is according to Jesus and Plato (Laws), recognized at law-abiding citizens. Kant's categorical imperative can be reconciled with law-abidingness, especially if writing of laws also consider Kant's categorical imperative.
At 398d-e Socrates opines that Greek " 'hērōs' " (" 'hero' ") is a derivative of the old Attic word " 'erōs' ", which implies that " 'hērōs' " were born from " 'love' " between a "god" or "goddess" and a "mortal". Another possibility Socrates considered is that " 'hērōs' " was derived from "rhētores" ("clever speech-makers") and "erōtan" ("skilled questioners"), which he equates with "sophists", being the descendants of "the noble breed of heroes".
At 399c Socrates explains with the Greek word " 'anthrōpos' " how he thinks words form by conjunction from different words. " 'Anthrōpos' " (human) was derived by combining words which mean together we reason about that, which we observe in contrast with animals, which do not reason. Socrates also inferred that, because, animals do not have hands and because we do not understand their languages, they do not reason.
Around 400 Socrates and Hermogenes agree that Anaxagoras's conception about " 'soul' " ("psuchē"), that sustains ("ochei kai echei") nature ("phusis") is correct. This could be a differentiating factor between Plato and Socrates at roots, if Plato preferred the word anima for soul, like in Aristotle's De Anima (On the Soul) (Aristotle, 1986). Was Aristotle's De Anima derived from the same root as Ana of Anaxagoras? Plato however was author or editor of this dialogue, therefore he used words similar to Anaxagoras and Socrates, if he quoted Socrates correct.
At 401d Socrates opines he agrees with Heraclitus's doctrine that the things which "are" are caused by the "pusher" that " 'is' " "the cause and originator of them". Therefore Hestia is the goddess who receives the first part of "a sacrifice" and is named first in "prayers" and "oaths".
At 402d Socrates discussed "Posidon" and Pluto, Zeus's brothers. Diogenes Laertius wrote Plato was a descendant of Poseidon. The democrats had Zeus as their God. In Laws Plato visits with two interlocutors the cave of Zeus on Crete where Magnesia will be established. It could imply that Plato's 'god' he thought of was Cronus. His family for example Critias, maybe had Poseidon in their minds, which caused friction with democrats who had Zeus in their minds.
At 405c-e Socrates opines that the single l of " 'Apolon' " signifies a dictatorial one therefore another l was added to the name of " 'Apollo' " to signify harmony. Truthfullness is also brought in connection with Apollo by implication. Singlemindedness which is truthfulness, according to Socrates, with Apolon.
"Apollyon |əˈpälyən| a name for the Devil (Rev. 9:11). ORIGIN from late Latin (Vulgate), from Greek Apolluōn ‘destroyer’ (translating Abaddon ), from apollunai, from apo- ‘quite’ + ollunai [destroy.]" (New Oxford)
27 April 2014
At 408c Socrates says: "You know speech signifies all things (to pan) and keeps them circulating and always going about, and that it has two forms—true and false?" Hermogenes answers, "Certainly" and then Socrates carries on, "Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells among the gods above, while the false part dwells below among the human masses, and is rough and goatish (tragikon); for it is here in the tragic (tragikon) life, that one finds the vast majority of myths and falsehoods."
At 411d Socrates says wisdom is "the understanding of motion". At 411e-412a Socrates opines that " 'Knowledge' " indicates "a worthwhile soul" adjusts with the flow of things without "running on ahead" or lagging behind. At 412c Socrates says " 'good' ('agathon') is intended to signify everything in nature that is admirable (agaston)" and fast moving things should be admired.
Socrates was taught in secret that " 'the just (dikaiou sunesis)' " are the cause of all things, but he could not find out from his teachers what the just is/are because they each had a different opinion. " 'Injustice (adikia)' " meant to Socrates the prevention of penetration.
" 'Thein' " means " 'to run' ". At 414d Socrates opines that people who respect not "the truth" change words to sound nice, when they speak, without considering the meanings of the individual letters.
At 417c Socrates opines that " 'good' " promotes continuous flowing of things, which naturally opposes an "end (telos) to motion".
28 April 2014
SOCRATES: "while 'thumos' ('spirit', 'anger') derives from the raging (thusis) and boiling of the soul."
"SOCRATES: 'Doxa' ('opinion) either derives from the pursuit (diōxis) the soul engages in when it hunts for the knowledge of how things are, or it derives from the shooting of a bow (toxon). But the latter is more likely. At any rate, 'oiēsis' ('thinking') is in harmony with it. It seems to express the fact that thinking is the motion (oisis) of the soul towards every thing, towards how each of the things that are really is."
"HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the finest and most important names, 'alētheia' ('truth'), 'pseudos' ('falsehood'), 'on' ('being'), and—the subject of our present conversation—'onoma' ('name') and why it is so named.
SOCRATES: Do you know what 'maiesthai' means?
HERMOGENES: Yes, it means 'to search' ('zētein').
SOCRATES: Well, 'onoma' ('name') seems to be a compressed statement which says: "this is a being for which there is a search." You can see this more easily in 'onomaston' ('thing named'), since it clearly says: "this is a being for which there is a search (on hou masma estin)." 'Alētheia' ('truth') is like these others in being compressed, for the divine motion of being is called 'alētheia' because 'alētheia' is a compressed form of the phrase "a wandering that is divine (alē theia)." 'Pseudos' ('falsehood') is the opposite of this motion, so that, once again, what is constrained or compelled to be inactive is reviled by the name-giver, and likened to people asleep (katheudousi)—but the meaning of the name is concealed by the addition of 'ps'. 'On' ('being') or 'ousia' ('being') says the same as 'alētheia' once an 'i' is added, since it signifies going (ion). 'Ouk on' ('not being'), in turn, is 'ouk ion' ('not going') and indeed some people actually use that name for it."
Socrates and Cratyles argued here about where words came from. Part of the discussion was about the alphabet letters. Cratylus argued that the first 'name-giver' knew the words before he used the words. Cratylus thus argued that the first 'name-giver' received the words, already formed. Socrates did not accept Cratylus's argument. The argument did not make sense. According to Socrates in Phaedrus, the dialogue, Theuth discovered the alphabet. Logically Theuth thus took the words, which were used for hieroglyphs, used by Ammon and his people. Theuth then gave symbols for each sound and those 'names' of the sounds, were used to spell the existing words without picturing the words with hieroglyphs. Socrates seems to have argued that the alphabet was discovered before hieroglyphs because Socrates claims that "r", for example, presented movement in Greek. I think the symbols simply presented sounds in the case of Theuth. Maybe letter symbols developed from writing, the way letters change when writing with cursive letters. It could also be that the 'r' sound in Greek speaking, presented movement, before they used symbols to write, and the symbol therefore, after being taken from Theuth's Egyptian, therefore represented movement in Greek but not in Egyptian. In hieroglyphs the pictures represented two types of entities. The animal, for example, and the sound, which depicted the animal. Letter symbols could therefore be derivatives of the pictures, which represented two types of things. Let's say the picture of a dog represented the sound 'kainos' and the animal. Theuth then broke the word down into different sounds, perhaps by breaking up the picture into parts. If all pictures were broken into parts and similar letters were shown from different pictures and similar sounds were shown from different pictures, that would have been an interesting discovery, which would have implied that letters and sounds as facts, represent shapes and parts of bodies.
"SOCRATES: First off, 'r', seems to me to be a tool for copying every sort of motion ('kinēsis').—We haven't said why motion has this name, but it's clear that it means 'hesis' ('a going forth'), since in ancient times we used 'e' in place of 'ē'. The first part comes from 'kiein', a non-Attic name equivalent to 'ienai' ('moving'). So if you wanted to find an ancient name corresponding to the present 'kinēsis', the correct answer would be 'hesis'. But nowadays, what with the non-Attic word 'kiein', the change from 'e' to 'ē', and the insertion of 'n', we say 'kinēsis', though it ought to be 'kieinēsis'. 'Stasis' ('rest') is a beautified version of a name meaning the opposite 'ienai' ('moving').—In any case as I was saying, the letter 'r' seemed to the name-giver to be a beautiful tool for copying motion, at any rate he often uses it for this purpose."
At 426e-437a Cratylus opines that proper words reflect movement which "all" things are subject to.
At 438c Cratylus opines that a more than human power determined the first words and therefore the first words were absolutely right. Cratylus also stated that the two opposing forces, motion and rest, which are represented by symbols, according to Socrates, mean that either of the two "aren't names at all."
"SOCRATES: But since there's a civil war among names, with some claiming that they are like the truth and others claiming that they are, how then are we to judge between them, and what are we to start from? We can't start from other different names because there are none. No, it's clear we'll have to look for something other than names, something that will make plain to us without using names which of these two kinds of names are the true ones—that is to say, the ones that express the truth about the things that are."
At 439a-b Socrates and Cratylus agreed that if letters are proper 'names', then the letters must be "likenesses" of what the letters represent. Cratylus also opined that it is better to learn from actuality, without words, than from representations. Socrates then acknowledges his limitations in connection with philosophical ambivalent realism and he implies that nominalist learning is only what we can do and we can learn nominally better, from actuality than from words. My argument above together with Socrates's and Cratylus's agreement, implies that sounds and body parts represented by symbols are actually similar in form. It implies that learning from actuality and learning from words would be the same if symbols are 'accurate', which they can never be. Symbols thus gave us a third 'dimension' because, before symbols existed, only perfect words and bodies existed. It implies that perfect words (sounds) could have created ex nihilo, but false pictures distorted perfect sounds.
From 439-440e Socrates explains why he thinks that perfect form exists apart from our experienced world and that our experienced knowledge is more accurate than knowledge attained through letters. Furthermore Socrates opines that knowledge itself is temporary because 'the truth' is not within our reach. Socrates's opinion seems to be a philosophical nominalist view rather than a philosophical realist view. Socrates's view could even, with regard to human abilities to attain knowledge, be more conservative than nominalism because he thinks knowledge is not possible.
Socrates stated he agreed not with Heraclitus at 439b-c. Cratylus stated he agreed with Heraclitus at 440e. 
According to Socrates's opinion at 402, Heraclitus had a significant influence on poets, which elsewhere was stated a practise Plato's family practiced. If I remember correctly Solon's writing of laws and his poetry was condensed into one activity by Socrates.
7 May 2014
SOCRATES: "The two are absolutely omniscient, so much so that I never knew before what pancratiasts really were." Crito asked Socrates who were two people Socrates talked with at the Lyceum and Socrates answered him with regard to Eythydemus and Dionysodorus, two brothers. At 272a-b Socrates looks very taken with the methodology of Eythydemus and Dionysodorus and he specifically says that they do not care whether their arguments are "true or false."
"The pancration (lit., "all round fighting") was a combination of wrestling and boxing."
There was another word i read earlier, which was similar to this "pancratiasts", which meant followers of Aristotle. Socrates met the two brothers at the Lyceum, it could thus be that they were students of Aristotle's school and it implies then that Aristotle was a Sophist.
Crito says that they are "another new kind of sophist", he supposes. Socrates says they left as colonists from Chios to Thurii but were exiled from Thurii before they came to Athens. At 274a Socrates asks Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to speak "the truth" when they lecture to him.
It seems that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were students with a following or maybe lecturers at the Lyceum. Socrates it seems was also a student or lecturer at the Lyceum because he was in the locker rooms when he had his discussion with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.
SOCRATES: "The two men themselves [Euthydemus and Dionysodorus] were pretty well advanced in years when they made a start on this wisdom I want to get; I mean the eristic sort. Last year or the year before they were not yet wise."
The translator, Rosamond Kent Sprague, used the word "virtue" to refer to the teachings of the sophists.
At 274b Socrates say Euthydemus and Dionysodorus was at the Lyceum to teach. At 275a Socrates calls Euthydemus and Dionysodorus teachers of "philosophy and the practice of virtue". The technique of the two sophists is also called "philosophy" at 304e. At 275b-d Socrates invites Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to teach Clinias, a boy of Athens, who Socrates and other Athenians were fond of. Also, Socrates opines that what he then heard from Euthydemus and Dionysodorus was "wisdom" that was "so great."
At 293-294a Euthydemus and Dionysodorus posits an ambivalent realist argument that a person who knows something knows everything because everything and nothing are opposites, therefore something has to be the same as everything.
At 302b-d Socrates stated that he had not an "ancestral Zeus". Socrates thus did not believe himself to be a descendant of Zeus. He however stated that Athenians regarded Apollo to be an ancestor. He stated that they regarded Zeus not as an ancestor but rather a protector. At 305b Crito reproaches Socrates because Socrates argued with the two sophists in public. At 305c Socrates places philosophers and statesmen in opposing forces. At 306c Socrates does it again, which implies that statesmen were regarded as honest at the time. At 305e Crito supports men of middles after Socrates disregarded them. At 306a Socrates promotes "truth". It seems at 306 Socrates gives an argument, which supports the law of the excluded middle.
At 307c the dialogue ends where Socrates proclaim that philosophy, the teachings of the sophists is a worthwile topic to study.
The dialogue reenforced my thoughts that Socrates was too friendly with the sophists for his own good. In the Republic Socrates stated that leaders should be allowed to lie to the populace, which seems to be diametrically opposed to the general feeling which placed statesmen and sophists (philosophers) in opposition.
Polycrates claimed Socrates justified deceiving and stealing.
12 May 2014
"χρηστóτης (chrēstotēs), honesty: moral sincerity, together with intelligence; excellence of character."
"εŭσεβεια (eusebeia), piety: justice concerning the gods, the ability to serve the gods voluntarily; the correct conception of the honor due to gods; knowledge of the honor due to gods."
"αγνεια (hagneia), piety: caution about mistakes with respect to the gods; paying service, in a normal way, to the honor of a god."
"πιστις (pistis), faith: the conception that things are as they appear to one; firmness of character."
"αγηθεια (alētheia), truth, veracity: the correct state expressed in affirmation and denial; edge of truths."
"ταξις (taxis), order: functional similarity in all the mutual elements of a whole; due proportion in a society; cause of all the mutual elements of a whole; due proportion in respect of learning."
"νóησις (noēsis), intuition: the starting point of knowledge." 
"μαντεια (manteia), divining: the knowledge which predicts events without proof."
"μαντιχη (mantikē), divination: the knowledge which contemplates the present and the future of mortal beings."
"σοφια (sophia), wisdom: non-hypothetical knowledge; knowledge of what always exists; knowledge which contemplates the cause of beings."
"φιλοσοφια (philosophia), philosophy: desire for the knowledge of what always exists; the state which contemplates the truth, what makes it true; cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason."
"λογος (logos), speech: voice articulated in letters capable of indicating each existing thing; liguistic sound compounded of nouns and verbs, without music."
"ωφελιμον (ōphelimon), utility: what causes something to be well off; what causes good."
"νομος (nomos), law: political judgement of many people, not limited to a certain time."
"υποθεσις (hypothesis), hypothesis: indemonstrable first principle; summary of the principal points in a discourse."
"τυραμμος (turannos), dictator: an officer of a city who rules according to his own ideas."
"σοφιστης (sophistēs) sophist: paid hunter of rich and distinguished young men."
"μανια (mania), madness: the state which is destructive of true conception."
Socrates's acknowledgement of specialisation and that specialists know best how to do their jobs again apparent.
At 117a-d Socrates explains to Alcibiades that they "know" nominalist truths but the concepts "just and unjust", "good and bad", "admirable and contemptible" and "advantageous and disadvantageous" Alcibiades knows not the concepts because he knows not "about them". Socrates also shows Alcibiades that when he know he knows not something then Alcibiades would not profess to know that something. Socrates then use the argument to prove that the uncertainty Alcibiades experiences about the nature of the concepts is because he thinks he knows about something he knows not really.
Socrates used the same answer and question technique that the sophists used in Eythydemus and he insisted that Alcibiades follows his (Socrates's) questions.
At 117 e-118a Socrates explains that people who know they don't know leave those things to others do do and therefore they don't make mistakes. Those who know they know make not mistakes. Therefore, the people who make mistakes are the people who think they know but in fact they don't know.
At 118a-b Socrates motivate why Alcibiades and most other statesmen of Athens are ignorant of the most important concepts they should be well versed in. At 118e reference is made to Clinias the brother of Alcibiades. I assumed that the brother must have been Alcibiades's elder brother, the Clinias in Eythydemus, who approached Socrates with his many "lovers". Clinias, the brother of Alcibiades and son of Clinias. Clinias in The laws was "apparently" a "fictional" character.
At 120a-e Socrates claims that the Spartan and Persian kings are descendants of Perseus son of Zeus and that they are Alcibiades's enemies Alcibiades should be competing against.
Clinias claims descent from Zeus through Zeus's descendant, Eurysaces. Socrates claims descent from Hephaestus, son of Zeus. Hephaestus was the "artisan" of the Olympian gods. Hephaestus had a descendant called Daedalus, who sculptors regarded as their "patron". Socrates's father was a sculptor.
At 121c-d Socrates opines that much more fuss is made about the Persian and Spartan aristocracy than about the Athenian aristocracy. According to Socrates the Persian king is taught to be "truthful", "brave" and not a slave of pleasure. Zoroaster was their prophet. Socrates put much emphasis on the Delphic inscription " 'know thyself' ".
At 125a Socrates emphasise specialisation and the effect of specialists knowing better than others about their jobs. At 129a Socrates says that because of specialists who can do many things, who need not be ruled over about those things it is important that Alcibiades first lern to know himself like the oracle at Delphi says before Alcibiades could rule over others. 129a-130a Socrates argues that in analogy to a craftsman and his tools, souls are users of their bodies. Socrates however referred to "the soul" and "the body". At 130c-d Socrates concludes his argument that "man" is "nothing" or else if man is "something" man is "his soul", excluding his body. Socrates and Alcibiades settles on "man" being "the soul" being an "individual self". Socrates used "his soul" and "the soul". In Euthydemus the sophists argued if a man knows "something" he knows "everything", which is the opposite of "nothing", therefore I guess now that a man can be "everything" according to Socrates and sophists.
Socrates then follows on with his argument at 131a-b that a doctor who knows his body in a doctor's context knows not "himself" and a farmer who knows his farm and not his body is even further from knowing "himself" and therefore they do not know themselves and therefore they are not "self-controlled". Therefore, according to Socrates doctor's and farmer's businesses are not businesses of "gentleman" who regards those businesses "beneath" them.
Earlier in the dialogue the age of Alcibiades is stated at 20 years of age and it was stated that Alcibiades had many men before who loved his body and Socrates ignored Alcibiades up to his current age in the dialogue. At 131d Socrates states that now that Alcibiades's body is not loved anymore Socrates loves Alcibiades's soul, which is Alcibiades himself. In the introduction to Alcibiades the translator said that the phrase "Platonic love" was derived from Alcibiades, the dialogue.
At 131e Socrates states that Alcibiades "have no lovers and never have had any" but that he was followed by "lovers". "Lovers" can thus mean admirers.
The following is Socrates's explanation of how a person can learn to "know thyself".
19 May 2014
At 133 Socrates argues for attributes of true statesmen. It could thus imply, read with other arguments for example, in Euthydemus that Socrates was not pleased with actions of current statemen. It could also just mean that Socrates wanted to teach the young Alcibiades how to be a proper statesman.
"SOCRATES: Then it's impossible for anyone to prosper unless he is self-controlled and good.
SOCRATES: So it's the bad men who are failures.
SOCRATES: And so the way to avoid being a failure is not by getting rich, but by being self-controlled.
SOCRATES: So it's not walls or war-ships or shipyards that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to prosper, nor is it numbers or size, without virtue." Socrates then continues to say that Alcibiades must get "virtue" in order to be able to impart virtue to citizens to, by being an example, be a good statesman. Virtue is then expanded on by Socrates by mentioning "justice and self-control" a prerequisite.
According to Socrates virtue depends on "God". The word "God" was translated from "θεὸς". "θεός" = "noun sg masc nom". It seems Socrates used singular form male nominative (subject of a verb) and Plato used plural form accusative (indicating an object).
899b in The laws the Athenian says: "Ἀθηναῖος
ἄστρων δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα; [899ξ] " "θεούς = noun pl masc acc" "θεῶν" - this word could not be identified as masculine or feminine. Explanations made it mostly feminine and plural.
The dialogue, Alcibiades ends with Socrates saying that the power of the city could overpower his and Alcibiades' striving for virtue. It implies that Socrates's "God" was in opposition with Athens.
At 148b Socrates refers to a specific poet as "wise". This statement contradicts some opinions that Socrates was against poetry.
At 148e Socrates tells a story about Athenians who consulted Ammon about reasons, which make them lose in war against the Spartans, although Athenians sacrifices more to the gods than the Spartans. The answer by the prophet was that Ammon prefers the few words without serimonies of the Spartans, which make not a fuss about the gods. A note by Anthony Kenny and the editors state that Ammon was an "Egyptian god with an oracle in the Libyan desert."  Socrates then says at 149e that "the gods" take more cognisance of how we preserve our "souls" than about sacrifices and prosessions in their favour.
20 May 2014
The Academy's work contributed to Stoicism and scepticism.
At 393d Socrates mentions an important qualification with regard to his thesis. That is health is more important than wealth. 
At 394e Socrates says that a successful doctor or a successful other professional would be "valued more highly" than any material possession a wealthy man can own.  Socrates's view explains the view of his time whereby professional people could have been regarded possessions of rich people.
23 May 2014
At 395a Eryxias asks Socrates, whether Socrates thinks that Socrates is wiser than Callias, who spent much money on the teachings of sophists. Callias was one the richest men in Athens.  The question arises whether Callias really thought the Sophists were wise, or did he spend the money to control them because he regarded them enemies of the city state.
At 395b-c Socrates states that functionalist arguments have being and that Eryxias, who did not regard the being of functionalist arguments do not acknowledge the "wisest" who do not speak "the truth". Socrates promoted deceit by referring to the use of "false" functionalist statements during argumentation. "Wealth" meant for Eryxias material wealth and for Socrates "wealth" had a figurative definition, which could imply that Socrates was 'better' off than Callias. It seems thus that "the truth" in this translation is a nominalist concept. It is not clear whether coherence is the overriding principle, which made Eryxias annoyed. If coherence was the overriding priority for Eryxias it could imply that Eryxias had a true realist opinion, which did not prioritise winning during arguments above truths.
At 395d-e Eryxias says the important matter is the conditions that led to wealth and ' "what kind of thing wealth is, whether it's good or bad." ' Socrates acknowledges Socrates's mistake.
At 396a-d Socrates wrote or was quoted: 'Then I said to them: " '. Socrates acknowledged that Athenians regarded material wealth very important and good. Eryxias and Critias were relatives.
From 396e to 397c Socrates explains Critias used a sophistical (wise) argument to show that a poor man has less temptations and therefore poor men are 'better' than rich men: ' "Just a couple of days ago this very argument was being used in the Lyceum by a wise man named Prodicus, from Ceos. …". According to Mark Joyal, the translator, and the editors the Lyceum was "a public space just outside the walls of Athens." 
The dialogue, Eryxias, was written as if Plato wrote it because Socrates referred to himself as ' "I" ' at 397e. At 397e a quotation of Socrates starts in which he quotes someone, probably Erasistratus (related to Eris?). Socrates's quotation starts with ' " ' and also, the quotation of Socrates in Eryxias, starts with ' " '. Socrates indirectly could have accused Critias of not acknowledging that he was using Prodicus's argument, Critias heard at the Lyceum.  I am not sure about what i wrote here because the quotation marks started to confuse me.
At 398c Socrates was quoted, quoting a young man who argued against the sophist Prodicus a few days earlier at the Lyceum. The young man asked Prodicus if Prodicus thinks ' " 'excellence' " ' can be taught or whether excellence is ' " 'innate' " '. Prodicus, according to Socrates, said excellence can be taught.  Remember the definition of chrestatos (honesty) included "excellence of character".
At 399b-c Socrates implied that Critias's argument is accepted because he is a "gentleman" but a similar argument by Prodicus was not accepted at the "gymnasium" because he was a sophist and that sophists are accused of influencing youths negatively. If the sophist was a "gentleman" his argument would have been regarded "absolutely true." According to Socrates the same things happened in court at the time.  I stopped using many quotation marks here, that i used during the previous paragraphs because using many quotation marks become confusing and could be incorrect.
At 399e-400c Socrates showed how he changes the meaning of words in order to win. Earlier he changed the meaning of wealth, which Crytias and Eryxias regards "possession of a lot of property." Socrates then also started to change the meaning of the word property by arguing the word "property" should have some universal meaning because the "currencies" (money and fixed property) of different countries, Socrates discussed had very different values (money value) ascribed to those currencies in different countries. Socrates argued the same subjectivity applies to "beautiful and ugly".  At 400e Socrates explains that the universal essence of "property" is that property is "useful to us .. while everything useless is not" property. 
From 400d-403d Socrates then states that skills make people wealthy because they can trade their skills for other property, which sustain their lives. Socrates also argues that "property" is only useful if the possessor knows how to use it and, sarcartically meant, that only "gentlemen" knows how to use money. Critias did not agree with Socrates but he enjoyed Socrates's company. 
At 403e-404c Socrates uses an argument, which could imply that with deduction honesties can be proven to be the most valuable cultural property because honesties allow us to create things, we use to sustain our lives. Socrates also showed that contradiction is not accepted by him. He also showed that in Euthydemus in his discussion with Critias when he explained the ways of men of middles.
At 404c the argument could have been by Critias that money can be used to do anything on which Socrates opined that everything is not good. At 405c the argument ended on decision that all properties are useful and indecision about whether all useful things are properties.  At 406 Socrates ends the dialogue by saying that rich people are usually ill because their needs are more than healty people's needs.
27 May 2014
Gorgias, who was from Sicily is "loosely" considered a " 'sophist' " by the translators. He was active at the embassy in Athens around 427BC. He was a famous teacher of oratory. His teachings was limited to speechmaking and he did not teach the youth about " 'virtue' ".
Reference is made by the editors and translator (Donald J. Zeyl) to "Socrates' dialectic". They refer to Socrates's commitment to "the objective existence of justice" in opposition to "rhetorical skill", which suffices for "the selfish, domineering, pleaure-seeking" life.
At 447b-c Socrates states that he wants to hear what Gorgias teaches and what "his craft can accomplish". At 447d-448a Gorgias claims that he can answer any question from anyone.  At 449a-e after enquiry by Socrates about what Gorgias is, Gorgias calls himself a "good orator". Gorgias also answers that oratory is about speeches but not all kinds of speeches because he teaches not speechmaking that refers to curing people. Socrates enquire about crafts a lot, implying that specialisation is important for him. His objective is usually to realize exactly what it is a sophist claims to be effective at.
Gorgias contradicted his earlier statement that he knows everything because he states his speech making is not about medical matters. 
At 451e Socrates mentions that a song regards health the first priority, good looks (a trained body) the second priority and being "honestly rich" the third priority in life. Socrates also states that it is debatable. 
Gorgias claims to teach the greatest good; oratory, "the source of freedom for humankind" and "the source of rule over others in one's own city."  Socrates described oratory as the art of "instilling persuasion" and Gorgias agreed with the description.
Socrates then questions Gorgias about the object, oratory persuades about, because other crafts have a specific object for example arithmetic has as object numbers and computation. Socrates knows not what the objective of the oratory is Gorgias teaches, although Gorgias said the objectives were freedom and ruling over others. Socrates implies that Gorgias teaches not an objective art, for example medicine, mathematics, which is outside of the teacher. Gorgias's objectives were teaching others how to attain their own freedom and ruling over others, by way of oratory.
Gorgias states specifically that his oratory is about justice in the law courts and large assemblies. 
Gorgias states there is not something like "true and false knowledge" but "true and false conviction" exists. Gorgias and Socrates agrees that oratory is about convincing but not specifically about "what's just and unjust."  The dialogue then continues. Socrates still do not know what oratory convinces about. Socrates states that oratory convinces not about which craftsmen is appointed for a task because the master craftsmen decide about that based on their knowledge of the craft. Gorgias then states that Socrates there identified the task of oratory; that is convincing others about initiating a required task for example a large civil project. Socrates then states oratory is therefore about "supernatural" scope. Gorgias agrees because oratory "encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished." 
At 457b Gorgias states that the art of oratory should not be used unjustly because it could be used for that. It depends on the user of the art whether he uses it justly or unjustly. 
At 457d Socrates acknowledge the irritating phenomenon whereby people argue just to win without "investigating the subject under discussion." 
At 458a-b Socrates proclaims his own nature, being a man who is not after winning but after truths. Socrates minds not to be refuted, but rather prefers that to refuting another, because being refuted teaches something, that relates to "anything untrue" in his own mind.  Is it true what Socrates proclaim? Up to the reading i have done to date Socrates gave me a different impression; that he is out to refute others.
At 458b Gorgias proclaims to be the same type of man Socrates said Socrates is. 
At 459a Gorgias and Socrates agrees that oratory relates to convincing groups about things they have not knowledge. Knowledge is for example something a doctor has about his subject field.
At 459d-460a Socrates asks whether a person needs knowledge about a subject before Gorgias could teach that person oratory. 
"SOCRATES: … By the Dog, Gorgias".
At 461c-d Polus accused Socrates of "great rudeness" because Socrates led Gorgias with questioning into contradicting himself (Gorgias). Socrates thanked Polus for the interruption and asked him to keep it brief.
At 462b-c Socrates says he thinks oratory is not a "craft" and that it is a "knack" at "producing a certain graitification and pleasure." 
At 463a-d Socrates explicitly opposes "oratory", "flattery" and "sophistry" being not "admirable" Socrates compared oratory with preparing food and he said oratory is a "part of politics", which he calls "bad things", which are "shameful".
At 465d Socrates explains that sophistry and oratory mixes up knowledge in such a way that specialisation would not be possible if everybody practised it. Socrates claims that the sophist way is the way of Anaxagoras. 
At 466b-c Polus claims that sophists have the "greatest power in their cities" because they murder anyone they want, confiscate properties and expell people from "their cities". Socrates claims it is not "power" because that type of tyranny only benefits sophists. 
At 469a-b Socrates states that someone who puts another to death justly is not to be envied and a person who does so unjustly is to be pitied and doing "what's unjust is the worse thing there is." 
"SOCRATES: .. by Zeus!" 
At 470e Socrates claims that happiness depends entirely on "education and justice" and not wealth. 
From 470e-472d Socrates and Polus argues about causes of happiness. Polus favours unjust actions. Socrates in the argument mentions powerful people who could use testimonies by many influential people in courts of law against Socrates. Socrates mentions Pericles, Aristocrates, Nicias the son of Niceratus and his brother, who have tripods in the precinct of Dionysus, who hate Socrates. 
At 476e Socrates classifies good things together for example pleasure, benefitting and admiration. Socrates thought that good things could be grouped together with "pleasure". Socrates's pleasure therefore could not have referred to boodily things. He referred primarily to matters about souls.  Previously Socrates said although he would prefer not to experience any of the following to be treated unjustly is preferable to treating another unjustly. Socrates's view was based on comparing choices between good and bad.
At 481a-b Socrates thinks oratories protect the unjust and a corrupt man can "live forever in corruption" or if not for ever, "as long as possible in that condition." 
The difference Socrates identified between oratories and eristics are enlightening. The eristic argumentation at the Lyceum by two sophists, in Euthydemus, who were exiled, was appreciated by Socrates but the oratory by an ambassador, Gorgias, at a private house, it seems, was not appreciated by Socrates.
29 May 2014
At 481d-482c Socrates proclaims he and Callicles each "is a lover of two objects", Socrates is of "Alcibiades, Clinias' son" and "philosophy" and Callicles is of "the Demos who's the son of Pyrilampes" and of "the demos [people]". Callicles says just what the "Athenian demos" and what the "good-looking" son of Pyrilampes want to hear and "philosophy" says always the same. Socrates said "by the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you". Socrates also said he prefers himself being dissonant with others to being untruthful towards his own belief.
At 482e-483b Callicles accuses Socrates of taking the side of "law" and not "nature", which each is in opposition to the other side. Callicles then contradicts himself by saying that Socrates sometimes chooses the side of law and sometimes the side of nature and Callicles talks as if he knows nature. Callicles states his opinion that the laws are instituted by the "many" because they are "weak" as individuals. According to Callicles strength is recognized in willings, which use the most violent means.  At 488d-e Socrates says that the "rules of the many are the rules of the superior" and Callicles agrees.  At 489b, according to Socrates law and nature are not in opposition because according to law and nature it is more unjust to do unjust things according to the definitions of law and good nature than to suffer due to unjust doings of others, in their unjust states of nature, according to definitions of written law and Socrates's understanding of nature.  At 489c Callicles implies that people who only have physical strength do not institute laws. It is not clear whether Callicles means physical strength due to numbers or individuals' physical strengths.  At 490a-b Callicles clarrifies that he regards "the more intelligent one" to be "worthier" than individuals of a group with individuals of lesser intelligence and, that one, should rule over that group and that one should have a greater share of their all, than "his inferiors." 
Callicles view is problematic in the sense that he claims the most violent individuals are the most intelligent individuals. Socrates's view is problematic because Socrates claims that the largest group is always the most powerful and therefore in control. Elsewhere Socrates spoke out against group power when he referred to "the demos". Both of their reasonings prioritize violence as root cause and both of them contradicted themselves, like we all do at times. Callicles prioritizes violence by individuals or a smaller group, who acts against written laws and Socrates prioritizes violence backed by a large group, which he eventually accepted as lawful with regard to his own suicide sentence. Allthough they disagree about who posses(ses) the ultimate power they agree that instilling fear is the first priority when seeking power. It seems to me today that the power of creativities was not fathomed by either of them.
At 494c Socrates exhibits one of his important methods of argumentation. That is to show that statements, which are not objective, implies generalisation, which can be showed to be wrong due to very few true generalisations in existence. From 497c-499c Socrates show that pleasure and good are not the same thing and pain and bad are not the same thing. He convincingly argued the difference between experiencing pleasure and being good because he showed that both bad and good men experience pleasure at the same time when their pleasures originate at the same place. The example he used referred to the pleasures that brave men and cowards experience when their enemy retreats during a war the bad and the good are involved in on the same side. The method Socrates used to decide on what "good" is was agreement. He and Callicles agreed that braveries are "good" for example.
At 502d Socrates opines that tragic plays are oratories, which flatter the crowds it adress. 
At 505e Socrates says that "all of us", as "a good common" goal, should "be contentiously eager to know what's true and what's false about the things we're talking about." 
"SOCRATES: …But surely we are good, both we and everything else that's good, when some excellence has come to be present in us? Yes, I do think that that's necessarily so, Callicles. … So it's when a certain order, the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that it makes each of the things there are, good?—Yes, I think so. ... is.—And an orderly sould is a self-controlled one?—Absolutely.—So a self-controlled sould is a good one. I for one can't say anything else beyond that, Callicles my friend; if you can please teach me. The good for Socrates will be benefitted in the afterlife.
At 508b Socrates says: "I was speaking in earnest when I said that a man should be his own accuser, or his son's or his friend's, if he's done anything unjust, and should use oratory for that purpose." Previously Socrates criticized "oratory" therefore he, if accepted that he is being consistent, could mean here that oratory should be used to influence the public.
At 517a Socrates refers to "true oratory".
At 511a-b Socrates says with certainty that a man who follows in the footsteps of a city tyrant, in order to gain, from worldly pleasures, the tyrant is au fait with for example ' "power" ', will be harming his "soul" and if such a man kill a good man, who benefits his soul, "it'll be a wicked man killing one who's admirable and good."
At 512e Socrates says for "one who is truly a man", death of self is not a valid consideration when taking decisions. 
At 513c Socrates implies he "loves" not the Athenian demos.  At 515e-516c Socrates states rhetorically that Pericles harmed souls of Athenian people because Pericles instituted wages. Socrates supports his argument by saying that when Pericles were elected the demos liked him but at the end of Pericles's reign over them they despised him. Elsewhere, i recall Socrates favoured profit taking.
At 518a Socrates says that medicine and gymnastics are the best "crafts" because of its good effects on souls and bodies. 
Socrates seems to have argued against "progress" because he blamed "harbors and dockyards, walls, and tribute payments and such trash as that", together with injustice as the cause of Athenian problems of the time. 
Socrates says sophists contradicted themselves because they claim to make their students virtuous but on the other hand they calim their students are evil because they do not pay their sophist teachers. 
At 522e Socrates mentions specifically his objective of not reaching Hades with evil baggage because that would be "the ultimate of all bad things". Socrates appreciated Minos, Rhadamanthus and Aeacus to be fair judges in the afterlife. 
30 May 2014
"Socrates is portrayed as a very bright and promising young philosopher—he is virtually a teenager, only just beginning his career in the subject—who needs to think a lot harder and longer before he will have an adequate grasp of the nature of reality: this Socrates is a budding metaphycisian, not the purely ethical thinker of Apology and other 'Socratic' dialogues."  In this dialogue the theory of "Forms" is discussed which was further discussed in Sophist, Statesman and Philebus. "The meeting of Socrates with the Eleatic philosophers (an invention of Plato's) is reported in a way unparalleled in the other dialogues."
Antiphon, Plato's and Adeimantus half-brother (same mother as Plato and Adeimantus) memorized this dialogue when he was younger, but at the time (when Cephalus spoke) of Parmenides, the dialogue, narrated by Cephalus, written by Plato, Antiphon was working with horses. Cephalus heard a narration from Antiphon about the original dialogue. 
The dialogue between Socrates, Parmenides and Zeno, which are carried over from memory in this dialogue, took place at "the Great Panathenaea". Parmenides was about 65 years old, Zeno close to 40, and Socrates young. Aristotle who later became one of "the Thirty" tyrants also took part in the original dialogue. The original dialogue took place "outside the city wall in the Potters' Quarter". The dialogue started after Zeno read his book, which Zeno and Parmenides brought to Athens to promote.
Socrates claims that Zeno and Parmenides says basically the same but tries to hide the similarity with different words; the similarity that "all is one". Zeno answers Socrates that Socrates grasped not "the truth" about Zeno's book, because Zeno's book was a defence of Parmenides's theory. 
At 129b Socrates says rightly that he will "be astonished" if someone shows what "the one" is, Zeno and Parmenides claim, exist. 
The forms of Parmenides is grasped by reasoning. 
Parmenides says that Plato is a recent ("young") philosopher and therefore Socrates still cares about what other philosophers think Socrates thinks. 
At 131a Socrates asks Parmenides why can't all be one whole.  My answer, with Parmenides's and Zeno's thesis, if i was a sophist, would have been that all must have a form, which is separate and unlike but like the all around us.
Parmenides answered: "So, being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in things that are many and separate; and thus it would be separate from itself." 
It seems during this dialogue, Socrates was a nominalist because he did not like the "contradiction" that something is like and unlike. To Socrates "like" meant something similar to "gelykenis" in the Decalogue of the Old Testament of the Bible.
131d-e: Someone says that if something that partakes 'in' the form, small, is divided, then the part will always be larger than the form of small. 
132c: It was Socrates's contribution to the theory of forms that ' "that other things partake of forms" ', according to Parmenides. 
132d, Socrates said: ' "No, what appears most likely to me is this: these forms are like patterns set in nature, and other things resemble them and are likenesses; and this partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them." '
133c-134c: Each character of the alphabet represents a form we partake of through our names, but we cannot know the form of the characters.
134c: The character of knowledge is precision according to Parmenides.
134: According to Parmenides's theory of forms, Forms relate to "god" and "gods'" knowledge. Icorporeal theon cannot influence us and we have no knowledge of incorporeal theon. 
135a-b, Parmenides: ' "Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself." '
At 135b-c, Parmenides says that if someone allows not for these forms we cannot know and by implication nullifies the purpose of definitions, then "the power of dialectic" ("dialegesthai") or in another word ' "discourse" ' or "untechnically", ' "conversation" ', will be destroyed. 
With reference to a discussion Parmenides overheard between Socrates and Aristotle, Parmenides claims that because Socrates have not been taught "philosophy" ("something people think useless – what the crowds call idle talk.") enough, Socrates sees not clearly because Socrates tries to isolate the forms of "beautiful, and just and good", something not one can do in the right way, without the necessary training. Socrates needs training in Parmenides's doctrine, "Otherwise, the truth will escape you", according to Parmenides.
The consequences of hypotheses according to Parmenides should be thought about as if the hypotheses are and are not.  To investigate the "is" and "is not" of each hypothesis will, after training make "a full view of the truth" possible.  I think Parmenides meant his statement in a functional, consequentialist way in order to manipulate Socrates. Maybe Parmenides realised that the most important truth we can realise is to be honest in order to build more coherent pictures via nominalist truths and false theories, we know is false, which we do not portray as truth, a truth or the truth. If Parmenides realised that he however did not practice it because he influenced Socrates with a fiunctionalist promise of giving Socrates, through philosophical training a view of "the truth", which in my view are the beliefs, which give courages to be honest.
Socrates answers that what Parmenides promises is not possible. 
From 137c-157b, Parmenides gives an example of his "dialectic" ("dialegesthai") by thinking aloud about a "oneness" of "the one". He ends with ' "Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it."—"Apparently not."—"Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it."—"It seems not."—"Is it possible that these things are for the one?"—"I certainly don't think so." ' Then he starts again with a dialectic to "agree on the consequences for it", which ends with "And a name and an account belong to it, and it is named and spoken of. … That's exactly so." The third dialectic about that one, which begins with "If" ends with "Doubtless."
16 June 2014
"In the Protagoras the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself as the original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced in the Ion. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and of opinion: he professes to have all knowledge, which is derived by him from Homer, just as the sophist professes to have all wisdom, which is contained in his art of rhetoric. Even more than the sophist he is incapable of appreciating the commonest logical distinctions; he cannot explain the nature of his own art; his great memory contrasts with his inability to follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest moments of inspiration he has an eye to his own gains."
At 530d Ion refers to Glaucon as a specialist (maybe a rhapsode also) of Homer.
"SOCRATES: O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth."
Magnesia is according to note 2 also a place in Caria, Asia Minor. In Plato's Laws Magnesia was the republic he wrote laws for, in Crete, close to the cave of Zeus.
At 536e to 537 Socrates identifies another meaning of "subjects". Ion understands "subjects" to mean the gods of professions but Socrates refers to the subject ('vak') of chariot driving as well.
30 May 2014
This dialogue gives primarily Plato's opinion about the nature of knowledge, therefore it is the founding document of " 'epistemology' ". "Theaetetus was a famous mathematician", active at the Academy during Plato's life.
28 July 2014
"SOCRATES: So knowledge and wisdom will be the same thing?
Socrates acknowledges that good mathematical skills originate from honesties because he says Theaetetus will not be a "false witness" at 148.
150e, l.5324: Socrates opines that he brings out knowledge from people he interacts but some of them realise not that Socrates's method helps them to see clearer what actualitie are. They then "set more value on lies and phantoms than upon the truth".
151d, l.5335: "SOCRATES: … but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie and put away truth."
152e, l.5345: Theaetetus opines "knowledge is simply perception." and Socrates answers that's "a good frank answer, my son. That's the way to speak one's mind." Socrates then says Protagoras also opined that perception is knowledge and he quotes Protagoras's saying as proof: "'Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.'"
152d-e, l.5374: Socrates states a "no ordinary theory", according to him, Because people perceive things differently, nothing is the way it seems, because things are continuously changing and "blending" and "coming to be." According to Socrates "all the wise men of the past" had this view, except Parmenides. They included Empedocles, Heraclitus, Protagoras and also poets; Epicharmus who wrote comedies and Homer who wrote tragedies.
l.7162, note 6: Protagoras was a sophist.
153a, l.5385: Socrates opines that "being" and "becoming" are products "of motion" and "not-being and passing away result from a state of rest."
154a: Socrates says that colour is something between the thing with colour and eyes and although we use the same name for the colour we do not necessarily see the colour the same way.
This sceptic, relativistic argument of Socrates cannot apply to forms of things because forms are fitted together to form new forms. A V fits physically into another V and therefore the V appear the same to different people because two Vs can be explained by one and fitted by another.
156a-c, l.5481: Socrates claims all things perceived, result from motion, which has two parts, one moving and one at rest. The perceived and the perceiving.
Earlier Socrates also mentioned things between objects and perceiving.
157b-c, l.5509: Socrates opines that a knowledgeable man must not talk about stasis because then he could be refuted. If he mentions movement, which is really happening continuously, then he will speak truer.
157c-d, l.5515: Socrates claims he is just repeating what other wise men taught him and that he is "barren of theories" of his own.
158b, l.5535: "THEAETETUS: … But I really shouldn't know how to dispute the suggestion that a madman believes what is false when he thinks he is a god".
160b-c, l.5613: Socrates says that '''being'" and "'becoming'" should never be used apart from the things it refers to. He says: "That is the meaning of the theory we have been expounding."
160c, l5613: Theaetetus acknowledges that he observes only his perspective.
This statement of Theaetetus supports the plurality of God because creativity can be better when different perspectives are combined. Say for example an object has to be fit into another object and two people view the object to be fitted, from two sides. The one person sees that on his side there is a protrusion, which will hamper the fitting. If he does not communicate that observation truly to the other person who cannot see the protrusion the fitting process could be a failure. There is also by implication a mentioning of the possibility of selfishness when that what only one realise is not shared with a teammate.
160d, l.5620: "SOCRATES: Then that was a grand idea of your when you told us that knowledge is nothing more or less than perception."
162d-e, l.5671-5676: Socrates turns the whole argument syaing that the relativist, sceptical argument he convinced Theaetetus with is "mob-oratory" because a sophist would say: "'My good people, young and old, you sit here orating; you drag in gods, whose existence or nonexistence I exclude from all discussion, written or spoken; you keep on saying whatever is likely to be acceptable to the mob, telling them that it would be a shocking thing if no man were wiser than any cow in a field; but of proof or necessity not a word. You must rely on plausibility; though if Theodorus or any other geometer were to do that in his branch of science, it's a good-for-nothing geometer he would be'."
It seems from the above that Sophistical arguments are currently prevailing in South-African society. "Sophistical" here means not the same as Kant's "Sophistical" in his book Critique of pure reason. The use of the word "sophist" is not constant because the translator stated at l.7162, note 6: Protagoras was a sophist. Socrates refers here to a Protagoras argument, which accepts only certain truths, with proof. Sophists became empiricists, who are irrational. They do not value reason. It is thus an important distinction, which is made here by Socrates for distinguishing between empirical thought, which disregards reason and reasonable arguments, which posit God (partly gods and goddesses), a reality.
163-164c, l.5711: Socrates adds another argument. That because memories of perceptions exist we cannot say that knowledge is perception.
This argument made me think that memories are only perspectival knowledge, unless memories originate from perceptions already combined in a fuller picture before observation takes place. Socrates explains this thought at 165d-e, l.5776.
164c-d, l.5745: Socrates argues against sophists he calls "champion controversialists".
166-167a, l.5808: "SOCRATES: … In education, too, what we have to do is to change a worse state into a better state; only whereas the doctor brings about the change by the use of drugs, the professional teacher does it by the use of words."
Socrates implies here that the different perspectival memories of people should be combined to form a more coherent whole knowledge than the individual knowledges of perspectival perception.
166d-e, l.5803: For Socrates the difference between knowledgeable and not knowledgeable is that "the man", who is knowledgeable, can change problems for the better, "for him".
167a-b, l.5812: Socrates claims what we immediately experience is true and that we cannot judge "what is not". His argument seems to be empiricist but then he states that if a person is healthy his perception is "better" but not "truer".
This argument considers not that society who suffers from Caiaphas syndrome sometimes can perceive things not better than an individual they claim is sick, but actually are healthier than society.
168d-e, l.5843: Here i started thinking that possibly Socrates is contradicting himself. My thoughts were probably wrong because he spoke much in the 3rd person. What Protagoras would have said to him. I understood Protagoras and other sophists (See 152d-e, l.5374), according to Socrates, to have claimed that everything is in motion and therefore everything is relative. It seems thus that Socrates was a supporter of Parmenides, who claimed everything is one stable entity.
Was Plato a man of middles who placed him in between the sophist and other philosophies? It could be that it was his position, except in the Laws, which apparently gave his view via the Athenian's.
169d, l.5876: Socrates states here he argues against Protagoras's sophist opinion that all men are equally the measure of their own truth. Socrates thus regard men to be different.
Platonism is often regarded a communist doctrine, but Socrates here states a different opinion.
170b-c, l.5896: Socrates distinguishes between true and false judgement and he states that in times of crises people tend to look towards leaders, who are knowledgeable.
170d, l.5902: When Socrates says "that man is the measure of all things" he argues against that. He thus regard "man" in the singular, with a perspectivist view, which should become more accurate via true knowledge, which is a wider concept than perspectivist nominalist truths of one man at a time.
172c-d, l.5966: Socrates compares court sophists with students of philosophy and he says philosophers are not successful in court.
Could it be that courts function better with nominalist truths, than with realist truths? Probably, because my many pages written in the court procedures i am involved in seems to fall on deaf ears.
176a, l.6040: Socrates mentions "the life of gods". He therefore acknowledged living "gods".
176b, l.6045: Socrates says a man becomes "as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with understanding." The singular "a man" is problematic, why not "men"?
176c, l.6049: "SOCRATES: … In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as just as it lies in human nature to be. And it is here that we see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a nonentity; for it is the realization of this that is genuine wisdom and goodness, while the failure to realize it is manifest folly and wickedness." Again singular "the man". It seems the same singularity problem of Caiaphaci was applicable at Socrates. His God is by implication partly, all "good" people, but perfection of God, he posits, places God completely away from humanity, and therefore his view is not sufficient to counter evil.
176d-177a, l.6063: Socrates says the penalty for evil is persons' souls do not leave earth, and wander amongst evil doers after death.
178c, l.6100: Socrates refutes Protagoras's argument of each man the measure of his things by referring to the future. One man's predictions come true and another's not therefore Protagoras's argument cannot be applied to the future.
This argument about the future favours a correspondences theory of truths, with a coherence and correspondence priority for honesties.
178e-179a, l.6119: Theodorus proclaims that Protagoras claimed to be a good judge of the future, but Socrates doubts whether it was the case.
Maybe Protagoras, if he was a good judge of the future can be then classified as an honest philosopher according to Intequinism. The generalisations that arguments are with regard to relativity or the absolute can therefore according to Intequinism be attributed to conditions. Sometimes relativity would be applicable, sometimes absolutism. But that is just with regard to correspondence. The issue at hand is a teleological end. What do we aim for?
179b, l.6125: Here Socrates mentions the main point of their argument. Socrates, like Plato (his philosopher king) claims the cleverest man is "'the measure'", whereas Protagoras claimed that all men have each their own measure.
The two views depends on what is the measure over. National or local or house politics. Intequinism's claim is that aspectual knowledge from corresponding truths gives the best measure. The better Knowledges, thus, are formed by aspectual science from corresponding truths. The problem question now that questions Intequinism's postulate as counter argument in favour of a philosopher king is; what is practical. Can aspectual true knowledge be formed currently in a corrupt society? Aspectual true knowledge could therefore be just a teleological end, Intequinism posits, without being possible currently. It is a territorial question in the sphere context of reformational Christian philosophy. It seems to me that in any territory, large or small, inclusive of smaller territories, an aspectual view, which punishes deceit, in stead of a perspectivist view, will be more useful, because minds that work together can achieve more and know more than one mind. A problem Socrates questioned is interference into smaller territories or specialized jobs by a higher authority. To solve the problem there has to be universal applications like honesties, which can only be made not-applicable by, for example, NPCI.
179c, l.6131: "SOCRATES: There is more than one point besides these, Theodorus, on which a conviction might be secured—at least so far as it is a matter of proving that not every man's judgment is true. But so long as we keep within the limits of that immediate present experience of the individual which gives rise to perceptions and to perceptual judgments, it is more difficult to convict these latter of being untrue—but perhaps I'm talking nonsense. Perhaps it is not possible to convict them at all; perhaps those who profess that they are perfectly evident and are always knowledge may be saying what really is. And it may be that our Theaetetus was not (d) far from the mark with his proposition that knowledge and perception are the same thing. We shall have to come closer to grips with the theory, as the speech on behalf of Protagoras required us to do. We shall have to consider and test this moving Being, and find whether it rings true or sounds as if it had some flaw in it, anyway—and no shortage of fighting men.
THEODORUS: No, indeed; but in Ionia it seems to be even growing, and assuming vast dimensions. On the side of this theory, the Heraclitean party is conducting a most vigorous campaign.
SOCRATES: The more reason, then, my dear Theodorus, why we should examine it by going back to its first principle, which is the way they (e) present it themselves.
THEODORUS: I quite agree. You know, Socrates, these Heraclitean doctrines (or, as you say, Homeric or still more ancient)—you can't discuss them in person with any of the people at Ephesus who profess to be adepts, any more than you could with a maniac. They are just like the things they say in their books—always on the move. As for abiding by what is said, or sticking to a question, or quietly answering and asking questions in turn, (180) there is less than nothing of that in their capacity. That's an exaggeration, no doubt. I mean there isn't so much as a tiny bit of repose in these people. If you ask any one of them a question, he will pull out some little enigmatic phrase from his quiver and shoot it off at you; and if you try to make him give an account of what he has said, you will only get hit by another, full of strange turns of language. You will never reach any conclusion with any of them, ever; indeed they never reach any conclusion with each other, they are so very careful not to allow anything to be stable, either in an (b) argument or in their own souls. I suppose they think that if they did it would be something that stands still—this being what they are totally at war war with, and what they are determined to banish from the universe, if they can."
180e, l.6170: "SOCRATES: … What are we to do with all these people, my friend? We have been gradually advancing till, without realizing it, we have got ourselves in (181) between the two parties; and if we don't in some way manage to put up a fight and make our escape, we shall pay for it, like the people who play that game on the line in the wrestling schools, and get caught by both parties and pulled in opposite directions.
Now I think we ought to begin by examining the other party, the fluent fellows we started to pursue. If they appear to us to be talking sense, we will help them drag us over to their side, and try to escape the others. But if those who make their stand for the whole appear to be nearer the (b) truth, we will take refuge with them from the men who 'move what should not be moved'."
181d, l.6190: "SOCRATES: Then I now have two forms of motion, alteration and spatial movement.
THEODORUS: Yes; and that's quite correct."
186c, l.6341: "SOCRATES: Now is it possible for someone who does not even get at being to get at truth?
THEAETETUS: No; it's impossible.
SOCRATES: And if a man fails to get to the truth of a thing, will he ever be a person who knows that thing?
(d) THEAETETUS: I don't see how, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth."
187c-188d(b)-, l.6397: "SOCRATES: I have something on my mind which has often bothered me [d] before, and got me into great difficulty, both in my onw thought and in discussion with other people—I mean, I can't say what it is, this experience we have, and how it arises in us.
THEAETETUS: What experience?
SOCRATES: Judging what is false. …
(188) SOCRATES: Now isn't it true about all things, together or individually, that we must either know them or not know them? I am ignoring for the moment the intermediate conditions of learning and forgetting, as they don't affect the argument here.
THEAETETUS: Of course, Socrates, in that case there is no alternative. With each thing we either know it or we do not.
SOCRATES: Then when a man judges, the objects of his judgement are necessarily ]either[ things which he knows [of]—or things which he doesn't know?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that must be so.
SOCRATES: Yet if he knows a thing, it is impossible that he should not (b) know it; or if he does not know it, he cannot know it.
THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.
SOCRATES: Now take the man who judges what is false. Is he thinking that things which he knows are not these things but some other things which he knows—so that knowing both he is ignorant of both?
THEAETETUS: But that would be impossible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then is he imagining that things which he doesn't know are other things which he doesn't know? Is it possible that a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?
(c) THEAETETUS: I don't see how that could happen.
SOCRATES: But a man certainly doesn't think that things he knows are things he does not know, or again that things he doesn't know are things he knows.
THEAETETUS: No, that would be a very odd thing.
SOCRATES: Then in what way is false judgment still possible? There is evidently no possibility of judgment outside the cases we have mentioned, since eveything is either a thing we know or a thing we don't know; and within these limits there appears to be no place for false judgment to be possible.
THEAETETUS: That's perfectly true.
SOCRATES: Then perhaps we had better take up a different line of inquiry; (d) perhaps we should proceed not by way of knowing and not-knowing, but by way of being and not-being?
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Perhaps the simple fact is this: it is when a man judges about anything things which are not, that he is inevitably judging falsely, no matter what may be the nature of his thought in other respects.
THEAETETUS: That again is very plausible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Now how will that be? What are we going to say, Theaetetus, if somebody sets about examining us, and we are asked, 'Is what these words express possible for anyone? Can a man judge what is not, either (e) about one of the things which are, or just by itself?' I suppose we shall reply, 'Yes, when he is thinking, but thinking what is not true.' Or how shall we answer?
THEAETETUS: That's our answer.
SOCRATES: Now does this kind of thing happen elsewhere?
THEAETETUS: What kind of thing?
SOCRATES: Well, for instance, that a man sees something, yet sees nothing.
THEAETETUS: How could he?
SOCRATES: On the contrary, in fact, if he is seeing any one thing, he must be seeing a thing which is. Or do you think that a 'one' can be found among the things which are not?
THEAETETUS: I certainly don't.
SOCRATES: Then a man who is seeing any one thing is seeing something which is?
SOCRATES: It also follows that a man who is hearing anything is hearing (189) some one thing and something which is.
SOCRATES: And a man who is touching anything is touching some one thing, and a thing which is, if it is one?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that also follows.
SOCRATES: And a man who is judging is judging some one thing, is he not?
SOCRATES: And a man who is judging some one thing is judging something which is?
THEAETETUS: I grant that.
SOCRATES: Then that means that a man who is judging something which is not is judging nothing?
THEAETETUS: So it appears.
SOCRATES: But a man who is judging nothing is not judging at all.
THEAETETUS: That seems clear.
SOCRATES: And so it is not possible to judge what is not, either about (b) the things which are or just by itself.
THEAETETUS: Apparently not.
SOCRATES: False judgment, then, is something different from judging things which are not?
THEAETETUS: It looks as if it were.
SOCRATES: Then neither on this approach nor on the one we followed just now does false judgment exist in us."
190d, l.6494: "SOCRATES: But if he has only one of them before his mind in judging, and the other is not present to him at all, he will never judge that one is the other."
A problem of Socrates's
dialectic is that he leads conclusions into a very specific
direction with leading questions and then he extrapolates to
universals for example with "never" above. His method is not
scientific because his "never" and "all" is based on his
reasoning alone. In his example above it is possible to
include another circumstance that posits that persons can
mistakenly call a dog a cat, if they have not the knowledge
about a dog that looks like a cat. If persons have not the
word "dog" in their vocabulary they could make a mistake, with
regards to a cat that looks like a dog, etc. Did not think
these examples through properly. Such kinds of circumstances
exclude the possibility of the word "never" and "all". "At
all" is another term, which could include the word "all"
because it refers not to all circumstances according to my
understanding. It is used to express a strong motivation, not
necessarily all circumstances.
1 August 2014.
193d-194a, l.6592: "SOCRATES: Well, I was saying that if you know one man and perceive (e) him as well, and keep your knowledge of him in line with your perception, you will never take him for some other person whom you know and are perceiving, and the knowledge of whom you are holding straight with the perception. Wasn't that so?
SOCRATES: There remained, I take it, the case we have just mentioned where false judgment arises in the following manner: you know both men (194) and you are looking at both, or having some other perception of them; and you don't hold the two signs each in line with its own perception, but like a bad archer you shoot beside the mark and miss—which is precisely what we call falsehood."
Socrates implies here the problems, which disinformation, via own lies can cause. Memories regarding disinformation about others logically causes malformed thoughts about those others by the selves, who spread false rumours. Those rumours have to be remembered by disinformers and therefore causes illogical knowledge. Disinformations are clatter of knowledge and logically the most negative effect will be at disinformers selves.
The opinions that Socrates give about "false" at 194b reveals that he considers not honesties (soundnesses). He says that if "we do not know and have never perceived, there is no possibility of error or of false judgement, if what we are saying is at all sound".
At 194d, l.6614, Socrates posits that a good memory is a sign of truth. Maybe it was in his time the case, because according to Feyerabend concepts had fixed forms, which most agreed about. To integrate perceptions about concepts into memories is currently problematic because the same constancy do not exist as, for example, perceptions of physical matter. Perceptions about metaphysical matters are not constant at all currently.
At 195d; l.6643, Socrates explains that his opinion about truths here are similar to correspondence theories of truth and it is "some beautiful discovery."
196c, l.6669: SOCRATES: … But as the matter now stands, either there is no such thing as false judgment; or a man may not know what he knows. Which do you choose?
THEAETETUS: You are offering me an impossible choice, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But I'm afraid the argument will not permit both.
At 199e: l.6779, Socrates and Theaetetus acknowledges information ("knowledge") and disinformation ("ignorance") and that disinformation causes "false" judgment. The word "ignorance" is not correct because a reference is made to something. Ignorance implies something exists not at the point of interest; ignorance is the lack of knowledge at ones, which exists at others. Disinformation implies words that formed the disinformation exist, but the reality corresponds not with the words.
201a; l.6813: "SOCRATES: The art of the greatest representatives of wisdom—the men called orators and lawyers."
201d; l.6827: "THEAETETUS: … He said that it is true (d) judgment with an account that is knowledge; true judgment without an account falls outside of knowledge. And he said that the things of which there is no account are not knowable (yes, he actually called them that), while those which have an account are knowable.
SOCRATES: Very good indeed."
201e-202b; l.6835-6849: "SOCRATES:…the
primary elements, (e) as it were, of which we and everything
else are composed, have no account. Each of them, in itself,
can only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of
it, either that it is or that it is not. That would mean that
we were (202) adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must
not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself
alone. Indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as
'itself' or 'that', 'each', 'alone', or 'this', or any other
of the many words of this kind…it can only be named, for a
name is all that it has. But with the things composed of
these, it is another matter. Here, just in the same way as the
elements themselves are woven together, so their names may be
woven together and become an account of something—an account
being essentially a complex of names. Thus the elements are
unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable,
whereas the complexes are both knowable and expressable and
can be the objects of true judgement."
202e; l.6861: "SOCRATES: Letters—the elements of language—and syllables. It must have been these, musn't it, that the author of our theory had in view—it couldn't have been anything else?"
204b; l.6907: "SOCRATES: Now do you call 'sum' and 'whole' the same thing or different things?
THEAETETUS: I don't feel at all certain; but as you keep telling me to answer up with a good will, I will take a risk and say they are different."
6 Augustus 2014
217a-b, l.7306: Socrates distinguishes "sophist", "statesman" and "philosopher" and asks if the words can be combined and separated to be understood better and the visitor answers, in Elea (Italy), they distinguishes three complicated distinct kinds.
219a-c, l.7354-7369: The visitor then uses an example to explain his methodology. The example is to show how an acccount of angling is derived. He starts at a high level concept and divides "expertise" into two types; "production" and "acquisition". Production refers to producing (making) and acquisition refers to "learning, recognition, commerce, combat, and hunting." Acquisition "take things that are or have come into being, and they take possession of some of them with words and actions, and they keep other things from being taken possession of."
219d-221a, l.7374-7420: The visitor then divides acquisition again into two parts. "The part that's done openly we label combat" and "the part that's secret we call hunting." Hunting is then again divided into two; "the hunting of living things and the hunting of lifeless things." He continues with divisions into two, which shows partly his methodology and way of thinking, until he isolates other methods of hunting from angling, because angling is the object of discussion. Angling is defined as fishing with lines and hooks.
222c-d, l.7470: The visitor divides hunting for humans into two types, one relating to "war" and "force" and another relating to "persuasion."
222e-223a, l.7478-7486. The visitor from Elea distinguishes sophists from hunters of people who hunts by flattery and giving presents. Sophistry he relates to teachings about "virtue" for income and flattery he relates to "expertise in love."
223b, l.7493: The visitor defines sophists with his methodology as people who hunts for income from "rich, prominent young men." The visitor's classification is apart from production; "appropriation, taking possession, hunting, animal hunting, hunting on land, human hunting, hunting by persuasion, hunting privately, and money earning."
224c-d, l.7532: "VISITOR: …We'll say that the expertise of the part of acquisition, exchange, selling, wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing in words and learning (d) that have to do with virtue—that's sophistry in its second appearance."
224e, l7538: The visitor
distinguishes between "things
that others make" and "things
that he [a sophist]
makes himself", which sophists sell
when retailing. The visitor's classifications are therefore
not definite because when he started his explanation he
divided expertise between acquisition and production. Here he
includes "things that he makes himself" in the category, which initially excluded
225c, l.7563: "VISITOR: But what about disputation that's done expertly and involves controversy about general issues, including what's just and what's unjust? Don't we normally call that debating [eristic]?" Note 6, l.8968: "The word here translated by "debating," eristikon, is sometimes translated (or transliterated) "eristic." It refers to a practice of competitive debating which the sophists made popular in Athens. Plato's use of the term stigmatizes the practice as not directed at truth."
225d-226a, l7569-7577: "VISITOR: Part of debating [eristic], it turns out, wastes money and the other part makes money.
VISITOR: Let's try and say what each of them ought to be called."
225e-226a, l.7577: They then distinguishes between people who debate for their own pleasure, which is unpleasant to others and describe it as "chatter". The type that makes money according to them is the opposite of chatter and identified as sophistry.
229e-230e, l.7698-7720: The visitor refers to two types of teaching. Admonition, "our forefathers' time-honored method of scolding" which is not appreciated, and refutation. Refutation shames people by showing them their contradicting arguments. Refutation is regarded the best method to cleanse a soul, of ones who think they know but do not know. The visitor does not want to acknowledge sophistry by ascribing refutation to sophists but he explains that sophistry has something to do with refutation.
231c-, l.7738-: "VISITOR: But let's stop first and catch our breath, so to speak. And while (d) we're resting let's ask ourselves, "Now, how many different appearances has the sophist presented to us?" I think we first discovered him as a hired hunter of rich young men.
VISITOR: Second, as a whole-saler of learning about the soul.
VISITOR: Third, didn't he appear as a retailer of the same things?
THEAETETUS: Yes, and fourth as a seller of his own learning?
VISITOR: Your memory's correct. I'll try to recall the fifth way: he was (e) an athlete in verbal combat, distinguishing by his expertise in debating.
VISITOR: The sixth appearance was disputed, but still we made a concession to him and took it that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere with learning."
232b-233c, l.7758-7807: The visitor then leads Theaetetus into realising that sophists specialize in disputation about anything but that 'disputation about anything' is "self-referentially incoherent" because not one can have knowledge about everything. The sophists are nevertheless paid and appear to be very knowledgeable about many things but they do not know what truths are.
233c, l.7807: "VISITOR: So the sophist has now appeared as having a kind of belief knowledge about everything, but not truth."
235a, l.7849: "VISITOR: So we have to regard him [a sophist] as a cheat and an imitator."
236e-237c, l.7895-7919: "VISITOR: Really, my young friend, this is a very difficult investigation we're engaged in. This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and (e) this saying things but not true things—all these issues are full of confusion, just as they always have been. It's extremely hard, Theaetetus, to say what form of speech we should use to say there really is such a thing as false saying or believing, and moreover to utter this without being caught (237) in a verbal conflict.
VISITOR: Because this form of speech of ours involves the rash assumption that that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn't come into being. But when we were boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us form start to finish, speaking in both prose and poetic rhythms, that
'Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be; While you search, keep your thought far away from this path.'
So we have his testimony to this. And our own way of speaking itself (b) would make the point especially obvious if it we examined it a little. So if it's all the same to you, let's look at that first.
THEAETETUS: As far as I'm concerned you can do what you want. But as far as our way of speaking is concerned, think about how it will go best, and follow along with it and take me along the road with you.
VISITOR: That's what we have to do. Tell me: do we dare to utter the sound that which in no way is?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: But suppose one of our listeners weren't debating or playing a game but had to think seriously and answer the following question: What (c) should the name, that which is not, be applied to? Why do we think he'd use it, and in what connection, and for what kind of purpose? And what would he indicate by it to someone else who wanted to find out about it?
THEAETETUS: That's a hard question. In fact, it's just about completely, impossibly confusing for someone like me to answer.
VISITOR: But anyway this much is obvious to us, that that which is not can't be applied to any of those which are.
THEAETETUS: Of course not.
VISITOR: So if you can't apply it to that which is, it wouldn't be right to apply it to something."
The above argument, which was referenced by Taylor and Lee was proven false by phenomenology because "that which is not" exists as phenomena in minds and as words, whilst not existing as material.
239c, l.7988: The visitor uses this argument that, "that which is not" cannot be sensibly talked about because it doesn’t exist. We cannot even logically refer to "it" as singular or plural. This is used then as an argument against sophists because they tend to speak about immaterial things, which exist only as words and as phenomena in minds.
240a, l.8001: The visitor claims, that what sophists say, exists "only in terms of words", but he acknowledges not phenoma in minds. The visitor says that sophists talk about something that is through everything that connects everything as one thing.
240d, l.8022: "VISITOR: When we say that he [a sophist] deceives us about appearances and that (d) he's an expert at deception, are we saying so because his expertise makes our souls believe what is false? Or what shall we say?
THEAETETUS: Just that."
7 August 2014
243e-244a, l.8121-8133: The visitor distinguishes two types of being pronounced by "is" and "are". He is not sure about the actuality because some regard "are" to be not because they say everything "is" one.
246b-c, l.8214: Theaetetus and the visitor mentions quarrels that are between men about being. Some say "beings" are referred to only when its consist of matter and some say real being are referred to as consisting of immaterial concepts like "truth". The referrers to truths replaces being with a "process of coming-to-be". "There's a never-ending battle going on constantly between them about this issue." The people referring to the concept of the truth, primarily, in the sense of being thus recognized the participle verb, being.
Can we refer to them who beinged?
246c-d, l.8219: "VISITOR: It's easier to talk with the ones who put being in the forms. They're gentler people. It's harder—and perhaps just about impossible—with (d) the ones who drag everything down to body by force. It seems to me that we have to deal with them this way."
The concept of the truth, combined with matter, make up beings' being and becoming.
247d, l.8253: The visitor acknowledges the possibilty that concepts and matter are, in stead of just either is of concept or is of matter.
247e, l.8259: "VISITOR: …I'll take it as a definition that those which are amount to nothing other than capacity." Materialists agree with this view.
250c, l.8347: "THEAETETUS: It does seem probably true that when we say change and rest are, we do have a kind of omen of that which is as a third thing.
VISITOR: So that which is isn’t both change and rest; it's something different from them instead.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
VISITOR: Therefore by its own nature that which is doesn't either rest or change."
250d-e, l.8361: "VISITOR: When we were asked what we should apply the name that which is not to, we became completely confused. Do you remember?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And now aren't we in just as much confusion about that (e) which is?
THEAETETUS: We seem to be in even more confusion, if that's possible."
254a-b, l.8458-8465: "VISITOR: The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he's had practice dealing with, and he's hard to see because the place is so dark. Isn't that right?
THEAETETUS: It seems to be.
VISITOR: But the philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form, being. He isn't at all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people's souls can't bear to look at what's divine.
THEAETETUS: That seems just as right as what you just said before."
256d, l.8563: "VISITOR: So shall we go on fearlessly contending that change is different from that which is?
THEAETETUS: Yes, we should be absolutely fearless.
VISITOR: So it's clear that change really is both something that is not, but also a thing that is since it partakes in that which is?
THEAETETUS: That's absolutely clear."
257c-d, l.8591-8599: "VISITOR: Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that has to do with something is marked off and has a name peculiar to itself. That's why there are said to be many expertises and many kinds (d) of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Of course." This statement supports truths with regard to aspectual knowledge, because what else than truths can hold varied expertises together in a coherent whole?
258b-c, l.8628-8633: "VISITOR: …Should we say .. that which is not also was and is not being, and is one form among the many that are? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts about that?
VISITOR: You know, our disbelief in Parmenides has gone even farther than his prohibition.
VISITOR: We've pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about." I assume this identifcation of existence of "that which is not", may be referring to phenomena in minds, which occur because of lies as well as the words that made up those lies, the paper it could have been written on and the memories the sound waves could have been recorded with.
260b-261a, l.8683-8704: "VISITOR: That which is not appeared to us to be one kind among others, but scattered over all those which are.
VISITOR: So next we have to think about whether it blends with belief and speech.
(c) VISITOR: If it doesn't blend with them then everything has to be true. But if it does then there will be false belief and false speech, since falsity in thinking and speaking amount to believing and saying those that are not.
VISITOR: And if there's falsity then there's deception.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And if there's deception then necessarily the world will be full of copies, likenesses, and appearances.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: We said that the sophist had escaped into this region, but that (d) he denied that there has come to be or is such a thing as falsity. For he denied that anyone either thinks or says that which is not, on the ground that that which is not never in any way has a share in being.
THEAETETUS: That's what he said.
VISITOR: But now it apparently does share in that which is, so he probably wouldn't still put up a fight about that. … Then when we've seen that clearly we can show that falsity is, and when we've shown that we can tie the soophist up in it, if we can keep hold of him—or else we'll let him go and look for him in another kind."
263, l.8763: The visitor explains that truth and falsity relate to correspondence with facts, if words are used literally. He relates the truth to "those that are, as they are".
265a, l.8840-8846: "VISITOR: Didn't we begin by dividing expertise into productive and acquisitive?
VISITOR: And under the aquisitive part the sophist appeared in hunting, combat, wholesaling, and tyes of that sort.
THEAETETUS: Of course."
265b-e, l.8847-8866: The visitor explains to Theaetetus that production can be divided between "divine" and "human" production. Divine production is effected by "a god" and is seen in "nature" and human production is identified by it's likenesses to natural things. A uniquely shaped car for example will not fall under divine production because cars do not grow.
268b-c, l.8945-8951: Theaetetus and the visitor explains that the name 'sophist' is used to identify sophists because they imitate wise people, not because they are wise themselves.
8 August 2014
l.22062; 310b, 22093; 311b, 22123: Hippocrates, not the famous physician, was Socrates's friend and accompanied him to Callias's house when Socrates debated with Protagoras.
314b, l.22191-22195: SOCRATES: "Anyway, these are the questions we should look into, with the help of our elders. You and I are still a little too young to get to the bottom of such a great matter."
316d-317b, 22238-22246: PROTAGORAS: "Now, I maintain that the sophist's art is an ancient one, but that the men who practiced it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, disguised it, masking it sometimes as poetry, as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did, or as mystery religions and prophecy, witness Orpheus and Musaeus and occasionally, I've noticed even as athletics, as with (e) Iccus and Tarentum and, in our own time, Herodicus and Selymbria (originally of Megara), as great a sophist as any. Your own Agathocles, a great sophist, used music as a front, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. All (317) of them, as I say, used these various arts as screens out of fear of ill will. And this is where I part company with them all, for I do not believe that they accomplished their end; I believe they failed, in fact, to conceal from the powerful men in the cities the true purpose of their disguises. …So I have come down the completely opposite road. I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate (c) men, and I consider this admission to be a better precaution than denial."
Protagoras implies that an ancient art, that had been hidden was brought out into the open by partly him recently. Was it out in the open though, because as far as i can see no sophist has said that they use lies. From the previous dialogue, Theaetetus, they claim that lies do not exist.
318e-319a, l.22278: PROTAGORAS: '"What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage (319) one's household, and in public affairs—how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action."'
SOCRATES: '"Am I following what you are saying?" I asked. "You appear to be talking about the art of citizenship, and to e promising to make men good citizens."'
PROTAGORAS: '"This is exactly what I claim, Socrates."'
It seems thus that Protagoras claims to sell knowledge about a competitive advantage to people. The knowledge has been used by others but not admittedly.
319c-320b, l.22287-22300: Socrates tells Protagoras that usually in Athens they accept only teachings by people who are specialists ('"a person not regarded as a craftsman"') and who were educated with regard to technical matters. With regard to '"city management"', '"public life"' and '"private life"', though, anyone can talk, without an education, because '"virtue"' cannot be taught. Socrates uses Pericles, the political leader of Athens and his sons as examples. Pericles was successful but he struggled to teach Alcibiades and Clinias, whom he oversees.
324c-d, l.22374: According to Protagoras, the Athenians and himself regard '"virtue"' a teachable subject.
326d-e, l.22408: Protagoras regards '"virtue"' a teachable subject because to him it relates to complying with laws of cities.
328b, l.22431: Protagoras claims to teach how to become '"noble and good"'.
335d-336a, l.22622-22632: Socrates wants to leave the debate because Protagoras does not want to follow Socrates's dialectical question and answer technique. Socrates requires brief answers to his questions. Protagoras says it will count against him if he answers in brief like Socrates wants. After Socrates stood up to leave Callias told him to stay and Socrates agreed, if Protagoras follows Socrates's method.
337b, l.22650: During the argument about the methodology being used Prodicus said that '"eristics"' should not be allowed because '"eristics are for enemies at odds."'
339d, l.22703: Protagoras, a sophist uses contradiction to prove a point, which is something not expected from deceivers.
341e, l.22752: They are discussing a poem by Simonides in which Simonides wrote only God can be good. '"God aloen can have this privilege."' It seems thus that Caiaphas syndrome was present at the time.
342a-b, l.22757-22763: Socrates says that Greeks of Crete and Lacedaemon were the first philosophers and there the highest concentration of sophists are situated. The natives there however deny that it is because of their '"wisdom that they are the leaders of the Greek world"' because they do not want to give away their secret for success.
It seems thus clear that deceit are the winning methodology to use in order to come out at the top in a society. The problem however is that it hinders creativities in that society and therefore cause colonization. It is a difficult problem. Lying benefits own bodies and bodily pleasures, but harms society, those bodies are parts of. Honesties benefit society but harms own bodies.
a native or inhabitant of Lacedaemon, an area of ancient Greece comprising the city of Sparta and its surroundings.
of Lacedaemon or its inhabitants; Spartan." (New Oxford American Dictionary)
342d-e, l.22771: According to Socrates '"the Spartans have the best education in philosophy and (e) debate."'
Why do we not know of famous Spartan philosophers?
343a-b, l.22775-22779: Socrates mentions people with Spartan education. They are '"Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, the seventh in the list, Chilon of Sparta"'. They had Apollo as God and at his temple at Delphi their slogan appeared, '"'Know thyself' and 'Nothing in excess.'"'
343c, l.22778-22783: According to Socrates, Pittacus's maxim was '"It is hard to be good"' and Simonides then tried to refute Pittacus's maxim with Simonides's own poem, by saying it is hard to '"become"' good.
345d, l.22830: Socrates quotes Simonides: '"All who do no wrong willingly I praise and love. Necessity not even the gods resist." '
Caiaphas syndrome again.
361a-b, l.23188-23192: SOCRATES: '"It seems to me that our discussion has turned on us, and if it had a voice of its own, it would say, mockingly, 'Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both of you.'"'
The above quote describes how i felt about this dialogue. Socrates was more ridiculous than Protagoras though. His disrespect towards Protagoras, Callias's guest, in Callias's house; gave an uncouth appearance. The discussion are about adjectives, like good and bad in general, without reference to specific circumstances. Also the telos discussed seems to be the benefit to "a man", and not society as a whole, especially in Socates's views. Society has not come into contention, except a little bit, in Protagoras's opinions. Socrates is obnoxious and he babbles on. The adjectives being discussed are not discussed in relation to something specific. It seems to be usually in relation to "a man", according to Socrates. Although Socrates support truths he does that selfishly because the telos of his argumentation is "the man". All men against all other men, one at a time. He regards not the society in this dialogue.
8 September 2014
"Aspasia" was "Pericles' intellectually accomplished mistress." She wrote the original text of this recitation by Socrates.
"SOCRATES: No by Zeus, it isn't."
Aspasia taught Pericles, the best orator among Greeks, according to Socrates, and she also taught Socrates.
236a: Socrates acknowledges two teachers he had. They are Connus his "music" teacher and Aspasia his teacher of "oratory."
234a-b: Menexenus was a young man from the ruling families of Athens.
236c-d: "MENEXENUS: Have no fear, Socrates. Speak. I shall be very grateful, whether you're pleased to recite Aspasia's speech or whosever it is. Only speak.
SOCRATES: But perhaps you will laugh at me if I seem to you, old as I am, to go on playing like a child.
MENEXENUS: Not at all, Socrates. In any case, just speak the speech.
SOCRATES: Well, certainly you're a man I'm so bound to gratify that I would even be inclined to do so if you asked me to take off my clothes (d) and dance—especially since we are alone. All right, listen."
Note 3, l.28144: "In myth Athena and Posidon vied for sovereignty of Athens. On the grounds that Athena's gift of the olive tree was more valuable than the salt-water spring Posidon had made gush forth on the Acropolis, the twelve gods apppointed by Zeus to arbitrate the dispute awarded the sovereignty to her."
l.27896-l.27910; 237b-e: Socrates quotes Aspasia, saying about the fallen during the recent war: ' "The nobility of these men's origin is rooted in that of their ancestors. The latter were not immigrants and did not, by arriving from elsewhere, make these descendants of theirs live as aliens in the land, but made them children of the soil, really dwelling and having their being in their ancestral home, nourished not, as other peoples are, by a stepmother, but by a mother, the land in which they lived. Now they lie in death among the (c) familiar places of her who gave them birth, suckled them, and received them as her own. Surely it is most just to celebrate the mother herself first; in this way the noble birth of these men is celebrated at the same time.
"Our land is indeed worthy of being praised not merely by us but by all of humanity. There are many reasons for that, but the first and greatest is that she has the good fortune to be dear to the gods. The quarrel of the gods who disputed over her and the verdict that setlled it bear witness (d) to what we say. note3 How could it not be just for all human kind to praise a land by the gods? The second commendation that is due her is that in the age when the earth was causing creatures of all kinds—wild animals and domestic livestock—to spring up and thrive, our land showed herself to be barren of savage beasts and pure. Out of all the animals she selected and brought forth the human, the one creature that towers over the others in understanding and alone acknowledges justice and the gods.
"That fact that everything that gives birth is supplied with the food (e) its offspring needs is weighty testimony for this assertion that the earth hereabouts gave birth to these men's ancestors and ours. For by this sign it can be seen clearly whether or not a woman had really given birth: she is foisting off an infant not her own, if she does not have within her the wellsprings of its nourishment. The earth here, our mother, offers precisely this as sufficient testimony that she has brought forth humans.'
Note 5; l.28149: When the sons of Heracles were pursued by their father's enemy, Eurystheus, who ruled Pelloponnesian cities, together called Argos, Heracles's sons found refuge in Athens and the Athenians protected them and killed Eurystheus during a war.
Note 14; l.28167: A Athenian civil war was fought during 403 during which the ' "Thirty Tyrants" ', who took power by conniving with Sparta, were defeated at Eleusis.
It seems that Aristotle, being one of the Thirty, in Parmenides, connived with Sparta. I was also brought under the impression that Sparta in some way was involved with Hippias who was exiled (to) who went to the Persians. The Persians were defeated by Greeks (Athenians and Spartans) at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea. I guess the problem can be found at the alliances relating to Heracles and his sons?
Note 16; l.28174: Sparta "brought Persia into" the war, against Athens during 412; the Peloponnesian War.
l.27028 & New Oxford American Dictionary: According to Nicholas D. Smith, the translator and the editors, Hippias was a "great sophist", probably not born in Athens. He praised Troy's war's "truthful" Achilles, the son of Thessaly's (North Eastern Greece) king and scourned Oddyseus king of Ithaca, an Island in the Ionian sea, because he was " 'wily and a liar' ".
363c-d; l.27065: "HIPPIAS: … I always go from my home at Elis to the festival of the Greeks at Olympia when it (d) is held and offer myself at the temple to speak on demand about any subject I have prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions anyone wants to ask."
363d-364a; l.27065-27070: "SOCRATES: What a godlike state of mind you're in, Hippias, if you go to (264) the temple at every Olympiad so confident about your soul's wisdom! I'd be amazed if any of the athletes of the body goes there to take part in the contests as fearless and trusting about his body as you say you are about your intellect!
HIPPIAS: It is reasonable for me to be in that state of mind, Socrates. Ever since I began taking part in the contests at the Olympic games, I have never met anyone superior to me in anything."
364c; l.27079: "HIPPIAS: … I say that Homer made Achilles the "best and bravest" man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest."
Note 1, l.27433; 365a-b, l.27088: Hippias quotes the "embassy scene" from the Iliad where Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax "plead" Achilles to return to the fighting against Troy:
Achilles says to Odysseus: "Son of Leartes, sprung from Zeus, resourceful Odysseus,
I must speak the word bluntly,
How I will act and how I think it shall be accomplished,
For as hateful to me as the gates of Hades
(b) Is he who hides one thing in his mind, and says another. As for me, I will speak as it shall also be accomplished.1"
366a, l.27116: "SOCRATES: Stop. Let us recall what it is that you are saying. You claim that liars are powerful and intelligent and knowledgeable and wise in those matters in which they are liars?
HIPPIAS: That's what I claim."
Hippias means that specialists who lie, are cunning, and it seems Socrates protects his thesis that specialisation is paramount to success of an area, even if specialisation includes lying.
366a-b, l.27124: "SOCRATES: Well, then. The liars are among the powerful and wise, according to your argument.
SOCRATES: And when you say that liars are powerful and wise in (b) these very matters, do you mean that they have the power to lie if they want, or that they are without power in the matters in which they are liars.
HIPPIAS: I mean they are powerful."
Hippias are on the side of honest men although he acknowledges that liars are "powerful and wise".
366c-d, l.27138: Hippias was good with mathematics.
367b-d, l.27157-27172: Socrates opines a specialist is "the good person" and have the most "power to lie" and to "tell the truth" about their field of knowledge. Maybe this section shows convincingly what Socrates's opinion of "good" was, together with the part from The Republic. A good person for Socrates is a specialist who lies and tells the truth.
367d, l.27172: Hippias disagrees with Socrates's generalisation about specialisation and says about mathematics: "He does not appear to be [good], at least in this field."
369b, l.27215: "SOCRATES: You are now aware, then, that the same person has been discovered to be a liar and truthful, so that if Odysseus was a liar, he also becomes truthful, and if Achilles was truthful, he also becomes a liar, and these two men are not different from one another, nor opposites, but similar?"
Socrates was probably worried about the divisive effect of distinguishing between liars and honest people. Odysseus and Achilles were both Greeks who were involved in the war against Troy, on the Greek side.
370a-371a, l.27228-27247: Socrates claims that Achilles is nobly dishonest because Achilles said he will go back to his country before the war is over but nowhere did he even get his ships ready to go back and eventually he fought to the end and Hippias answers: "That's because you don't look at it right, Socrates. When Achilles lies, he's portrayed as lying not on purpose but involuntarily, forced to stay and help by the misfortune of the army. But the lies of Odysseus are voluntary and on purpose.
SOCRATES: You're deceiving me, my dear Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus!
HIPPIAS: Not at all, Socrates! What do you mean? What are you referring to?"
Is it possible to ask a liar if he is lying and trust the answer. Somewhere i read that the Sophists were a nobility.
371d-e, l.27264-27269: It seems Socrates is accusing Hippias that Hippias is praising Achilles in a monumental way, whilst in actuality, taking sides with Odysseus, who seems to not have been a 'fighter', but a politician.
Socrates claims that doing anything badly, voluntarily, is better than doing anything badly involuntarily to motivate his opinion that it is better to lie on purpose than to lie by mistake, and Hippias answers at 375d, l.27393: "But it would be terrible, Socrates, if those who commit injustice voluntarily are to be better than those who do it involuntarily!"
It seems Sophistry should not be equated with lying but rather equated with the idea of realism.
375e, l.27407: Socrates opines again that also justice is measured by the level of specialisation. In Ion, Socrates's opinion was against Ion because he kew only the poetry of one poet. The level of specialisation for Socrates is thus subjective.
376b, l.27422: "SOCRATES: Therefore, it's up to the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and the bad man to do it involuntarily; that is, if the good man has a good soul." This view by Socrates is directly related to s(a)inity and non-pathological criminal incapacity and protection of individuals by the law. What was relevant during Socrates's time is not necessary relevant today, depending on the level of justice in a legal system, or not?
376b-c, l.27422-: "HIPPIAS: I can't agree with you in that, Socrates.
(c) SOCRATES: Nor I with myself, Hippias. But given the argument, we can't help having it look that way to us, now at any rate. However, as I said before, on these matters I waver back and forth and never believe the same thing."
Socrates was just babbling, according to this part. He seems to have really doubted "the truth".
10 September 2014
Meno's family was leading aristocracy from Thessaly, which traditionally had good relations with Athens. Meno was hosted in Athens by a democratic politician, Anytus, who was one of Socrates accusers at his trial in Athens. Meno enquires about Socrates's views about virtue. In the dialogue Socrates cites "wise priests and priestesses."
70-71c, l.25559-25572: Meno asks Socrates what virtue is. Socrates answers he doesn't know and Meno replies: "Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? (c) Are we to report this to the folk back home about you?"
This interaction could imply that Socrates's opinion was in opposition to the opinion by aristocratic Greek families that the difference between good and bad cannot be known. Socrates's view was similar to that of God in the old Testament. That knowledge of good and evil was a result of the fall into sin.
70a, l.25559: Socrates refers to Thessalians' wealth and horsemanship.
71e-72a, l.25584-25588: "MENO: It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man (72) or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every task of ours and every one of us—and, Socrates, the same is true for wickedness.
SOCRATES: I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them."
72a-e, l.25588-25604: Socrates compares the likeness ("form") amongst bees ('real objects' – Popper and Kuhn) with the form amongst virtues and argues bees and virtues are similar and therefore virtues should share one striking attribute. It could be argued Socrates's meaning related to essences or substances.
Note 1, l.26273: "Prodicus was a well-known sophist who was especially keen on the exact meaning of words."
76b-c, l.25691-25697: "SOCRATES: Even someone who was blindfolded would know from your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers.
MENO: Why so?
SOCRATES: Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants as long as they are young. And (c) perhaps you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with handsome people, so I will do you the favor of an answer."
76e-, l.25708-25714: "SOCRATES: It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that about shape.—It does.
SOCRATES: It is not better, son of Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the mysteries as you tolf me yesterday, but could remain and be initiated."
77e, l.25733: Socrates opines that when a person do not know he is doing something bad he is actually doing good because he knows not what is bad altogether.
78d, l.25757: "SOCRATES: Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friend of the Great King, [a] virtue is the acquisition of gold and silver." Somewhere else the 'Great King' was explained to be the Persian king if i remember correctly.
AT the time of this dialogue Meno was young and "about to embark on an unscrupulous military and political career, leading to an early death at the hands of the Persian king."
81a-e, l.25815-25832: Socrates mentions priests and priestesses who talked about "divine matters" he thought was "both true and beautiful". Pindar wrote about similar things according to Socrates. According to Meno Socrates opined that "learning is recollection". Socrates meant that souls have experienced everything and what we learn, reminds souls of actualities.
86c, l.25969: Socrates compares the logic in finding geometrical figures with logic of finding an essence of "virtue" after he showed how a slave who was never taught geometry understands the logic thereof.
91b-92c, l.26074-26094: Socrates acknowledges that sophists claim to be teaching ways to attain "virtue". Anytus opines that sophists corrupt their followers. Socrates answers that he agrees not with Anytus because if it was true that they corrupt their followers, they would not have made money from their teachings. Anytus says he needs not to know what sophists teach to be aware that their teachings are fallacious, because he knows who they are.
92d, l.26100: Socrates acknowledges that he supports the sophists.
94e, l.26142-26147: Socrates opines that virtue can not be taught with references to virtuous men and their immediate family who turned out to be not virtuous and Anytus warns Socrates to be careful about what he says of the prominent people he mentioned, because he could harm them with his negative opinions.
97b, l.26197: "SOCRATES: So true opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, (c) for true opinion can do so also."
97e-98a, l.26209-26215: Socrates opines that true opinion becomes knowledge when it is remembered. True opinion has the nature of spreading and unless true opinion is secured it becomes not knowledge. Socrates thus here acknowledges an esoteric character of knowledge.
99a-b, l.26239-26244; 100b, l.26266: Socrates opines that "true belief and knowledge" does not necessarily cause virtue, which is bestowed by divine non-human influence. Virtue can however not be present without true belief and knowledge being present. Virtue cannot be taught and therefore the prominent virtuous people mentioned earlier could not carry virtue, they had, over, to their sons or students.
99c-d, l.26256: "SOCRATES: We should be right to call divine also those sooth-sayers and prophets whom we just mentioned, and all the poets, and we should call (d) no less divine and inspired those public men who are no less under the gods' influence and possession, as their speeches lead to success in many important matters, though they have no knowledge of what they are saying.—Quite so.
SOCRATES: Women too, Meno, call good men divine, and the Spartans, when they eulogize someone, say "This man is divine.""
This statement by Socrates gels not with his general opinion that goodness is recognized by specialisation in a craft. Perhaps he just said it after the warning by Anytus earlier, to please Anytus. Socrates's reference to women and the Spartans, could mean that he regards "good" and "divine" men not as men, like women sometimes do.
11 September 2014
This dialogue is about "andreia", "literally 'manliness'".
183a, l.19859: The Lacedaemonians (Spartans) were supreme with regards to matters of warfare.
180d, l.19809: Nicias says that Socrates recommended "Damon" as a music teacher.
184d-e, l.19883-19899: "LYSIMACHUS: … So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out with which of them you plan to vote.
SOCRATES: What's that, Lysimachus? Do you intend to cast your vote for whatever position is approved by the majority of us?
LYSIMACHUS: Why, what else could a person do, Socrates?
(e) SOCRATES: And do you, Melesias, plan to act in the same way? Suppose there should be a council to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer?
MELESIAS: Probably by the latter, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And you would be persuaded by him rather than by the four of us?
SOCRATES: So I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule.
190b, l.20017: "SOCRATES: Well then, Laches, aren't these two now asking our advice as to the manner in which virtue might be added to the souls of their sons to make them better?"
LACHES: Yes, indeed."
190c-d, l.20023-20030: Socrates decides that they will discuss only part of virtue, which is topical to their discussion, about the "technique of fighting in armor". The part of virtue is "courage".
191d-e, l.20059-20064: Socrates is looking for an essence of "courage", which can be applied to cavalry, hoplites and sea warriors, because their tactics are not the same usually. This essence he wants to apply to the dealings of politics and more general matters, for example the way men act when confronted with temptations of "desire and pleasure". Socrates makes use of two opposites for his search, namely "courage and cowardice".
195d, l.20189: Nicias and Laches opines it is sometimes better to die than to live.
197d, l.20244: Socrates mentions his and Nicias's friend Damon again and that Damon spends much time with Prodicus a well-known sophist. Laches respects not the sophists and says they are not worthy to be Athens's leaders.
198c, l.20267: Socrates and Nicias agree that true knowledge of what should be feared and what should be hoped for is part of (cause) courage.
199a-c, l.20279-20292: Socrates says that "the law decrees" that "the general" (warfare generals) command "the seer" (doctors, etc.). Also that knowledge, which gives courage are the same for knowing history, understanding the present and predicting the future. The previous reference to fear and hope only referred to the future.
200b, l.20321: Damon is referred to again by Nicias as a worth while person to cite with regards to knowledge about courage.
201a-b, l.20335: Socrates again promotes the business of sophists who get paid for teaching. He says they need to find the best sophist for themselves as well as for the sons of Melesias and Lysimachus. He quotes Homer as aid to their needs for knowledge, who wrote: '"Modesty is not a good mate for a needy man."'
12 September 2014
Philebus was one of Plato's last works together with Sophist, Statesman and Laws. A topic, readily associated with Socrates is discussed in Philebus; "what is 'the human good'? how will a human being lead the best life possible?" "Philebus" means '"youth lover"'.
11d-12b, l.12101-12121: Socrates, Philebus and Protarchus are searching for "some posession or state of the soul to be the one that render life happy for all human beings." Initially the hypothesis of the dialogue is that Socrates argues "knowledge" and Philebus argues "pleasure", causes happiness. Philebus calls "the goddess herself" as his witness and Socrates agrees to that and say Philebus says, "her truest name is pleasure" although she is called Aphrodite.
13a-b, l.12134-12139: Socrates states that all pleasures are not good. Pleasure and happiness is thus not the same. Happiness is more equated with good, than pleasure, because bad pleasures exist.
14d-15c, l.12172-12194: Socrates says that the question about the whole and parts, "the one and many that have become commonplace" is not worth investigating because it leads to nothing. Socrates favours identifications of the perceivable whether it is parts or a whole. They however start a discussion partly about realism and nominalism.
16d-e, l.12223-12227: According to Socrates "the gods" gave them the methodology to investigate problems from identifications of a form for a kind. After identifying that form they should search for a next form and then a next to see reality clearer. The one form to identify initially in an investigation is thus a type of universality for a group of things. Socrates seems to not point to nominalism. By nominalism i mean a singularity of a single thing, because Socrates wants to identify a singularity, firstly, of a group. Each member of the group must partake of that singular identification.
16e-17a, l.12227-12231: Socrates says that the "clever ones among" [sophists] them do not investigate the stage between "limited" and "unlimited". They jump directly from the limited to the unlimited. That jump Socrates sees, shows the difference between "dialectical" and "eristic discourse" to him.
17c, l.12244: Socrates finds knowledge of music important.
17e, l.12255: "SOCRATES: … The boundless multitude, however, in any and every kind of subject leaves you in boundless ignorance, and makes you count for nothing and amount to nothing, since you have never worked out the amount and number of anyhting at all."
18b-d, l.12266-12271: Socrates says "some god or god-inspired man", a "deity called Theuth" realised that vowels are unlimited in sound. Theuth identified different letters and "he" [Theuth] realised "that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them, taken (d) by itself without understanding them all".
19a-b, l.12282-12293: Protarchus, son of Callias, and, Socrates identifies a necessity; that is before sensible discussion can take place different "kinds" of "pleasure" and of "knowledge" should be identified.
19c, l.12298: The difference between Philebus and Socrates's focuses in attaining happiness is that Philebus focuses on himself or himself and his immediate surrounds whereas Socrates focuses on all people.
11d-12b, l.12101-12121: Socrates and Protarchus are searching for "some posession or state of the soul to be the one that render life happy for all human beings."
20b, l.12311: Socrates posits again that it is neither pleasure nor knowledge, which cause happiness but that there is a third candidate, which causes happiness.
20d-21b, l.12317-12344: They agree that the "good" they are searching for is something "perfect" they want to partake of.
22d, l.12386: Although they agree that neither pleasure nor knowledge can be the good (happiness) they are searching for, Socrates says that maybe they can identify one of pleasure or knowledge as the "cause" of happiness.
23c-e, l.12403-12417: Socrates says "the god had revealed a division of what is into the unlimited and the limit." Socrates then identifies a mixture between the unlimited and the limited as their "third kind", but also identifies that they need a fourth kind. The fourth kind is the "cause" that combines the limited and the inlimited. Socrates further says it might be necessary to find a fifth kind.
Russell wrote in his History of western philosophy, that Hume stated we cannot identify causes as things or kinds of things. Did Socrates venture to far away from experiences we can share?
23e-24a, l.12417-12424: Socrates then continues by saying he must first show how the unlimited and limited, each "is in fact one and many."
25b, l.12458: When Socrates is asked the difficult question to identify the third kind, the mixture of limited and unlimited, Socrates calls on "a god" to give him the answer.
25c-26a, l.12465-12485: Socrates claims that it is the combination of two unlimited identifications, which causes the limited. Hottest and coldest, mixed, establishes, for example, a limited indentification, like two extremes, which each can cause a sickness, combines in health.
26d-c, l.12496: Socrates indetifies "law and order" as the limit, set by "the goddess [of pleasure] herself", to the unbounded pleasure she gives.
Socrates's argument is not accurate because he initially said that he wanted to combine the limited and unlimited to form a third kind. He then formed the limited by combining two unlimited extremes. His combination of the limited and the unlimited is not a combination between two equal kinds. His combination between the limited and unlimited was not clearly defined. Two form the third combination between limited and ulimited, the unlimited had a weight of 2/3s and the limited a weight of 1/3.
26c, l.12501: Protarchus also did not grasp the third kind clearly.
26d, l.12508: Socrates explains his third kind sufficiently to Protarchus, Socrates identifies the third kind as "a coming-into-being created through the measures imposed by the limit."
26e, l.12515: Socrates's fourth kind, "the cause" of the third kind, Socrates also identifies as "the maker"; "the maker and the cause would rightly be called one".
27a-b, l.12522-12529: The three kinds is also identified with "what comes to be and that from which it is produced". Thus, the logos (unlimited), the matter (limited) and the product. The "craftsman" (cause) represents the fourth kind.
28c-e., l.12571-12577: "SOCRATES … For all the wise are agreed, in true self-exaltation, that reason is our king, both over heaven and earth. And perhaps they are justified." Socrates then start to question whether "this whole world order are ruled by unreason and irregularity, as chance would have it, or whether they are not rather, as our forebears taught us, governed by reason and by the order of a wonderful intelligence." Protarchus then claims the suggestion that unreason could rule is "impious".
31a, l.12643: "Reason" and "cause" are related according to Socrates, which he equates with Zeus, gods, kings, craftsmen and ruling.
34e-35c, l.12778-12809: Socrates argues that "every living creature" "desires" a balance via "the domain of the soul", without first experiencing things. He gives as example that a person naturally desires filling with water after thirst, without knowing that filling will quench thirst. Memory is thus partly related to soul matters according to Socrates.
38a-39a, l.12896-12934: The discussion Socrates leads with regard to "true and false judgement" proves that Socrates's definition of truth did relate to corrrespondence. Judgements which are "true or false" relate to correspondence. Correspondent truths lead to judgements, which are right and non-correspondence leads to wrong judgements.
39a-40c, l.12934-12984: Socrates identifies false pains and false pleasures which have been memorized by our souls after false information have been inscribed to our souls. These false pains and pleasures relate to the future and our exptectations. According to Socrates the falseness causes bad.
41a. l.13004: Protarchus differs with Socrates because he claims it is not falseness, which causes 'bad' but something else.
48c-d, l.13242: Socrates refers to the inscription in Delphi, '"Know thyself"', together with the vice, of not knowing oneself.
48e-49a, l.13257-13264: With regard to not knowing oneself Socrates identifies three commonly made mistakes. First, "someone thinks himself richer than he in fact is", secondly "more consider themselves taller and handsomer than they in fact are" and thirdly "an overwhelming number are mistaken about the third kind, which belongs to the soul, namely virtue, and believe that they are superior in virtue, although they are not." False thoughts about virtue, relate especially to false claims about existent "wisdom" and "knowledge".
52c, l.13359: Socrates ascribes moderation to pure pleasure and high intesnity pleasures to "impure" pleasure.
56b-57d, l.13472-13527: Socrates distinguishes between different types of knowledge based on "purity" and "certainty". He referred to the certainty of measurements involved at construction as opposed to the uncertainty of other sciences. He also referred to two types of geometry and two types of arithmetic.
57e-58c, l.13534-13544: Socrates refers to a science of the most permanent certain being, which is "by far the truest of all kinds of knowledge." The science he has in mind "aims for clarity, precision, and the highest degree of truth".
59c, l.13573: This science according to Socrates has a permanent subject, which is not opinionated temporary ideas. It is the truth, the presupposition, which makes other sciences possible, like Nietzsche also wrote.
60b, l.13597: Socrates claims that the part that knowledge is of good and happiness is greater than the part that pleasure is of good and happiness.
60c, l.13602: "SOCRATES: Any creature that was in permanent possession of it [good], entirely and in every way, would never be in need of anything else, but would live in perfect self-sufficiency."
61c, l.13634: Socrates proclaims that pleasure has to be tempered with knowledge in order to attain "a perfect mixture of the two" for happiness.
Knowledge, which relates to truths is prioritized and pleasure takes 2nd place in the order of importances, which live towards the good.
61d, l.13648: "SOCRATES: But there was also a difference between different sciences, since one kind deals with a subject matter that comes to be and perishes, the other (e) is concerned with what is free of that, the eternal and self-same. Since we made truth our criterion, the latter kind appeared to be the truer one."
61e-62e, l.13649-13673: It is however necessary to mix the impure sciences of temporary matter with the pure science of the truth, because it makes us more self-sufficient.
63b-c, l.13691: "SOCRATES: What has been said already: "It is neither possible nor beneficial (c) for one tribe to remain alone, in isolation and unmixed. We would prefer to live side by side with that best kind of knowledge, the kind that understands not only all other things but also each one of us, as far as that is possible.""
Socrates made a habit of making comparisons, sometimes in a way, which makes "gelykenisse" of the Old Testament relevant.
64b, l.13712: "SOCRATES: Wherever we do not mix in truth nothing could truly come to be nor remain in existence once it had come to be. …To me at least it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design of what migth be called an incorporeal order that rules harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul.
PROTARCHUS: Count me as one who shares that opinion, Socrates."
65a-b, l.13733-13746: "SOCRATES: Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion [measurements], and truth. …So now let us judge each of the three in relation to pleasure and reason."
Academy. 1997. Definitions. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 46797-47191. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
Annas, J and Waterfield, R. 1995. Plato: Statesman. (New York: Cambridge University Press)
Cooper, JM. 1996. Introduction to Plato's Complete works. Location 99 - 519 (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
Dover, K, ed. 1986. The symposium. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
New Oxford American Dictionary. c2005-2011. (Apple Inc. Version 2.1(80) & 2.2.1(143.1))
PLATO. 1951. The symposium. (London: Penguin)
PLATO. 1986. Phaedrus. (Wiltshire, England: Aris & Phillips Ltd.)
PLATO. 1970. The laws. (Translated by Trevor J Saunders. London: Penguin, 2004 edition)
PLATO. 2007. The republic. (Translated by Desmond Lee. London: Penguin)
PLATO. 1997a. Alcibiades. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 16547-17826. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997c. Charmides. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 19053-19748.Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997e. Cratylus. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 3215-5029. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997i. Euthydemus. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 20975-22025. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997j. Eryxias. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 48025-48453. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997k. Gorgias. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 23241-25527. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997o. Ion. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 27444-27804. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997p. Laches. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 19749-20359. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997s. Menexenus. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 27805-28179. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997t. Meno. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 25528-26304. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997x. Parmenides. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 10935-12050. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997y. Philebus. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 12051-13855. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997z. Lesser Hippias. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 27028-27443. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997. Protagoras. (In Cooper, JM and
Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete
works, location 22034-23240. Indianapolis, Indiana and
Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March
PLATO. 1997. Sophist. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 7250-9012. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997. Second Alcibiades. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 17827-18195. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO. 1997. Theaetetus. (In Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Plato: Complete works, location 5030-7249. Indianapolis, Indiana and Cambridge: Hackett. Kindle edition. From: www.amazon.com on 18 March 2014)
PLATO (not sure). 2008. Alcibiades I. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1676. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO (imitation). 2008. Alcibiades II. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1677. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Apology. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1656. 5 November 2012 update. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014)
PLATO. 2008. Charmides. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1580. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Cratylus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1616. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Critias. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1571. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO (imitation). 2008. Eryxias. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1681. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Euthydemus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1598. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Euthyphro. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1642. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Gorgias. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1672. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Ion. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1635. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Laches. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1584. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Laws. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1750. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Lesser Hippias. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1673. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Menexenus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1682. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Meno. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1643. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Parmenides. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1687. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Phaedo. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1658. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Phaedrus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1636. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Philebus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1744. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Protagoras. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1591. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. The republic. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1497. 5 November 2012 update. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Sophist. (Salt
City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1735. From: http://www.gutenberg.org
on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Statesman. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1738. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Symposium. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1600. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Theaetetus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1726. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Timaeus. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. Ebook #1572. From: http://www.gutenberg.org on 17 March 2014.)
PLATO. 2008. Timaeus and Critias. (London: Penguin)
PLATO. 2013. Apology. (In PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues of Plato, pp. 609-640. New York: Barnes & Noble)
PLATO. 2013. Crito. (In PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues of Plato, pp. 641-658. New York: Barnes & Noble)
PLATO. 2013. Euthyphro. (In PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues of Plato, pp. 585-608. New York: Barnes & Noble)
PLATO. 2013. Phaedo. (In PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues of Plato, pp. 659-743. New York: Barnes & Noble)
Widger, D. 2008. The Project Gutenberg works of Plato: An index. (Salt Lake City, UT: The Project Gutenberg. From: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/29441/29441-h/29441-h.htm on 17 March 2014.)
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 611-612.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 619.
 From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Schleiermacher on 21 March 2014.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 623-624.
 "Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1 translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1966." From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text;jsessionid=43EBCFE8C99E943AC04C86EB99A986B6?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D21a on 21 March 2014.
 "Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John
Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903." From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0169%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D21a
on 21 March 2014.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 629.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 127a-d:l.10989-10996.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 598.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 607.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 599.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 600.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 600-601.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 602.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 644.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 644-645.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 593.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 643-645.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 661-668.
 PLATO. 2013. The republic and other dialogues: Plato, 742-743.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 7-8.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, xliii.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 57.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 53-56.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 58.
 PLATO. 1970. The
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 62.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 63.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 63.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 63.
 The laws, 665e (Plato. 1970:59).
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 59.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 64.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 74.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 78.
 STOKER, HG. 2010. Philosophy of the creation idea.
 PLATO. 2007. The republic, 266.
 PLATO. 2007. The republic, 266.
 PLATO. 2007. The republic, 266.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 82.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 82-83.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 83.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 83-84.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 88.
 689a (Plato. 1970:91-92)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 91, 96.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, 91.
 PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 99.
 694b (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:99)
 " 'wise' man … (Saunders' ellipsis) just now: See 689d." (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:510)
 696c (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:102)
 698a (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:104)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 115.
 708e-712a (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:119-123)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 119-121.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 122.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 122-123.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 125-126.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws, xliii.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 125-126.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 122-123.
 Protagoras, a philosopher of 2500 years ago posited " 'man is the measure of all things'." (Plato, 1970:512)
 717a-717b (Plato, 1970:130)
 737b (Plato, 1970:158-159)
or Dodona or Ammon: The most
celebrated of these oracles was that of Apollo at Delphi, on
the southern slopes of Mount Parnassus, north of the gulf of
Corinth. Dodona was an oracle of Zeus in Epirus (north-west
Greece); Ammon was a deity whose oracle was established at
the oasis of Siwa in the Libyan desert." (Plato, 1970:513)
 738b-738c (Plato, 1970:160)
 769d-769e (Plato, 1970:202)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 205-206.
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 203-204.
 806c-806d. (Plato, 1970:202)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 258-259.
 819a (Plato, 1970:266-267)
 835c-836b (Plato, 1970:287-288)
 838a-839d, (Plato, 1970:290-292)
 897c (Plato, 1970:385)
 916d-917a (Plato, 1970:414)
 PLATO. 1970. The laws (Saunders), 445.
 "take an oath: One, the guilty, would decline it, since gods punish perjurers." (Plato, 1970:526)
 948b-948c (Plato, 1970:457)
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.154.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.393.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.415-425.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.446.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.457.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Introduction, l.478-488.
 Cooper, JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19053.
JM and Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19053-19066.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19090, 153c.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19104, 154b.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19157, 156c-157a.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19194, 158a.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19233, 159d.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19053.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19268, up to 160e.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19268-19361, 160e-163c.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19361, 163d.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19403, 165a.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19403, 165b.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19403-19553, 165b-170d.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19609.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19609.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19624.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19641.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19641-19675.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19053. "Temperance" was used to translate " 'sōphrosunē' ", the Greek aristocratic value, which Socrates did not appreciate.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19673.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Charmides, l.19704-19732.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3215-3239.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3260-3277.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3385.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3385-3407.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3407.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3438.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3438.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3438.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3438.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3463-3534.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3636.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3659.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3678.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3696.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3714.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3756.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3794.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3876,4982.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3593-3971.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4068.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4086.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4107.
 412c-413d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4103-4131.
 414a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4152.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4247.
 419e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4349.
 420b-c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4349.
 421a-c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4368-4386.
 438a-438b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4841-4859.
 426c-d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4528.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4823.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4859.
 438d-e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4859-4875.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4875.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.4920.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Cratylus, l.3776.
 271a-c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21013.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21022.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21986.
 271b-c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21009.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21056.
 272e, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21041.
 272b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21029.
 273d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21047.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21059.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21931.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21082.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21567-21597.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21859-21874.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21931.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21943-21954.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21943.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21954.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Euthydemus, l.21977.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. On justice, l.47192.
 412e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46900.
 412e-413a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46919.
 414a-b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46995.
 413c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46946.
 413c, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46946.
 413d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46946-46966.
 414a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46995.
 414b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46995.
 414b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.46995.
 414d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Definitions, l.47014.
 414d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.47033.
 415b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.47054.
 415, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.47078.
 416, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Definitions, l.47137.
 107, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.16683.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17065-17100.
 104-117, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.16584-17065.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17100.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17120.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17136.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. The laws, l.37621.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17171-17204.
 121a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17197,17784.
 121a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17214.
 122a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17226.
 124b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17273.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17289.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17473.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17473-17518.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17542-17548.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17561-17578.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17597.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17597-17616.
 132d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Alcibiades, l.17638.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17645-17681.
 134a-d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17681-17705.
 135d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17744.
 "Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903." From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0175%3Atext%3DAlc.+1%3Asection%3D135d on 19 May 2014.
 135e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Alcibiades, l.17744.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18040.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18071.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18114.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18119.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18192.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Second Alcibiades, l.18142.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48046.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48083.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48108.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48113,48429.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48120.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48134.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48174.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48427.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48178.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48195.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48218.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48229-48241.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, l.48254.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, to l.48336.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, to l.48344-48361.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, to l.48364.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, to l.48397.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Eryxias, to l.48423.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23241.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23255-23262.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23282.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23292.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23332-23361.
 449e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23361.
 452b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23426.
 449e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23417.
 452d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23442.
 453a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Gorgias, to l.23450.
 453d-454a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23478.
 454b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23488.
 454d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23496.
 454e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23509.
 454e-456a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23509-23538.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23559.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23566.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23573.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23579.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23597.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23624.
 461a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23655.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23670.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23688.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23708-23728.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23771.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23786.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23889.
 470e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23940.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23950.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.23950-23980.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24140.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24295.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24302-24322.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24329-24336.
 484b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24356.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24439.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24458.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24466.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24484.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24593.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24698-24796.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24890.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.24986.
 506d-507a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25002-25009.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25037.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25247.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25101.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25138.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25155.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25138-25225.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25269.
 519a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25289.
 519e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25302.
 519e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25383.
 524a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Gorgias, to l.25404.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.10943-10957.
Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.10964,126b:l.10978,126c:l.10989.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 127a-d:l.10989-10996.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 127c:l.10996.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 128b-c:l.11013-11016.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11039.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 130a:l.11053.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 130e:l.11070.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11075.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 131a-b:l.11084.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11105.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11122.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11135.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11161-11188.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11188.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11209.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11209-11216.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11215,12037.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 135c-d:l.11222.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 135e-136a:l.11231.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 135e-136c:l.11246.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, 136c:l.11246.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Parmenides, l.11277-11767.
 Jowett, B. 2014. Introduction to Ion, a.i1b (In Plato. 2014. Ion. (Centurion:
Africahead, draft for Kindle edition, Amazon))
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27477.
 Plato. 2014. Ion, 532d. (Centurion: Africahead, draft for Kindle edition, Amazon)
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, 533d; l.27559,27794.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27444.
 Plato. 2014. Ion, 534-535. (Centurion: Africahead, draft for Kindle edition, Amazon) & Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27586.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27634.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27649.
 Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Ion, l.27664.
 524a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997. Theaetetus, to l.5030.
 PLATO. 1997. Theaetetus, 145e, l.5168.
 l.7198, note 24: "I.e., the principle that everything is really motion (156a).
 "'Account' translates logos, which can also mean 'statement,' 'argument', 'speech', and 'discourse'." (PLATO. 1997. Theaetetus, l.7224, note 38).
 "'Letters' translates stoicheia, which can alos mean 'elements' more generally (and is so translated sometimes below). 'Syllables': in Greek sullabai, also translated below as 'complexes.'" (PLATO. 1997. Theaetetus, l.7229, note 40).
 "The word translated 'sum' (pan) and the word translated 'all' (panta) in the phrase 'all the parts' are singular and plural forms of the same Greek word." (PLATO. 1997. Theaetetus, l.7233, note 42).
 Note 8, l.8972: "See Parmenides, frg. 7, ll.1-2. The same lines reoccur, with one slight textual difference, at 258d."
 Menexenus, l.27810.
 Menexenus, l.27857; 235d.
 Menexenus, l.27863; 235e.
 Meno, l.25528.
 Meno, l.25533.
 Meno, l.25546.
 Meno, l.25528.
 Laches, l.19749.
 Philebus, l.12051.
 Philebus, l.12056-12061.
 Note 7, l.13826: "See 16c."