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to Unedited Philosophy Quotes and Ramblings about Intequinism.
Notes about Plato's works.
Reader: Mr. MD Pienaar
CONTENTS
PMC – Paper, MD Pienaar, comments for M.Phil.
PPMC – Postscript, Paper, MD Pienaar, comments
for M.Phil.
PJCQ – Paper quotation of Jowett for M.Phil.
PJCP – Paper paraphrase of Jowett for M.Phil.
PJQ – Quotations from Jowett's translation of
Plato's works for M.Phil paper.
20 March 2014
PJCQ: "Plato
was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not
appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal
accuracy. … The apology of Plato is not the report of what
Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so
in fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even
indulge in the fancy that the actual defense of Socrates was
as much greater than the Platonic defense as the master was
greater than the disciple."[1]
PJCP: Schleiermacher
opined that Plato's reflection in Apology was a
nominalist production about the actual events because Plato
would not have changed reality.[2]
Karl Barth was in
opposition to Schleiermacher's theological enterprise,
Shleiermacher was called ' "Father
of Modern Liberal Theology" '.
Schleiermacher had a big influence on hermeneutics, which
attempt to find the intentions of authors.[3]
This could mean that Schleiermacher's opinion about Plato's
intent was specialised knowledge.
21 March 2014
PJQ: Socrates: "I
will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that
witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about my
wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have
known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a
friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the
people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know,
was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi
and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was
saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to
tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian
prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon
is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will
confirm the truth of what I am saying."[4]
PMC (23 March 2014): The
effect of the words of Chaerephon had an immense impact on
Socrates. The level of impact could mean there was something
that made Socrates prone to misleading. Maybe his opinion of
his self, whether that was too high or too low, i do not know.
Socrates states that Chaerephon was an early friend of him.
Was Socrates correct with regards to the friendship? Was
Chaerephon not perhaps an enemy who used functionalist
language to tempt Socrates into thinking he is The best,
without realizing that 'best' exists not, rationally.
Socrates's definition of 'God' is relevant. Probably the word
'God' is not the correct translation in my understanding of
'God' because 'God' for Socrates refers to words of an oracle
and Chaerephon. 'God' here, however refers not to my
definition because it was Socrates who spoke. I don't know
what Socrates's definition of The absolute was. It seems he
regarded himself part of The absolute because he tried to
refute 'God' by speaking to too many 'wise' people, in order
to show to himself that he is not wise, according to his own
belief, and to then just realise according to himself that he
is wiser than them, and after all, maybe the oracle was
correct. Socrates however stayed steadfast in his belief that
he is not the greatest if i see the realities through Plato's
books. It seems true that Socrates disrespected 'God' in
Athenian terms of the time, because in The laws, writ later
than Socrates's sentence, impiety, the charge against
Socrates, is against the law. If the Greek word for 'God',
Socrates used, was the word, which could imply impiety,
Socrates could have been a scapegoat, which implies Caiaphas
syndromes. I am not sure whether, impiety, was a writ offense
at the time of the trial. In The republic
according to Saunders Plato still thought that Statesman should be
above the law and therefore, impiety, the offense, could have
entered the legal system via common law judgements. New common
law judgements, which introduce new offenses to a leagl
system, should however according to me today, first be written
down and advertised. The common law system, which implies
functionalist use of scapegoats should be changed. In The laws Plato
included impiety as a writ offense. According to Socrates's
defence, impiety had not a fixed understanding. The
non-generalisable word 'impiety' also shows in Euthyphro,
where Socrates enquires from Euthyphro to explain what piety
is.
PMC: The emphasis on
Socrates's request above, if Jowett's translation is
nominalist, not to be interrupted, could imply that Plato,
very cleverly, wanted his dialogue to look like a nominalist
production, or it could imply that Plato's dialogue was a
nominalist production of the actual events. Socrates
contradicts himself here because if he refers to God who said
he is the wisest man how can he then say that he is not wise.
That does not make sense. The English translation at 21a of
Perseus Digital Library also has the request of Socrates to
not interrupt, but it is not between emphasis marks.[5]
There are emphases marks in the Greek version of the Perseus
Digital Library, similar to Jowett's translation quoted.[6]
PPMC: It is not possible
to generalize about the dialogues because parts of the
dialogues could be nominalist truths and part could be
ambivalent realism. The thought came up that Socrates's
progress was to realize again the human part of God in his
community. It was however an alien thought because the
populace was indoctrinated into believing that God is
pantheistic One, with corresponding Caiaphas syndrome.
Caiaphas did not completely overcome the ideas about One human
but he did better than the group of the populace, with their
Caiaphas syndromes, who therefore sacrificed Socrates.
Socrates: "But
now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in
spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
He cannot.
How lucky I am to have extracted
that answer, by the assistance of the court!"[7]
14 June 2014
"Plato is always concerned
to advocate views that will make people what he thinks
virtuous; he is hardly ever intellectually honest, because he
allows himself to judge doctrines by their social
consequences. Even about this, he is not honest; he pretends
to follow the argument and to be judging by purely theoretical
standards, when in fact he is twisting the discussion so as to
lead to a virtuous result. He introduced this vice into
philosophy, where it has persisted ever since." (Russel, 2004:84).
"Let us begin with
Xenophon, a military man, not very liberally endowed with
brains, and on the whole conventional in his outlook. Xenophon
is pained that Socrates should have been accused of impiety
and of corrupting the youth; he contends that, on the
contrary, Socrates was eminently pious and had a thoroughly
wholesome effect on those who came under his influence. His
ideas, it appears, so far from being subversive, were rather
dull and commonplace. This defence goes to far, since it
leaves the hostility to Socrates unexplained." (Russel, 2004:89).
"There has been a tendency
to think that everything Xenophon says must be true, because
he had not the wits to think of anything untrue. This is a
very invalid line of argument. A stupid man's report of what a
clever man says is never accurate, because he unconsciously
translates what he hears into something that he can
understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemy
among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy." (Russel, 2004:90).
"Nevertheless, some of
Xenophon's reminiscences are very convincing. He tells (as
Plato also does) how Socrates was continually occupied with
the problem of getting competent men into positions of power.
He would ask such questions as: 'If I wanted a shoe mended,
whom should I employ?' To which some ingenuous youth would
answer: 'A shoemaker, O Socrates.' He would go on to
carpenters, coppersmiths, etc., and finally ask some such
question as 'who should mend the Ship of State?' When he fell
into conflict with the Thirty Tyrants, Critias, their chief,
who knew his ways from having studied under him, forbade him
to continue teaching the young, and added: 'You had better be
done with shoemakers, carpenters and coppersmiths. These must
be pretty well trodden out at heel by this time, considering
the circulation you have given them' (Xenophon, Memorabilia, Bk. I, chap. ii)."
(Russel, 2004:90).
"With Plato's account of
Socrates, the difficulty is quite a different one from what it
is in the case of Xenophon, namely, that it is very hard to
judge how far Plato means to portray the historical Socrates,
and how far he intends the person called 'Socrates' in his
dialogues to be merely the mouthpiece of his own opinions.
Plato, in addition to being a philosopher, is an imaginative
writer of great genius and charm. No one suppposes, and he
himself does not seriously pretend, that the conversations in
his dialogue took place just as he records them." (Russel, 2004:90).
Russell wrote with regard to
Plato's dialogue, Apology:
"He [Socrates], however, proposed a fine of thirty minae, for
which some of his friends (including Plato) were willing to go
surety." (Russel, 2004:90). "After the verdict, and the
rejection of the alternative penalty of thirty minae (in
connection with which Socrates names Plato as one among his
sureties, and present in court), he makes one final speech."
(Russel, 2004:94).
In Apology at 33 to 34
Socrates talks about Plato, being present at the trial. From
this part of the dialogue much might be learnt about who was
Socrates's real friends and real enemies
(Plato, 2013:634). Was the alternative sentence, of 30
minae, Socrates suggested a sarcastic reference to "the
Thirty" tyrants. The "Thirty" included Aristotle[8]. Today i think that perhaps the younger
generation, under te influence of Critias, Plato's uncle,
influenced, for Socrates's trial.
20 March 2014
PMC: Socrates opined that
quarrels exist partly as a result of the inability to refer to
nominalist reality for example the weighing or measuring of
something. Due to the unavailibility of nominalist realities,
differences of opinion occur with resulting quarrels amongst "gods" and also amongst others. (Euthyphro[9], 8).
Jowett referred to "Cf.
Alcibiades"[10]
Socrates: "For
surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the
doer of injustice is not to be punished? … But they join issue
about the particulars—gods and men alike;" (Euthyphro[11], 8).
Socrates: "The
point which I should first wish to understand is whether the
pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or
holy because it is beloved of the gods." (Euthyphro[12], 10).
Socrates distinguished
between "God" and "gods" because he said "holy" is an independent concept from "gods". "Holy"
relates more to "God"
than to "gods"
because "holy"
exists not because that holy is "loved" by "gods".
The state of being "pious" is therefore according to Socrates independent
of what interpreters of "gods" think. (Euthyphro[13], 10).
In the dialogue with Euthyphro up to 10, there was not a clear
distinction made between "gods" of Socrates and "gods" of Euthyphro. There was however common
referring to Zeus, Cronos and Uranus. Zeus killed his father
Cronos and Cronos killed his father Uranus because the fathers
devoured their sons.
Socrates: "but
if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by
him," (Euthyphro[14], 11).
PJCQ: "That
Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him
during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later
ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who
had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the
now restored democracy." [15]
"It may be observed however that
Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but
only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to
do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show
his master maintaining in death the opinions which he had
professed in his life. Not "the world", but the "one wise
man," is still the paradox of Socrates in his last hours. He
must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may be
fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the many can do
neither good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he
means, of moral evil; in his own words, "they cannot make a
man wise or foolish." "[16]
PMC: Referring to
Socrates' students, including Critias, Plato's uncle, who was
one of the thirty tyrants, implies that Socrates' teachings
could have been regarded in a Machiavellian sense, with
reference to Socrates statement in The republic that the
leaders should lie for the good of The state. Those lies
probably partly caused the takeover by democracy over
oligarchy. Socrates could have been therefore as well regarded
as an enemy of democracy, although Jowett states that Socrates
was neutral during the time of flux between the oligarchy and
democracy. In Euthyphro[17]
at 2, "King"
Archon's porch is mentioned where Socrates awaited his trial.
The democracy included therefore a king of Athens, which could
have caused Caiaphas syndrome, because Socrates's reasoning
during his trial implied he is wiser than the king. In Statesman the idea
of the philosopher king is mentioned. Jowett refers to reason
as feminine, which could imply that he espoused rationalism
but that he did not regard himself as rational. The
circumstances around honesties and mania is referred to by "refuses
to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest". Caiaphas syndrome, which was present at
Socrates's hearing is mentioned by " "one
wise man" " and "many
can
do neither good nor evil".[18]
PMC after reading the dialogue: Crito suggests
that Socrates escape to Thessaly where Crito has friends.
Thessaly was mentioned in Apology as a place where laws are not dominant.
Socrates however decides to place the Law above himself and to
die although he agrees not with his sentence. Socrates thus in
effect substantiates te idea that Laws are the most important
concept in the city. There are many similarities between
Socrates's views and Jesus of Nazareth's view because Jesus
defined love as the compliance with Laws and prophecies.
Socrates also believed that evil should not follow others'
evil deeds, which is similar to Jesus's statement that they
should not oppose there offenders who represented the city
Jerusalem. The logic in it is that there is no use in opposing
because of the power of plurality. Socrates decided not to
choose exile in Apology,
also because of the power of plurality because he knew
that it will be the same problem in other territories.
22 March 2014
I read the first pages of
the commentary of Phaedo
until I realised that it relates too much to ambivalent
realism.[19]
I also read the last part of the dialogue where Socrates drank
the poison.[20]
Discussions about the soul and body and other metaphysical
matters we cannot vouch with nominalist truth for this study.
Jowett wrote that Plato was not present during the dialogue,
which implies that the work is a literary work produced by
Plato and had not a bureaucratic purpose, which normally
excludes hearsay. It also implies that Plato was not a real
friend of Socrates who was not there at Socrates's end. The
mention of Plato by Socrates, as present, during Apology, did not show
friendliness. My doubts about the intentions of Plato thus
still exist. Did Plato's works contribute to Socrates's
sentencing, is still my question. If so was it necessary, that
is Socrates's sentence? Socrates's sentence is in today's
context not right because of freedom of speech. If honesties
was a law in their time Socrates's statement in The republic that
leaders could lie to 'enemies' of the state would have been a
transgression. In Apology
it was stated that part of the populace was in exile and
therefore the 'leaders' could have regarded some of the
citizens of Athens as enemies of The state. It was those
'enemies', who sentenced Socrates after their return from
exile if I understood Apology
right. Although Socrates was neutral during the oligarchic and
democratic strive, my understanding today is that he sided
with the oligarchic leaders (Plato's family) and partly
therefore he was sentenced. Plato's role is still a mystery.
23 March 2014
At the start of The laws (627a-628a)[21]
the Athenian, who represents Plato's thought according[22]
to, the translator, Trevor J. Saunders, posits that an
important function of law is to protect good minorities
against evil majorities.
25 March 2014
"CHILDREN
ARE EASILY PERSUADED"
"ATHENIAN: But just
suppose that the truth had been different from what the
argument has now shown it to be, and that a lawgiver, even a
mediocre one, had been sufficiently bold, in the interests of
the young, to tell them a lie. Could he have told a more
usefull lie than this, or one more effective in making
everyone practise justice in everything they do, willingly and
without pressure?
CLEINIAS: Truth is a fine
thing, sir, and it is sure to prevail, but to persuade men of
it certainly seems no easy task." (663e)[23]
From this quote it seems
Plato was a functionalist realist, arguing for white lies to
influence people in the direction of his idea of good. It also
seems that "truth" was not nominalist truths for Plato because
nominalist truths cannot be 'supposed to be different from
what an argument showed'. Nominalist truths in my
understanding is plain to see. Nominalist truths relates not
to concepts, but only to material (extended matter) things,
which are described with words, which are commonly understood.
The nominalist truths values of words, which could be included
in a dictionary for example relates.
The preceding rubric was
"JUSTICE AND HAPPINESS GOES TOGETHER" (660e-663d)[24].
Saunders opined that the Athenian promotes the idea that
happiness and goodness goes together. My understanding of the
section was that Plato meant that goodness cause eventual
happiness and it should be taught to children. Plato did not
mean that if a person is happy it means he did good, because
short lived happiness can be deceiving. Plato had an eternal
happiness in mind, which relates to old age and the after
life. This eternal happiness is a result of living well and
moderately in a beneficial manner to society as a whole.
In the next section called
"THE THREE CORUSES" the Athenian (Plato) opines that if
children are told that the good life causes happiness it is
the "plain" truth, which are told (664c)[25].
This statement by the
Athenian makes Plato look like a nominalist, who regards
happiness in a stoic way.
664d-665a[26]
could explain partly where Nietzsche got his appreciation for
Dionysus and Apollo from. Plato divides a good play between
three parts. A first chorus who praises the Muses, a second
praises Apollo and a third Dionysus. The Muses are for
children, Apollo for middle aged people and Dionysus for the
old "good" people of Plato.
At 667e[27]
Athenian opines that abstract art should not relate to "usefulness
or truth, or accuracy of representation". Abstract art gives pleasure according to
Plato. "Truth" is used in a nominalist sense here by Plato
because truths are the opposite of abstract art.
This opinion could relate
to the earlier espousing of Egyptian laws by Athenian relating
to art and Old Testament laws about makings of "gelykenisse".
At 668a[28]
Athenian opines that realistic (imitative) art should be
judged on nothing but accuracy. Pleasure and pain has no part
in appreciating imitative arts. This opinion is in favour of
nominalism.
At 668a-668b[29]
Athenian opines that music should be only an imitative art in
the sense of representing the beautiful. If music is used for
enjoyment it should be illegal. Did he mean that music for
enjoyment is only meant for old Dionysian people? "These
people, then, who are anxious to take part in the finest
possible singing, should, apparently, look not for a music
which is sweet, but one which is correct; and correctness, as
we said, lies in the imitation and successful reproduction of
the proportions and characteristics of the model." (668b) [30]
Saunders opines that "These
people" are the old people who take
part in the Dionysian chorus. I disagree because Athenian
earlier said old people are not[31]
eager to sing and take part in plays. It is thus more likely a
reference to the young and beautiful who sings the second
chorus of Apollo. At 665d[32]
Plato describes the Dionysian chorus with "the
noblest
and most useful songs", which is it
seems not the "finest possible singing" of the Apollonian chorus mentioned at 668b.
At 668e[33]
Athenian refers to the characters represented in a play with "creatures".
26 March 2014
"LIFE
AFTER THE FLOOD"[34]
At 679c the Athenian said:
"So these men were good, partly for that
very reason, partly because of what we might call their
'naïveté'. When they heard things labelled 'good' or 'bad',
they were so artless as to think it a statement of the literal
truth and believe it. This
lack of sophistication precluded the cynicism you find today:
they accepted as the truth the doctrine they heard about gods
and men, and lived their lives in accordance with it."[35]
This statement by Plato
was contradicting at first contemplation because first the
Athenian says "men were good" and then he said those corporeal theon's
acceptances, that statements about differences between "good" and "bad" are true, were wrong. The Athenian however
refers explicitly to "literal
truth" and therefore makes a clear
distinction between nominalist truths and ambivalent realist
"One" truïsm, which made Plato
more of a nominalist than an ambivalent realist. Amibivalent
realism makes not the distinction between different truths,
because, for ambivalent realists the "cosmos as cosmos"[36]
is a datum. The "cosmos as cosmos", an inspiring belief,
cannot be a datum, but we can get better understandings of the
parts in the cosmos, which give better understandings about
the cosmos. In The
republic[37]
at 534a Socrates distinguished between correspondences ("opinion"[38]) and belief (faith, "pure
knowledge"[39])
of an individual. Correspondences (honest uses of words) can
be compared with "literal truth". Beliefs, faiths and "pure
knowledge", which are truer than
correspondences brought correspondences (literal truths)
closer to actualities due to increased levels of honesties.
Beliefs make ones honest and cause loving corresponding
language uses, which bring opinions closer to reality and
cause true realism. The identification by Plato of "literal
truth" implies he was closer to
nominalism and true realism than to ambivalent realism,
because of different truths (objective correspondences and
subjective coherencies) he acknowledges, which contribute to
societal coherence, the first priority. According to Kant this
first priority, implied by Popper to be the first principle of
science, can be accomplished, if enough people build there
subjective coherencies with components made of correspondences
(literal truths). Figurative truths also has a role but
figurative truths can only be understood after corresponding
truths are known. Figurative "good" and "evil" are well
understood after literal "gods", "goddesses" and "devils" are
understood.
"TROY"[40]
Whilst reading 682[41],
a realization about necessities of creativities and progress
were enforced because Noah, a creator of new shipbuilding
technology survived the great flood and after the flood, the
technology they had, managed before the flood, enhanced their
position on Earth. The circumstances imply that nature and
creativities work together to assure progress of creating
groups. Colonizations and effective defence confirm this.
"THE
DORIAN LEAGUE"[42]
At 682e-683a[43]
the Athenian says: "As
if God himself were guiding us, we've come back to the very
point from which we digressed: the actual foundation of
Sparta." The Athenian also recalled
that Sparta's and Crete's laws, which were established "on
the right lines" had a family
resemblance. Crito arranged Socrates escape from jail in order
to flee to Crete. There's also resemblance between Crito's
name and Crete's name.
"WHY
DID THE LEAGUE FAIL"[44]
"ATHENIAN:
So what kind of ignorance would deserve the title 'crass'? See
if you agree with my description. I suggest this kind.
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: The kind involved when a
man thinks something is fine and good, but loathes it instead
of liking it, and conversely when he likes and welcomes what
he believes is wicked and unjust. I maintain that this
disaccord between his feelings of pleasure and pain and his
rational judgement constitutes the very lowest depth of
ignorance."[45]
This has to do with
Caiaphas syndrome.
27 March 2014
The Athenian and Clenias
(from Crete) refers to "God"[46].
See 688e and 692b. Cleinias for example says at 688e. "And
so we shall, God willing."[47]
They did not define what they mean by the word "God". Their meanings could be either functionalist
uses in the sense of accusative (accusing another that they
think they are "God"
or "God" are
references to A force separate of their circumstances that
influence them. Another possibility is also functionalist,
that, they think not they each are "God", after being accused that they think they are
"God" and accusing that others think they are "God". I recall not that Megillus (from Sparta) have
used the word "God". Such
uses of the word "God"
can be grouped into meaning that their "God" was completely separate of them, not
themselves. A functionalist accusation that another,
mistakenly thinks he is "God" could imply two things. First that the accuser
thinks he is in a sense "God" or, that, "God" is completely separate of all people (the
Athenian, Megillus and Cleinias) taking part in the discussion
or separate of all people in the world. Using the accusative
functionalist form "God", could imply Caiaphas syndrome at the accuser.
Maybe the users of the word "God" included themselves as parts of "God" without using "God" in an accusative sense.
The uncertainty of the
meanings shows the importance of Vollenhoven's thesis that
works should have pre-theses. Such pre-theses logically could
be definitions for important words. Popper did not believe in
defining his words, which is strange if ones consider that
correspondences were important to him. That is a difference
between Popper and i. Sometimes i also feel like Popper, but
if clarity and higher levels of correspondence is an aim,
Vollenhoven's idea of a pre-theses could be used to aim more
accurately at correspondences. Obviously there is a limit to
how many definitions can be given in pre-theses.
"THE
PERSIAN MONARCHY"[48]
"ATHENIAN:
Then let's listen to the story. Under Cyrus, the life of the
Persians was a judicious blend of liberty and subjection, and
after gaining their own freedom they became the masters of a
great number of other people. As rulers, they granted a degree
of liberty to their subjects and put them on the same footing
as themselves, with the result that soldiers felt more
affection for their commanders and displayed greater zeal in
the face of danger. The king felt no jealousy if any of his
subjects was intelligent and had some advice to offer; on the
contrary, he allowed free speech and valued those who could
contribute to the formulation of policy; a sensible man could
use his influence to help the common cause. Thanks to freedom,
friendship and the practice of pooling their ideas, during
that period the Persians made progress all along the line."[49]
"ATHENIAN:
But surely, in the absence of self control, justice will never
spring up.
MEGILLUS: Of course not.
ATHENIAN: Nor indeed will the 'wise'
man we put forward just now,[50]
who keeps his feelings of pleasure and pain in tune with right
reason and obedient to it."[51]
"ATHENIAN:
So let's have done with the Persians. Our conclusion is that
the empire is badly run at the moment because the people are
kept in undue subjection and the rulers excessively
authoritarian."[52]
1 April 2014
The Athenian promotes
aiming for the whole of virtue in stead of aiming only for a
part (705d, 631a)[53].
The rationality of Plato here can be seen by him positing an
aiming in stead of an attaining. Attaining the whole is not a
possible state of being but is rather a state of aiming in
order to always improve ones' selves.
2 April 2014
"THE NEED FOR A BENEVOLENT DICTATOR"[54]
"That
the all-controlling agent in human affairs is God"
(709b) and "God will have done nearly all that
he usually does when he wants to treat a state with particular
favour" when the state has a single
benevolent dictator who understands how laws give right order.
More than one leader is not as good as a state with one leader
because "difficulties are in direct
proportion to the numbers."(710d).[55]
Plato prefers one
benevolent leader but like before I think he was writing about
colonies, which were not independent. Plato's one leader is
the point of contact of a colony with the people like himself
who forms colonies. In the Statesman the same view of Plato
came out.
At 711a the Athenian says
the reason a single benevolent leader institutes the best
government and an oligarchy the least best is because a single
benevolent leader can allow the "rapid
and trouble-free transition", which
is needed when progress is required.[56]
At 711c the Athenian refers to a requirement of changing and
developing laws. At 711e the Athenian says "Nestor" who lived during Trojan times was such a leader
of "moderation"
and "self-restraint".[57]
The Athenian stated clearly that he thinks such leaders are
rare. Popper's view thus that Plato limited change for the
good is refuted here in The laws.
From 713a to 714b the
Athenian refers to "the
god" of a state as an incorporeal
being. Cronus appointed superior beings ("spirits") the Athenian contrasted with mortals, to rule
over humans, like humans rule over domesticated animals.[58]
3 April 2014
"LAW
SHOULD BE SUPREME"
From 714b to 715d the
Athenian promotes a state which has Laws above all people. His
reason is that when supreme force of revolutions, Pindar
posited, the origins of ruling authorities, too much flux is
relevant, which disadvantages parts of a state. The Laws
should be written to benefit all of a state. At 711c the
Athenian talked about the importance of changing Laws in order
to adjust to new circumstances.
The Athenian prefers one
ruler in the service of "a god" ("spirit") of that state. The
Athenian's view implies that one ruler should have control
over Laws. This posited one ruler should be in service of "a
god", which is a "spirit". The spirits of states were
originally during Cronus's time appointed by Cronus. Cronus
was not supreme during Plato's writing because he used the
word "God" in his translated work. The Athenian (who
represents Plato's thought)
[59]
compared Cronus with "God", but up to here "God" has not been
defined. The closest Plato has come to defining "God" is by
comparing God with Cronus[60]
and Nestor[61].
It seems thus that due to the singularity of Plato's "God",
Plato could have regarded himself to be his "God". Based on Phaedrus and The laws, up to
here, and other works of Plato read to date Plato's "God" was
in the spirit world, where his spirit will go after his death.
25-26 April 2020: From the Trevor J. Saunders (Penguin) translation 716a:
"ADDRESS TO THE NEW COLONISTS
ATHENIAN: Now then, our address should go like this: 'Men, according to the ancient story, there is a god who holds in his hands
the beginning and end and middle of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature. Justice, who takes vengeance on those
who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side. The man who means to live in happiness latches onto her and follows her with
meekness and humility. But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honours or by physical beauty when young and foolish,
whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to
others - there's a man whom God has deserted. And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy
he causes universal chaos. Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty
and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin. Thus it is ordained. What action, then, should a sensible man take,
and what should his outlook be? What must he avoid doing or thinking?'
CLEINIAS: This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those who follow in the company of God.
ATHENIAN: 'So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his wishes? There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying
"like approves of like" (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due proportion). In our view it is God who is pre-eminently
the "measure of all things", much more so than any "man", as they say. (Note22)"
(Note 22: Page 512: ""measure of all things"..."man", as they say: Protagoras, a philosopher of the fifth century BC, maintained
that 'man is the measure of all things'.")
ATHENIAN (continued): So if you want to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best to make
your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate man is God's friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate
and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning applies to the other vices to. 'Let's be clear that
the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines the finest and truest): If a good man
sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in his prayers and offerings and every kind of worship he can give them,
this will be the best and noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is his
most effective way of achieving a happy life. But if the wicked man does it, the results are bound to be just the opposite...
The first weapon in our armoury will be to honour the gods of the underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron gods of the
state". The Athenian (Plato) continues explaining after the underworld, spirits, forefather etc and parents must be worshipped and
respected.
SELF
This section explains Plato's definition for God. Socrates's definition was different. Socrates regarded
God more in the sense of "the dog" in whose "name" he swore, which relates to good ideas, development, ostracism and vagrancy.
At 716c the Athenian says:
'God who is pre-eminently the "measure of all
things", much more so than any "man", as they say.[62]'
Plato seems to emphasise
singularity of 'any "man" ', which could imply Caiaphas syndrome. My
feeling is that Protagoras's " 'man
..' " was meant in the plural.
My current conception of God that give courage to be honest,
could be similar to Protagoras' plural " 'man
..' ", plus logos
"The
first weapon in our armoury will be to honour the gods of the
underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron gods of the
state; the former should be alotted such secondary honours as
the Even and the Left, while the latter should receive
superior and contrasting honours like the Odd. That's the best
way a man can hit his target, piety. After these gods, a
sensible man will worship the spirits, and after them the
heroes."[63]
7 April 2014
"ATHENIAN:
… But when, as with us now, God has given a group of people
anew state to found, in which so far there is no mutual malice
– well, to stir up ill-will towards each other because of the
way they distribute the land and houses would be so criminally
stupid that no man could bring himself to do it.[64]…
It doesn't matter whether he's founding a new state from
scratch or reconstructing an old one that has gone to ruin: in
either case, if he has any sense, he will never dream of
altering whatever instructions may have been received from
Delphi or Dodona or Ammon[65]
about the gods and temples that ought to be founded by the
various groups in the state, and the gods or the spirits after
whom the temples should be named.[66]"
8 April 2014
"ATHENIAN:
… well, do you think there's any legislator so stupid as not
to realize that his code has many inevitable deficiencies
which must be put right by a successor, if the state he's
founded is to enjoy a continuous improvement in its
administrative arrangements, rather than suffer a decline."[67]
At 772b-772d[68]
the Athenian says that the laws should be adjusted over a
period of ten years until strictly correct. After that the
laws can only be changed by unanimous decision amongst "all
the officials, the entire citizen body and all the oracles of
the gods."
At 770d-771a[69]
the Athenian says that "Our
aim in life should be goodness and the spiritual virtue
appropritae to mankind." He also
talked about censuring laws, which do not help us and about
being law-abiding citizens.
13 April 2014
At 797d the Athenian says
change is "extremely dangerous", except if "the change affects
something evil". At 798c-798d the
Athenian says "the biggest evil that can affect
a state" takes place when the laws
are changed for "praising and censuring" the "moral
character" of citizens.
"MEGILLUS:
What on earth are we to do, Cleinias? Are we going to let our
visitor run down Sparta for us like this?
CLEINIAS: Yes, we are. We told him
he could be frank, and we must give him his head until we've
properly worked through every section of our legal code."[70]
At 812d-813a the Athenian
gives his opinion about what is not good music. For example
the lyre may not be used to play an "independent
melody" and short intervals may not
be combined with large, high notes with low, and quick with
slow tempos. Cleinias then says: "Here
again you've spoken the truth -" and
the Athenian replies: "-
the whole truth and nothing but the truth! So these are the
regulations the person appointed as our Director of Music must
adopt and enforce: let's wish him the best of luck in his task."[71]
From 667a to 668b a
discussion about music takes place. Opinions by the Athenian
are described by Cleinias as "emphatically
true" and "Very
true".
It starts to look now as
if Plato regarded his opinions as 'the truth' and therefore he
was an adherent to a type of ambivalent realism, but, it is
not clear yet if his opinions were based at his old age on
nominalist truths through out his life. If Plato was a
deceiver it would mean according to Kant that Plato had not
built the necessary correspondences with nature, in his mind,
to have had, at old age, good judgement.
At 817a-817b the Athenian
regards himself, Cleinias and Megillus "tragedians". It seems thus that Plato's character sided
with observers, the types who copy tragedies. It does not
contradict his writings of Socrates's philosophy and death.
Plato regularly refers to impiety and at 799b he describes a
situation that can be compared to Socrates's sentences, with
regard to theon, as wrong, and his consequential sentence as
right. I have however read a commentary in which the
commentator wrote that Plato felt that Socrates's sentence was
not fair.
At 818b-818c the Athenian
regards "at least some practical and theoretical knowledge" and "synthesis" necessary for education.
"ATHENIAN:
… Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or
disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known
intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught."[72]
This statement by Plato could mean that Plato had a similar
opinion than Kant. That correspondences will lead to coherence
at old age, even if a person is completely ignorant of a field
of knowledge. It is therefore, according to Plato, it seems
now, not vast studies, which cause coherent views of the world
but something else. That something else could be
correspondences, which would make Plato more of a nominalist
than an ambivalent realist. The ambivalent realism i referred
to earlier should perhaps have been bivalent realism, because
what i meant was that the truth of his opinions about music
can not be determined readily therefor the word "bivalent".
Bivalent realism refers in my mind now to true realism, which
must be tempered by universal laws against, for example,
murdering and deceiving. Ambivalent realism is the type i
oppose. Trivalent realism is something better than bivalent
realism. Recall the descriptions in the philosophy
dictionaries about bivalence.
At 819e-820e the Athenian
uses arguments about commensurability and incommensurability,
which supports my epistemology that the only stable background
for trivalent realism are corresponding truths with nature.
"Corresponding" is descriptive of a state between nature and
words, which we can agree upon without too much theoretical
content included in presuppositions. The only presupposition
should be "correspondence per se". Instruments should be
allowed too measure correspondence but only if agreed upon.
The most accurate measure to judge "correspondence" is honery
testing.
At 823e a negative opinion
is raised against fishing and killing birds but it is allowed
in Plato's laws at 824a.
13 April 2014
Whilst discussing sexual
matters the Athenian said the following. "But
now for something which is not a triviality at all. It's a
point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God
himself is really the only person to do it – supposing, that
is, we could in fact somehow get explicit instructions from
him. Since that's impossible, it looks as if we need some
intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify
the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens,
give a firm 'no' to our most compelling passions, and order
his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of
conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole
organization of the state. There will be no one to back him
up. He'll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him. …
(there's no one listening, so let's be frank)"[73]
"HOW
TO DISCOURAGE UNNATURAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE"[74]
16 April 2014
From 895c-897b Plato
elaborates on the belief that "soul" was prior to all other things, including
materials.
From 897b-899d Plato
elaborates on the belief that "reason" orders heavenly bodies. The Athenian says
that we ought to say that "reason" "is the best kind of soul that
cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best
path." On this philosophical realist
statement Cleinias answered only "True" and the Athenian then answered that if the
heavenly bodies moves not in predictable order we ought to say
that "the evil kind of soul is in charge
of them."[75]
Elsewhere in the book it was explained that the word "planets" referred to the evil souls' moving powers
because "planets"
in Greek literally means "wanderers".
"ATHENIAN:
… Everyone should think of adulteration as essentially the
same sort of thing as lying and deceit – which in fact people
commonly describe as quite respectable. But they are wrong to
defend this sort conduct as 'frequently justified, on
appropriate occasions', because what they mean by the
'appropriate' place and occasion they leave vague and
indefinite and their dictum does nothing but harm both to
themselves and to others. Now
a legislator cannot afford to leave this vague: he must always
lay down precise limits, however wide or narrow they may be.
So let's define some limits now: a man must tell no lie,
commit no deceit, and do no fraud in word or deed when he
calls upon the gods, unless he wants to be thoroughly loathed
by them – as anyone is who snaps his fingers at them and
swears false oaths, or (though they find this less offensive)
tells lies in the presence of his superior."[76]
At 937c the death penalty
is proposed against witnesses who commit perjury three times.[77]
"ATHENIAN:
… Rhadamanthus should be admired for the way in which,
according to report, he decided the suits that came before
him. He realized that his contemporaries were absolutely
convinced of the existence of gods – and not surprisingly, as
most people alive then were actually descended from them, and
this is traditionally true of Rhadamanthus himself. I suppose
it was because he thought that no mere man should be given the
task of judging, but only gods, that he managed to make his
judgements so swift and straightforward. What ever the subject
of dispute, he let the litigants take an oath,[78]
a device which enabled him to get through his list of cases
rapidly and without making mistakes. Nowadays, however, some
people (as we remarked) don't believe in gods at all, while
others believe they are not concerned about mankind; and there
are others – the worst and most numerous category – who hold
that in return for a miserable sacrifice here and a little
flattery there, the gods will help them to steal enormous sums
of money and rescue them from all sorts of heavy penalties."[79]
After reading The laws i thought
that Plato believed that "gods" and "goddesses" grouped
together by him as "theon", were living corporeal honest human
beings as well as the heavenly bodies, which had orderly
movements, which's movements could be predicted with accuracy.
Plato referred often to gods and children of gods. Inferences
could be made between the things Jesus did and said and the
things Plato wrote in The
laws. Tarnas's opinion about early Christians being
influenced by Greek philosophy is true. The seven deadly sins
or some of them appeared often as topical issues in The laws. Anger was
often mentioned.
23 April 2014
The Cooper and Hutchinson
edition used the Thrasyllus manuscript. Thrasyllus lived
during the first century of the common era.[80]
It is fact that Plato's
opinions should be understood as part of a whole similar to
philosohical realism.[81]
According to Cooper and
Hutchinson the primary speaker in Plato's dialogues represents
not Plato's opinion, even so with the Athenian in Laws. The reason is
because dialogue forms mean that authors remove themselves
from pictures they portray.[82]
Aristotle regarded the
main speaker of the dialogues to be presenting Plato's opinion
except at the Socratic dialogues, in which he ascribed the
opinons to the historical Socrates. The tradition in the
Academy, when reading Plato's works, after Aristotle's death,
for example Arcesilaus's, (2nd century BC head of
the Academy) was sceptic in the sense of not attaining an
absolute truth. Arcesilaus opined Plato was a sceptic like
Socrates.[83]
Antiochus of Ascalon (1st century BC) argued that
Plato's works did not portray a sceptic attitude.[84]
The Neoplatonists then started again to spread Plato's works
with more dogmatic opinions ascribed to Plato.[85]
Charmides and Critias in
conversation with Socrates when Charmides was a teenager.[86]
The thirty tyrants, "antidemocrats" of whom Charmides and Critias were part, were
appointed in 404 BC by the Spartan king after Athens was
defeated in the Peloponnesian War. Both died in 403 BC during
the "fighting",
which "restored"
democracy.[87]
Socrates was referenced
here in the first person "I". It looks as if Socrates wrote
Charmides, the dialogue.[88]
Charmides was the son of Critias's mother's brother, Glaucon
and Critias's cousin.[89]
Socrates refers to
doctors' treatments of eyes in a philosophical realist way. He
mentions treating the whole of the body instead of only a
part, being a "principle". Similarly "the
body" should not be treated apart
from "the soul".
"The whole" should be in
order for parts to function well. Doctors' treatments should
start at "the soul"
with "charms",
which are "beautiful words" according to Zalmoxis, "a
god" and king of Thrace.[90]
The family of Solon was
known for their poetry. Charmides's maternal uncle Pyrilampes
was "the finest and most influential man
in the country" due to his political
connections with the "Great King" and other countries.[91]
Socrates opines that
playing the lyre quick and lively is "admirable" and Charmides agrees.[92]
Whilst discussing " 'sōphrosunē' "[93]
("temperance"), Charmides
opined that temperance is doing things quietly. Socrates then
influenced Charmides to agree that doing things "violently", quickly and lively is more admirable than
doing things slowly and quietly. Charmides then changed "quiet" behaviour to "modest" behaviour, for being temperate. Socrates then
equated his opinion about violent behaviour, with "temperance" and "good".[94]
It looked to me as if Charmides, the dialogue, was an
explanation, which Socrates wrote to Plato, before his trial.
The dialogue up to here was understood in the context of
Socrates who returned from war. His actions during the war had
to be quick to survive, therefore, obviously, quickened
actions would have been "good" to him. Such actions of war is the opposite of
slow stately austere actions, which was characteristic of
Plato's stately family. Charmides and Critias was killed,
before democracy was instilled. It could be that Socrates's
motivation for "violent"
behaviour led to Charmides's death. Critias was however an
older man, which was maybe not influenced by Socrates. It now
seems to me that Socrates in philosophy can be compared with
Machiavelly and Hobbes.
The argument then turned
to "minding one's own business". Someone who appeared to be
wise told Charmides that "minding one's own business" is
temperance. Socrates disagreed because he argued that when
Charmides writes he writes not only about himself. When
Critias started to argue the case for "minding one's own
business", creativities entered the argument. Critias opined
that work is always admirable but that creativities only when
it is good creativities.[95]
Critias eventually equated
temperance with being "good", not "bad".[96]
Critias quoted a verse "Pledges
lead to perdition".[97]
Critias opines "that temperance is to know
oneself."[98]
The argument then lead to whether science of temperance should
be regarded as a science of itself and of all other sciences.
Also relevant was what selves know and know not and being
aware of that. I had the impression that the argument was
basically the result of two men who tried to each get the
upperhand over the other and that actuality was not really the
issue. Socrates especially gave me that impression, probably,
still being on a high after the fighting he was involved in
during the battles of the Peloponnesian War, where he returned
from, before the discussion.[99]
26 April 2014
At 172a Socrates wrote or
was quoted: ' "Isn't this what we mean about temperance,
Critias," I said, "when we say what a good thing it would be
to know what one knows and what one does not know?" "This is
certainly what we mean," he said.'[100]
Up to here in the dialogue the impression was formed that
Socrates was busy challenging Critias, one of the royals,
about their science of temperance, which Socrates thought, was
not a science, which could give knowledge to interfere with
other sciences, for example, medicine and contruction
(building houses). Socrates said that the leaders of the
state, who study the science of temperance should leave the
other sciences to go about their businesses, without
interference. The specialisation and little interference by
leaders will then cause an ordered state according to
Socrates.
At 172b Socrates opines
that the science of temperance is knowledge of science per se
without knowledge about a specialised science. This knowledge
of science per se will give a person the ability to see all
things clearer in a philosophical realist sense. Such a person
will be able to act like himself (Socrates), when he questions
others with his dialectical method of questioning, which
according to him shows 'the truth' or truths about the
specialised "subjects he himself knows in a more
effective fashion".[101]
At 172d Socrates asks
whether the science of temperance adds benefit to society and
he aks whether it is professional duty to do what we know and
to hand over to others to do what we do not know. Critias
answers in the affirmative but at 172e Socrates counters that
he thinks it is not the case. Critias then replies,
' "You certainly say some queer things, Socrates" '
on which Socrates replies ' "By the dog" ',
' "they seem queer to me to, and that is why, when I
became aware of this a moment ago, I said that some strange
things would come to light and that I was afraid we were not
conducting the examination correctly. Because truly, even if
their were no doubt that [173] temperance is like this, it
appears in no way clear to me that it does us any
good." '[102]
At 173b-d Socrates
promotes specialisation in sciences to improve living
conditions and he rejects "deceivers" and promotes the "mantic" science, which predicts the future most
accurately. These "prophets of the future" are "the
true
seers" according to Socrates.
Temperance will (not shall) then reign and happiness will (not
shall) be promoted by science and not the absence of science.[103]
At 173e – 174b Socrates adds that the most desirable knowledge
is that of the "seer"
who knows the future, past and present. Socrates meant
nominalist knowledge with regard to the past and present and
philosophical realist knowledge with regard to the future. At
174b Critias adds or replies that the science, which most
effectively cause happiness is knowledge of ' "good
and evil" '.[104]
At 174c-174d Socrates agrees with Critias but he qualifies his
agreement by saying that knowledge of 'good and evil' is not
the same as knowledge of temperance (" 'sōphrosunē' "[105]).
Socrates opposed the Greek aristocracy by not accepting their
words.[106]
At 176 Charmides and
Critias agree that the youth should hear what Socrates says
and they also threatened or warned Socrates that they will use
violence if Socrates opposes them.[107]
A debate between
Hermogenes and Cratylus about the meaning of names. According
to Hermogenes the definitions of words are determined merely
by agreement and convention. According to Cratylus words have
a deeper meaning, which says something about the nature of
things.[108]
At 384c-385e Hermogenes
contradicts himself because he says an individual can decide
to call a "man" a "horse" and it will be right, but he also
said that definitions are decided upon by "convention
and agreement". He bases his
argument by comparing an individual person to a nation. He
says different languages use different words for the same
thing, therefore it applies to individual persons as well. He
however seems to refer primarily to new words with regard to
individual persons.[109]
If one can decide what a word should be for description, then
societal "convention and agreement" is not regarded important, unless societies
agree to disagree. To agree to disagree is however
unsustainable because that would allow deceits to reign, which
cause regression, due to lacks of creativities. Copyrights to
new words are relevant here. I started to use "intequity".
Does that mean I decide what the definition should be for
"intequity"? I propose the definition and societies accept or
reject the thesis. Acceptance and use are dependant on
societies and an individual, who proposes a new word.
At 387 Socrates and
Hermogenes defines "the
truth" and "a
falsehood". Socrates says: "And
those that say of the things that are that they are, are true,
while those that say of the things that are that they are not
are false?"[110]
At 388b Socrates explains
that names (words) are tools we use for "dividing
being."[111]
At 388d Socrates explains that words should be used according
to rules, which law-givers set.[112]
At 388e-389a Socrates opines that "a
rule-setter" is "a
name-maker", "the
kind of craftsman most rarely found among human beings."[113]
At 390a Socrates refer to different numbers of syllables of
different words of different languages, which depict the same
thing and he compares the different syllables to different
types of materials, tools are made of. He then says the tools
work as long as forms of tools are correct, whilst different
types of wood and metal are used. Wood for spindles and metal
for hard hammers. Socrates also opines that "rule-setters" have equal purpose in different territories.[114]
At 390b Socrates opines
that lyre-players should supervise manufacturers of lyres and
ship-captains should supervise shipbuilders because users of
tools know best what is needed in their tools.[115]
At 390c Socrates then infers from the examples of lyres and
ships that the users of words should supervise and "judge" the words and "work of a
rule-setter".[116]
The practical sides of this opinion by Socrates are
complicated because remunerations must be apportioned fairly
between rule-setters and the users (judges) of new words and
concepts.
At 390c-e Socrates opines
that "a dialectician" who asks questions and can answer them should
supervise rule-setters. He then agrees with Cratylus that
words have natural essences, which rule-setters grasp.[117]
At 391-393 Socrates and
Hermogenes use examples from Protagoras's ' "Truth" ' to originations of different words, for the same
things, Homer ascribed in his Iliad to "the
gods" and "men". He then
goes on to compare gods to singular men who defend cities on
their own and men to women of a city.[118]
At 397c Socrates uses
" 'theoi' " is the Greek word for " 'gods' ". At 397d Socrates opines that " 'theoi' " is a suitable name for gods because they
"run" "(thein)" constantly like the moon, the sun and the stars. [119]
At 398b-c Socrates equites
"good" with "wise" and gold. "Daemon" Socrates uses to refer to the wise after they
died.[120]
According to the New Oxford American Dictionary the arhaic
word "daemon" changed into the current "demon". It thus
supports my belief that the words "good", "gods" and
"godesses" and "God" should not be mixed up with knowledge,
which can be used for evil purposes. The two most prominent
contenders for parts of "good" are currently truths, which
implies honesties and love. Love is according to Jesus and
Plato (Laws),
recognized at law-abiding citizens. Kant's categorical
imperative can be reconciled with law-abidingness, especially
if writing of laws also consider Kant's categorical
imperative.
At 398d-e Socrates opines
that Greek " 'hērōs' " (" 'hero' ") is a derivative of the old Attic word " 'erōs' ", which implies that " 'hērōs' " were born from " 'love' " between a "god" or "goddess"
and a "mortal".
Another possibility Socrates considered is that " 'hērōs' " was derived from "rhētores" ("clever speech-makers") and "erōtan" ("skilled questioners"), which he equates with "sophists", being the descendants of "the
noble breed of heroes".[121]
At 399c Socrates explains
with the Greek word " 'anthrōpos' " how he thinks words form by conjunction from
different words. " 'Anthrōpos' " (human) was derived by combining words which
mean together we reason about that, which we observe in
contrast with animals, which do not reason.[122]
Socrates also inferred that, because, animals do not have
hands and because we do not understand their languages, they
do not reason.
Around 400 Socrates and
Hermogenes agree that Anaxagoras's conception about " 'soul' " ("psuchē"),
that
sustains ("ochei kai echei")
nature
("phusis") is correct.[123]
This could be a differentiating factor between Plato and
Socrates at roots, if Plato preferred the word anima for soul,
like in Aristotle's De
Anima (On the Soul) (Aristotle, 1986). Was Aristotle's De Anima derived from
the same root as Ana of Anaxagoras? Plato however was author
or editor of this dialogue, therefore he used words similar to
Anaxagoras and Socrates, if he quoted Socrates correct.
At 401d Socrates opines he
agrees with Heraclitus's doctrine that the things which "are" are caused by the "pusher" that " 'is' " "the
cause and originator of them".
Therefore Hestia is the goddess who receives the first part of
"a sacrifice" and is
named first in "prayers"
and "oaths".[124]
At 402d Socrates discussed
"Posidon" and Pluto, Zeus's brothers.[125]
Diogenes Laertius wrote Plato was a descendant of Poseidon.
The democrats had Zeus as their God. In Laws Plato visits
with two interlocutors the cave of Zeus on Crete where
Magnesia will be established. It could imply that Plato's
'god' he thought of was Cronus. His family for example
Critias, maybe had Poseidon in their minds, which caused
friction with democrats who had Zeus in their minds.
At 405c-e Socrates opines
that the single l of " 'Apolon' " signifies a dictatorial one therefore another l
was added to the name of " 'Apollo' " to signify harmony. Truthfullness is also
brought in connection with Apollo by implication.
Singlemindedness which is truthfulness, according to Socrates,
with Apolon.[126]
"Apollyon |əˈpälyən| a name for the
Devil (Rev. 9:11). ORIGIN from late Latin (Vulgate), from
Greek Apolluōn ‘destroyer’ (translating Abaddon
), from apollunai, from apo- ‘quite’ +
ollunai [destroy.]" (New Oxford)
27 April 2014
At 408c Socrates says: "You
know speech signifies all things (to pan) and keeps
them circulating and always going about, and that it has two
forms—true and false?" Hermogenes
answers, "Certainly"
and then Socrates carries on, "Well,
the true part is smooth and divine and dwells among the gods
above, while the false part dwells below among the human
masses, and is rough and goatish (tragikon); for it is
here in the tragic (tragikon)
life, that one finds the vast majority of myths and
falsehoods."[127]
At 411d Socrates says
wisdom is "the understanding of motion".[128]
At 411e-412a Socrates opines that " 'Knowledge' " indicates "a
worthwhile soul" adjusts with the
flow of things without "running
on ahead" or lagging behind.[129]
At 412c Socrates says " 'good'
('agathon') is intended to signify
everything in nature that is admirable (agaston)" and fast
moving things should be admired.[130]
Socrates was taught in secret that " 'the
just (dikaiou sunesis)' " are the
cause of all things, but he could not find out from his
teachers what the just is/are
because
they each had a different opinion. " 'Injustice
(adikia)' " meant to
Socrates the prevention of penetration.[131]
" 'Thein' " means
" 'to
run' ".[132]
At 414d Socrates opines that people who respect not "the
truth" change words to sound nice, when they speak,
without considering the meanings of the individual letters.[133]
At 417c Socrates opines that " 'good' "
promotes continuous flowing of things, which naturally opposes
an "end (telos) to motion".[134]
28 April 2014
SOCRATES: "while
'thumos' ('spirit',
'anger') derives from the raging (thusis) and boiling of the
soul."[135]
"SOCRATES: 'Doxa' ('opinion)
either derives from the pursuit (diōxis) the soul
engages in when it hunts for the knowledge of how things are,
or it derives from the shooting of a bow (toxon). But the
latter is more likely. At any rate, 'oiēsis' ('thinking')
is in harmony with it. It seems to express the fact that
thinking is the motion (oisis)
of the soul towards every thing, towards how each of the
things that are really is."[136]
"HERMOGENES:
Well, then, let me ask about the finest and most important
names, 'alētheia'
('truth'), 'pseudos'
('falsehood'), 'on'
('being'), and—the subject of our present conversation—'onoma' ('name') and
why it is so named.
SOCRATES: Do you know what 'maiesthai' means?
HERMOGENES: Yes, it means 'to
search' ('zētein').
SOCRATES: Well, 'onoma' ('name') seems
to be a compressed statement which says: "this is a being for
which there is a search." You can see this more easily in 'onomaston' ('thing
named'), since it clearly says: "this is a being for which
there is a search (on
hou masma estin)." 'Alētheia' ('truth')
is like these others in being compressed, for the divine
motion of being is called 'alētheia' because 'alētheia' is a
compressed form of the phrase "a wandering that is divine (alē theia)." 'Pseudos'
('falsehood') is the opposite of this motion, so that, once
again, what is constrained or compelled to be inactive is
reviled by the name-giver, and likened to people asleep (katheudousi)—but the
meaning of the name is concealed by the addition of 'ps'. 'On' ('being') or 'ousia' ('being') says
the same as 'alētheia' once an 'i' is added, since it
signifies going (ion). 'Ouk on' ('not
being'), in turn, is 'ouk
ion' ('not going') and indeed some people actually use
that name for it."[137]
Socrates and Cratyles
argued here about where words came from. Part of the
discussion was about the alphabet letters. Cratylus argued
that the first 'name-giver' knew the words before he used the
words. Cratylus thus argued that the first 'name-giver'
received the words, already formed. Socrates did not accept
Cratylus's argument. The argument did not make sense.
According to Socrates in Phaedrus, the
dialogue, Theuth discovered the alphabet. Logically Theuth
thus took the words, which were used for hieroglyphs, used by
Ammon and his people. Theuth then gave symbols for each sound
and those 'names' of the sounds, were used to spell the
existing words without picturing the words with hieroglyphs.
Socrates seems to have argued that the alphabet was discovered
before hieroglyphs because Socrates claims that "r", for
example, presented movement in Greek. I think the symbols
simply presented sounds in the case of Theuth. Maybe letter
symbols developed from writing, the way letters change when
writing with cursive letters. It could also be that the 'r'
sound in Greek speaking, presented movement, before they used
symbols to write, and the symbol therefore, after being taken
from Theuth's Egyptian, therefore represented movement in
Greek but not in Egyptian. In hieroglyphs the pictures
represented two types of entities. The animal, for example,
and the sound, which depicted the animal. Letter symbols could
therefore be derivatives of the pictures, which represented
two types of things. Let's say the picture of a dog
represented the sound 'kainos' and the animal. Theuth then
broke the word down into different sounds, perhaps by breaking
up the picture into parts. If all pictures were broken into
parts and similar letters were shown from different pictures
and similar sounds were shown from different pictures, that
would have been an interesting discovery, which would have
implied that letters and sounds as facts, represent shapes and
parts of bodies.[138]
"SOCRATES:
First off, 'r',
seems to me to be a tool for copying every sort of motion ('kinēsis').—We haven't
said why motion has this name, but it's clear that it means 'hesis' ('a going
forth'), since in ancient times we used 'e' in place of 'ē'. The first part
comes from 'kiein',
a non-Attic name equivalent to 'ienai' ('moving'). So
if you wanted to find an ancient name corresponding to the
present 'kinēsis',
the correct answer would be 'hesis'. But nowadays, what with the non-Attic
word 'kiein', the change from 'e' to 'ē', and the insertion
of 'n', we say 'kinēsis', though it
ought to be 'kieinēsis'.
'Stasis' ('rest') is
a beautified version of a name meaning the opposite 'ienai'
('moving').—In any case as I was saying, the letter 'r' seemed to the
name-giver to be a beautiful tool for copying motion, at any
rate he often uses it for this purpose."[139]
At 426e-437a Cratylus
opines that proper words reflect movement which "all" things are subject to.[140]
At 438c Cratylus opines
that a more than human power determined the first words and
therefore the first words were absolutely right. Cratylus also
stated that the two opposing forces, motion and rest, which
are represented by symbols, according to Socrates, mean that
either of the two "aren't names at all."[141]
"SOCRATES:
But since there's a civil war among names, with some claiming
that they are like the truth and others claiming that they are, how then
are we to judge between them, and what are we to start from?
We can't start from other different names because there are
none. No, it's clear we'll have to look for something other
than names, something that will make plain to us without using
names which of these two kinds of names are the true ones—that
is to say, the ones that express the truth about the things
that are."[142]
At 439a-b Socrates and
Cratylus agreed that if letters are proper 'names', then the
letters must be "likenesses" of what the letters represent. Cratylus also
opined that it is better to learn from actuality, without
words, than from representations. Socrates then acknowledges
his limitations in connection with philosophical ambivalent
realism and he implies that nominalist learning is only what
we can do and we can learn nominally better, from actuality
than from words.[143]
My argument above together with Socrates's and Cratylus's
agreement, implies that sounds and body parts represented by
symbols are actually similar in form. It implies that learning
from actuality and learning from words would be the same if
symbols are 'accurate', which they can never be. Symbols thus
gave us a third 'dimension' because, before symbols existed,
only perfect words and bodies existed. It implies that perfect
words (sounds) could have created ex nihilo, but false
pictures distorted perfect sounds.
From 439-440e Socrates
explains why he thinks that perfect form exists apart from our
experienced world and that our experienced knowledge is more
accurate than knowledge attained through letters. Furthermore
Socrates opines that knowledge itself is temporary because
'the truth' is not within our reach. Socrates's opinion seems
to be a philosophical nominalist view rather than a
philosophical realist view. Socrates's view could even, with
regard to human abilities to attain knowledge, be more
conservative than nominalism because he thinks knowledge is
not possible.
Socrates stated he agreed
not with Heraclitus at 439b-c. Cratylus stated he agreed with
Heraclitus at 440e. [144]
According to Socrates's
opinion at 402, Heraclitus had a significant influence on
poets, which elsewhere was stated a practise Plato's family
practiced. If I remember correctly Solon's writing of laws and
his poetry was condensed into one activity by Socrates.[145]
7 May 2014
SOCRATES: "The
two are absolutely omniscient, so much so that I never knew
before what pancratiasts really were."
Crito asked Socrates who were two people Socrates talked with
at the Lyceum and Socrates answered him with regard to
Eythydemus and Dionysodorus, two brothers.[146]
At 272a-b Socrates looks very taken with the methodology of
Eythydemus and Dionysodorus and he specifically says that they
do not care whether their arguments are "true
or false."[147]
"The
pancration (lit., "all round fighting") was a combination of
wrestling and boxing."[148]
There was another word i
read earlier, which was similar to this "pancratiasts", which
meant followers of Aristotle. Socrates met the two brothers at
the Lyceum, it could thus be that they were students of
Aristotle's school and it implies then that Aristotle was a
Sophist.
Crito says that they are "another
new kind of sophist", he supposes.
Socrates says they left as colonists from Chios to Thurii but
were exiled from Thurii before they came to Athens.[149]
At 274a Socrates asks Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to speak "the
truth" when they lecture to him.[150]
It seems that Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus were students with a following or maybe
lecturers at the Lyceum. Socrates it seems was also a student
or lecturer at the Lyceum because he was in the locker rooms[151]
when he had his discussion with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.
SOCRATES: "The
two men themselves [Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus] were pretty well advanced in
years when they made a start on this wisdom I want to get; I
mean the eristic sort. Last year or the year before they were
not yet wise."[152]
The translator, Rosamond
Kent Sprague, used the word "virtue" to refer to the teachings of the sophists.[153]
At 274b Socrates say
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus was at the Lyceum to teach.[154]
At 275a Socrates calls Euthydemus and Dionysodorus teachers of
"philosophy and the practice of virtue".[155]
The technique of the two sophists is also called "philosophy" at 304e.[156]
At 275b-d Socrates invites Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to
teach Clinias, a boy of Athens, who Socrates and other
Athenians were fond of. Also, Socrates opines that what he
then heard from Euthydemus and Dionysodorus was "wisdom" that was "so
great."[157]
At 293-294a Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus posits an ambivalent realist argument that a
person who knows something knows everything because everything
and nothing are opposites, therefore something has to be the
same as everything.[158]
At 302b-d Socrates stated
that he had not an "ancestral
Zeus". Socrates thus did not believe
himself to be a descendant of Zeus. He however stated that
Athenians regarded Apollo to be an ancestor. He stated that
they regarded Zeus not as an ancestor but rather a protector.[159]
At 305b Crito reproaches Socrates because Socrates argued with
the two sophists in public.[160]
At 305c Socrates places philosophers and statesmen in opposing
forces. At 306c Socrates does it again, which implies that
statesmen were regarded as honest at the time.[161]
At 305e Crito supports men of middles after Socrates
disregarded them.[162]
At 306a Socrates promotes "truth". It seems at 306 Socrates gives an argument,
which supports the law of the excluded middle.[163]
At 307c the dialogue ends
where Socrates proclaim that philosophy, the teachings of the
sophists is a worthwile topic to study.[164]
The dialogue reenforced my
thoughts that Socrates was too friendly with the sophists for
his own good. In the Republic Socrates stated that leaders
should be allowed to lie to the populace, which seems to be
diametrically opposed to the general feeling which placed
statesmen and sophists (philosophers) in opposition.
Polycrates claimed
Socrates justified deceiving and stealing.[165]
12 May 2014
"χρηστóτης
(chrēstotēs),
honesty: moral sincerity, together with intelligence;
excellence of character."[166]
"εŭσεβεια
(eusebeia), piety:
justice concerning the gods, the ability to serve the gods
voluntarily; the correct conception of the honor due to gods;
knowledge of the honor due to gods."[167]
"αγνεια (hagneia), piety:
caution about mistakes with respect to the gods; paying
service, in a normal way, to the honor of a god."[168]
"πιστις (pistis), faith: the
conception that things are as they appear to one; firmness of
character."[169]
"αγηθεια (alētheia), truth,
veracity: the correct state expressed in affirmation and
denial; edge of truths."[170]
"ταξις (taxis), order:
functional similarity in all the mutual elements of a whole;
due proportion in a society; cause of all the mutual elements
of a whole; due proportion in respect of learning."[171]
"νóησις (noēsis), intuition:
the starting point of knowledge." [172]
"μαντεια
(manteia),
divining: the knowledge which predicts events without proof."
"μαντιχη (mantikē),
divination: the knowledge which contemplates the present and
the future of mortal beings."[173]
"σοφια (sophia), wisdom:
non-hypothetical knowledge; knowledge of what always exists;
knowledge which contemplates the cause of beings."
"φιλοσοφια (philosophia),
philosophy: desire for the knowledge of what always exists;
the state which contemplates the truth, what makes it true;
cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason."[174]
"λογος (logos), speech:
voice articulated in letters capable of indicating each
existing thing; liguistic sound compounded of nouns and verbs,
without music."[175]
"ωφελιμον (ōphelimon), utility:
what causes something to be well off; what causes good."[176]
"νομος (nomos), law:
political judgement of many people, not limited to a certain
time."
"υποθεσις (hypothesis),
hypothesis: indemonstrable first principle; summary of the
principal points in a discourse."[177]
"τυραμμος (turannos), dictator:
an officer of a city who rules according to his own ideas."
"σοφιστης (sophistēs) sophist:
paid hunter of rich and distinguished young men."[178]
"μανια (mania), madness: the
state which is destructive of true conception."[179]
Socrates's acknowledgement
of specialisation and that specialists know best how to do
their jobs again apparent.[180]
At 117a-d Socrates
explains to Alcibiades that they "know" nominalist truths but the concepts "just
and unjust", "good
and
bad", "admirable
and contemptible" and "advantageous
and
disadvantageous" Alcibiades knows
not the concepts because he knows not "about
them". Socrates also shows
Alcibiades that when he know he knows not something then
Alcibiades would not profess to know that something. Socrates
then use the argument to prove that the uncertainty Alcibiades
experiences about the nature of the concepts is because he
thinks he knows about something he knows not really.[181]
Socrates used the same
answer and question technique that the sophists used in Eythydemus and he
insisted that Alcibiades follows his (Socrates's)
questions.[182]
At 117 e-118a Socrates
explains that people who know they don't know leave those
things to others do do and therefore they don't make mistakes.
Those who know they know make not mistakes. Therefore, the
people who make mistakes are the people who think they know
but in fact they don't know.[183]
At 118a-b Socrates
motivate why Alcibiades and most other statesmen of Athens are
ignorant of the most important concepts they should be well
versed in.[184]
At 118e reference is made to Clinias the brother of
Alcibiades. I assumed that the brother must have been
Alcibiades's elder brother, the Clinias in Eythydemus, who
approached Socrates with his many "lovers". Clinias, the brother of Alcibiades and son of
Clinias.[185]
Clinias in The laws
was "apparently"
a "fictional"
character.[186]
At 120a-e Socrates claims
that the Spartan and Persian kings are descendants of Perseus
son of Zeus and that they are Alcibiades's enemies Alcibiades
should be competing against.[187]
Clinias claims descent
from Zeus through Zeus's descendant, Eurysaces. Socrates
claims descent from Hephaestus, son of Zeus. Hephaestus was
the "artisan" of the Olympian gods. Hephaestus had a
descendant called Daedalus, who sculptors regarded as their "patron". Socrates's father was a sculptor.[188]
At 121c-d Socrates opines
that much more fuss is made about the Persian and Spartan
aristocracy than about the Athenian aristocracy.[189]
According to Socrates the Persian king is taught to be "truthful", "brave"
and not a slave of pleasure. Zoroaster was their prophet.[190]
Socrates put much emphasis on the Delphic inscription " 'know
thyself' ".[191]
At 125a Socrates emphasise
specialisation and the effect of specialists knowing better
than others about their jobs.[192]
At 129a Socrates says that because of specialists who can do
many things, who need not be ruled over about those things it
is important that Alcibiades first lern to know himself like
the oracle at Delphi says before Alcibiades could rule over
others.[193]
129a-130a Socrates argues that in analogy to a craftsman and
his tools, souls are users of their bodies. Socrates however
referred to "the soul"
and "the body".[194]
At 130c-d Socrates concludes his argument that "man" is "nothing"
or else if man is "something" man is "his
soul", excluding his body. Socrates
and Alcibiades settles on "man" being "the
soul" being an "individual
self".[195]
Socrates used "his soul" and "the soul". In Euthydemus the
sophists argued if a man knows "something" he knows
"everything", which is the opposite of "nothing", therefore I
guess now that a man can be "everything" according to Socrates
and sophists.
Socrates then follows on
with his argument at 131a-b that a doctor who knows his body
in a doctor's context knows not "himself" and a farmer who knows his farm and not his
body is even further from knowing "himself" and therefore they do not know themselves and
therefore they are not "self-controlled". Therefore, according to Socrates doctor's and
farmer's businesses are not businesses of "gentleman" who regards those businesses "beneath" them.[196]
Earlier in the dialogue
the age of Alcibiades is stated at 20 years of age and it was
stated that Alcibiades had many men before who loved his body
and Socrates ignored Alcibiades up to his current age in the
dialogue. At 131d Socrates states that now that Alcibiades's
body is not loved anymore Socrates loves Alcibiades's soul,
which is Alcibiades himself.[197]
In the introduction to Alcibiades the translator said that the
phrase "Platonic love" was derived from Alcibiades, the
dialogue.
At 131e Socrates states
that Alcibiades "have no lovers and never have
had any" but that he was followed by
"lovers". "Lovers" can thus mean admirers.[198]
The following is
Socrates's explanation of how a person can learn to "know
thyself".[199]
19 May 2014
At 133 Socrates argues for
attributes of true statesmen. It could thus imply, read with
other arguments for example, in Euthydemus that Socrates was
not pleased with actions of current statemen. It could also
just mean that Socrates wanted to teach the young Alcibiades
how to be a proper statesman.[200]
"SOCRATES:
Then it's impossible for anyone to prosper unless he is
self-controlled and good.
ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
SOCRATES: So it's the bad men who
are failures.
ALCIBIADES: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: And so the way to avoid
being a failure is not by getting rich, but by being
self-controlled.
ALCIBIADES: Apparently.
SOCRATES: So it's not walls or
war-ships or shipyards that cities need, Alcibiades, if they
are to prosper, nor is it numbers or size, without virtue." Socrates then continues to say that Alcibiades
must get "virtue" in
order to be able to impart virtue to citizens to, by being an
example, be a good statesman. Virtue is then expanded on by
Socrates by mentioning "justice
and self-control" a prerequisite.[201]
According to Socrates
virtue depends on "God".[202]
The word "God" was
translated from "θεὸς"[203]. "θεός" = "noun sg masc nom".[204] It seems Socrates used singular form male
nominative (subject of a verb) and Plato used plural form
accusative (indicating an object).
At
899b in The laws the Athenian says: "Ἀθηναῖος
ἄστρων
δὴ
πέρι
πάντων
καὶ
σελήνης,
ἐνιαυτῶν
τε
καὶ
μηνῶν
καὶ
πασῶν
ὡρῶν
πέρι,
τίνα
ἄλλον
λόγον
ἐροῦμεν
ἢ
τὸν
αὐτὸν
τοῦτον,
ὡς
ἐπειδὴ
ψυχὴ
μὲν
ἢ
ψυχαὶ
πάντων
τούτων
αἴτιαι
ἐφάνησαν,
ἀγαθαὶ
δὲ
πᾶσαν
ἀρετήν,
θεοὺς
αὐτὰς
εἶναι
φήσομεν,
εἴτε
ἐν
σώμασιν
ἐνοῦσαι,
ζῷα
ὄντα,
κοσμοῦσιν
πάντα
οὐρανόν,
εἴτε
ὅπῃ
τε
καὶ
ὅπως;
ἔσθ᾽
ὅστις
ταῦτα
ὁμολογῶν
ὑπομενεῖ
μὴ
θεῶν
εἶναι
πλήρη
πάντα;
[899ξ]
"[205]
"θεούς = noun pl masc acc"[206] "θεῶν"
- this
word could not be identified as masculine or feminine.
Explanations made it mostly feminine and plural.[207]
The
dialogue, Alcibiades ends with Socrates saying that the power
of the city could overpower his and Alcibiades' striving for
virtue. It implies that Socrates's "God" was in opposition with Athens.[208]
At 145c[209]
and 146c[210]
Socrates says
knwoing what is best is without a doubt knowledge of "utility" and such a person is "wise". The opposite is not good for the state
according to Socrates.
At 148b Socrates refers to
a specific poet as "wise".[211]
This statement contradicts some opinions that Socrates was
against poetry.
At 148e Socrates tells a
story about Athenians who consulted Ammon about reasons, which
make them lose in war against the Spartans, although Athenians
sacrifices more to the gods than the Spartans. The answer by
the prophet was that Ammon prefers the few words without
serimonies of the Spartans, which make not a fuss about the
gods.[212]
A note by Anthony Kenny and the editors state that Ammon was
an "Egyptian god with an oracle in the
Libyan desert." [213]
Socrates then says at 149e that "the gods" take more
cognisance of how we preserve our "souls" than about
sacrifices and prosessions in their favour.[214]
20 May 2014
The Academy's work
contributed to Stoicism and scepticism.[215]
At 393d Socrates mentions
an important qualification with regard to his thesis. That is
health is more important than wealth. [216]
At 394e Socrates says that
a successful doctor or a successful other professional would
be "valued more highly" than any material possession a wealthy man can
own. [217]
Socrates's view explains the view of his time whereby
professional people could have been regarded possessions of
rich people.
23 May 2014
At 395a Eryxias asks
Socrates, whether Socrates thinks that Socrates is wiser than
Callias, who spent much money on the teachings of sophists.
Callias was one the richest men in Athens. [218]
The question arises whether Callias really thought the
Sophists were wise, or did he spend the money to control them
because he regarded them enemies of the city state.
At 395b-c Socrates states
that functionalist arguments have being and that Eryxias, who
did not regard the being of functionalist arguments do not
acknowledge the "wisest"
who do not speak "the truth". Socrates promoted deceit by referring to the
use of "false"
functionalist statements during argumentation. "Wealth" meant for Eryxias material wealth and for
Socrates "wealth"
had a figurative definition, which could imply that Socrates
was 'better' off than Callias.[219]
It seems thus that "the
truth" in this translation is a
nominalist concept. It is not clear whether coherence is the
overriding principle, which made Eryxias annoyed. If coherence
was the overriding priority for Eryxias it could imply that
Eryxias had a true realist opinion, which did not prioritise
winning during arguments above truths.
At 395d-e Eryxias says the
important matter is the conditions that led to wealth and
' "what kind of thing wealth is,
whether it's good or bad." '
Socrates acknowledges Socrates's mistake.[220]
At 396a-d Socrates wrote
or was quoted: 'Then I said to
them: " '. Socrates acknowledged that Athenians regarded
material wealth very
important and good. Eryxias and Critias were relatives.[221]
From 396e to 397c Socrates
explains Critias used a sophistical (wise) argument to show
that a poor man has less temptations and therefore poor men
are 'better' than rich men: ' "Just
a couple of days ago this very argument was being used in the
Lyceum by a wise man named Prodicus, from Ceos. …".[222]
According
to Mark Joyal, the translator, and the editors the Lyceum was
"a public space just outside the walls of Athens." [223]
The dialogue, Eryxias, was written
as if Plato wrote it because Socrates referred to himself as
' "I" ' at 397e. At 397e a quotation of Socrates
starts in which he quotes someone, probably Erasistratus
(related to Eris?). Socrates's quotation starts with
' " ' and also, the quotation of Socrates in Eryxias, starts with
' " '. Socrates indirectly could have accused
Critias of not acknowledging that he was using Prodicus's
argument, Critias heard at the Lyceum. [224]
I am not sure about what i wrote here because the quotation
marks started to confuse me.
At 398c Socrates was
quoted, quoting a young man who argued against the sophist
Prodicus a few days earlier at the Lyceum. The young man asked
Prodicus if Prodicus thinks ' " 'excellence' " ' can be taught or whether excellence is ' " 'innate' " '. Prodicus, according to Socrates, said
excellence can be taught. [225]
Remember the definition of chrestatos (honesty) included
"excellence of character".
At 399b-c Socrates implied
that Critias's argument is accepted because he is a "gentleman" but a similar argument by Prodicus was not
accepted at the "gymnasium" because he was a sophist and that sophists are
accused of influencing youths negatively. If the sophist was a
"gentleman" his argument would have been regarded "absolutely
true." According to Socrates the
same things happened in court at the time. [226]
I stopped using many quotation marks here, that i used during
the previous paragraphs because using many quotation marks
become confusing and could be incorrect.
At 399e-400c Socrates
showed how he changes the meaning of words in order to win.
Earlier he changed the meaning of wealth, which Crytias and
Eryxias regards "possession of a lot of property." Socrates then also started to change the
meaning of the word property by arguing the word "property"
should have some universal meaning because the "currencies"
(money and fixed property) of different countries, Socrates
discussed had very different values (money value) ascribed to
those currencies in different countries. Socrates argued the
same subjectivity applies to "beautiful
and
ugly". [227]
At 400e Socrates explains that the universal essence of "property" is that property is "useful
to us .. while everything useless is not" property. [228]
From 400d-403d Socrates
then states that skills make people wealthy because they can
trade their skills for other property, which sustain their
lives. Socrates also argues that "property" is only useful if
the possessor knows how to use it and, sarcartically meant,
that only "gentlemen" knows how to use money. Critias did not
agree with Socrates but he enjoyed Socrates's company. [229]
At 403e-404c Socrates uses
an argument, which could imply that with deduction honesties
can be proven to be the most valuable cultural property
because honesties allow us to create things, we use to sustain
our lives. Socrates also showed that contradiction is not
accepted by him. He also showed that in Euthydemus in his
discussion with Critias when he explained the ways of men of
middles.[230]
At 404c the argument could
have been by Critias that money can be used to do anything on
which Socrates opined that everything is not good.[231]
At 405c the argument ended on decision that all properties are
useful and indecision about whether all useful things are
properties. [232]
At 406 Socrates ends the dialogue by saying that rich people
are usually ill because their needs are more than healty
people's needs.[233]
27 May 2014
Gorgias, who was from
Sicily is "loosely"
considered a " 'sophist' " by the translators. He was active at the
embassy in Athens around 427BC. He was a famous teacher of
oratory. His teachings was limited to speechmaking and he did
not teach the youth about " 'virtue' ".[234]
Reference is made by the
editors and translator (Donald J. Zeyl) to "Socrates'
dialectic". They refer to Socrates's
commitment to "the objective existence of justice" in opposition to "rhetorical skill", which
suffices for "the selfish, domineering,
pleaure-seeking" life.[235]
At 447b-c Socrates states
that he wants to hear what Gorgias teaches and what "his
craft can accomplish".[236]
At 447d-448a Gorgias claims that he can answer any question
from anyone. [237]
At 449a-e after enquiry by Socrates about what Gorgias is,
Gorgias calls himself a "good orator".
Gorgias also answers that oratory is about speeches but not
all kinds of speeches because he teaches not speechmaking that
refers to curing people.[238]
Socrates enquire about crafts a lot, implying that
specialisation is important for him. His objective is usually
to realize exactly what it is a sophist claims to be effective
at.
Gorgias contradicted his
earlier statement that he knows everything because he states
his speech making is not about medical matters. [239]
At 451e Socrates mentions
that a song regards health the first priority, good looks (a
trained body[240])
the second priority and being "honestly
rich" the third priority in life.
Socrates also states that it is debatable. [241]
Gorgias claims to teach
the greatest good; oratory, "the
source of freedom for humankind" and
"the source of rule over others in one's own
city." [242] Socrates described oratory as the art of "instilling
persuasion" and Gorgias agreed with
the description.[243]
Socrates then questions
Gorgias about the object, oratory persuades about, because
other crafts have a specific object for example arithmetic has
as object numbers and computation. Socrates knows not what the
objective of the oratory is Gorgias teaches, although Gorgias
said the objectives were freedom and ruling over others.
Socrates implies that Gorgias teaches not an objective art,
for example medicine, mathematics, which is outside of the
teacher.[244]
Gorgias's objectives were teaching others how to attain their
own freedom and ruling over others, by way of oratory.
Gorgias states
specifically that his oratory is about justice in the law
courts and large assemblies.
[245]
Gorgias states there is
not something like "true
and false knowledge" but "true
and false conviction" exists.[246]
Gorgias and Socrates agrees that oratory is about convincing
but not specifically about "what's
just and unjust." [247]
The dialogue then continues. Socrates still do not know what
oratory convinces about. Socrates states that oratory
convinces not about which craftsmen is appointed for a task
because the master craftsmen decide about that based on their
knowledge of the craft. Gorgias then states that Socrates
there identified the task of oratory; that is convincing
others about initiating a required task for example a large
civil project. Socrates then states oratory is therefore about
"supernatural" scope.
Gorgias agrees because oratory "encompasses
and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be
accomplished." [248]
At 457b Gorgias states
that the art of oratory should not be used unjustly because it
could be used for that. It depends on the user of the art
whether he uses it justly or unjustly. [249]
At 457d Socrates
acknowledge the irritating phenomenon whereby people argue
just to win without "investigating
the subject under discussion." [250]
At 458a-b
Socrates proclaims his own nature, being a man who is not
after winning but after truths. Socrates minds not to be
refuted, but rather prefers that to refuting another, because
being refuted teaches something, that relates to "anything
untrue" in his own mind. [251]
Is it true what Socrates proclaim? Up to the reading i have
done to date Socrates gave me a different impression; that he
is out to refute others.
At 458b Gorgias proclaims
to be the same type of man Socrates said Socrates is. [252]
At 459a Gorgias and
Socrates agrees that oratory relates to convincing groups
about things they have not knowledge. Knowledge is for
example something a doctor has about his subject field.[253]
At 459d-460a Socrates asks
whether a person needs knowledge about a subject before
Gorgias could teach that person oratory. [254]
"SOCRATES:
… By the Dog, Gorgias".[255]
At 461c-d Polus accused
Socrates of "great rudeness" because Socrates led Gorgias with questioning
into contradicting himself (Gorgias). Socrates thanked Polus
for the interruption and asked him to keep it brief.[256]
At 462b-c Socrates says he
thinks oratory is not a "craft" and that it is a "knack" at "producing a certain
graitification and pleasure." [257]
At 463a-d Socrates
explicitly opposes "oratory",
"flattery"
and "sophistry"
being not "admirable"
Socrates compared oratory with preparing food and he said
oratory is a "part of politics", which he calls "bad
things", which are "shameful".[258]
At 465d Socrates explains
that sophistry and oratory mixes up knowledge in such a way
that specialisation would not be possible if everybody
practised it. Socrates claims that the sophist way is the way
of Anaxagoras. [259]
At 466b-c Polus claims
that sophists have the "greatest
power in their cities" because they
murder anyone they want, confiscate properties and expell
people from "their cities". Socrates claims it is not "power" because that type of tyranny only benefits
sophists. [260]
At 469a-b Socrates states
that someone who puts another to death justly is not to be
envied and a person who does so unjustly is to be pitied and
doing "what's unjust is the worse thing
there is." [261]
"SOCRATES:
.. by Zeus!" [262]
At 470e Socrates claims
that happiness depends entirely
on "education and justice" and not wealth. [263]
From 470e-472d Socrates
and Polus argues about causes of happiness. Polus favours
unjust actions. Socrates in the argument mentions powerful
people who could use testimonies by many influential people in
courts of law against Socrates. Socrates mentions Pericles,
Aristocrates, Nicias the son of Niceratus and his brother, who
have tripods in the precinct of Dionysus, who hate Socrates. [264]
At 476e Socrates
classifies good things together for example pleasure,
benefitting and admiration. Socrates thought that good things
could be grouped together with "pleasure". Socrates's pleasure
therefore could not have referred to boodily things. He
referred primarily to matters about souls. [265]
Previously Socrates said although he would prefer not to
experience any of the following to be treated unjustly is
preferable to treating another unjustly. Socrates's view was
based on comparing choices between good and bad.
At 481a-b Socrates thinks
oratories protect the unjust and a corrupt man can "live
forever in corruption" or if not for
ever, "as long as possible in that
condition." [266]
The difference Socrates
identified between oratories and eristics are enlightening.
The eristic argumentation at the Lyceum by two sophists, in Euthydemus, who were
exiled, was appreciated by Socrates but the oratory by an
ambassador, Gorgias, at a private house, it seems, was not
appreciated by Socrates.
29 May 2014
At 481d-482c Socrates
proclaims he and Callicles each "is
a lover of two objects", Socrates is
of "Alcibiades, Clinias' son" and "philosophy" and Callicles is of "the
Demos who's the son of Pyrilampes"
and of "the demos [people]". Callicles says just what the "Athenian
demos" and what the "good-looking" son of Pyrilampes want to hear and "philosophy" says always the same. Socrates said "by
the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree
with you". Socrates also said he
prefers himself being dissonant with others to being
untruthful towards his own belief.[267]
At 482e-483b Callicles
accuses Socrates of taking the side of "law" and not "nature", which each is in opposition to the other side.
Callicles then contradicts himself by saying that Socrates
sometimes chooses the side of law and sometimes the side of
nature and Callicles talks as if he knows nature. Callicles
states his opinion that the laws are instituted by the "many" because they are "weak" as individuals.[268]
According to Callicles strength is recognized in willings,
which use the most violent means. [269]
At 488d-e Socrates says that the "rules
of the many are the rules of the superior" and Callicles agrees. [270]
At 489b, according to Socrates law and nature are not in
opposition because according to law and nature it is more
unjust to do unjust things according to the definitions of law
and good nature than to suffer due to unjust doings of others,
in their unjust states of nature, according to definitions of
written law and Socrates's understanding of nature. [271]
At 489c Callicles implies that people who only have physical
strength do not institute laws. It is not clear whether
Callicles means physical strength due to numbers or
individuals' physical strengths. [272]
At 490a-b Callicles clarrifies that he regards "the
more intelligent one" to be "worthier" than individuals of a group with individuals of
lesser intelligence and, that one, should rule over that group
and that one should have a greater share of their all, than "his
inferiors." [273]
Callicles view is
problematic in the sense that he claims the most violent
individuals are the most intelligent individuals. Socrates's
view is problematic because Socrates claims that the largest
group is always the most powerful and therefore in control.
Elsewhere Socrates spoke out against group power when he
referred to "the demos". Both of their reasonings prioritize
violence as root cause and both of them contradicted
themselves, like we all do at times. Callicles prioritizes
violence by individuals or a smaller group, who acts against
written laws and Socrates prioritizes violence backed by a
large group, which he eventually accepted as lawful with
regard to his own suicide sentence. Allthough they disagree
about who posses(ses) the ultimate power they agree that
instilling fear is the first priority when seeking power. It
seems to me today that the power of creativities was not fathomed by either
of them.
At 494c Socrates exhibits
one of his important methods of argumentation. That is to show
that statements, which are not objective, implies
generalisation, which can be showed to be wrong due to very
few true generalisations in existence.[274]
From 497c-499c Socrates show that pleasure and good are not
the same thing and pain and bad are not the same thing. He
convincingly argued the difference between experiencing
pleasure and being good because he showed that both bad and
good men experience pleasure at the same time when their
pleasures originate at the same place. The example he used
referred to the pleasures that brave men and cowards
experience when their enemy retreats during a war the bad and
the good are involved in on the same side. The method Socrates
used to decide on what "good" is was agreement. He and
Callicles agreed that braveries are "good" for example.[275]
At 502d Socrates opines
that tragic plays are oratories, which flatter the crowds it
adress. [276]
At 505e Socrates says that
"all of us", as "a
good common" goal, should "be
contentiously eager to know what's true and what's false about
the things we're talking about." [277]
"SOCRATES:
…But surely we are good, both we and everything else that's
good, when some excellence has come to be present in us? Yes,
I do think that that's necessarily so, Callicles. … So it's
when a certain order, the proper one for each thing, comes to
be present in it that it makes each of the things there are,
good?—Yes, I think so. ... is.—And an orderly sould is a
self-controlled one?—Absolutely.—So a self-controlled sould is
a good one. I for one can't say anything else beyond that,
Callicles my friend; if you can please teach me.[278]
The
good for Socrates will be benefitted in the afterlife.
At 508b Socrates says: "I
was speaking in earnest when I said that a man should be his
own accuser, or his son's or his friend's, if he's done
anything unjust, and should use oratory for that purpose."[279]
Previously Socrates criticized "oratory" therefore he, if
accepted that he is being consistent, could mean here that
oratory should be used to influence the public.
At 517a Socrates refers to "true
oratory".[280]
At 511a-b Socrates says with certainty that a man
who follows in the footsteps of a city tyrant, in order to
gain, from worldly pleasures, the tyrant is au fait with for
example ' "power" ', will be
harming his "soul" and if such
a man kill a good man, who benefits his soul, "it'll
be
a wicked man killing one who's admirable and good."[281]
At 512e Socrates says for "one
who is truly a man", death of
self is not a valid consideration when taking decisions. [282]
At 513c Socrates implies he "loves" not the
Athenian demos. [283]
At 515e-516c Socrates states rhetorically that Pericles harmed
souls of Athenian people because Pericles instituted wages.
Socrates supports his argument by saying that when Pericles
were elected the demos liked him but at the end of Pericles's
reign over them they despised him.[284]
Elsewhere, i recall Socrates favoured profit taking.
At 518a Socrates says that medicine and
gymnastics are the best "crafts" because of its good effects
on souls and bodies. [285]
Socrates seems to have argued against "progress"
because he blamed "harbors and dockyards, walls,
and tribute payments and such trash as that", together
with injustice as the cause of Athenian problems of the time. [286]
Socrates says sophists contradicted themselves
because they claim to make their students virtuous but on the
other hand they calim their students are evil because they do
not pay their sophist teachers. [287]
At 522e Socrates mentions specifically his
objective of not reaching Hades with evil baggage because that
would be "the ultimate of all bad things".[288]
Socrates appreciated Minos, Rhadamanthus and Aeacus to be fair
judges in the afterlife. [289]
30 May 2014
"Socrates
is portrayed as a very bright and promising young
philosopher—he is virtually a teenager, only just beginning
his career in the subject—who needs to think a lot harder and
longer before he will have an adequate grasp of the nature of
reality: this Socrates is a budding metaphycisian, not the
purely ethical thinker of Apology and other 'Socratic'
dialogues." [290] In this
dialogue the theory of "Forms" is discussed which was further
discussed in Sophist, Statesman and Philebus. "The
meeting of Socrates with the Eleatic philosophers (an
invention of Plato's) is reported in a way unparalleled in the
other dialogues."[291]
Antiphon, Plato's and Adeimantus half-brother
(same mother as Plato and Adeimantus) memorized this dialogue
when he was younger, but at the time (when Cephalus spoke) of
Parmenides, the
dialogue, narrated by Cephalus, written by Plato, Antiphon was
working with horses. Cephalus heard a narration from Antiphon
about the original dialogue.
[292]
The dialogue between Socrates, Parmenides and
Zeno, which are carried over from memory in this dialogue,
took place at "the Great Panathenaea". Parmenides
was about 65 years old, Zeno close to 40, and Socrates young.
Aristotle who later became one of "the
Thirty" tyrants also took part in the original
dialogue.[293]
The original dialogue took place "outside
the city wall in the Potters' Quarter". The
dialogue started after Zeno read his book, which Zeno and
Parmenides brought to Athens to promote.[294]
Socrates claims that Zeno and Parmenides says
basically the same but tries to hide the similarity with
different words; the similarity that "all is one". Zeno
answers Socrates that Socrates grasped not "the
truth" about Zeno's book, because Zeno's book was a
defence of Parmenides's theory. [295]
At 129b Socrates says rightly that he will "be
astonished" if someone shows what "the one" is, Zeno and
Parmenides claim, exist. [296]
The forms of Parmenides is grasped by reasoning. [297]
Parmenides says that Plato is a recent ("young")
philosopher and therefore Socrates still cares about what
other philosophers think Socrates thinks. [298]
At 131a Socrates asks Parmenides why can't all be
one whole. [299]
My answer, with Parmenides's and Zeno's thesis, if i was a
sophist, would have been that all must have a form, which is
separate and unlike but like the all around us.
Parmenides answered: "So,
being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a
whole, in things that are many and separate; and thus it would
be separate from itself." [300]
It seems during this dialogue, Socrates was a
nominalist because he did not like the "contradiction" that
something is like and unlike. To Socrates "like" meant
something similar to "gelykenis" in the Decalogue of the Old
Testament of the Bible.
131d-e: Someone says that if something that
partakes 'in' the form, small, is divided, then the part will
always be larger than the form of small. [301]
132c: It was Socrates's contribution to the
theory of forms that ' "that
other things partake of forms" ',
according to Parmenides. [302]
132d, Socrates said: ' "No,
what
appears most likely to me is this: these forms are like
patterns set in nature, and other things resemble them and are
likenesses; and this partaking of the forms is, for the other
things, simply being modeled on them." '[303]
133c-134c: Each character of the alphabet
represents a form we partake of through our names, but we
cannot know the form of the characters.[304]
134c: The character of knowledge is precision
according to Parmenides.[305]
134: According to Parmenides's theory of forms,
Forms relate to "god" and "gods'" knowledge.
Icorporeal theon cannot influence us and we have no knowledge
of incorporeal theon. [306]
135a-b, Parmenides: ' "Only
a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there
is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy
more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach
someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly
and critically for himself." '[307]
At 135b-c, Parmenides says that if someone allows
not for these forms we cannot know and by implication
nullifies the purpose of definitions, then "the
power of dialectic" ("dialegesthai") or in
another word ' "discourse" ' or "untechnically", ' "conversation" ', will be
destroyed. [308]
With reference to a discussion Parmenides
overheard between Socrates and Aristotle, Parmenides claims
that because Socrates have not been taught "philosophy" ("something
people think useless – what the crowds call idle talk.") enough,
Socrates sees not clearly because Socrates tries to isolate
the forms of "beautiful, and just and good", something
not one can do in the right way, without the necessary
training. Socrates needs training in Parmenides's doctrine, "Otherwise,
the truth will escape you", according
to Parmenides.[309]
The consequences of hypotheses according to
Parmenides should be thought about as if the hypotheses are
and are not. [310]
To investigate the "is" and "is not" of each hypothesis will,
after training make "a full view of the
truth" possible. [311]
I think Parmenides meant his statement in a functional,
consequentialist way in order to manipulate Socrates. Maybe
Parmenides realised that the most important truth we can
realise is to be honest in order to build more coherent
pictures via nominalist truths and false theories, we know is
false, which we do not portray as truth, a truth or the truth.
If Parmenides realised that he however did not practice it
because he influenced Socrates with a fiunctionalist promise
of giving Socrates, through philosophical training a view of
"the truth", which in my view are the beliefs, which give
courages to be honest.
Socrates answers that what Parmenides promises is
not possible. [312]
From 137c-157b, Parmenides gives an example of
his "dialectic" ("dialegesthai") by thinking
aloud about a "oneness" of "the
one". He ends with ' "Therefore,
no name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any
knowledge or perception or opinion of it."—"Apparently
not."—"Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the
object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is
perceive it."—"It seems not."—"Is it possible that these
things are for the one?"—"I certainly don't think so." ' Then he
starts again with a dialectic to "agree
on the consequences for it", which ends
with "And a name and an account belong to
it, and it is named and spoken of. … That's exactly so." The third
dialectic about that one, which begins with "If" ends with "Doubtless."[313]
16 June 2014
"In the Protagoras
the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself as the
original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced
in the Ion. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and
of opinion: he professes to have all knowledge, which is
derived by him from Homer, just as the sophist professes to
have all wisdom, which is contained in his art of rhetoric.
Even more than the sophist he is incapable of appreciating the
commonest logical distinctions; he cannot explain the nature
of his own art; his great memory contrasts with his inability
to follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest
moments of inspiration he has an eye to his own gains."[314]
At 530d Ion refers to Glaucon as a specialist
(maybe a rhapsode also) of Homer.[315]
"SOCRATES: O that
we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but
you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing,
are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth."[316]
Magnesia is according to note 2 also a place in
Caria, Asia Minor.[317]
In Plato's Laws
Magnesia was the republic he wrote laws for, in Crete, close
to the cave of Zeus.
At 534 to 535 Jowett used "the
God" "the Gods" and "God" where Paul
Woodruff[318]
used "the god" and "the
gods".[319]
At 536e to 537 Socrates identifies another
meaning of "subjects". Ion understands "subjects" to mean the
gods of professions but Socrates refers to the subject ('vak')
of chariot driving as well.[320]
At 537c Socrates claims that each profession has
"a god".[321]
At 538 this opinion of Socrates is queried by him.[322]
30 May 2014
This dialogue gives
primarily Plato's opinion about the nature of knowledge,
therefore it is the founding document of " 'epistemology' ". "Theaetetus
was a famous mathematician", active at
the Academy during Plato's life.[323]
28 July 2014
"SOCRATES:
So knowledge and wisdom will be the same thing?
THEAETETUS: Yes."[324]
Socrates acknowledges that
good mathematical skills originate from honesties because he
says Theaetetus will not be a "false
witness" at 148.
150e, l.5324: Socrates
opines that he brings out knowledge from people he interacts
but some of them realise not that Socrates's method helps them
to see clearer what actualitie are. They then "set
more value on lies and phantoms than upon the truth".
151d, l.5335: "SOCRATES:
… but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie and
put away truth."
152e, l.5345: Theaetetus
opines "knowledge is simply perception." and Socrates answers that's "a
good frank answer, my son. That's the way to speak one's mind." Socrates then says Protagoras also opined that
perception is knowledge and he quotes Protagoras's saying as
proof: "'Man is the measure of all things:
of the things which are, that they are, and of the things
which are not, that they are not.'"
152d-e, l.5374: Socrates
states a "no ordinary theory", according to him, Because people perceive
things differently, nothing is the way it seems, because
things are continuously changing and "blending" and "coming
to be." According to Socrates "all
the wise men of the past" had this
view, except Parmenides. They included Empedocles, Heraclitus,
Protagoras and also poets; Epicharmus who wrote comedies and
Homer who wrote tragedies.
l.7162, note 6: Protagoras
was a sophist.
153a, l.5385: Socrates
opines that "being" and
"becoming" are products
"of motion" and "not-being
and passing away result from a state of rest."
154a: Socrates says that
colour is something between the thing with colour and eyes and
although we use the same name for the colour we do not
necessarily see the colour the same way.
This sceptic, relativistic
argument of Socrates cannot apply to forms of things because
forms are fitted together to form new forms. A V fits
physically into another V and therefore the V appear the same
to different people because two Vs can be explained by one and
fitted by another.
156a-c, l.5481: Socrates
claims all things perceived, result from motion, which has two
parts, one moving and one at rest. The perceived and the
perceiving.
Earlier Socrates also
mentioned things between objects and perceiving.
157b-c, l.5509: Socrates
opines that a knowledgeable man must not talk about stasis
because then he could be refuted. If he mentions movement,
which is really happening continuously, then he will speak
truer.
157c-d, l.5515: Socrates
claims he is just repeating what other wise men taught him and
that he is "barren of theories" of his own.
158b, l.5535: "THEAETETUS:
… But I really shouldn't know how to dispute the suggestion
that a madman believes what is false when he thinks he is a
god".
160b-c, l.5613: Socrates
says that '''being'"
and "'becoming'"
should never be used apart from the things it refers to. He
says: "That is the meaning of the theory we
have been expounding."
160c, l5613: Theaetetus
acknowledges that he observes only his perspective.
This statement of
Theaetetus supports the plurality of God because creativity
can be better when different perspectives are combined. Say
for example an object has to be fit into another object and
two people view the object to be fitted, from two sides. The
one person sees that on his side there is a protrusion, which
will hamper the fitting. If he does not communicate that
observation truly to the other person who cannot see the
protrusion the fitting process could be a failure. There is
also by implication a mentioning of the possibility of
selfishness when that what only one realise is not shared with
a teammate.
160d, l.5620: "SOCRATES:
Then that was a grand idea of your when you told us that
knowledge is nothing more or less than perception."
162d-e, l.5671-5676:
Socrates turns the whole argument syaing that the relativist,
sceptical argument he convinced Theaetetus with is "mob-oratory" because a sophist would say: "'My
good people, young and old, you sit here orating; you drag in
gods, whose existence or nonexistence I exclude from all
discussion, written or spoken; you keep on saying whatever is
likely to be acceptable to the mob, telling them that it would
be a shocking thing if no man were wiser than any cow in a
field; but of proof or necessity not a word. You must rely on
plausibility; though if Theodorus or any other geometer were
to do that in his branch of science, it's a good-for-nothing
geometer he would be'."
It seems from the above
that Sophistical arguments are currently prevailing in
South-African society. "Sophistical" here means not the same
as Kant's "Sophistical" in his book Critique of pure reason.
The use of the word "sophist" is not constant because the
translator stated at l.7162, note 6: Protagoras was a sophist.
Socrates refers here to a Protagoras argument, which accepts
only certain truths, with proof. Sophists became empiricists,
who are irrational. They do not value reason. It is thus an
important distinction, which is made here by Socrates for
distinguishing between empirical thought, which disregards
reason and reasonable arguments, which posit God (partly gods
and goddesses), a reality.
163-164c, l.5711: Socrates
adds another argument. That because memories of perceptions
exist we cannot say that knowledge is perception.
This argument made me
think that memories are only perspectival knowledge, unless
memories originate from perceptions already combined in a
fuller picture before observation takes place. Socrates
explains this thought at 165d-e, l.5776.
164c-d, l.5745: Socrates
argues against sophists he calls "champion
controversialists".
166-167a, l.5808: "SOCRATES:
… In education, too, what we have to do is to change a worse
state into a better state; only whereas the doctor brings
about the change by the use of drugs, the professional teacher
does it by the use of words."
Socrates implies here that
the different perspectival memories of people should be
combined to form a more coherent whole knowledge than the
individual knowledges of perspectival perception.
166d-e, l.5803: For
Socrates the difference between knowledgeable and not
knowledgeable is that "the
man", who is knowledgeable, can
change problems for the better, "for
him".
167a-b, l.5812: Socrates
claims what we immediately experience is true and that we
cannot judge "what is
not". His argument seems to be
empiricist but then he states that if a person is healthy his
perception is "better" but not "truer".
This argument considers
not that society who suffers from Caiaphas syndrome sometimes
can perceive things not better than an individual they claim
is sick, but actually are healthier than society.
168d-e, l.5843: Here i
started thinking that possibly Socrates is contradicting
himself. My thoughts were probably wrong because he spoke much
in the 3rd person. What Protagoras would have said
to him. I understood Protagoras and other sophists (See
152d-e, l.5374), according to Socrates, to have claimed that
everything is in motion and therefore everything is relative.
It seems thus that Socrates was a supporter of Parmenides, who
claimed everything is one stable entity.
Was Plato a man of middles
who placed him in between the sophist and other philosophies?
It could be that it was his position, except in the Laws,
which apparently gave his view via the Athenian's.
169d, l.5876: Socrates
states here he argues against Protagoras's sophist opinion
that all men are equally the measure of their own truth.
Socrates thus regard men to be different.
Platonism is often
regarded a communist doctrine, but Socrates here states a
different opinion.
170b-c, l.5896: Socrates
distinguishes between true and false judgement and he states
that in times of crises people tend to look towards leaders,
who are knowledgeable.
170d, l.5902: When
Socrates says "that man is the measure of all
things" he argues against that. He
thus regard "man" in the singular, with a perspectivist view,
which should become more accurate via true knowledge, which is
a wider concept than perspectivist nominalist truths of one
man at a time.
172c-d, l.5966: Socrates
compares court sophists with students of philosophy and he
says philosophers are not successful in court.
Could it be that courts
function better with nominalist truths, than with realist
truths? Probably, because my many pages written in the court
procedures i am involved in seems to fall on deaf ears.
176a, l.6040: Socrates
mentions "the life of gods". He therefore acknowledged living "gods".
176b, l.6045: Socrates
says a man becomes "as
like God as possible; and a
man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with
understanding." The singular "a
man" is problematic, why not "men"?
176c, l.6049: "SOCRATES:
… In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely
just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as
just as it lies in human nature to be. And it is here that we
see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a
nonentity; for it is the realization of this that is genuine
wisdom and goodness, while the failure to realize it is
manifest folly and wickedness."
Again singular "the man".
It seems the same singularity problem of Caiaphaci was
applicable at Socrates. His God is by implication partly, all
"good" people, but perfection of God, he posits, places God
completely away from humanity, and therefore his view is not
sufficient to counter evil.
176d-177a, l.6063:
Socrates says the penalty for evil is persons' souls do not
leave earth, and wander amongst evil doers after death.
178c, l.6100: Socrates
refutes Protagoras's argument of each man the measure of his
things by referring to the future. One man's predictions come
true and another's not therefore Protagoras's argument cannot
be applied to the future.
This argument about the
future favours a correspondences theory of truths, with a
coherence and correspondence priority for honesties.
178e-179a, l.6119:
Theodorus proclaims that Protagoras claimed to be a good judge
of the future, but Socrates doubts whether it was the case.
Maybe Protagoras, if he
was a good judge of the future can be then classified as an
honest philosopher according to Intequinism. The
generalisations that arguments are with regard to relativity
or the absolute can therefore according to Intequinism be
attributed to conditions. Sometimes relativity would be
applicable, sometimes absolutism. But that is just with regard
to correspondence. The issue at hand is a teleological end.
What do we aim for?
179b, l.6125: Here
Socrates mentions the main point of their argument. Socrates,
like Plato (his philosopher king) claims the cleverest man is
"'the measure'", whereas
Protagoras claimed that all men have each their own measure.
The two views depends on
what is the measure over. National or local or house politics.
Intequinism's claim is that aspectual knowledge from
corresponding truths gives the best measure. The better
Knowledges, thus, are formed by aspectual science from
corresponding truths. The problem question now that questions
Intequinism's postulate as counter argument in favour of a
philosopher king is; what is practical. Can aspectual true
knowledge be formed currently in a corrupt society? Aspectual
true knowledge could therefore be just a teleological end,
Intequinism posits, without being possible currently. It is a
territorial question in the sphere context of reformational
Christian philosophy. It seems to me that in any territory,
large or small, inclusive of smaller territories, an aspectual
view, which punishes deceit, in stead of a perspectivist view,
will be more useful, because minds that work together can
achieve more and know more than one mind. A problem Socrates
questioned is interference into smaller territories or
specialized jobs by a higher authority. To solve the problem
there has to be universal applications like honesties, which
can only be made not-applicable by, for example, NPCI.
179c, l.6131: "SOCRATES:
There is more than one point besides these, Theodorus, on
which a conviction might be secured—at least so far as it is a
matter of proving that not every man's judgment is true. But
so long as we keep within the limits of that immediate present
experience of the individual which gives rise to perceptions
and to perceptual judgments, it is more difficult to convict
these latter of being untrue—but perhaps I'm talking nonsense.
Perhaps it is not possible to convict them at all; perhaps
those who profess that they are perfectly evident and are
always knowledge may be saying what really is. And it may be
that our Theaetetus was not (d) far from the mark with his
proposition that knowledge and perception are the same thing.
We shall have to come closer to grips with the theory, as the
speech on behalf of Protagoras required us to do. We shall
have to consider and test this moving Being, and find whether
it rings true or sounds as if it had some flaw in it,
anyway—and no shortage of fighting men.
THEODORUS: No, indeed; but in Ionia
it seems to be even growing, and assuming vast dimensions. On
the side of this theory, the Heraclitean party is conducting a
most vigorous campaign.
SOCRATES: The more reason, then, my
dear Theodorus, why we should examine it by going back to its
first principle,[325]
which is the way they (e) present it themselves.
THEODORUS: I quite agree. You know,
Socrates, these Heraclitean doctrines (or, as you say, Homeric
or still more ancient)—you can't discuss them in person with
any of the people at Ephesus who profess to be adepts, any
more than you could with a maniac. They are just like the
things they say in their books—always on the move. As for
abiding by what is said, or sticking to a question, or quietly
answering and asking questions in turn, (180) there is less
than nothing of that in their capacity. That's an
exaggeration, no doubt. I mean there isn't so much as a tiny
bit of repose in these people. If you ask any one of them a
question, he will pull out some little enigmatic phrase from
his quiver and shoot it off at you; and if you try to make him
give an account of what he has said, you will only get hit by
another, full of strange turns of language. You will never
reach any conclusion with any of them, ever; indeed they never
reach any conclusion with each other, they are so very careful
not to allow anything to be stable, either in an (b) argument
or in their own souls. I suppose they think that if they did
it would be something that stands still—this being what they
are totally at war war with, and what they are determined to
banish from the universe, if they can."
180e, l.6170:
"SOCRATES: … What are we to do with all these people, my
friend? We have been gradually advancing till, without
realizing it, we have got ourselves in (181) between the two
parties; and if we don't in some way manage to put up a fight
and make our escape, we shall pay for it, like the people who
play that game on the line in the wrestling schools, and get
caught by both parties and pulled in opposite directions.
Now I think we ought to begin by
examining the other party, the fluent fellows we started to
pursue. If they appear to us to be talking sense, we will help
them drag us over to their side, and try to escape the others.
But if those who make their stand for the whole appear to be
nearer the (b) truth, we will take refuge with them from the
men who 'move what should not be moved'."
181d, l.6190: "SOCRATES:
Then I now have two forms of motion, alteration and spatial
movement.
THEODORUS: Yes; and that's quite
correct."
186c, l.6341: "SOCRATES:
Now is it possible for someone who does not even get at being
to get at truth?
THEAETETUS: No; it's impossible.
SOCRATES: And if a man fails to get
to the truth of a thing, will he ever be a person who knows
that thing?
(d) THEAETETUS: I don't see how,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then knowledge is to be
found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning
about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences,
that it is possible to grasp being and truth."
187c-188d(b)-, l.6397: "SOCRATES:
I have something on my mind which has often bothered me [d]
before, and got me into great difficulty, both in my onw
thought and in discussion with other people—I mean, I can't
say what it is, this experience we have, and how it arises in
us.
THEAETETUS: What experience?
SOCRATES: Judging what is false. …
(188) SOCRATES: Now isn't it true
about all things, together or individually, that we must
either know them or not know them? I am ignoring for the
moment the intermediate conditions of learning and forgetting,
as they don't affect the argument here.
THEAETETUS: Of course, Socrates, in
that case there is no alternative. With each thing we either
know it or we do not.
SOCRATES: Then when a man judges,
the objects of his judgement are necessarily ]either[ things
which he knows [of]—or things which he doesn't know?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that must be so.
SOCRATES: Yet if he knows a thing,
it is impossible that he should not (b) know it; or if he does
not know it, he cannot know it.
THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.
SOCRATES: Now take the man who
judges what is false. Is he thinking that things which he
knows are not these things but some other things which he
knows—so that knowing both he is ignorant of both?
THEAETETUS: But that would be
impossible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then is he imagining that
things which he doesn't know are other things which he doesn't
know? Is it possible that a man who knows neither Theaetetus
nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is
Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?
(c) THEAETETUS: I don't see how that
could happen.
SOCRATES: But a man certainly
doesn't think that things he knows are things he does not
know, or again that things he doesn't know are things he
knows.
THEAETETUS: No, that would be a very
odd thing.
SOCRATES: Then in what way is false
judgment still possible? There is evidently no possibility of
judgment outside the cases we have mentioned, since eveything
is either a thing we know or a thing we don't know; and within
these limits there appears to be no place for false judgment
to be possible.
THEAETETUS: That's perfectly true.
SOCRATES: Then perhaps we had better
take up a different line of inquiry; (d) perhaps we should
proceed not by way of knowing and not-knowing, but by way of
being and not-being?
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Perhaps the simple fact is
this: it is when a man judges about anything things which are
not, that he is inevitably judging falsely, no matter what may
be the nature of his thought in other respects.
THEAETETUS: That again is very
plausible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Now how will that be? What
are we going to say, Theaetetus, if somebody sets about
examining us, and we are asked, 'Is what these words express
possible for anyone? Can a man judge what is not, either (e)
about one of the things which are, or just by itself?' I
suppose we shall reply, 'Yes, when he is thinking, but
thinking what is not true.' Or how shall we answer?
THEAETETUS: That's our answer.
SOCRATES: Now does this kind of
thing happen elsewhere?
THEAETETUS: What kind of thing?
SOCRATES: Well, for instance, that a
man sees something, yet sees nothing.
THEAETETUS: How could he?
SOCRATES: On the contrary, in fact,
if he is seeing any one thing, he must be seeing a thing which
is. Or do you think that a 'one' can be found among the things
which are not?
THEAETETUS: I certainly don't.
SOCRATES: Then a man who is seeing
any one thing is seeing something which is?
THEAETETUS: Apparently
SOCRATES: It also follows that a man
who is hearing anything is hearing (189) some one thing and
something which is.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And a man who is touching
anything is touching some one thing, and a thing which is, if
it is one?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that also follows.
SOCRATES: And a man who is judging
is judging some one thing, is he not?
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
SOCRATES: And a man who is judging
some one thing is judging something which is?
THEAETETUS: I grant that.
SOCRATES: Then that means that a man
who is judging something which is not is judging nothing?
THEAETETUS: So it appears.
SOCRATES: But a man who is judging
nothing is not judging at all.
THEAETETUS: That seems clear.
SOCRATES: And so it is not possible
to judge what is not, either about (b) the things which are or
just by itself.
THEAETETUS: Apparently not.
SOCRATES: False judgment, then, is
something different from judging things which are not?
THEAETETUS: It looks as if it were.
SOCRATES: Then neither on this
approach nor on the one we followed just now does false
judgment exist in us."
190d, l.6494: "SOCRATES:
But if he has only one of them before his mind in judging, and
the other is not present to him at all, he will never judge
that one is the other."
A problem of Socrates's
dialectic is that he leads conclusions into a very specific
direction with leading questions and then he extrapolates to
universals for example with "never" above. His method is not
scientific because his "never" and "all" is based on his
reasoning alone. In his example above it is possible to
include another circumstance that posits that persons can
mistakenly call a dog a cat, if they have not the knowledge
about a dog that looks like a cat. If persons have not the
word "dog" in their vocabulary they could make a mistake, with
regards to a cat that looks like a dog, etc. Did not think
these examples through properly. Such kinds of circumstances
exclude the possibility of the word "never" and "all". "At
all" is another term, which could include the word "all"
because it refers not to all circumstances according to my
understanding. It is used to express a strong motivation, not
necessarily all circumstances.
1 August 2014.
193d-194a, l.6592: "SOCRATES: Well, I was saying that if you know one
man and perceive (e) him as well, and keep your knowledge of
him in line with your perception, you will never take him for
some other person whom you know and are perceiving, and the
knowledge of whom you are holding straight with the
perception. Wasn't that so?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: There remained, I take it, the case we
have just mentioned where false judgment arises in the
following manner: you know both men (194) and you are looking
at both, or having some other perception of them; and you
don't hold the two signs each in line with its own perception,
but like a bad archer you shoot beside the mark and miss—which
is precisely what we call falsehood."
Socrates implies here the
problems, which disinformation, via own lies can cause.
Memories regarding disinformation about others logically
causes malformed thoughts about those others by the selves,
who spread false rumours. Those rumours have to be remembered
by disinformers and therefore causes illogical knowledge.
Disinformations are clatter of knowledge and logically the
most negative effect will be at disinformers selves.
The opinions that Socrates
give about "false" at 194b reveals that he considers not
honesties (soundnesses). He says that if "we do not know and have never perceived, there is
no possibility of error or of false judgement, if what we are
saying is at all sound".
At 194d, l.6614, Socrates
posits that a good memory is a sign of truth. Maybe it was in
his time the case, because according to Feyerabend concepts
had fixed forms, which most agreed about. To integrate
perceptions about concepts into memories is currently
problematic because the same constancy do not exist as, for
example, perceptions of physical matter. Perceptions about
metaphysical matters are not constant at all currently.
At 195d; l.6643, Socrates
explains that his opinion about truths here are similar to
correspondence theories of truth and it is "some
beautiful discovery."
196c, l.6669: SOCRATES:
… But as the matter now stands, either there is no such thing
as false judgment; or a man may not know what he knows. Which
do you choose?
THEAETETUS: You are offering me an
impossible choice, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But I'm afraid the
argument will not permit both.
At 199e: l.6779, Socrates and Theaetetus
acknowledges information ("knowledge") and
disinformation ("ignorance") and that
disinformation causes "false" judgment.
The word "ignorance" is not
correct because a reference is made to something. Ignorance
implies something exists not at the point of interest;
ignorance is the lack of knowledge at ones, which exists at
others. Disinformation implies words that formed the
disinformation exist, but the reality corresponds not with the
words.
201a; l.6813: "SOCRATES:
The art of the greatest representatives of wisdom—the men
called orators and lawyers."
201d; l.6827: "THEAETETUS:
… He said that it is true (d) judgment with an account[326]
that is knowledge; true judgment without an account falls
outside of knowledge. And he said that the things of which
there is no account are not knowable (yes, he actually called
them that), while those which have an account are knowable.
SOCRATES: Very good indeed."
201e-202b; l.6835-6849: "SOCRATES:…the
primary elements, (e) as it were, of which we and everything
else are composed, have no account. Each of them, in itself,
can only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of
it, either that it is or that it is not. That would mean that
we were (202) adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must
not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself
alone. Indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as
'itself' or 'that', 'each', 'alone', or 'this', or any other
of the many words of this kind…it can only be named, for a
name is all that it has. But with the things composed of
these, it is another matter. Here, just in the same way as the
elements themselves are woven together, so their names may be
woven together and become an account of something—an account
being essentially a complex of names. Thus the elements are
unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable,
whereas the complexes are both knowable and expressable and
can be the objects of true judgement."
202e; l.6861: "SOCRATES:
Letters—the elements of language—and syllables.[327]
It must have been these, musn't it, that the author of our
theory had in view—it couldn't have been anything else?"
204b; l.6907: "SOCRATES:
Now do you call 'sum'[328]
and 'whole' the same thing or different things?
THEAETETUS: I don't feel at all
certain; but as you keep telling me to answer up with a good
will, I will take a risk and say they are different."
6 Augustus 2014
217a-b, l.7306: Socrates
distinguishes "sophist",
"statesman" and "philosopher" and asks if the words can be combined and
separated to be understood better and the visitor answers, in
Elea (Italy), they distinguishes three complicated distinct
kinds.
219a-c, l.7354-7369: The
visitor then uses an example to explain his methodology. The
example is to show how an acccount of angling is derived. He
starts at a high level concept and divides "expertise" into two types; "production" and "acquisition". Production refers to producing (making) and
acquisition refers to "learning,
recognition, commerce, combat, and hunting." Acquisition "take
things that are or have come into being, and they take
possession of some of them with words and actions, and they
keep other things from being taken possession of."
219d-221a, l.7374-7420:
The visitor then divides acquisition again into two parts. "The
part that's done openly we label combat" and "the
part that's secret we call hunting."
Hunting is then again divided into two; "the
hunting of living things and the hunting of lifeless things." He continues with divisions into two, which
shows partly his methodology and way of thinking, until he
isolates other methods of hunting from angling, because
angling is the object of discussion. Angling is defined as
fishing with lines and hooks.
222c-d, l.7470: The
visitor divides hunting for humans into two types, one
relating to "war" and "force" and another relating to "persuasion."
222e-223a, l.7478-7486.
The visitor from Elea distinguishes sophists from hunters of
people who hunts by flattery and giving presents. Sophistry he
relates to teachings about "virtue" for income and flattery he relates to "expertise
in love."
223b, l.7493: The visitor
defines sophists with his methodology as people who hunts for
income from "rich, prominent young men." The visitor's classification is apart from
production; "appropriation, taking possession,
hunting, animal hunting, hunting on land, human hunting,
hunting by persuasion, hunting privately, and money earning."
224c-d, l.7532: "VISITOR:
…We'll say that the expertise of the part of acquisition,
exchange, selling, wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing
in words and learning (d) that have to do with virtue—that's
sophistry in its second appearance."
224e, l7538: The visitor
distinguishes between "things
that others make" and "things
that he [a sophist]
makes himself", which sophists sell
when retailing. The visitor's classifications are therefore
not definite because when he started his explanation he
divided expertise between acquisition and production. Here he
includes "things that he makes himself" in the category, which initially excluded
produced things.
225c, l.7563: "VISITOR:
But what about disputation that's done expertly and involves
controversy about general issues, including what's just and
what's unjust? Don't we normally call that debating [eristic]?" Note 6, l.8968: "The
word here translated by "debating," eristikon, is
sometimes translated (or transliterated) "eristic." It refers
to a practice of competitive debating which the sophists made
popular in Athens. Plato's use of the term stigmatizes the
practice as not directed at truth."
225d-226a, l7569-7577: "VISITOR:
Part of debating [eristic], it
turns
out, wastes money and the other part makes money.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: Let's try and say what each
of them ought to be called."
225e-226a, l.7577: They
then distinguishes between people who debate for their own
pleasure, which is unpleasant to others and describe it as
"chatter". The type that makes money according to them is the
opposite of chatter and identified as sophistry.
229e-230e, l.7698-7720:
The visitor refers to two types of teaching. Admonition, "our
forefathers' time-honored method of scolding" which is not appreciated, and refutation.
Refutation shames people by showing them their contradicting
arguments. Refutation is regarded the best method to cleanse a
soul, of ones who think they know but do not know. The visitor
does not want to acknowledge sophistry by ascribing refutation
to sophists but he explains that sophistry has something to do
with refutation.
231c-, l.7738-: "VISITOR:
But let's stop first and catch our breath, so to speak. And
while (d) we're resting let's ask ourselves, "Now, how many
different appearances has the sophist presented to us?" I
think we first discovered him as a hired hunter of rich young
men.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Second, as a whole-saler of
learning about the soul.
THEAETETUS: Right.
VISITOR: Third, didn't he appear as
a retailer of the same things?
THEAETETUS: Yes, and fourth as a
seller of his own learning?
VISITOR: Your memory's correct. I'll
try to recall the fifth way: he was (e) an athlete in verbal
combat, distinguishing by his expertise in debating.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: The sixth appearance was
disputed, but still we made a concession to him and took it
that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere with
learning."
232b-233c, l.7758-7807:
The visitor then leads Theaetetus into realising that sophists
specialize in disputation about anything but that 'disputation
about anything' is "self-referentially incoherent" because not
one can have knowledge about everything. The sophists are
nevertheless paid and appear to be very knowledgeable about
many things but they do not know what truths are.
233c, l.7807: "VISITOR:
So the sophist has now appeared as having a kind of belief
knowledge about everything, but not truth."
235a, l.7849: "VISITOR:
So we have to regard him [a sophist]
as a cheat and an imitator."
236e-237c, l.7895-7919: "VISITOR:
Really, my young friend, this is a very difficult
investigation we're engaged in. This appearing, and this
seeming but not being, and (e) this saying things but not true
things—all these issues are full of confusion, just as they
always have been. It's extremely hard, Theaetetus, to say what
form of speech we should use to say there really is such a
thing as false saying or believing, and moreover to utter this
without being caught (237) in a verbal conflict.
THEAETETUS: Why?
VISITOR: Because this form of speech
of ours involves the rash assumption that that which is not
is, since otherwise falsity wouldn't come into being. But when
we were boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us
form start to finish, speaking in both prose and poetic
rhythms, that
'Never shall this force itself on
us, that that which is not may be; While you search, keep your
thought far away from this path.'[329]
So we have his testimony to this.
And our own way of speaking itself (b) would make the point
especially obvious if it we examined it a little. So if it's
all the same to you, let's look at that first.
THEAETETUS: As far as I'm concerned
you can do what you want. But as far as our way of speaking is
concerned, think about how it will go best, and follow along
with it and take me along the road with you.
VISITOR: That's what we have to do.
Tell me: do we dare to utter the sound that which in no way is?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: But suppose one of our
listeners weren't debating or playing a game but had to think
seriously and answer the following question: What (c) should
the name, that which is
not, be applied to? Why do we think he'd use it, and in
what connection, and for what kind of purpose? And what would
he indicate by it to someone else who wanted to find out about
it?
THEAETETUS: That's a hard question.
In fact, it's just about completely, impossibly confusing for
someone like me to answer.
VISITOR: But anyway this much is
obvious to us, that that
which is not can't be applied to any of those which are.
THEAETETUS: Of course not.
VISITOR: So if you can't apply it to
that which is, it wouldn't be right to apply it to something."
The above argument, which was referenced by
Taylor and Lee was proven false by phenomenology because "that
which is not" exists as
phenomena in minds and as words, whilst not existing as
material.
239c, l.7988: The visitor uses this argument
that, "that which is
not" cannot be sensibly talked about because it doesn’t
exist. We cannot even logically refer to "it" as singular or
plural. This is used then as an argument against sophists
because they tend to speak about immaterial things, which
exist only as words and as phenomena in minds.
240a, l.8001: The visitor claims, that what
sophists say, exists "only
in terms of words", but he
acknowledges not phenoma in minds. The visitor says that
sophists talk about something that is through everything that
connects everything as one thing.
240d, l.8022: "VISITOR:
When we say that he [a sophist] deceives us about appearances
and that (d) he's an expert at deception, are we saying so
because his expertise makes our souls believe what is false?
Or what shall we say?
THEAETETUS: Just that."
7 August 2014
243e-244a, l.8121-8133:
The visitor distinguishes two types of being pronounced by "is" and "are". He is not sure about the actuality because
some regard "are" to be not because they say everything "is"
one.
246b-c, l.8214: Theaetetus
and the visitor mentions quarrels that are between men about
being. Some say "beings" are referred to only when its consist
of matter and some say real being are referred to as
consisting of immaterial concepts like "truth". The referrers to truths replaces being with a
"process of coming-to-be".
"There's a never-ending battle going on constantly
between them about this issue." The
people referring to the concept of the truth, primarily, in
the sense of being thus recognized the participle verb, being.
Can we refer to them who
beinged?
246c-d, l.8219: "VISITOR:
It's easier to talk with the ones who put being in the forms.
They're gentler people. It's harder—and perhaps just about
impossible—with (d) the ones who drag everything down to body
by force. It seems to me that we have to deal with them this
way."
The concept of the truth,
combined with matter, make up beings' being and becoming.
247d, l.8253: The visitor
acknowledges the possibilty that concepts and matter are, in
stead of just either is of concept or is of matter.
247e, l.8259: "VISITOR:
…I'll take it as a definition that those which are
amount to nothing other than capacity." Materialists agree with this view.
250c, l.8347: "THEAETETUS:
It does seem probably true that when we say change and rest
are, we do have a kind of omen of that which is as a
third thing.
VISITOR: So that which is isn’t
both change and rest; it's something different from them
instead.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
VISITOR: Therefore by its own nature
that which is
doesn't either rest or change."
250d-e, l.8361: "VISITOR:
When we were asked what we should apply the name that which is not to,
we became completely confused. Do you remember?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And now aren't we in just
as much confusion about that (e) which is?
THEAETETUS: We seem to be in even
more confusion, if that's possible."
254a-b, l.8458-8465: "VISITOR:
The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not,
which he's had practice dealing with, and he's hard to see
because the place is so dark. Isn't that right?
THEAETETUS: It seems to be.
VISITOR: But the philosopher always
uses reasoning to stay near the form, being. He isn't at
all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of
most people's souls can't bear to look at what's divine.
THEAETETUS: That seems just as right
as what you just said before."
256d, l.8563: "VISITOR:
So shall we go on fearlessly contending that change is different
from that which is?
THEAETETUS: Yes, we should be
absolutely fearless.
VISITOR: So it's clear that change really is both
something that is not, but also a thing that is since it
partakes in that which
is?
THEAETETUS: That's absolutely clear."
257c-d, l.8591-8599: "VISITOR:
Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of
it that has to do with something is marked off and has a name
peculiar to itself. That's why there are said to be many
expertises and many kinds (d) of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Of course." This statement supports truths with regard to
aspectual knowledge, because what else than truths can hold
varied expertises together in a coherent whole?
258b-c, l.8628-8633: "VISITOR:
…Should we say .. that
which is not also was and is not being, and is one form
among the many that are? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any
doubts about that?
THEAETETUS: No.
VISITOR: You know, our disbelief in
Parmenides has gone even farther than his prohibition.
THEAETETUS: How?
VISITOR: We've pushed our
investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what
he prohibited us from even thinking about." I assume this identifcation of existence of "that
which is not", may be referring to
phenomena in minds, which occur because of lies as well as the
words that made up those lies, the paper it could have been
written on and the memories the sound waves could have been
recorded with.
260b-261a, l.8683-8704: "VISITOR:
That which is not appeared
to us to be one kind among others, but scattered over all those which are.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So next we have to think
about whether it blends with belief and speech.
THEAETETUS: Why?
(c) VISITOR: If it doesn't blend
with them then everything has to be true. But if it does then
there will be false belief and false speech, since falsity in
thinking and speaking amount to believing and saying those that are not.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: And if there's falsity then
there's deception.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And if there's deception
then necessarily the world will be full of copies, likenesses,
and appearances.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: We said that the sophist
had escaped into this region, but that (d) he denied that
there has come to be or is such a thing as falsity. For he
denied that anyone either thinks or says that which is not, on
the ground that that
which is not never in any way has a share in being.
THEAETETUS: That's what he said.
VISITOR: But now it apparently does
share in that which is,
so he probably wouldn't still put up a fight about that. …
Then when we've seen that clearly we can show that falsity is,
and when we've shown that we can tie the soophist up in it, if
we can keep hold of him—or else we'll let him go and look for
him in another kind."
263, l.8763: The visitor
explains that truth and falsity relate to correspondence with
facts, if words are used literally. He relates the truth to "those
that are, as they are".
265a, l.8840-8846: "VISITOR:
Didn't we begin by dividing expertise into productive and
acquisitive?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: And under the aquisitive
part the sophist appeared in hunting, combat, wholesaling, and
tyes of that sort.
THEAETETUS: Of course."
265b-e, l.8847-8866: The
visitor explains to Theaetetus that production can be divided
between "divine"
and "human"
production. Divine production is effected by "a
god" and is seen in "nature" and human production is identified by it's
likenesses to natural things. A uniquely shaped car for
example will not fall under divine production because cars do
not grow.
268b-c, l.8945-8951:
Theaetetus and the visitor explains that the name 'sophist' is
used to identify sophists because they imitate wise people,
not because they are wise themselves.
8 August 2014
l.22062; 310b, 22093;
311b, 22123: Hippocrates, not the famous physician, was
Socrates's friend and accompanied him to Callias's house when
Socrates debated with Protagoras.
314b, l.22191-22195:
SOCRATES: "Anyway, these are the questions we
should look into, with the help of our elders. You and I are
still a little too young to get to the bottom of such a great
matter."
316d-317b, 22238-22246:
PROTAGORAS: "Now, I maintain that the sophist's
art is an ancient one, but that the men who practiced it in
ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, disguised it,
masking it sometimes as poetry, as Homer and Hesiod and
Simonides did, or as mystery religions and prophecy, witness
Orpheus and Musaeus and occasionally, I've noticed even as
athletics, as with (e) Iccus and Tarentum and, in our own
time, Herodicus and Selymbria (originally of Megara), as great
a sophist as any. Your own Agathocles, a great sophist, used
music as a front, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others.
All (317) of them, as I say, used these various arts as
screens out of fear of ill will. And this is where I part
company with them all, for I do not believe that they
accomplished their end; I believe they failed, in fact, to
conceal from the powerful men in the cities the true purpose
of their disguises. …So I have come down the completely
opposite road. I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate
(c) men, and I consider this admission to be a better
precaution than denial."
Protagoras implies that an
ancient art, that had been hidden was brought out into the
open by partly him recently. Was it out in the open though,
because as far as i can see no sophist has said that they use
lies. From the previous dialogue, Theaetetus, they
claim that lies do not exist.
318e-319a, l.22278:
PROTAGORAS: '"What I teach is sound deliberation,
both in domestic matters—how best to manage (319) one's
household, and in public affairs—how to realize one's maximum
potential for success in political debate and action."'
SOCRATES: '"Am
I following what you are saying?" I asked. "You appear to be
talking about the art of citizenship, and to e promising to
make men good citizens."'
PROTAGORAS:
'"This
is exactly what I claim, Socrates."'
It seems thus that
Protagoras claims to sell knowledge about a competitive
advantage to people. The knowledge has been used by others but
not admittedly.
319c-320b, l.22287-22300:
Socrates tells Protagoras that usually in Athens they accept
only teachings by people who are specialists ('"a
person not regarded as a craftsman"')
and who were educated with regard to technical matters. With
regard to '"city management"', '"public
life"' and '"private
life"', though, anyone can talk, without an education,
because '"virtue"' cannot be
taught. Socrates uses Pericles, the political leader of Athens
and his sons as examples. Pericles was successful but he
struggled to teach Alcibiades and Clinias, whom he oversees.
324c-d, l.22374: According to Protagoras, the
Athenians and himself regard '"virtue"' a teachable
subject.
326d-e, l.22408: Protagoras regards '"virtue"' a teachable
subject because to him it relates to complying with laws of
cities.
328b, l.22431: Protagoras claims to teach how to become
'"noble and good"'.
335d-336a, l.22622-22632: Socrates wants to leave
the debate because Protagoras does not want to follow
Socrates's dialectical question and answer technique. Socrates
requires brief answers to his questions. Protagoras says it
will count against him if he answers in brief like Socrates
wants. After Socrates stood up to leave Callias told him to
stay and Socrates agreed, if Protagoras follows Socrates's
method.
337b, l.22650: During the argument about the
methodology being used Prodicus said that '"eristics"' should not
be allowed because '"eristics
are for enemies at odds."'
339d, l.22703: Protagoras, a sophist uses
contradiction to prove a point, which is something not
expected from deceivers.
341e, l.22752: They are discussing a poem by
Simonides in which Simonides wrote only God can be good. '"God
aloen can have this privilege."' It seems
thus that Caiaphas syndrome was present at the time.
342a-b, l.22757-22763: Socrates says that Greeks
of Crete and Lacedaemon were the first philosophers and there
the highest concentration of sophists are situated. The
natives there however deny that it is because of their '"wisdom
that they are the leaders of the Greek world"' because
they do not want to give away their secret for success.
It seems thus clear that deceit are the winning
methodology to use in order to come out at the top in a
society. The problem however is that it hinders creativities
in that society and therefore cause colonization. It is a
difficult problem. Lying benefits own bodies and bodily
pleasures, but harms society, those bodies are parts of.
Honesties benefit society but harms own bodies.
"Lacedaemonian |ˌlasədəˈmōnēən|
noun
a native or inhabitant of
Lacedaemon, an area of ancient Greece comprising the city of
Sparta and its surroundings.
adjective
of Lacedaemon or its inhabitants;
Spartan." (New Oxford American Dictionary)
342d-e, l.22771: According to Socrates '"the
Spartans have the best education in philosophy and (e)
debate."'
Why do we not know of famous Spartan
philosophers?
343a-b, l.22775-22779: Socrates mentions people
with Spartan education. They are '"Thales
of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, our own
Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, the seventh in
the list, Chilon of Sparta"'. They had
Apollo as God and at his temple at Delphi their slogan
appeared, '"'Know thyself' and 'Nothing in
excess.'"'
343c, l.22778-22783: According to Socrates,
Pittacus's maxim was '"It
is hard to be good"' and
Simonides then tried to refute Pittacus's maxim with
Simonides's own poem, by saying it is hard to '"become"' good.
345d, l.22830: Socrates quotes Simonides: '"All
who do no wrong willingly I praise and love. Necessity not
even the gods resist." '
Caiaphas syndrome again.
361a-b, l.23188-23192:
SOCRATES: '"It seems to me that our discussion
has turned on us, and if it had a voice of its own, it would
say, mockingly, 'Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you
are, both of you.'"'
The above quote describes
how i felt about this dialogue. Socrates was more ridiculous
than Protagoras though. His disrespect towards Protagoras,
Callias's guest, in Callias's house; gave an uncouth
appearance. The discussion are about adjectives, like good and
bad in general, without reference to specific circumstances.
Also the telos discussed seems to be the benefit to "a man",
and not society as a whole, especially in Socates's views.
Society has not come into contention, except a little bit, in
Protagoras's opinions. Socrates is obnoxious and he babbles
on. The adjectives being discussed are not discussed in
relation to something specific. It seems to be usually in
relation to "a man", according to Socrates. Although Socrates
support truths he does that selfishly because the telos of his
argumentation is "the man". All men against all other men, one
at a time. He regards not the society in this dialogue.
8 September 2014
"Aspasia" was "Pericles'
intellectually accomplished mistress."
She wrote the original text of this recitation by Socrates.[330]
"SOCRATES:
No by Zeus, it isn't."[331]
Aspasia taught Pericles,
the best orator among Greeks, according to Socrates, and she
also taught Socrates.[332]
236a: Socrates
acknowledges two teachers he had. They are Connus his "music" teacher and Aspasia his teacher of "oratory."
234a-b: Menexenus was a
young man from the ruling families of Athens.
236c-d: "MENEXENUS:
Have no fear, Socrates. Speak. I shall be very grateful,
whether you're pleased to recite Aspasia's speech or whosever
it is. Only speak.
SOCRATES: But perhaps you will laugh
at me if I seem to you, old as I am, to go on playing like a
child.
MENEXENUS: Not at all, Socrates. In
any case, just speak the speech.
SOCRATES: Well, certainly you're a
man I'm so bound to gratify that I would even be inclined to
do so if you asked me to take off my clothes (d) and
dance—especially since we are alone. All right, listen."
Note 3, l.28144: "In
myth Athena and Posidon vied for sovereignty of Athens. On the
grounds that Athena's gift of the olive tree was more valuable
than the salt-water spring Posidon had made gush forth on the
Acropolis, the twelve gods apppointed by Zeus to arbitrate the
dispute awarded the sovereignty to her."
l.27896-l.27910; 237b-e:
Socrates quotes Aspasia, saying about the fallen during the
recent war: ' "The nobility of these men's
origin is rooted in that of their ancestors. The latter were
not immigrants and did not, by arriving from elsewhere, make
these descendants of theirs live as aliens in the land, but
made them children of the soil, really dwelling and having
their being in their ancestral home, nourished not, as other
peoples are, by a stepmother, but by a mother, the land in
which they lived. Now they lie in death among the (c) familiar
places of her who gave them birth, suckled them, and received
them as her own. Surely it is most just to celebrate the
mother herself first; in this way the noble birth of these men
is celebrated at the same time.
"Our land is indeed worthy of being
praised not merely by us but by all of humanity. There are
many reasons for that, but the first and greatest is that she
has the good fortune to be dear to the gods. The quarrel of
the gods who disputed over her and the verdict that setlled it
bear witness (d) to what we say. note3 How could
it not be just for all human kind to praise a land by the
gods? The second commendation that is due her is that in the
age when the earth was causing creatures of all kinds—wild
animals and domestic livestock—to spring up and thrive, our
land showed herself to be barren of savage beasts and pure.
Out of all the animals she selected and brought forth the
human, the one creature that towers over the others in
understanding and alone acknowledges justice and the gods.
"That fact that everything that
gives birth is supplied with the food (e) its offspring needs
is weighty testimony for this assertion that the earth
hereabouts gave birth to these men's ancestors and ours. For
by this sign it can be seen clearly whether or not a woman had
really given birth: she is foisting off an infant not her own,
if she does not have within her the wellsprings of its
nourishment. The earth here, our mother, offers precisely this
as sufficient testimony that she has brought forth humans.'
Note 5; l.28149: When the
sons of Heracles were pursued by their father's enemy,
Eurystheus, who ruled Pelloponnesian cities, together called
Argos, Heracles's sons found refuge in Athens and the
Athenians protected them and killed Eurystheus during a war.
Note 14; l.28167: A Athenian civil war
was fought during 403 during which the ' "Thirty
Tyrants" ', who took power by
conniving with Sparta, were defeated at Eleusis.
It seems that Aristotle,
being one of the Thirty, in Parmenides, connived with Sparta.
I was also brought under the impression that Sparta in some
way was involved with Hippias who was exiled (to) who went to
the Persians. The Persians were defeated by Greeks (Athenians
and Spartans) at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea. I guess the
problem can be found at the alliances relating to Heracles and
his sons?
Note 16; l.28174: Sparta "brought
Persia into" the war, against Athens
during 412; the Peloponnesian War.
l.27028 & New Oxford
American Dictionary: According to Nicholas D. Smith, the
translator and the editors, Hippias was a "great
sophist", probably not born in
Athens. He praised Troy's war's "truthful" Achilles, the son of Thessaly's (North Eastern
Greece) king and scourned Oddyseus king of Ithaca, an Island
in the Ionian sea, because he was " 'wily
and a liar' ".
363c-d; l.27065: "HIPPIAS:
… I always go from my home at Elis to the festival of the
Greeks at Olympia when it (d) is held and offer myself at the
temple to speak on demand about any subject I have prepared
for exhibition, and to answer any questions anyone wants to
ask."
363d-364a; l.27065-27070:
"SOCRATES: What a godlike state of mind you're in,
Hippias, if you go to (264) the temple at every Olympiad so
confident about your soul's wisdom! I'd be amazed if any of
the athletes of the body goes there to take part in the
contests as fearless and trusting about his body as you say
you are about your intellect!
HIPPIAS: It is reasonable for me to
be in that state of mind, Socrates. Ever since I began taking
part in the contests at the Olympic games, I have never met
anyone superior to me in anything."
364c; l.27079: "HIPPIAS:
… I say that Homer made Achilles the "best and bravest" man of
those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus
the wiliest."
Note 1, l.27433; 365a-b,
l.27088: Hippias quotes the "embassy
scene" from the Iliad where
Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax "plead" Achilles to return to the fighting against
Troy:
Achilles says to Odysseus:
"Son of Leartes, sprung from Zeus, resourceful
Odysseus,
I must speak the word bluntly,
How I will act and how I think it
shall be accomplished,
For as hateful to me as the gates of
Hades
(b) Is he who hides one thing in his
mind, and says another. As for me, I will speak as it shall
also be accomplished.1"
366a, l.27116: "SOCRATES:
Stop. Let us recall what it is that you are saying. You claim
that liars are powerful and intelligent and knowledgeable and
wise in those matters in which they are liars?
HIPPIAS: That's what I claim."
Hippias means that
specialists who lie, are cunning, and it seems Socrates
protects his thesis that specialisation is paramount to
success of an area, even if specialisation includes lying.
366a-b, l.27124: "SOCRATES:
Well, then. The liars are among the powerful and wise,
according to your argument.
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And when you say that
liars are powerful and wise in (b) these very matters, do you
mean that they have the power to lie if they want, or that
they are without power in the matters in which they are liars.
HIPPIAS: I mean they are powerful."
Hippias are on the side of
honest men although he acknowledges that liars are "powerful
and wise".
366c-d, l.27138: Hippias
was good with mathematics.
367b-d, l.27157-27172:
Socrates opines a specialist is "the
good person" and have the most "power
to lie" and to "tell
the
truth" about their field of
knowledge. Maybe this section shows convincingly what
Socrates's opinion of "good" was, together with the part from
The Republic. A good
person for Socrates is a specialist who lies and tells the
truth.
367d, l.27172: Hippias
disagrees with Socrates's generalisation about specialisation
and says about mathematics: "He
does not appear to be [good],
at least in this field."
369b, l.27215: "SOCRATES:
You are now aware, then, that the same person has been
discovered to be a liar and truthful, so that if Odysseus was
a liar, he also becomes truthful, and if Achilles was
truthful, he also becomes a liar, and these two men are not
different from one another, nor opposites, but similar?"
Socrates was probably
worried about the divisive effect of distinguishing between
liars and honest people. Odysseus and Achilles were both
Greeks who were involved in the war against Troy, on the Greek
side.
370a-371a, l.27228-27247:
Socrates claims that Achilles is nobly dishonest because
Achilles said he will go back to his country before the war is
over but nowhere did he even get his ships ready to go back
and eventually he fought to the end and Hippias answers: "That's
because you don't look at it right, Socrates. When Achilles
lies, he's portrayed as lying not on purpose but
involuntarily, forced to stay and help by the misfortune of
the army. But the lies of Odysseus are voluntary and on
purpose.
SOCRATES: You're deceiving me, my dear Hippias, and
are yourself imitating Odysseus!
HIPPIAS: Not at all, Socrates! What
do you mean? What are you referring to?"
Is it possible to ask a
liar if he is lying and trust the answer. Somewhere i read
that the Sophists were a nobility.
371d-e, l.27264-27269: It
seems Socrates is accusing Hippias that Hippias is praising
Achilles in a monumental way, whilst in actuality, taking
sides with Odysseus, who seems to not have been a 'fighter',
but a politician.
Socrates claims that doing
anything badly, voluntarily, is better than doing anything
badly involuntarily to motivate his opinion that it is better
to lie on purpose than to lie by mistake, and Hippias answers
at 375d, l.27393: "But it would be
terrible, Socrates, if those who commit injustice voluntarily
are to be better than those who do it involuntarily!"
It seems Sophistry should
not be equated with lying but rather equated with the idea of
realism.
375e, l.27407: Socrates
opines again that also justice is measured by the level of
specialisation. In Ion,
Socrates's opinion was against Ion because he kew only the
poetry of one poet. The level of specialisation for Socrates
is thus subjective.
376b, l.27422: "SOCRATES:
Therefore, it's up to the good man to do injustice
voluntarily, and the bad man to do it involuntarily; that is,
if the good man has a good soul."
This view by Socrates is directly related to s(a)inity and
non-pathological criminal incapacity and protection of
individuals by the law. What was relevant during Socrates's
time is not necessary relevant today, depending on the level
of justice in a legal system, or not?
376b-c, l.27422-: "HIPPIAS:
I can't agree with you in that, Socrates.
(c) SOCRATES: Nor I with myself,
Hippias. But given the argument, we can't help having it look
that way to us, now at any rate. However, as I said before, on
these matters I waver back and forth and never believe the
same thing."
Socrates was just
babbling, according to this part. He seems to have really
doubted "the truth".
10 September 2014
Meno's family was leading
aristocracy from Thessaly, which traditionally had good
relations with Athens.[333]
Meno was hosted in Athens by a democratic politician, Anytus,
who was one of Socrates accusers at his trial in Athens. Meno
enquires about Socrates's views about virtue.[334]
In the dialogue Socrates cites "wise
priests and priestesses."[335]
70-71c, l.25559-25572:
Meno asks Socrates what virtue is. Socrates answers he doesn't
know and Meno replies: "Socrates,
do you really not know what virtue is? (c) Are we to report
this to the folk back home about you?"
This interaction could
imply that Socrates's opinion was in opposition to the opinion
by aristocratic Greek families that the difference between
good and bad cannot be known. Socrates's view was similar to
that of God in the old Testament. That knowledge of good and
evil was a result of the fall into sin.
70a, l.25559: Socrates
refers to Thessalians' wealth and horsemanship.
71e-72a, l.25584-25588: "MENO:
It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want the
virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue
consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so
doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be
careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue
of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage
the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to
her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is
different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want
that, or if you want that of a free man (72) or a slave. And
there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a
loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every task of
ours and every one of us—and, Socrates, the same is true for
wickedness.
SOCRATES: I seem to be in great
luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have found
you to have a whole swarm of them."
72a-e, l.25588-25604:
Socrates compares the likeness ("form") amongst bees ('real objects' – Popper and
Kuhn) with the form amongst virtues and argues bees and
virtues are similar and therefore virtues should share one
striking attribute. It could be argued Socrates's meaning
related to essences or substances.
Note 1, l.26273: "Prodicus
was a well-known sophist who was especially keen on the exact
meaning of words."
76b-c, l.25691-25697: "SOCRATES:
Even someone who was blindfolded would know from your
conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers.
MENO: Why so?
SOCRATES: Because you are forever
giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who
behave like tyrants as long as they are young. And (c) perhaps
you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with handsome
people, so I will do you the favor of an answer."
76e-, l.25708-25714: "SOCRATES:
It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than
that about shape.—It does.
SOCRATES: It is not better, son of
Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think
you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the
mysteries as you tolf me yesterday, but could remain and be
initiated."
77e, l.25733: Socrates
opines that when a person do not know he is doing something
bad he is actually doing good because he knows not what is bad
altogether.
78d, l.25757: "SOCRATES:
Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friend of
the Great King, [a] virtue
is the acquisition of gold and silver." Somewhere else the 'Great King' was explained
to be the Persian king if i remember correctly.
AT the time of this
dialogue Meno was young and "about
to embark on an unscrupulous military and political career,
leading to an early death at the hands of the Persian king."[336]
81a-e, l.25815-25832:
Socrates mentions priests and priestesses who talked about "divine
matters" he thought was "both
true and beautiful". Pindar wrote
about similar things according to Socrates. According to Meno
Socrates opined that "learning
is recollection". Socrates meant
that souls have experienced everything and what we learn,
reminds souls of actualities.
86c, l.25969: Socrates
compares the logic in finding geometrical figures with logic
of finding an essence of "virtue" after he showed how a slave who was never
taught geometry understands the logic thereof.
91b-92c, l.26074-26094:
Socrates acknowledges that sophists claim to be teaching ways
to attain "virtue".
Anytus opines that sophists corrupt their followers. Socrates
answers that he agrees not with Anytus because if it was true
that they corrupt their followers, they would not have made
money from their teachings. Anytus says he needs not to know
what sophists teach to be aware that their teachings are
fallacious, because he knows who they are.
92d, l.26100: Socrates
acknowledges that he supports the sophists.
94e, l.26142-26147:
Socrates opines that virtue can not be taught with references
to virtuous men and their immediate family who turned out to
be not virtuous and Anytus warns Socrates to be careful about
what he says of the prominent people he mentioned, because he
could harm them with his negative opinions.
97b, l.26197: "SOCRATES:
So true opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action
than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our
investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only
knowledge can lead to correct action, (c) for true opinion can
do so also."
97e-98a, l.26209-26215:
Socrates opines that true opinion becomes knowledge when it is
remembered. True opinion has the nature of spreading and
unless true opinion is secured it becomes not knowledge.
Socrates thus here acknowledges an esoteric character of
knowledge.
99a-b, l.26239-26244;
100b, l.26266: Socrates opines that "true
belief
and knowledge" does not necessarily
cause virtue, which is bestowed by divine non-human influence.
Virtue can however not be present without true belief and
knowledge being present. Virtue cannot be taught and therefore
the prominent virtuous people mentioned earlier could not
carry virtue, they had, over, to their sons or students.
99c-d, l.26256: "SOCRATES:
We should be right to call divine also those sooth-sayers and
prophets whom we just mentioned, and all the poets, and we
should call (d) no less divine and inspired those public men
who are no less under the gods' influence and possession, as
their speeches lead to success in many important matters,
though they have no knowledge of what they are saying.—Quite
so.
SOCRATES: Women too, Meno, call good
men divine, and the Spartans, when they eulogize someone, say
"This man is divine.""
This statement by Socrates
gels not with his general opinion that goodness is recognized
by specialisation in a craft. Perhaps he just said it after
the warning by Anytus earlier, to please Anytus. Socrates's
reference to women and the Spartans, could mean that he
regards "good" and
"divine" men not as men,
like women sometimes do.
11 September 2014
This dialogue is about "andreia", "literally 'manliness'".[337]
183a, l.19859: The
Lacedaemonians (Spartans) were supreme with regards to matters
of warfare.
180d, l.19809: Nicias says
that Socrates recommended "Damon" as a music teacher.
184d-e, l.19883-19899: "LYSIMACHUS:
… So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out with
which of them you plan to vote.
SOCRATES: What's that, Lysimachus?
Do you intend to cast your vote for whatever position is
approved by the majority of us?
LYSIMACHUS: Why, what else could a
person do, Socrates?
(e) SOCRATES: And do you, Melesias,
plan to act in the same way? Suppose there should be a council
to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular kind
of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by the greater
number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a
good trainer?
MELESIAS: Probably by the latter,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: And you would be persuaded
by him rather than by the four of us?
MELESIAS: Probably.
SOCRATES: So I think it is by
knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make
them well, and not by majority rule.
MELESIAS: Certainly."
190b, l.20017: "SOCRATES:
Well then, Laches, aren't these two now asking our advice as
to the manner in which virtue might be added to the souls of
their sons to make them better?"
LACHES: Yes, indeed."
190c-d, l.20023-20030:
Socrates decides that they will discuss only part of virtue,
which is topical to their discussion, about the "technique
of
fighting in armor". The part of
virtue is "courage".
191d-e, l.20059-20064:
Socrates is looking for an essence of "courage", which can be applied to cavalry, hoplites and
sea warriors, because their tactics are not the same usually.
This essence he wants to apply to the dealings of politics and
more general matters, for example the way men act when
confronted with temptations of "desire
and pleasure". Socrates makes use of
two opposites for his search, namely "courage
and cowardice".
195d, l.20189: Nicias and
Laches opines it is sometimes better to die than to live.
197d, l.20244: Socrates
mentions his and Nicias's friend Damon again and that Damon
spends much time with Prodicus a well-known sophist. Laches
respects not the sophists and says they are not worthy to be
Athens's leaders.
198c, l.20267: Socrates
and Nicias agree that true knowledge of what should be feared
and what should be hoped for is part of (cause) courage.
199a-c, l.20279-20292:
Socrates says that "the
law decrees" that "the
general" (warfare generals) command
"the seer" (doctors,
etc.). Also that knowledge, which gives courage are the same
for knowing history, understanding the present and predicting
the future. The previous reference to fear and hope only
referred to the future.
200b, l.20321: Damon is
referred to again by Nicias as a worth while person to cite
with regards to knowledge about courage.
201a-b, l.20335: Socrates
again promotes the business of sophists who get paid for
teaching. He says they need to find the best sophist for
themselves as well as for the sons of Melesias and Lysimachus.
He quotes Homer as aid to their needs for knowledge, who
wrote: '"Modesty is not a good mate for a
needy man."'
12 September 2014
Philebus was one
of Plato's last works together with Sophist, Statesman and Laws.[338]
A topic, readily associated with Socrates is discussed in
Philebus; "what is 'the human good'? how will a
human being lead the best life possible?" "Philebus" means '"youth
lover"'.[339]
11d-12b, l.12101-12121:
Socrates, Philebus and Protarchus are searching for "some
posession or state of the soul to be the one that render life
happy for all human beings."
Initially the hypothesis of the dialogue is that Socrates
argues "knowledge"
and Philebus argues "pleasure", causes happiness. Philebus calls "the
goddess herself" as his witness and
Socrates agrees to that and say Philebus says, "her
truest name is pleasure" although
she is called Aphrodite.
13a-b, l.12134-12139:
Socrates states that all pleasures are not good. Pleasure and
happiness is thus not the same. Happiness is more equated with
good, than pleasure, because bad pleasures exist.
14d-15c, l.12172-12194:
Socrates says that the question about the whole and parts, "the
one and many that have become commonplace" is not worth investigating because it leads to
nothing. Socrates favours identifications of the perceivable
whether it is parts or a whole. They however start a
discussion partly about realism and nominalism.
16d-e, l.12223-12227:
According to Socrates "the
gods" gave them the methodology to
investigate problems from identifications of a form for a
kind. After identifying that form they should search for a
next form and then a next to see reality clearer. The one form
to identify initially in an investigation is thus a type of
universality for a group of things. Socrates seems to not
point to nominalism. By nominalism i mean a singularity of a
single thing, because Socrates wants to identify a
singularity, firstly, of a group. Each member of the group
must partake of that singular identification.
16e-17a, l.12227-12231:
Socrates says that the "clever
ones among" [sophists] them do not
investigate the stage between "limited" and "unlimited". They jump directly from the limited to the
unlimited. That jump Socrates sees, shows the difference
between "dialectical"
and "eristic discourse" to him.
17c, l.12244: Socrates
finds knowledge of music important.
17e, l.12255: "SOCRATES:
… The boundless multitude, however, in any and every kind of
subject leaves you in boundless ignorance, and makes you count
for nothing and amount to nothing, since you have never worked
out the amount and number of anyhting at all."
18b-d, l.12266-12271:
Socrates says "some god or god-inspired man", a "deity called Theuth" realised that vowels are unlimited in sound.
Theuth identified different letters and "he" [Theuth] realised "that
none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them,
taken (d) by itself without understanding them all".
19a-b, l.12282-12293:
Protarchus, son of Callias, and, Socrates identifies a
necessity; that is before sensible discussion can take place
different "kinds" of
"pleasure" and of "knowledge" should be identified.
19c, l.12298: The
difference between Philebus and Socrates's focuses in
attaining happiness is that Philebus focuses on himself or
himself and his immediate surrounds whereas Socrates focuses
on all people.
11d-12b, l.12101-12121:
Socrates and Protarchus are searching for "some
posession or state of the soul to be the one that render life
happy for all human beings."
20b, l.12311: Socrates
posits again that it is neither pleasure nor knowledge, which
cause happiness but that there is a third candidate, which
causes happiness.
20d-21b, l.12317-12344:
They agree that the "good" they are searching for is something "perfect" they want to partake of.
22d, l.12386: Although
they agree that neither pleasure nor knowledge can be the good
(happiness) they are searching for, Socrates says that maybe
they can identify one of pleasure or knowledge as the "cause" of happiness.
23c-e, l.12403-12417:
Socrates says "the god had revealed a division of
what is into the unlimited and the limit.[340]" Socrates then identifies a mixture between the
unlimited and the limited as their "third
kind", but also identifies that they
need a fourth kind. The fourth kind is the "cause" that combines the limited and the inlimited.
Socrates further says it might be necessary to find a fifth
kind.
Russell wrote in his
History of western philosophy, that Hume stated we cannot
identify causes as things or kinds of things. Did Socrates
venture to far away from experiences we can share?
23e-24a, l.12417-12424:
Socrates then continues by saying he must first show how the
unlimited and limited, each "is
in fact one and many."
25b, l.12458: When
Socrates is asked the difficult question to identify the third
kind, the mixture of limited and unlimited, Socrates calls on
"a god" to give him the
answer.
25c-26a, l.12465-12485:
Socrates claims that it is the combination of two unlimited
identifications, which causes the limited. Hottest and
coldest, mixed, establishes, for example, a limited
indentification, like two extremes, which each can cause a
sickness, combines in health.
26d-c, l.12496: Socrates
indetifies "law and order" as the limit, set by "the
goddess [of pleasure]
herself", to the unbounded pleasure
she gives.
Socrates's argument is not
accurate because he initially said that he wanted to combine
the limited and unlimited to form a third kind. He then formed
the limited by combining two unlimited extremes. His
combination of the limited and the unlimited is not a
combination between two equal kinds. His combination between
the limited and unlimited was not clearly defined. Two form
the third combination between limited and ulimited, the
unlimited had a weight of 2/3s and the limited a weight of
1/3.
26c, l.12501: Protarchus
also did not grasp the third kind clearly.
26d, l.12508: Socrates
explains his third kind sufficiently to Protarchus, Socrates
identifies the third kind as "a
coming-into-being created through the measures imposed by the
limit."
26e, l.12515: Socrates's
fourth kind, "the cause"
of the third kind, Socrates also identifies as "the
maker"; "the
maker
and the cause would rightly be called one".
27a-b, l.12522-12529: The
three kinds is also identified with "what
comes
to be and that from which it is produced". Thus, the logos (unlimited), the matter
(limited) and the product. The "craftsman" (cause) represents the fourth kind.
28c-e., l.12571-12577: "SOCRATES
… For all the wise are agreed, in true self-exaltation, that
reason is our king, both over heaven and earth. And perhaps
they are justified." Socrates then
start to question whether "this
whole world order are ruled by unreason and irregularity, as
chance would have it, or whether they are not rather, as our
forebears taught us, governed by reason and by the order of a
wonderful intelligence." Protarchus
then claims the suggestion that unreason could rule is "impious".
31a, l.12643: "Reason" and "cause" are related according to Socrates, which he
equates with Zeus, gods, kings, craftsmen and ruling.
34e-35c, l.12778-12809:
Socrates argues that "every
living creature" "desires" a balance via "the
domain of the soul", without first
experiencing things. He gives as example that a person
naturally desires filling with water after thirst, without
knowing that filling will quench thirst. Memory is thus partly
related to soul matters according to Socrates.
38a-39a, l.12896-12934:
The discussion Socrates leads with regard to "true
and false judgement" proves that
Socrates's definition of truth did relate to corrrespondence.
Judgements which are "true
or false" relate to correspondence.
Correspondent truths lead to judgements, which are right and
non-correspondence leads to wrong judgements.
39a-40c, l.12934-12984:
Socrates identifies false pains and false pleasures which have
been memorized by our souls after false information have been
inscribed to our souls. These false pains and pleasures relate
to the future and our exptectations. According to Socrates the
falseness causes bad.
41a. l.13004: Protarchus
differs with Socrates because he claims it is not falseness,
which causes 'bad' but something else.
48c-d, l.13242: Socrates
refers to the inscription in Delphi, '"Know
thyself"', together with the vice,
of not knowing oneself.
48e-49a, l.13257-13264:
With regard to not knowing oneself Socrates identifies three
commonly made mistakes. First, "someone
thinks himself richer than he in fact is", secondly "more
consider themselves taller and handsomer than they in fact are" and thirdly "an
overwhelming number are mistaken about the third kind, which
belongs to the soul, namely virtue, and believe that they are
superior in virtue, although they are not." False thoughts about virtue, relate especially
to false claims about existent "wisdom" and "knowledge".
52c, l.13359: Socrates
ascribes moderation to pure pleasure and high intesnity
pleasures to "impure"
pleasure.
56b-57d, l.13472-13527:
Socrates distinguishes between different types of knowledge
based on "purity"
and "certainty".
He referred to the certainty of measurements involved at
construction as opposed to the uncertainty of other sciences.
He also referred to two types of geometry and two types of
arithmetic.
57e-58c, l.13534-13544:
Socrates refers to a science of the most permanent certain
being, which is "by far the truest of all kinds
of knowledge." The science he has in
mind "aims for clarity, precision, and the
highest degree of truth".
59c, l.13573: This science
according to Socrates has a permanent subject, which is not
opinionated temporary ideas. It is the truth, the
presupposition, which makes other sciences possible, like
Nietzsche also wrote.
60b, l.13597: Socrates
claims that the part that knowledge is of good and happiness
is greater than the part that pleasure is of good and
happiness.
60c, l.13602: "SOCRATES:
Any creature that was in permanent possession of it [good], entirely
and in every way, would never be in need of anything else, but
would live in perfect self-sufficiency."
61c, l.13634: Socrates
proclaims that pleasure has to be tempered with knowledge in
order to attain "a perfect mixture of the two" for happiness.
Knowledge, which relates
to truths is prioritized and pleasure takes 2nd
place in the order of importances, which live towards the
good.
61d, l.13648: "SOCRATES:
But there was also a difference between different sciences,
since one kind deals with a subject matter that comes to be
and perishes, the other (e) is concerned with what is free of
that, the eternal and self-same. Since we made truth our
criterion, the latter kind appeared to be the truer one."
61e-62e, l.13649-13673: It
is however necessary to mix the impure sciences of temporary
matter with the pure science of the truth, because it makes us
more self-sufficient.
63b-c, l.13691: "SOCRATES:
What has been said already: "It is neither possible nor
beneficial (c) for one tribe to remain alone, in isolation and
unmixed. We would prefer to live side by side with that best
kind of knowledge, the kind that understands not only all
other things but also each one of us, as far as that is
possible.""
Socrates made a habit of
making comparisons, sometimes in a way, which makes
"gelykenisse" of the Old Testament relevant.
64b, l.13712: "SOCRATES:
Wherever we do not mix in truth nothing could truly come to be
nor remain in existence once it had come to be. …To me at
least it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design
of what migth be called an incorporeal order that rules
harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul.
PROTARCHUS: Count me as one who
shares that opinion, Socrates."
65a-b, l.13733-13746: "SOCRATES:
Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will
have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty,
proportion [measurements],
and truth. …So now let us judge each of the three in relation
to pleasure and reason."
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PLATO. 2008. Charmides. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Cratylus. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Critias. (Salt
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PLATO
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PLATO. 2008. Euthydemus. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Euthyphro. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Gorgias. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Ion. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Laches. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Laws. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Lesser
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PLATO. 2008. Menexenus. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Meno. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Parmenides. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Phaedo. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Phaedrus. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Philebus. (Salt
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PLATO. 2008. Timaeus
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PLATO. 2013. Euthyphro. (In PLATO. 2013. The
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[1] PLATO. 2013. The
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[2] PLATO. 2013. The
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[3] From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Schleiermacher
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[4] PLATO. 2013. The
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[5] "Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes,
Vol. 1 translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by
W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press;
London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1966." From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text;jsessionid=43EBCFE8C99E943AC04C86EB99A986B6?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D21a
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[6] "Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John
Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903." From: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0169%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D21a
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[7] PLATO. 2013. The
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[8] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[9] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 598.
[10] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 607.
[11] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 599.
[12] PLATO. 2013. The
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[13] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 600-601.
[14] PLATO. 2013. The
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[15] PLATO. 2013. The
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[16] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 644-645.
[17] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 593.
[18] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 643-645.
[19] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 661-668.
[20] PLATO. 2013. The
republic and other dialogues: Plato, 742-743.
[21] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 7-8.
[22] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, xliii.
[23] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 57.
[24] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 53-56.
[25] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 58.
[27] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 62.
[28] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 63.
[29] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 63.
[30] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 63.
[31] The laws, 665e (Plato. 1970:59).
[32] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 59.
[33] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 64.
[34] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 74.
[35] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 78.
[36] STOKER,
HG. 2010. Philosophy of the creation
idea.
[37] PLATO. 2007. The
republic, 266.
[38] PLATO. 2007. The
republic, 266.
[39] PLATO. 2007. The
republic, 266.
[40] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 82.
[41] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 82-83.
[42] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 83.
[43] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 83-84.
[44] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 88.
[45] 689a (Plato. 1970:91-92)
[46] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, 91, 96.
[47]
PLATO. 1970. The laws, 91.
[49] 694b (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:99)
[50] " 'wise' man …
(Saunders' ellipsis) just
now: See 689d." (Plato.
1970. The laws [Saunders]:510)
[51] 696c (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:102)
[52] 698a (Plato. 1970. The laws [Saunders]:104)
[53] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 115.
[54] 708e-712a (Plato. 1970. The laws
[Saunders]:119-123)
[55] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 119-121.
[56] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 122.
[57] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 122-123.
[58] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 125-126.
[59] PLATO. 1970. The
laws, xliii.
[60] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 125-126.
[61] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 122-123.
[62] Protagoras, a philosopher of 2500 years ago
posited " 'man is the measure of all
things'." (Plato, 1970:512)
[63] 717a-717b (Plato, 1970:130)
[64] 737b (Plato, 1970:158-159)
[65] "Delphi
or Dodona or Ammon: The most
celebrated of these oracles was that of Apollo at Delphi, on
the southern slopes of Mount Parnassus, north of the gulf of
Corinth. Dodona was an oracle of Zeus in Epirus (north-west
Greece); Ammon was a deity whose oracle was established at
the oasis of Siwa in the Libyan desert." (Plato, 1970:513)
[66] 738b-738c (Plato, 1970:160)
[67] 769d-769e (Plato, 1970:202)
[68] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 205-206.
[69] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 203-204.
[70] 806c-806d. (Plato, 1970:202)
[71] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 258-259.
[72] 819a (Plato, 1970:266-267)
[73] 835c-836b (Plato, 1970:287-288)
[74] 838a-839d, (Plato, 1970:290-292)
[75] 897c (Plato, 1970:385)
[76] 916d-917a (Plato, 1970:414)
[77] PLATO. 1970. The
laws (Saunders), 445.
[78] "take an oath:
One, the guilty, would decline it, since
gods punish perjurers." (Plato,
1970:526)
[79] 948b-948c (Plato, 1970:457)
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[85] Cooper,
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[212] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Second Alcibiades, l.18119.
[213] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Second Alcibiades, l.18192.
[214] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[215] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48046.
[216] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48083.
[217] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48108.
[218] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[219] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48120.
[221] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48134.
[222] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[223] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[224] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[225] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48195.
[226] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48218.
[227] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48229-48241.
[228] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, l.48254.
[229] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, to l.48336.
[230] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, to l.48344-48361.
[231] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, to l.48364.
[232] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, to l.48397.
[233] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Eryxias, to l.48423.
[234] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23241.
[235] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23255-23262.
[236] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23282.
[237] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23292.
[238] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23332-23361.
[239] 449e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[240] 452b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[241] 449e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Gorgias, to l.23417.
[242] 452d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Gorgias, to l.23442.
[244] 453d-454a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS,
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[245] 454b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[246] 454d, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[247] 454e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[248] 454e-456a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS,
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[249] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23559.
[250] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23566.
[251] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23573.
[252] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23579.
[253] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23597.
[254] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23624.
[255] 461a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[256] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23670.
[257] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23688.
[258] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23708-23728.
[259] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23771.
[260] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23786.
[261] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23889.
[262] 470e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[263] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23950.
[264] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.23950-23980.
[266] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24295.
[267] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24302-24322.
[268] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24329-24336.
[269] 484b, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Gorgias, to l.24356.
[270] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24439.
[271] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24458.
[272] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24466.
[273] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24484.
[274] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24593.
[275] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24698-24796.
[276] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24890.
[277] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.24986.
[278] 506d-507a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS,
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[279] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25037.
[280] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25247.
[281] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25101.
[282] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25138.
[283] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25155.
[284] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[285] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Gorgias, to l.25269.
[286] 519a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[287] 519e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[288] 519e, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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[289] 524a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
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Parmenides, l.10964,126b:l.10978,126c:l.10989.
[293] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[294] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Parmenides, 127c:l.10996.
[295] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[296] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[297] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[298] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[299] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[300] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[301] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[302] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[303] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[304] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[305] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[306] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[307] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[308] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[310] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[311] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[312] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
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[314] Jowett, B. 2014. Introduction to Ion, a.i1b (In Plato. 2014. Ion. (Centurion:
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[315] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, l.27477.
[316] Plato. 2014. Ion, 532d. (Centurion:
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[317] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, 533d; l.27559,27794.
[318] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, l.27444.
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[320] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, l.27634.
[321] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, l.27649.
[322] Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds. 1997.
Ion, l.27664.
[323] 524a, Cooper, JM & Hutchinson, DS, eds.
1997. Theaetetus, to l.5030.
[324] PLATO.
1997. Theaetetus, 145e, l.5168.
[325] l.7198, note 24: "I.e., the principle that everything is really
motion (156a).
[326] "'Account' translates logos, which can
also mean 'statement,' 'argument', 'speech', and
'discourse'." (PLATO.
1997. Theaetetus, l.7224, note 38).
[327] "'Letters' translates stoicheia, which can alos mean
'elements' more generally (and is so translated sometimes
below). 'Syllables': in Greek sullabai, also
translated below as 'complexes.'" (PLATO.
1997. Theaetetus, l.7229, note 40).
[328] "The word translated 'sum' (pan) and the word
translated 'all' (panta) in the phrase 'all the parts' are
singular and plural forms of the same Greek word." (PLATO.
1997. Theaetetus, l.7233, note 42).
[329] Note 8, l.8972: "See Parmenides, frg. 7, ll.1-2. The same lines
reoccur, with one slight textual difference, at 258d."
[330] Menexenus, l.27810.
[331] Menexenus, l.27857; 235d.
[333] Meno, l.25528.
[334] Meno, l.25533.
[335] Meno, l.25546.
[336] Meno, l.25528.
[337] Laches, l.19749.
[338] Philebus, l.12051.
[339] Philebus, l.12056-12061.
[340] Note 7, l.13826: "See 16c."